JORDAN JAN 73 - OCT 73 IV

Folder continued from previous reel

1

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
4	memo	Saunders to Kissinger	8/30/70	B
6a	cable	Kissinger to Rifai	8/28/73	B
7	cable	WHSR to Latimer	8/14/73	B
8	memo	Quandt to Scowcroft	8/14/73	B
9	cable	Kissinger to Rifai	NID	B
10	memo	Saunders to Kissinger	7/30/73	B
11	note	Saunders to Jeanne w/ attachments	NID	B
12	memo	Saunders to Kissinger	7/3/73	B
13	memo	Saunders to Kissinger	5/25/73	B
15	cable	White House to Amman	6/2/73	B
18	memo	Saunders to Kissinger	4/5/73	B
20a	Report	Biography	N/D	B
29	note	Louise to Mrs. Davis	1/8/73	B
32	telegram	Amman to Secstate	10/30/73	B

FILE GROUP TITLE: NSC

BOX NUMBER: 618

FOLDER TITLE: (1)

RESTRICTION CODES

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F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes.
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H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
34	telegram	Amman to Secstate	10/27/73	B
36	telegram	Amman to Secstate	10/26/73	B
38	telegram	Amman to Secstate	10/26/73	B
40	telegram	Amman to Secstate	10/23/73	B
42	telegram	Amman to Secstate	10/22/73	B
43	telegram	Amman to Secstate	10/22/73	B
44	telegram	Amman to Secstate	10/22/73	B
45	telegram	Amman to Secstate	10/22/73	B
46	telegram	Amman to Secstate	10/22/73	B
49	telegram	Amman to Secstate	10/17/73	B
52	telegram	Amman to Secstate	10/15/73	B
53	telegram	Amman to Secstate	10/13/73	B
55	telegram	Amman to Secstate	10/12/73	B
56	telegram	Amman to Secstate	10/12/73	B

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61	telegram	Amman to Secstate	10/10/73	B
62	telegram	Amman to Secstate	10/10/73	B
64	telegram	Amman to Secstate	10/10/73	B
65	telegram	Amman to Secstate	10/10/73	B
66	telegram	Amman to Secstate	10/10/73	B
68	telegram	Amman to Secstate	10/9/73	B
69	telegram	Amman to Secstate	10/9/73	B
70	telegram	Amman to Secstate	10/9/73	B
71	telegram	Amman to Secstate	10/9/73	B
72	telegram	Amman to Secstate	10/9/73	B
73	telegram	Amman to Secstate	10/9/73	B
77	telegram	Amman to Secstate	10/8/73	B
78	telegram	Amman to Secstate	10/8/73	B

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82	telegram	Amman to Secstate	10/8/73	B
84	telegram	Amman to Secstate	9/29/73	B
85	telegram	Amman to Secstate	9/28/73	B
91	telegram	Amman to Secstate	9/5/73	B
96	telegram	Amman to Secstate	8/28/73	B
103	telegram	Amman to Secstate	8/14/73	B
105	telegram	Amman to Secstate	8/8/73	B
107	telegram	Amman to Secstate	8/4/73	B
109	telegram	Amman to Secstate	8/4/73	B
110	telegram	Amman to Secstate	8/5/73	B
112	telegram	Amman to Secstate	7/31/73	B
118	telegram	Amman to Secstate	7/22/73	B
123	telegram	Amman to Secstate	7/18/73	B

FILE GROUP TITLE: NSC

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127	telegram	Amman to Secstate	7/11/73	B
130	telegram	Amman to Secstate	7/11/73	B
131	telegram	Amman to Secstate	6/20/73	B
134	telegram	Amman to Secstate	6/16/73	B
137	telegram	Amman to Secstate	6/15/73	B
140	telegram	Amman to Secstate	5/30/73	B
142	telegram	Amman to Secstate	5/18/73	B
143	telegram	Amman to Secstate	5/18/73	B
144	telegram	Amman to Secstate	5/8/73	B
145	telegram	Amman to Secstate	5/4/73	B
147	telegram	Amman to Secstate	5/3/73	B
149	telegram	Amman to Secstate	4/30/73	B
150	telegram	Amman to Secstate	4/28/73	B

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DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]

DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
151	telegram	Amman to Secstate	4/26/73	B
153	telegram	Amman to Secstate	4/21/73	B
154	telegram	Amman to Secstate	4/17/73	B
160	telegram	Amman to Secstate	4/10/73	B
164	telegram	Amman to Secstate	4/9/73	B
166	telegram	Amman to Secstate	4/7/73	B
167	telegram	Amman to Secstate	4/5/73	B
173	telegram	Amman to Secstate	3/19/73	B
174	telegram	Amman to Secstate	3/19/73	B
179	telegram	Amman to Secstate	3/5/73	B
180	telegram	Amman to Secstate	2/24/73	B
181	telegram	Amman to Secstate	2/24/73	B
182	telegram	Amman to Secstate	2/18/73	B
183	telegram	Amman to Secstate	2/16/73	B

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184	telegram	Amman to Secstate	2/2/73	B
186	telegram	Amman to Secstate	2/2/73	B
192	telegram	Amman to Secstate	1/20/73	B
196	telegram	Amman to Secstate	1/9/73	B
203	telegram	Secstate to Amman	10/18/73	B
209	telegram	Secstate to Amman	10/8/73	B
232	telegram	Amman to Secstate	10/1/73	B
234	telegram	Amman to Secstate	10/27/73	B
235	telegram	Amman to Secstate	10/27/73	B
237	telegram	Amman to Secstate	10/25/73	B
239	telegram	Amman to Secstate	10/24/73	B
240	telegram	Amman to Secstate	10/21/73	B
242	telegram	Amman to Secstate	10/20/73	B
244	telegram	Amman to Secstate	10/28/73	B

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BOX NUMBER: 618

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245	telegram	Amman to Secstate	10/26/73	B
246	telegram	Amman to Secstate	10/19/73	B
247	telegram	Amman to Secstate	10/18/73	B
248	telegram	Amman to Secstate	10/17/73	B
252	telegram	Amman to Secstate	10/13/73	B
253	telegram	Amman to Secstate	10/13/73	B
254	telegram	Amman to Secstate	10/14/73	B
255	telegram	Amman to Secstate	10/13/73	B
257	telegram	Amman to Secstate	10/12/73	B
258	telegram	Amman to Secstate	10/12/73	B
259	telegram	Amman to Secstate	10/11/73	B
262	telegram	Amman to Secstate	10/11/73	B
263	telegram	Amman to Secstate	10/11/73	B
~~265~~	~~telegram~~	~~Amman to Secstate~~	10/11/73	B

FILE GROUP TITLE: NSC

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266	telegram	Amman to Secstate	10/10/73	B
267	telegram	Amman to Secstate	10/10/73	B
268	telegram	Amman to Secstate	10/3/73	B
269	telegram	Amman to Secstate	9/28/73	B
270	telegram	Amman to Secstate	9/22/73	B
271	telegram	Amman to Secstate	9/19/73	B
272	telegram	Amman to Secstate	9/19/73	B
273	telegram	Amman to Secstate	9/19/73	B
280	telegram	Amman to Secstate	8/14/73	B
281	telegram	Amman to Secstate	7/18/73	B
283	telegram	Amman to Secstate	5/31/73	B
284	telegram	Amman to Secstate	5/17/73	B
287	telegram	Amman to Secstate	3/17/73	B
293	telegram	Amman to Secstate	1/26/73	B
294	telegram	Amman to Secstate	1/22/73	B

FILE GROUP TITLE

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295	telegram	Amman to Secstate	1/16/73	B
296	telegram	Amman to Secstate	1/13/73	B
297	telegram	Amman to Secstate	1/13/73	B
298	telegram	Amman to Secstate	1/13/73	B
303	telegram	~~Amman~~ # Secstate to Amman	10/31/73	B
313	telegram	Secstate to Amman	10/17/73	B
319	telegram	Secstate to Amman	10/11/73	B
322	telegram	Secstate to Amman	10/2/73	B
323	telegram	Secstate to Amman	10/3/73	B

FILE GROUP TITLE: NSC

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION
1060 - Follow-on #1

SECRET (XGDS)

March 12, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: BRIGADIER GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS
WILLIAM B. QUANDT

SUBJECT: Military Assistance for Jordan

You will recall the attached description of how we plan to proceed in response to King Hussein's military equipment requests. Henry may even have told King Hussein that we would be sending a small military team to Jordan to review the list of military equipment presented to us during the King's visit.

The Department of Defense has now decided not to send a survey team in April as was once envisaged, preferring instead to discuss the Jordanian military equipment list during the Annual Review meeting in May. Without further guidance from you, Defense is likely to invite the Jordanians here, rather than sending a team there as Henry has probably promised the King. In addition, Defense prefers not to discuss a follow-on program in very specific terms, whereas we want them to get specific.

In order to insure that this is handled properly, it would be very helpful for you to call Admiral Murphy to convey the following points:

--You are finally getting around to tying up loose ends from the Hussein visit.

--We prefer that a US team be sent to Jordan rather than inviting the Jordanians here for the first discussion. They have just been here and presented their list. Now we ought to review their needs in the field. They have said they prefer this.

--In addition to discussing the details of the FY 1974 program, the team should be prepared to address in a general way a follow-on modernization program. This is what the King expects.

XGDS - 3
DECLAS - Date Impossible to Determine.
BYAUTH - Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

SECRET (XGDS)

--In order to provide guidance for the team, we would like an options paper prepared which discusses ways of handling the Jordanian requests. This should take the form of a memo to Dr. Kissinger.

RECOMMENDATION: That you call Admiral Murphy to convey the points mentioned above.

Don

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INFORMATION 1060

SECRET (GDS) March 1, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS
RICHARD T. KENNEDY

SUBJECT: Follow-on Military Assistance for Jordan

In preparation for King Hussein's visit, we asked the Defense Department in November to prepare an options paper on military assistance for Jordan beyond the completion of the present three-year modernization program in FY 1974. They responded by developing three illustrative options, ranging from a limited follow-on program of $10 million, through a modest modernization program totalling $40 million, to a major modernization program of $120 million. The major new items that would make up the larger packages include aircraft (22 F-5Es worth $35 million), tanks (88 M60A1s worth $27 million) and some miscellaneous items (trucks, APCs, artillery for a total of over $50 million).

This planning was behind the point in the President's talking paper recommending that he tell Hussein we were prepared to discuss a follow-on to the present modernization program.

We have now been given a shopping list for new equipment by the Jordanians of nearly $140 million. At DOD request the Jordanians have indicated the items to which they attach highest priority. They have not requested tanks and have ~~induced~~ included some items such as 175mm artillery that we are reluctant to provide, but otherwise their list is not radically different from the DOD high option.

The next step after checking our own availabilities, delivery possibilities and prices is for Defense to send a review team to Jordan. The Jordanian requirements and alternatives, if any, would be discussed with commanders on the ground. This was the procedure we followed in drawing up the

FY 72-74 modernization program. After this survey is completed it will be possible fairly quickly to present the President with choices for a follow-on military modernization program for Jordan. By summer, then, Jordan can expect a response to their new requests which would represent a follow-on 3 year program for FY 1975-77.

In short, this seems a reasonable way to move ahead in plenty of time to plan both budget and deliveries. We will follow this closely to see that the schedule is adhered to and that the options for decision are kept open for the President.

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROF

DOC MO DA	RECD MO DA HR	LOG NBR	INITIAL ACTION O
03 01	03 01 16	1060	

SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES ____ KISSINGER X ____ SCOWCROFT ____

FROM: ~~ROGERS~~ SAUNDERS / KENNEDY ____ RICHARDSON ____ SCHLESINGER ____ ELIOT ____

UNCLAS ____ LOU ____ C ____ (S) X ____ TS ____

LOG IN/OUT ONLY ____ NO FORN ____ EYES ONLY ____ CODEWORD ____ SENSITIVE ____ NODIS ____ EXDIS ____

SUBJECT: Follow-on Military Assistance for Jordan

REFERENCE: S/S ____ OTHER ____ NOT XEROXED ____

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION	ACTION	INFO	REC CY FOR
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT	■		
STAFF SECRETARY			
FAR EAST			
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA			
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA			(X)
EUROPE / CANADA			
LATIN AMERICA			
UNITED NATIONS			
ECONOMIC			
SCIENTIFIC			
NET ASSESSMENT GROUP			
PROGRAM ANALYSIS			
NSC PLANNING			(X)
CONGRESSIONAL			
OCEANS POLICY			

ACTION REQUIRED

MEMO FOR HAK ..... ( )
MEMO FOR PRES. ..... ( )
REPLY FOR ____ ( )
APPROPRIATE ACTION ..... ( )
MEMO ____ TO ____ ..... ( )
RECOMMENDATIONS ..... ( )
JOINT MEMO ..... ( )
REFER TO ____ FOR: ____ ( )
ANY ACTION NECESSARY? ..... ( )
CONCURRENCE ..... ( )
DUE DATE:

COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)

BM PASS

IF NO ACTION, RETURN W/PROFILE FOR FILES. IF CONVENIENCE CY NEEDED, PLEASE INDICATE: ☐

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
3/01	SAUND KENN	HAK	C/X	Info	
4/23				Scheduled by phone w/ Murphy per BS	

NSC/S DISP INSTR

DISPATCH ____ NOTIFY ____ & DATE ____
SPECIAL DISPOSITION) ____
OR RECORD COMMENT:) ____
CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: ____

CROSS REF W/ ____ JOINED BY LOG # ____

SEE # ____ FOR FINAL ACTION & FILING.

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: ✓

MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS:

M/F'D ✓ BY ____

CYS FOR) SA ____
) HP ____
ORIG) MR ✓
TO) PA ____
) SF ____
) NS ____
) EP ____
DESTROY) DY ____

APR 30 1973

★ GPO: 1973-489-668

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

954 Add-on

CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)

March 3, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Economic Assistance to Jordan

In response to your memorandum of February 26, 1973, "Review of U.S. Assistance to Jordan", the President has directed that the Government of Jordan be informed that the level of budget support provided from Supporting Assistance funds in CY 1973 should be $55 million, pending renewed Jordanian efforts to increase the level of assistance from other donors. The President has further directed that the U.S. be prepared to provide an additional $10 million in the second half of 1973 if the response of other donors is inadequate.

The President has further directed that an effort be made within the approved total of Supporting Assistance and other assistance being provided to Jordan to help the Government of Jordan meet its shortage of funds before July 1, 1973.

Henry A. Kissinger

cc: Director, Office of Management and Budget

CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION
954 Add-on

CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)

February 28, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS

SUBJECT: Aid for Jordan

Following your instructions to me on aid for Jordan, I have communicated the President's decision to both Sisco and AID. In order to prevent possible misunderstandings on how this is to be handled, I have drafted the attached memorandum from you to the Secretary of State.

RECOMMENDATION: That you sign the attached memorandum.

Concurrence: R. T. Kennedy

CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION 954

CONFIDENTIAL (GDS) February 26, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS
WILLIAM B. QUANDT

SUBJECT: Aid for Jordan

State has prepared a memorandum for the President seeking his decision on aid for Jordan. [Attached to memo from you to the President.]

State and AID have not been able to reach a common position. They differ over $10 million in grant Supporting Assistance, with AID recommending a total package of $105 million (including $55 million in Supporting Assistance in FY 1974, $10 million in Development Loans, and a Military Assistance Program of $40 million in FY 1974) and State pressing for a $115 million package (with $65 million in Supporting Assistance as the only difference).

AID makes the point that Supporting Assistance money for South Vietnam will be very tight if we provide an extra $10 million for Jordan. State emphasizes that the King will be disappointed with the lower level. As you know, both figures are considerably above what we gave Jordan last year. The issues involved in selecting between these two levels are briefly described in the attached memo from you to the President.

Under Secretary Rush suggests that the President call the King today to inform him of the decision on aid. If the decision is for the lower option, you may want to talk with Zayd Rifai to place the decision in the proper context.

RECOMMENDATION: That you seek the President's decision before the end of the day on aid for Jordan. The attached memorandum for the President recommends the lower option for now.

CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)

WBQuandt:HHSaunders:imp:2/26/73

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION 954

CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT: Aid for Jordan

King Hussein will be leaving the United States tomorrow, February 27, and State would like to give him a final decision on next year's aid package before his departure. Under Secretary Rush has sent you the attached memorandum discussing the issues, but without presenting an agreed State-AID position. AID favors a total package of $105 million, including a maximum of $55 million in grant Supporting Assistance, while State prefers a package of $115 million, with $65 million in Supporting Assistance.

The case for the higher level is easy to make. King Hussein will leave the United States with a feeling of accomplishment from his visit. Jordan will be spared some difficult belt tightening later this year. Finally the King will not have to make any concessions to his oil-rich neighbors in order to cover his budget needs. As AID points out, however, added help for Jordan will stretch thin our Supporting Assistance for South Vietnam.

The argument for holding at the lower level of $105 million is primarily to get King Hussein's neighbors to help him. We could tell the King quite candidly that in view of our own budget problems we can only provide $55 million in direct budget support now (plus $10 million in Development Loans and $40 million in Military Assistance, for a total of $105 million). We strongly feel that Saudi Arabia and Kuwait should provide Jordan with more aid and we will try to convince them to increase their support to Jordan just as we have increased ours. If this effort does not succeed, we can still provide Jordan with an added $10 million later in the year.

RECOMMENDATION: That you indicate your preference for telling the Jordanians that we will provide a total package of $105 million, including $55 million in direct budget support in FY 1974.

_____ Approve $105 million level, with option of adding $10 million at later date.

_____ Prefer full $115 million now.

CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)

WBQuandt:HHSaunders:imp:2/26/73

S/S 7303408

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

SECRET

February 26, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Review of U. S. Assistance to Jordan

Following your meeting with King Hussein on February 6 and my working luncheon with him that same day, more detailed talks were held with senior members of the King's party on U. S. assistance to Jordan on February 8 and 9. We took as a point of departure Option I of the Security Assistance Options paper sent you under my memorandum of January 30 (the lower $100 million package) but avoided, as requested by the White House, closing the door to the higher option of $115 million.

Our desire to assist Jordan to the limit of our abilities was made clear in these discussions; at the same time we took the opportunity to stress the serious budgetary limitations we face and the need for measures of economy in Jordan. On the military side, the Jordanians appeared generally satisfied with our assurances that the military modernization program can be completed in FY 1974. They were gratified to learn that we are prepared, in principle, to begin funding in FY 1975 of some additional military equipment. However, in the talks on financial and development assistance, Finance Minister Saad and Central Bank Governor Salem expressed deep concern over the effect on Jordan's budget and foreign exchange position if, as planned, we limited our direct budget support to Jordan for Calendar Year 1973 to $50 million. Jordanian budget planners have forecast a deficit for Calendar Year 1973 of approximately $34 million, which they feel is the maximum allowable level. In order to keep the deficit at about this amount, the Jordanians calculate that they must receive

GDS-DECLASS. DEC. 31, 1981

at least $70 million in budget support from the United States for 1973. Jordanian officials also pointed out that because Jordan is scheduled to receive only $10 million in direct budget support between now and the time the United States Government receives spending authority for its FY 1974 Foreign Assistance budget, they foresee a serious shortage of cash this spring; revenues during this period will amount to only about $12 million monthly, whereas expenditures are expected to exceed $21 million monthly.

On our side, it was pointed out that the burden on the Jordanian budget would be eased by our offer to allow approximately $10 million from the $40 million MAP appropriation we plan to request for Jordan in FY 1974 to be used to cover operations, maintenance and support costs for the Jordanian Army, and by our readiness to consider PL 480 Title I assistance. It appears, however, that Jordanian Army leaders are reluctant to make use of FY 1974 MAP funds to cover operations, maintenance and support costs, since this will slow equipment deliveries under the military modernization program. They are prepared to consider such funding in FY 1975.

We were particularly pleased by two steps the Jordanians have taken. One is the emphasis placed on development planning in the current Jordanian budget. For the first time since 1967, Jordan is now devoting sizeable sums to development, creating a hope, over the long term, for a reduction in the country's dependence on foreign assistance. The second is the extent of the role Jordan is now playing in maintaining security and stability in the newly independent Persian Gulf states as a follow-up to your talk on this matter with the King last year. During the visit, Court Minister Khammash filled us in more amply on Jordan's very useful effort in this area: Jordan currently has 250 military and security advisors in Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Qatar and Bahrain; additionally there are 90 Jordanian military and civilian experts in Oman, and 144 Omanis in training in Jordan. Though we would not want to encourage direct Jordanian military intervention in the Gulf, we do want to support the very beneficial training and advisory role the Jordanians are now

playing since it is fast becoming a significant element in Gulf stability.

As you instructed, we made a major effort to settle the matter of assistance with the Jordanians on the basis of a $100 million package ($50 million for supporting assistance; $40 million for MAP and $10 million for development loans). We did so without closing the door to going up to a package of $115 million if this should prove necessary.

The problem that faces us in relationship to King Hussein is that if we stick to the $100 million or even go up to $105 million, he will leave feeling that the results of his trip were a disappointment and that he had not achieved all of the support that he feels he needs in the current situation. On the other hand, if we could move from a $100 million package to a $115 million package through an increase from $50 million to $65 million in supporting assistance, this would meet his most pressing financial and budgetary difficulties, and he would leave feeling that American support remained both firm and resolute. I believe the King would be satisfied that we have done our utmost to help him and would be confirmed in his feeling that he can count on full U. S. backing for his policies of moderation and stability at home and the important contribution he is making to stability and security in the Persian Gulf.

We and AID have struggled with this matter long and hard because of the general problem of the strain on our resources. We could go to $115 million by increasing supporting assistance from $50 million to $55 million, and coupling it with an additional $10 million with PL 480 assistance which the Jordanians need because of drought this winter and a possible additional development project. AID believes this can be accomplished without undue strain on our resources. In our judgment, this is an improvement but does not meet the King's immediate and most pressing budgetary problem. We recognize the problem of the strain on the resources and in particular that if we moved from $50 million to $65 million in supporting assistance, AID believes this would put a severe strain on the Vietnam program.

You may wish to telephone King Hussein in Florida to inform him of your decision. He is scheduled to depart on Tuesday, the morning of February 27, and your call therefore should be made, if possible, some time on Monday.

Acting Secretary

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION 954

CONFIDENTIAL (GDS) February 26, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS
WILLIAM B. QUANDT

SUBJECT: Aid for Jordan

State has prepared a memorandum for the President seeking his decision on aid for Jordan. [Attached to memo from you to the President.]

State and AID have not been able to reach a common position. They differ over $10 million in grant Supporting Assistance, with AID recommending a total package of $105 million (including $55 million in Supporting Assistance in FY 1974, $10 million in Development Loans, and a Military Assistance Program of $40 million in FY 1974) and State pressing for a $115 million package (with $65 million in Supporting Assistance as the only difference).

AID makes the point that Supporting Assistance money for South Vietnam will be very tight if we provide an extra $10 million for Jordan. State emphasizes that the King will be disappointed with the lower level. As you know, both figures are considerably above what we gave Jordan last year. The issues involved in selecting between these two levels are briefly described in the attached memo from you to the President.

Under Secretary Rush suggests that the President call the King today to inform him of the decision on aid. If the decision is for the lower option, you may want to talk with Zayd Rifai to place the decision in the proper context.

RECOMMENDATION: That you seek the President's decision before the end of the day on aid for Jordan. The attached memorandum for the President recommends the lower option for now.

CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)

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SUBJECT: Rusk Summary of latest Developments on Jordanian Assistance & recommend Pres call Hussein in Florida

REFERENCE: S/S _____ OTHER _____ NOT XEROXED _____

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DUE DATE: ASAP

COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)

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SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS

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NOTE: Earlier memo attached 2/26/73 "OBE".

DISP INSTR/S

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★ GPO: 1973—489-668

INFORMATION
952

CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)

February 27, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS

SUBJECT: Aid to Jordan in FY 1973

Within the context of the memo sent to you yesterday on aid for Jordan, the following is an answer to the question of how we might help meet what Jordan regards as its budgetary shortfall before June 30.

It is true that our greatest flexibility is after June 30, but once the total level of US economic assistance is set, the following are possible trade-offs and adjustments that could be made if Jordan were flexible in its handling of the money at its end:

1. It is possible for us to borrow against ourselves for perhaps $10 million in Supporting Assistance funds before June 30. This would involve taking that amount from some other program before June 30 (probably from Vietnam and Cambodia) and then repaying that program from Jordanian funds after June 30. This would not affect the total going to Jordan, but would readjust the flow of cash. AID is strongly opposed to doing this, but would prefer this to an absolute increase in Supporting Assistance for Jordan.

2. Defense and State have agreed that up to $10 million in grant military assistance from the FY 1974 budget could be applied to operating and maintenance expenses. The Jordanians have rejected this because it would mean adjusting the deliveries of some items of equipment, but it is one way we might be helpful after June 30. Before then Jordan might take $1-2 million from FY 1973 MAP funds for current operating expenses.

3. A maximum of about $5 million in PL 480 could be provided after June 30 and perhaps a more modest (under $2 million) amount before then.

All of these alternatives should be considered as tentative, but they do illustrate the kind of things that might be done if there were a desire to help spread our money more evenly over the calendar year. At most we might be able to advance as much as $15 million before June 30. If necessary, however, Jordan can probably afford to draw down its large reserves to cover budget problems before June 30, provided that our help after then is assured.

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SUBJECT: On Meeting Jordanian budgetary shortfall before June 30: Aid to Jordan in FY 1973

REFERENCE: S/S _____ OTHER _____ NOT XEROXED _____

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MEMO FOR PRES. ..... ( )
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★ GPO: 1973-489-668

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION
981

CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)

February 23, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS

SUBJECT: Economic Assistance for Jordan

You will recall when King Hussein saw the President on February 6 there was a question about overall economic assistance levels. The details are in the attached memorandum. However, the basic components are $40 million in grant military assistance, $10 million in development assistance and $50 million in budget support. The issue was whether to raise that $50 million in budget support to $65 million. We asked State for a recommendation to the President following their talks with the Jordanians on the details of both the military and the economic assistance programs.

You should be aware that at this hour State and AID are trying to reach a final figure so that Secretary Rogers can phone King Hussein before the Secretary leaves tomorrow. State is pressing AID for the $65 million level in budget support.

The Secretary may already have a go-ahead from you or from the President, but since I am not sure of that I want you to be aware of two issues:

1. There is still an argument for holding the final $10 million in budget support for the time being in an effort to get more money out of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. This would not have to be a negative act. One could tell the King that $55 million is as high as we can go at the moment, that we feel very strongly about pressing for greater Saudi and Kuwaiti contributions and will work with the Jordanians on this and that we will be prepared to talk with them further after they see how those efforts go. We could then hold the extra $10 million in reserve. The alternative is simply to send the King away happy by providing the full amount now.

CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)

2. If we are going ahead, then there is a question about who should make the phone call to the King and get the primary credit for the decision.

My own disposition has been not to short-change Jordan but to try to get the maximum out of the Saudis and Kuwaitis. With their rising oil revenues, it seems a shame that the President has to strain his budget this year before a maximum effort is made to get the oil-rich Arabs to come through. However, my main purpose in writing this memo is to make sure that you are aware of this apparently imminent step.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

203

SECRET (GDS)

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT: Economic and Military Assistance for Jordan--Preparation for King Hussein's Visit February 6

One of the main subjects King Hussein will press during his visit with you on February 6 is this year's level of economic and military assistance for Jordan. The possible responses prepared for you are both at levels higher than last year's aid. However, since his request will be higher than either available option, it would be helpful to have your thoughts on how to respond to his requests as soon as possible so that AID, Defense and State can take a line consistent with your position.

Whatever is provided to Jordan this year will be higher than 1972 aid, which totaled $85 million. However, King Hussein will be asking for at least $130 million this year; including development aid, because his military costs have risen; because he ran a large deficit on last year's budget and expects to do the same this year; and because he is hoping to launch a new development program. The King is particularly concerned with financing his recurring budget deficit and acquiring more military equipment.

Here is how Hussein's request compares with our 1972 aid and choices for 1973 aid:

	1972	1973 Option 1	1973 Option 2	Hussein's Request
Budget Aid	50	50	65	80
Grant Military Aid	35	40	40	40+
Development Aid	-	10	10	10+
	85	100	115	130+

SECRET (GDS)

The difficult part of his request involves budget support. He already knows he will be receiving $50 million in 1973--$10 million in February from our FY 1973 funds and another $40 million after July 1 from our FY 1974 funds. The King, however, will stress his need for an additional $30 million before July. This would bring our total contribution to Jordan's budget in CY-1973 to $80 million (in addition to some $35-40 million in grant military aid for equipment and operating costs).

There are three points to be considered before deciding how to respond:

--We have an interest in seeing the Saudis and Kuwaitis contribute more to Jordan. When Hussein visited Faisal in December, Faisal simply gave him early payment on the subsidy installments due between January and June but refused to discuss more until after Hussein had been in Washington. With Saudi and Kuwaiti oil revenues rising rapidly, there is a strong argument for leaving some pressure on these other donors.

--We will be extremely hard pressed to find an additional $30 million from our FY 1973 budget. It would have to be taken from assistance to South Vietnam and Cambodia, which can ill afford to be cut. We have developed some flexibility for you from FY 1974 money, but before July 1 aid funds are already stretched tight.

--In both our own and Jordan's interest, it is important to leave pressure on Jordan to practice greater fiscal discipline. While we want to contribute heavily to a viable Jordan, there should be a limit on the degree to which we encourage the Jordanians to increase their dependence on us. The budget support Hussein will request would amount to about 30% of Jordan's total budget. Jordan's domestic revenues now cover only about 40% of that budget.

Thus you have a choice between two general postures. To make them concrete, they can be reduced to two statements you might make to Hussein:

Option 1: Last year our assistance ran at a level of about $85 million. In CY 1973 we are prepared to raise that level to $100 million [about one-third of Jordan's budget] and we are now ready to discuss Jordan's military modernization program beyond the present three-year program. We are

pleased that this level includes assistance for development projects for the first time in recent years. We will continue to view favorably requests for development aid. Because it is imperative to bring the US budget under control and to stem the spiral in the Jordanian budget, we must hold to that $100 million level. We also feel very strongly that Jordan's friends in the Middle East--Saudi Arabia and Kuwait--must do more. [Within this package, the Jordanians could choose to defer some equipment deliveries and apply as much as $10 million in grant military aid to operating costs, thus helping by that much to meet the budget deficit. The fact that we are now ready to discuss the military aid program beyond FY 1974 will provide the flexibility necessary to permit this kind of trade-off. Also, a small amount of the development loan could be disbursed before June to help with the deficit.]

Option 2: We are prepared to provide assistance at a level of about $115 million in CY 1973 [almost 40% of Jordan's budget]. We might make some small adjustments before June if they would be helpful, but the main increase in our aid will have to come after the beginning of our new fiscal year in July. We feel very strongly that Hussein's Arab friends--Saudi Arabia and Kuwait--must shoulder a larger share of this assistance obligation and hope he can meet his remaining needs before June from those sources without drawing down their future aid. [The King might still feel something of a pinch until July, but he should be quite pleased with the overall level.]

My own inclination is to stay with Option 1--the $100 million level--at this stage. If we went to the higher level now, the Kuwaitis and Saudis would not be so heavily pressed to do as much as they could, and the Jordanians would make this the starting point for higher requests in subsequent years. At a time when we are trying to bring our own budget under control, there is an argument for pressing the Jordanians to do the same. We have, nonetheless, insured that the extra $15 million will be available from FY 1974 funds, so if the Jordanians are in trouble later in the year we could help then. Even at the lower of the two levels now, you are in a position (1) to raise the aid level and (2) open the door to grant military aid beyond FY 1974.

RECOMMENDATION: That you indicate your preference for Option 1 and talk to King Hussein along these lines.

Option 1: A posture that represents a modest increase over last year's aid, but will encourage the King to seek more help from the Kuwaitis and

Saudis. (This translates into the package of $100 million.)

Approve _____

Prefer Option 2 below _____

Option 2: A posture which comes closer to meeting King Hussein's requests and pays less attention to pressing for contributions from other donors and Jordan's own fiscal restraint. (This implies a package of at least $115 million.)

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SUBJECT: Economic Assistance for Jordan · Need for Final Figures

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★ GPO: 1973-489-666

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)

MEMORANDUM FOR: HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Aid for Jordan

Attached at Tab A is a memo from Hal Saunder's staff forwarding the State paper on aid for Jordan. State prefers a package of $115 million with $65 million in Supporting Assistance, while AID favors holding Supporting Assistance to $55 million. The memo which was prepared for the President recommends he approve the lower figure (Tab A). I have attached a revised memo (Tab B) which opts for granting the full $115 million now.

You should know that Sisco has somehow learned that King Hussein will be in town tomorrow and has asked Saunder's staff if Hussein is planning to see you. Sisco is also pressing for a decision on aid so State can convey it to the Jordanians. If pressed, we could tell Sisco we understand the King wants to see Schlesinger and McNamara quietly.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve for the President the $115 million total aid package for Jordan. (Tab B))

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL (GDS) ACTION 954

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT: Aid for Jordan

King Hussein will be leaving the United States on February 27, and it would be desirable to give him a final decision on next year's aid package before his departure. Under Secretary Rush has sent you the attached memorandum discussing the issues, but without presenting an agreed State-AID position. AID favors a total package of $105 million, including a maximum of $55 million in grant Supporting Assistance, while State prefers a package of $115 million, with $65 million in Supporting Assistance.

The arguments in favor of the higher level are that for a relatively small increase: King Hussein will leave the United States with a feeling of accomplishment from his visit, Jordan will be spared some difficult belt tightening later this year, and finally the King will not have to make any concessions to his oil-rich neighbors in order to cover his budget needs. As AID points out, however, added help for Jordan will stretch thin our Supporting Assistance for South Vietnam.

The argument for holding at the lower level of $105 million is primarily to get King Hussein's neighbors to help him. We could tell the King quite candidly that in view of our own budget problems we can only provide $55 million in direct budget support now (plus $10 million in Development Loans and $40 million in Military Assistance, for a total of $105 million). We feel that Saudi Arabia and Kuwait should provide Jordan with more aid and we will try to convince them to increase their support to Jordan just as we have increased ours. If this effort does not succeed, we could still provide Jordan with an added $10 million later in the year.

RECOMMENDATION: That you approve providing a total package of $115 million, including $65 million in direct budget support in FY 1974.

_____approve full $115 million now.
_____prefer $105 million level, with option of adding $10 million at later date.

SECRET

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Memo For Gen Scowcroft 13 Feb

Brent:

this may be helpful

Sam M

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENTS THIS DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

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OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

I-20835/73

12 February 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: U.S.-Jordanian Bilateral Talks (U)

(S) On 8 February 1973 U.S.-Jordanian bilateral talks commenced with a short introductory meeting chaired by Mr. Sisco, who outlined the general scope of U.S. economic and military aid to Jordan. Mr. Sisco reiterated our intention to request $40 million in grant military aid for Jordan in FY 1974; from this figure he offered to divert $10 million to cover operating and maintenance (O&M) costs in an effort to relieve Jordan's budgetary problem. He also noted the intention of his government, subject to availability of funds, to continue some MAP support to Jordan after completion of the current modernization plan in FY 1974.

(S) The talks reconvened on the morning of 9 February at the Defense Department. Mr. Noyes and General Brett, in their capacities as Chairman and Alternate Chairman of the DoD Middle East Task Group (METG), led the U.S. side while the Jordanian delegation was headed by Ambassador Zaid al-Rifai and Major General Sharif Zaid ben Shakir. Before the plenary session was convened, senior members of the Jordanian delegation briefed Mr. Noyes and General Brett privately on their appraisal of current Syrian military capabilities.

(C) The talks were held in a friendly atmosphere. The Jordanians understood the real limitations on our present and future funding capabilities and made no unreasonable demands. Early in the conference they advised us that they would decline Mr. Sisco's offer to divert $10 million in FY 1974 MAP to O&M; State representatives assured the Jordanians that the option remained open should they reconsider. Acceptance of the offer would have caused a significant delay in the delivery of priority weapons within the three-year modernization program.

(S) The conference began with a resume by U.S. service representatives of deliveries under the FY 1971 and 1972 military assistance program. The conferees then agreed on the composition of the $38.4 million program for FY 1973. There followed an extended discussion on completion of the three-year modernization plan. The Jordanians wanted to complete this

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Sec Def Cont Nr. X-0565

funding as first priority but also hoped to accommodate some additional items within 1974 MAP. After comparison of pricing figures, the two sides agreed in principle on the contents of a $40 million FY 1974 package which would cover the remainder of the three-year plan except for $4.4 million in F-5 concurrent spare parts (CSP) and aerospace ground equipment (AGE) which will be deferred to FY 1975. (There is a possibility of a reduction in unit price of the F-5E from $1.6 to $1.4 million which would make this deferral unnecessary.) The proposed package also includes as additions two high priority Jordanian requirements: 1,000 M60 machine guns and 36 TOW anti-tank missile launchers with 360 HEAT and 100 practice missiles.

(S) Two points remain to be resolved. Deferral of the $4.4 million in F-5 support is contingent upon feasibility talks to be held by technical representatives of the two air forces. Release of the TOW system is subject to approval by the Departments of State and Defense. ISA is currently staffing a memorandum on this subject.

(C) The Jordanians asked if the USG has plans concerning the C-119K aircraft which crashed en route to Jordan. General Brett replied that we had not addressed the problem having been somewhat stunned by the loss of the crew. General ben Shakir responded that the Jordanians did not wish to press for a replacement aircraft but would appreciate some additional spare parts for the three C-119s on hand if possible. General Brett expressed appreciation for their understanding and indicated that we would give sympathetic consideration to their request for spare parts.

(S) Jordanian representatives briefed U.S. counterparts on their recent reorganization and provided a list of hardware requirements to complete equipping their new five divisional structure. The follow-on list contains an estimated $138.5 million worth of equipment to be funded, presumably, over a three-year period. They promised to provide a statement of priorities in the near future. The U.S. side took note of Jordan's requirements and suggested that the annual bilateral review of the current arms plan which we intend to schedule in May would be an appropriate occasion to address in more detail any future military assistance.

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC MO	DOC DA	RECD MO	RECD DA	RECD HR	~~LOG NBR~~	INITIAL ACTION OFF
2	12	2	14	12	136	Saunders

LOG IN/OUT ONLY _____

DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES _____ KISSINGER _____ HAIG _____

FROM: ELIOT _____ ROGERS, W _____ LAIRD, M _____

U _____ LOU _____ C _____ S S TS _____

~~NO FORN~~ _____ BUO _____ EYES ONLY _____ CODE WORD _____ SENSITIVE _____

NODIS _____ EXDIS _____ LIMDIS _____ RES DATA _____

SUBJECT: DOD Memcon of US-Jordanian Bilateral Talks re US Military Aid to Jordan for FY 1974

REFERENCE: S/S _____ OTHER 0565 NOT XEROXED _____

APP'TS: PRES _____ HAK _____ TALKER _____ MEMCON _____ DATE REQ. _____

SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION

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LATIN AMERICA			
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PROGRAM ANALYSIS			
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CONGRESSIONAL			

ACTION REQUIRED

MEMO FOR HAK ( )
MEMO FOR PRES. ( )
REPLY FOR _____ SIGNATURE ( )
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MEMO _____ TO _____ ( )
RECOMMENDATIONS ( )
JOINT MEMO ( )
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DUE DATE:

COMMENTS: *(Including Special Instructions)*

INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING

DATE	FROM	TO	S	ACTION REQUIRED	CY TO
5/29	Saunders	NSC/S		Close this file. This subject being handled in connection with report of military survey team just returned from Jordan. No action.	
				Close out! Rosemary HRS	
5/29			C	Close per Saunders	

DISPOSITION

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SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS: _____

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MAY 31 1973

☆ GPO: 1972-455-927

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Feb. 20

Secretariat:

Original tubed to Mr. Saunders
for update per General
Scowcroft.

Louise

403

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION

SECRET (XGDS) January 26, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS Hal

SUBJECT: Next Steps on the Arab-Israeli Problem

In the next six weeks, the President will be seeing both King Hussein (February 6) and Prime Minister Meir (March 1). You already have available in your office a book from me on our broad options and a memo on the desirability of reaching an understanding with State on how the next decisions on the Mid-East are to be made. The purpose of this memo is, in a more limited way, to outline for you the issues you and the President will face in connection with these visits and in setting our next steps on the Arab-Israeli problem.

It may sharpen the general issues for you right at the outset to know that there are two general viewpoints on how we should proceed. My purpose here is not to push one or the other but to assure that decisions can be made with full consideration of the alternatives. There are differences on the substance, style and timing of any new steps:

1. Substance of a general approach.

--The State Department approach continues to favor (1) concentrating on an Egypt-Israel settlement, leaving a Jordan-Israel settlement till later and (2) trying to start Egypt-Israel negotiations on an interim agreement, establishing a commitment to negotiate later on an overall settlement but not addressing any of the fundamental issues like boundaries now.

--The alternative would be (1) to deal with a Jordan-Israel agreement simultaneously with Egypt-Israel negotiations, recognizing that the US role would be quite different and (2) to address the issue of territory, at least in terms of general principles, at the outset in private talks with the Israelis, and eventually with the Egyptians. The latter point could be handled on a separate track from proximity talks, supplementing them. There are elements of both approaches that are not necessarily mutually exclusive.

/ XGDS - 3
DECLAS - Date Impossible to Determine.
BYAUTH - Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

2. Style.

--The State approach has normally been to begin consultations with the Israelis and Egyptians on the basis of a formal demarche and a fully developed formula from which the two sides would begin negotiations. Although that formula may be presented with expression of readiness to consult fully, this approach can have the appearance of trying to force something of our making on Israel.

--The alternative is to make a more general but still substantive approach, speaking at first in terms of fundamental points but not having a fully worked out formula which we are pressing on all major issues. The initial approach would be less formal and dramatic. The purpose would be to preserve an atmosphere of collaboration, to minimize the appearance of pressure, to encourage the Israelis to develop a formula, and yet to make clear the points we feel must be addressed.

3. Timing.

--The State approach would be to launch a new initiative as soon as possible, and before Prime Minister Meir's visit, recognizing that extensive consultations would follow the initial approach and might not be completed until well after the visit.

--The alternative would be to use Mrs. Meir's visit to try to reach a general understanding that we propose to move ahead together and that we feel certain general issues need to be addressed. There could also be some understanding on timing and on what is possible during an Israeli election year. Consultations could follow and be paced in accordance with that understanding.

The purpose of this memo is, having described these broad issues, to review for you the specific political issues that relate to each of the coming visits. Issues of economic and military assistance are handled in other memos; those issues are basically in hand, and the President will be in a position to be responsive within the framework of budget decisions that have been made.

Talks with King Hussein: Jordan-Israel

The main issue for us in talking with King Hussein is whether we feel we should try to encourage movement on the Jordanian as well as on the Egyptian side in parallel fashion. The State Department recommendation will be to tell Hussein that "we think our efforts can best be directed in the

first instance at least toward an attempt at getting an interim agreement between Egypt and Israel." We will, of course, want to know how he would feel about pursuing an agreement now, but his judgment will depend in part on how actively the US intends to involve itself.

The basic choice that King Hussein will have to make and will probably want to discuss is a choice among three basic strategies:

1. He could seek a negotiated settlement, knowing that he will get less than he wants. He will tell the President that the Israelis "seem as intransigent as ever on the basic issue of withdrawal" and that they "insist on annexing the western valley of the Jordan River as well as Jerusalem." For him, Jerusalem is the key, and other issues would be settled quickly if it were resolved. A negotiated agreement could be final; it could provide for staged implementation; or it could be "interim."

2. If a negotiated settlement is not possible now on terms he could live with, he could try for a tacit agreement among Jordan, Israel and the United States on a long-term strategy to return the West Bank to Arab control eventually, while in the meantime providing the Palestinians residing there a measure of autonomy under Israeli occupation and promising self-determination at some point.

3. He could simply let matters drift as they are. Some of his advisers argue that this is the safest course. Without high political cost, Jordan could stand back for a time and leave it to the Israelis to cope with gradually increasing interest on the West Bank for greater autonomy and economic progress. At some time in the future, the Israelis may have to loosen their hold on the West Bank and at that point Jordan could work out a new association.

We cannot be sure at this point which of these alternatives the King would prefer. A major purpose during his visit will be to learn what considerations will govern his choice of strategy. In particular, we will want his judgment on:

--Whether Jordan can enter an agreement with Israel ahead of Egypt. If not, then we will not want to press Jordan at this time. On balance, however, we think the King will express a willingness to go first if the terms are good enough.

--What it will take to bring Jordan and Israel close enough in their private talks to move toward agreement now. We know that the main problems are Jerusalem, the Jordan Valley and Gaza, but if we were to get into this further we would need a much more precise view on where he could make concessions.

--Whether, if there cannot be final agreement, Jordan sees any advantage in entering an interim agreement with Israel along the lines of the Allon plan, perhaps with some modifications on borders and provisions for Jordanian custody of the Holy Places in Jerusalem. The purpose of this approach would be to return the West Bank population to Hussein so that he could get on with organizing an autonomous West Bank for the Palestinians.

The main issue for us if the King wants help in making a hard try for a negotiated settlement is whether we will actively urge the Israelis toward a changed position on the West Bank and Jerusalem. Hussein may be more willing than some of his advisers to accept territorial changes on the West Bank during a transitional period provided that a part of Arab Jerusalem, including the Muslim Holy Places, were returned to his control. But only with a great deal of strain and imagination can an arrangement be worked out that both sides will feel they can live with.

The second issue we may face will arise if we and the King judge that it will not be possible to move Israel on the key issues. If this occurs, we might want to explore a long-term strategy for returning the West Bank to Arab control and allowing the Palestinians to choose their own political framework. If this cannot be done now by a formal settlement, it might be possible for Jordan, Israel and the US to discuss privately means by which the terms of the Israeli occupation might be modified to provide gradually increased authority for West Bank leaders. This might be a useful modification of simply letting the situation drift because it would provide a sense of direction.

The objective of such a tacitly agreed upon policy would be the emergence of moderate West Bank Palestinian leadership capable of assuming responsibility for local affairs initially and eventually able to organize the Palestinian community as it resumes control over the West Bank. Such a course would involve Israeli agreement to refrain from acts tantamount to annexing the territories, liberalized measures for allowing the free movement of people between the East and West Banks, and a gradual increase in self-government. There might also be some measures that we could take

in the way of assistance to help West Bank Palestinians improve their social and economic prospects. After a period of perhaps five to ten years the West Bankers might choose what long-term association they would prefer.

We have not yet discussed this with the Israelis, and we do not know what King Hussein's judgment would be on whether this offers a useful alternative. We do know that at least some prominent Jordanians are thinking along these lines.

Prime Minister Meir's Visit: Egypt-Israel

The Jordan-Israel aspects of Mrs. Meir's visit are covered above. My purpose here is to discuss the Egypt-Israel front.

The first issue is whether and how we are going to try to put our relationship with Israel on a plane where the very high level of US diplomatic, economic and military support will be reciprocated by a serious Israeli effort to move toward peace in close collaboration with the US. This is the major decision to be made and is a matter for general understanding at the highest level. We certainly do not want Mrs. Meir to go away now with no inkling that we are going to urge new steps and then be hit by a new initiative in a few weeks or months. Involved in this understanding, of course, is what can be done before the Israeli election and what must be delayed until after.

If we are to proceed, the next question is how. This involves the general question of style--how to maintain as much Israeli confidence as possible. Then it involves such practical issues as how to develop a base for Egyptian-Israeli negotiations and how to handle the mechanics of preparation for negotiations. By this latter point, I mean specifically whether the President might choose to have the State Department work on a formula for negotiating the first stage of withdrawal from the Canal, while you move on a separate track to discuss the general principles of an overall settlement so that we might address the big issues in a way that might keep those issues from stalling near-term progress on a first step.

On this latter point, there are some things you might inject into the process while leaving the detailed negotiating to State. Up until now, as you know, it has been impossible to make progress on an interim or full settlement of the Egyptian-Israeli conflict for two main reasons:

--Egypt will not negotiate the first stage of an agreement until she is assured of what the final stage will look like. In particular, Egypt insists that, before negotiations can begin, Israel must commit

herself to full withdrawal in return for peace. Egypt has to be given a glimpse of what may eventually come out of a new peace initiative. In particular, Egypt must be convinced that it can regain sovereignty in Sinai eventually, even if there are conditions attached to this outcome. Some confidence from private conversations that we are addressing this issue seriously and realistically might help bring them into negotiations on a first-stage withdrawal.

--Israel refuses to make a prior commitment to full withdrawal, both because she intends to retain some Egyptian territory and because she does not want to give up what she considers her major bargaining asset before negotiations begin. It is a long shot, but it might reassure Israel to know through private conversation that we are prepared to work with Israel through a prolonged settlement process in an almost alliance-like relationship to preserve her security position in the Sinai, even though Egypt might have to regain sovereignty over most of the Sinai.

Whether or not there is a decision to work on two tracks as described above, there is the third question of what the substance of any new US position might be. This issue can best be described by highlighting two current viewpoints--the State Department's and an alternative.

We do not yet have a formal recommendation from Secretary Rogers, but one can deduce from the things that have been said over recent weeks and from past style that his recommendation will contain the following elements:

--a new formula for getting proximity talks started and

--a formal approach to the Israelis, probably backed by a letter from the President putting this formula to the Prime Minister for discussion.

In greater detail, I believe the State approach will be to try to get talks going on an interim agreement while avoiding the hard issue of territory which will have to be addressed in a final agreement. They will probably propose some formula for beginning talks on an interim agreement by which both sides would agree that no outcome is precluded in advance of negotiations. The argument is for simply getting the process of negotiation started. In any course that is followed some such general formula will probably have to be used publicly because neither side will be able to handle hard final decisions politically at the outset. However, it remains true that Sadat may not be willing to enter talks unless he knows generally

where he might hope to come out, and the Israelis will be very suspicious that we will push the Rogers Plan. So there are advantages in not avoiding the ultimate issues, at least in general terms.

The alternative approach would face the issue of territory at the outset in private talks with the Israelis, and eventually with the Egyptians. This could be done in the form of the same kinds of general principles that we discussed before the Moscow summit last May. Essentially, we might strive for an Israeli agreement not to preclude the restoration of Egyptian sovereignty in Sinai, provided that concrete security arrangements could be worked out. These could include the agreed stationing of Israeli troops at key positions for extended periods, as we discussed last spring. The advantage of concentrating on "restoration of sovereignty" would be to shift the focus from "withdrawal", thus opening the way for return of Egyptian civil authority while preserving an Israeli security presence. State has shown some interest in this concept, but has not worked it into its essentially tactical approach to an interim settlement. The argument against this, of course, is that it would force the Israeli government to face up to a difficult decision on the eve of a national election. It should be possible, though, to handle this in a number of ways. For instance, the President and Mrs. Meir--or their representatives--might agree on a position to be taken publicly only after the Israeli election, which could permit us to take some measures now in the confidence that they would not be at odds with Israeli policy.

Conclusion

My purpose here is obviously not to seek decisions on these issues but to ask a few moments to discuss general directions with you so that I may prepare you and the President in the best way possible for the coming visits. The substance of the above boils down to two operational questions to begin with:

1. How far do you want to go in pursuing the details of a Jordan-Israel settlement during King Hussein's visit? The answer will dictate the kind of material we prepare for you.

2. Are you interested in developing the idea of two-track talks on an Egypt-Israel settlement, concentrating State's effort on a first-stage negotiation?

RECOMMENDATION: That you ask Dick Campbell to schedule 15-30 minutes in the coming week to discuss these issues with me.

APPROVE _____ NOT NOW _____

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC MO DA	RECD MO DA HR	LOG NBR	INITIAL ACTION OFF
1/26	1/26/18	403	

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DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES _____ KISSINGER ✓ HAIG _____

FROM: ELIOT _____ ROGERS, W _____ LAIRD, M _____ SAUNDERS

U _____ LOU _____ C _____ S ✓ TS _____

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SUBJECT: Next Steps on the Arab-Israeli Problem - Saunders suggestions agreed w/ HAK

REFERENCE: S/S _____ OTHER _____ NOT XEROXED _____

APP'TS: PRES _____ HAK _____ TALKER _____ MEMCON _____ DATE REQ. _____

SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION

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ACTION REQUIRED

MEMO FOR HAK ..... (_____)
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RECOMMENDATIONS ..... (_____)
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DUE DATE:

COMMENTS: *(Including Special Instructions)*

INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING

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1/26		HAK	X	Memo (1/30)	
2/20	HAK	Saunders	S	Redo (02/25)	
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DISPOSITION

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☆ GPO: 1972-455-927

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT

DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

49

SECRET (GDS)

January 4, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS
WILLIAM B. QUANDT

SUBJECT: Economic and Military Assistance for Jordan

Over the past three months, it has become increasingly clear that our military and economic assistance programs in Jordan are both entering new phases. This is important to the President for two reasons: (1) Hussein will raise assistance issues with the President when he visits in February. (2) Both programs will be related to whatever new relationship is established between Jordan and Israel. This latter point at least means that Jordan's continued strength and soundness remain important; more subtly, it means that a growing Jordanian economy can help erode part of the refugee problem.

The purpose of this memo is to seek your signature on the attached memo asking State and Defense to give the President a choice on assistance packages for Jordan before Hussein arrives. Staff work has progressed to the point where a formal request would give precision to those packages and permit choices to be understood now so we will not have the confusion of trying to work them out after the King sees the President. Prompt answers will also make the President seem more responsive, even where our own budget problems impose some limits on what we can do.

Economic Assistance

During the recently held Jordan Development Conference in Amman, the US delegation--Bill attended with Maury Williams and others--laid the groundwork for our assistance in CY 1973. Here is where we stand now:

The Jordanian Position. During the Development Conference, Crown Prince Hassan and Governor Salam of the Central Bank asked for budget support during the period of the Three Year Plan, 1973-75. Their plan "calls for" $70 million in US budget support in each of the three years of the plan. In CY 1973, the Jordanians

are asking for $70 million in budget support in addition to the $10 million payment they are already scheduled to receive this month under an earlier commitment. This amount, they say, is needed to cover recurring expenditures. Jordan already faces the prospect of a large deficit this year, and without increased US support, they will have to cut imports, draw down their reserves, drop some ongoing programs, or get more money from the Saudis.

The US Position. While expressing sympathy for Jordan's development efforts, the US delegation emphasized the difficulties of meeting Jordan's request for $70 million in supporting assistance alone in CY 1973. Maury Williams told the Jordanians that we are planning for $50 million in supporting assistance in CY 1973, including the $10 million already scheduled for payment this January. Maury was very firm in stressing that we simply could not find more money in the supporting assistance budget for FY 1974. At the same time, we concluded that Jordan was serious about its economic development and that we should lend some support to that effort. In order to do this, and to come closer to the $70 million the Jordanians hope for next year, Maury on the spot approved in principle providing Jordan with development loans for specific projects, even though the bureaucracy is generally reluctant to provide DL money to countries receiving supporting assistance. The advantages of this decision are that it permits us to draw funds from a somewhat less constrained budget; it allows us to direct money to areas of development of particular interest to the US; and it keeps from locking us into an ever-increasing spiral of budget support.

The one project of some magnitude that we can finance with development loan money is an extension of the East Ghor Canal, which will contribute to agricultural development in the Jordan Valley. The project will cost at least $10 million, several million of which can be used this year.

The problem for the US is that pressures on the supporting assistance budget are very great and Jordan's request for $70 million is hard to justify in view of Jordanian failure to gain control over the upward spiral in their own spending. We do, however, want to be responsive and to

contribute to Jordan's development. The best way to do this bureaucratically is to draw funds from several different budgets--supporting assistance, development loans, and MAP--in order to provide Jordan with enough budget relief to meet Hussein's legitimate needs without artificially inflating Jordanian demands by being overly responsive. Jordan can probably find some added help from Saudi Arabia and Persian Gulf countries, and we do not want to reduce his incentive to look to these regional sources.

The Package for King Hussein's Visit. In order to come close to meeting the King's anticipated request for $70 million in CY 1973, we will want to be able to put together a package that is obviously generous, meets Jordan's most pressing needs, and does not oblige us to take funds from other urgent programs. Something along the following lines should be adequate:

$50 million in Supporting Assistance ($10 million already scheduled for January 1973).

$10 million in development loans for the East Ghor Canal extension (several million of which can be spent in 1973).

$10-15 million in "operating and maintenance" costs to be covered from the FY 1974 MAP program (this is equivalent to added budget support).

At a minimum, this would provide Jordan with $60-$65 million in budget support for CY 1973, which at least approaches the $70 million Jordan will be requesting.

Military Assistance

While in Jordan, Bill attended a military briefing at Army Headquarters, which gave some indication of likely Jordanian requests for military assistance in the near future. You will recall that we are about half-way through the Jordanian military modernization program agreed to early in 1971. Our last contribution of $40 million in MAP will be made in FY 1974, and DOD has no specific plans for any follow-on, although at our urging they have now come up with some tentative alternative packages.

As background, it is worth noting that Jordanian military costs have been rising rapidly, in part because of manpower increases. When the modernization agreement was reached, Jordan envisaged a military establishment of at most 65,000 men. The target is now a manning level of about 76,000, with nearly 70,000 already in the armed forces. Jordan also wants to form another armored division to face the threat from a Syrian tank force that Jordan estimates at 1600 strong. (This is considerably more than we or the Israelis credit the Syrians with.) Jordan hopes to receive 175 mm. artillery, an accelerated delivery schedule for the F-5E aircraft, air defense equipment, and more armored personnel carriers.

What is beginning to emerge from these projections is a rather different Jordanian armed force than that envisaged by our 1971 modernization program. Initially we agreed to help Jordan acquire a good capability for self-defense at tolerable costs. Now the Jordanians are increasingly talking about the need for a more offensively oriented capability to deal with a somewhat inflated Syrian threat and to play a "peacekeeping" role in the Gulf, this latter supposedly at our request. The problem is that this type of Jordanian military will carry a large price tag and could require equipment such as 175 mm. artillery that the Israelis will be very unhappy to see in the hands of any Jordanian regime. This suggests that as part of discussions about a follow-on to the modernization program (a topic that King Hussein is certain to raise) we may want to talk with the Jordanians about the kind of armed forces that they can afford to acquire and that we are able to support.

Our basic choice will be between a limited and a major modernization program after FY 1974. The former would meet current Jordanian requests, particularly for comparatively expensive items such as trucks, C-130 transport planes, and armored personnel carriers, with a MAP program of about $40 million spread over a three to five year period. The more substantial program would involve another squadron of F-5Es, additional M60A1 tanks and more artillery. This package would cost approximately $120 million over a three to five year period. (DOD prefers the more limited program as being consistent with Jordan's self-defense needs and within the range of what our budget will permit.)

Summary

In planning for King Hussein's visit in February, we have the makings of a package that could look something like the following in response to anticipated Jordanian requests:

--Economic Assistance. Between $60-70 million, drawn from SA, DL and MAP. This compares with a probable request from Hussein for as much as $80 million, but nonetheless represents a significant increase for us. We feel the Saudis and Kuwaitis should be urged to provide more help for Jordan. The King already knows how much to expect in supporting assistance and development loans, and if the President wishes to be more responsive--an added $10-15 million, for example--we will have to take this from MAP equipment funds, which would delay the completion of the modernization program somewhat. It would, however, help Jordan's short-term budget problem.

--Military Assistance. $40 million from MAP in FY 1974, most of which will be used to complete the three-year modernization program. (If funds are taken from MAP to provide budget support, however, then some equipment programmed for delivery in FY 1974 will have to be carried over to FY 1975.) The main new thing that the President can offer King Hussein is a follow-on package for further modernization of the armed forces. This has not been mentioned to Hussein. The precise contents of this package will require careful study, but at some point a decision will be needed on whether to go beyond a limited program by agreeing to more tanks and/or aircraft. That is one purpose of the attached memo.

What we need at this point is to have the bureaucracy thrash out the details of both the economic and military assistance alternatives.

RECOMMENDATION: That you sign the attached memo to the Secretaries of State and Defense as soon as possible. The date for Hussein's visit has been set for February 6 with a fallback of January 30.

Concurrence:
Richard T. Kennedy

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ADMINISTRATOR, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

SUBJECT: Military and Economic Assistance for Jordan

The President has asked that the Secretary of State in collaboration with the Secretary of Defense and the Administrator, AID, prepare a memorandum for him presenting his choices in responding to probable Jordanian requests for economic and military assistance during King Hussein's planned visit to Washington.

This memorandum should describe:

--What the Jordanians now know about US assistance plans.

--What additional requests King Hussein can be expected to make.

--The President's choices in responding to these Jordanian requests.

This memorandum should be submitted by January 19, 1973.

Henry A. Kissinger

cc: Director, Office of Management and Budget

SECRET

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC MO	DOC DA	RECD MO	RECD DA	RECD HR	LOG NBR	INITIAL ACTION OFF
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DOC SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES _____ KISSINGER X HAIG _____

FROM: ELIOT _____ ROGERS, W _____ LAIRD, M _____ Saunders

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NO FORN _____ BUO _____ EYES ONLY _____ CODE WORD _____ SENSITIVE _____

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SUBJECT: Economic + Military asst for Jordan in planning for King Hussein's visit to US in Feb.

REFERENCE: S/S _____ _____ OTHER _____ NOT XEROXED _____

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SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION

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ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG			
STAFF SECRETARY			
FAR EAST			
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA			
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA			
EUROPE/CANADA			
LATIN AMERICA			
UNITED NATIONS			
ECONOMIC			
SCIENTIFIC			
LR PLANNING			
PROGRAM ANALYSIS			
NSC PLANNING			
CONGRESSIONAL			

ACTION REQUIRED

MEMO FOR HAK ..... (_____)
MEMO FOR PRES. ..... (_____)
REPLY FOR _____ SIGNATURE ..... (_____)
FOR DISTRIBUTION/DISPATCH ..... (_____)
MEMO _____ TO _____ ..... (_____)
RECOMMENDATIONS ..... (_____)
JOINT MEMO ..... (_____)
REFER TO STATE ..... (_____)
ANY ACTION NECESSARY ..... (_____)
CONCURRENCE ..... (_____)
DUE DATE:

COMMENTS: *(Including Special Instructions)*

INTERNAL/INTERIM ROUTING

DATE	FROM	TO	S	ACTION REQUIRED	CY TO
01/05	SAUN	HAK	X	Sign Memo to Cushman	(01/06)
1/6		Saunders	S	Further Action / See HAK note	(1/8)
1/31/73	Saunders	NSC/S		Close file. Will handle in new memo.	
1/31			C	No further action HHS	

DISPOSITION

CROSS REF WITH _____ NOTIFY _____ DATE _____

SEE LOG _____ DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO _____

JOINED BY LOG _____ COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE) _____

SPECIAL FILE RQMT: ____ SA, ____ HP, ____ HM

SPECIAL DISPOSITION COMMENTS: _____

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: YES ✓ NO ____

MICROFILM DATA
NO _____
INIT _____
DATE _____
FEB 02 1973
ORIG) NSC _____
TO) PAF ✓
WHC _____
SUBF _____

☆ GPO: 1972–455-927

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

'73 NOV 1 PM 3:15

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

SECRET 690

PAGE 01 AMMAN 05788 310900Z

20

2

ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

USSS-00 INRE-00 NSAE-00 /031 W

122302

O 310750Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9879
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T AMMAN 5788

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MOPS IS JO EG SY
SUBJECT: ISRAELI PRISONERS

REF: TEL AVIV 8778

1. CONGRESSMEN RYAN AND STEELE DISCUSSED PRISONER ISSUE WITH KING HUSSEIN. THEY TALKED OF GREAT EMOTION THEY HAD FOUND ON THU ISSUE IN ISRAEL.

2. THEY SUGGESTED TO KING THAT HE URGE SYRIANS TO RELEASE NAMES AS EGYPTIANS HAD DONE AND TO MAKE A HUMANITARIAN GESTURE, SUCH AS TURNING OVER WOUNDED TO ICRC.

3. KING SAID HE WOULD DO THIS.
BROWN

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SECRET

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT

DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State TELEGRAM

73 OCT 30 PM 12:06
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

SECRET 219

PAGE 01 AMMAN 05781 300841Z

21 16
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

USSS-00 INRE-00 NSAE-00 /031 W
---------- 111970

O 300810Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9876
INFO USINT CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T AMMAN 5781

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS1
TAGS: MOPS, JO, IS, SY, EG
SUBJECT: ISRAELI PRISONERS

1. I SPOKE TO PRIME MINISTER LAST NIGHT. SAID ISRAELI PRISONER ISSUE GETTING HOTTER AND HOTTER AND IF SOMETHING NOT DONE IT COULD THROW INITIATION OF NEGOTIATIONS OFF TRACK.

2. SAID I HOPED KING (OR WHOEVER IS NEXT VISITOR TO SEE ASAD) WOULD POINT THIS OUT TO SYRIANS AND URGE THEM TO SUPPLY NAMES TO ICRC. KING COULD ALSO SUGGEST TO ASAD THAT HE MAKE DRAMATIC GESTURE BY UNILATERALLY TURNING OVER SOME OF WOUNDED ISRAELIS TO ICRC OR UN.

3. PM WILL DISCUSS WITH KING. SAYS IT IS GOOD IDEA.

4. COMMENT: JORDANAINS THINK ONE OF FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO HOLD-UP PRISONER RETURN IS RELUCTANCE RELEASE PILOTS. WOULD A PAROLE SYSTEM BE POSSIBLE WHEREBY EACH SIDE WOULD RETURN PRISONERS IN CERTAIN CATEGORIES WITH UNDERSTANDING THEY RELEASED FROM MILITARY? PAROLE COULD BE TO UN. ISRAELIS WOULD

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 AMMAN 05781 300841Z

PROBABLY OPPOSE IN FIRST INSTANCE BUT, IF RETURN TO
ISRAEL RATHER THAN TO AIR FORCE DUTY IS BASIC DEMAND,
IT COULD BE WAY OUT.
BROWN

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SECRET

03/10/817

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 787

PAGE 01 AMMAN 05731 271626Z

41
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00 DODE-00

NSAE-00 /031 W
---------- 098147

O P 2715307 OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9856
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
USINT CAIRO PRIORITY
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
USMISSION USUN NY PRIORITY

S E C R E T AMMAN 5731

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR JO
SUBJ: KING HUSSEIN
E X D I S

1. IT'S TOUGH TO BE KING OF AN ECONOMICALLY NONVIABLE COUNTRY OF ONE AND A HALF MILLION, HALF OF WHOM ARE REFUGEES. YOU HAVE A TOUGH LITTLE ARMY OF 70,000 MEN, ABOUT THE SIZE OF THAT OF THE PHILIPPINES WITH ITS RELATIVELY ENORMOUS PUPULATION, BUT YOU STILL FEEL POWERLESS.

2. YOU LOOK AT THE MIDDLE EAST AS THE WORLD VIEWS IT. THE SOVIETS SUPPORT THE ARABS; THE US BACKS ISRAEL. BUT YOU DON'T FIT IN THIS SITUATION. YOU ARE THE US-BACKED ARAB STATE ON THE FRONT LINES AND YOU LOOK TO WASHINGTON FOR ADVICE. YOUR SO-CALLED ARAB PARTNERS ARE YOUR PROBLEM; SOMETIMES THEY ARE YOUR ENEMIES AND SOMETIMES YOUR FRIENDS, BUT BASICALLY THEY DON'T GIVE A DAMN ABOUT YOUR FUTURE.

3. YOU'RE ON THE SPOT. US ADVICE IS GOOD BUT OVER-CAUTIOUS. YOU'VE IGNORED IT WHEN YOU HAD TO (DON'T SEND TROOPS TO SYRIA); YOU'VE FOLLOWED IT BUT SLOWLY(WITHDRAW FROM SYRIA)

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 AMMAN 05731 271626Z

WHEN YOU BELIEVED THAT A PRECIPITATE ACTION WOULD DESTROY RECENTLY CONTRIVED FRAGILE RELATIONSHIPS WITH A BELEAGUERED ASSAD.

4. YOU ENTERED SYRIA IN ORDER TO PRESERVE SOME SORT OF MEANINGFUL RELATIONSHIP WITH ARAB STATES, ESPECIALLY SAUDI ARABIA, A SPIRITUAL AS WELL AS FINANCIAL MENTOR. AFTER THE EVENT YOU RATIONALIZED YOUR ACTION BY SAYING YOU WERE PREVENTING AN ARAQI TAKEOVER OF SYRIA. SYRIA IS THE COUNTRY WHOSE AMBITIONS AGAINST JORDAN YOU EARLIER USED TO JUSTIFY AN EXPANDED AMERICAN MILITARY AID PROGRAM. UNDERNEATH IT ALL YOU HAVE A HATE/LOVE RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL. YOUR PEOPLE, YOUR PALESTINIANS, WANT REVENGE BUT YOU KNOW THAT YOUR ONLY LONG-TERM INSURANCE POLICY IS--IF NOT A DURABLE PEACE--A MODUS VIVENDI WITH ISRAEL. AND NOW, AFTER THREE WEEKS OF WAR, YOU REALIZE THAT ISRAEL AGREES WITH YOU, AT LEAST THE MODUS VIVENDI.

5. UNSURE OF YOURSELF AND SUSPICIOUS THAT THE REAL CONCERNS OF THE US HAVE SWITCHED FROM THE MIDDLE EAST TO THE PRESERVATION OF THE DETENTE, YOU START TO FLOUNDER.

6. COMMENT: THIS IS WHERE THE KING IS TODAY. HE FEELS SUFFOCATED: HE WANTS SOME BREATHING SPACE. I UNDERSTAND OUR INTERNAL PROBLEMS. I'M EVEN ABLE--ALBEIT WITH A GREAT DEAL OF PERSONAL SKEPTICISM--TO UNDERSTAND OUR DOD POSITION. BUT I THINK THE TIME HAS COME TO TOSS IN ANOTHER MILITARY IMPACT PACKAGE. BUT, EVEN MORE IMPORTANT, WE WANT TO MOVE HIM FROM 24-HOUR CONCENTRATION OF WHAT IS HAPPENING AT THIS MOMENT ON THE FRONT TO HOW JORDAN FITS INTO THE PEACE SETTLEMENT. LET'S TAKE HIS MIND OF ASSAD'S LATEST WORRY AND LET IT FOCUS ON NEXT STEPS. WHAT WE SHOULD BE TELLING HIM IS HOW WE SEE THE NEGOTIATIONS OPENING. I'M NOT ASKING FOR A SORT OF IRON-CLAD GUARANTEE OF WHAT HAPPENS NEXT AND WHAT IT COULD LEAD TO. GIVE ME A PHILOSOPHICAL DISCOURSE ON PUBLIC VS. PRIVATE NEGOTIATION, SOME ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION, A GUIDELINE. LET HIM--AND MAKE HIS NEW TEMPORARY FRIENDS, ASSAD AND SADAT--START THINKING ALONG CONSTRUCTIVE LINES. HE WILL HAVE SOMETHING TO ANSWER. IT IS HIS PART OF THE WORLD. HE HAS PLAYED THE GAME BEAUTIFULLY SO FAR. MAYBE HE CAN HELP US. AFTER ALL,

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 03 AMMAN 05731 271626Z

WE ARE ALL FLOUNDERING IN THE SAME RED SEA.
BROWN

NOTE BY OC/T: EXDIS CAPTION INSERTED PER INSTRUCTIONS
S/S-O. MR. WRIGHT.

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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 849

SITUATION RM

PAGE 01 AMMAN 05711 262120Z

72
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

USSS-00 INRE-00 NSAE-00 /031 W
090419

O 262101Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9848

S E C R E T AMMAN 5711

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, JO, US
SUBJ: US POSITION ON 242

1. RIFAI TELLS ME HE HAS CABLE FROM SALAH SAYING THAT LATTER ASKED ATHERTON IF US INTERPRETATION OF 242 STILL HOLDS. ATHERTON ALLEGEDLY REPLIED THAT THE SITUATION HAS CHANGED SINCE THEN.

2. I TOLD RIFAI HE WAS MIS-READING SOMETHING OR OTHER.
BROWN

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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT

DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

PAGE 01 AMMAN 05659 231827Z

44
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

/031 W
---------- 056482

O 231824Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9822

S E C R E T AMMAN 5659

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: OGEN, PFOR, XF
SUBJECT: JORDANIAN FORCES IN SYRIA

REF: STATE 208919

KING WAS APPRECIATIVE OF CONTENTS REFTEL. HE HAS DELEGATION ON WAY TO CAIRO TO FIND OUT WHAT IS UP. WHEN IT RETURNS TONIGHT, WILL SEND ANOTHER TO DAMASCUS. ALL IS COOL ON SYRIAN FRONT. HE PLAN TO KEEP IT THAT WAY.
BROWN

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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT

DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CWH

'73 OCT 23 PM 3:12

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM 054175

2/3

SECRET 648

PAGE 01 AMMAN 05652 231359Z

43
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /031 W

O 231331Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9817

S E C R E T AMMAN 5652

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINT JO
SUBJ: PALESTINE

KING TOLD ME THAT HE WAS SURE THERE HAD BEEN SOME MOSCOW DISCUSSIONS OF ROLE OF PALESTINE IN EVENTUAL NEGOTIATIONS. HE WOULD LIKE TO BE INFORMED.
BROWN

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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT

DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

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DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 662

PAGE 01 AMMAN 05632 220944Z 2

16
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

USSS-00 INRE-00 NSAE-00 /031 W
---------- 047579

Z 220939Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 9808
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT FLASH
USINT CAIRO FLASH
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM FLASH
AMEMBASSY JIDDA FLASH
MAMEMBASSY LONDON FLASH 2708
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW FLASH
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV FLASH
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK FLASH

S E C R E T AMMAN 5632

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, XF, SC, ME, JO
SUBJECT: SC RESOLUTION

1. HAVE JUST SPOKEN TO KING TO ASK HIM IF JORDAN ACCEPTS SC RESOLUTION IN FULL. HE CONFIRMS THIS.

2. HE SENDS SECRETARY BEST WISHES FOR NEXT STOP AND HOPES TO BE INFORMED SOON THAT IT IS GOING WELL.
BROWN

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

614

SECRET 614

PAGE 01 AMMAN 05628 220731Z

2

16
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 /031 W
047178

Z 220715Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 9806

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW FLASH
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV FLASH

S E C R E T AMMAN 5628

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (HENRY KISSINGER)
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S TRAVEL TO ISRAEL

REF: MOSCOW 13161

1. SECRETARY'S MESSAGE PASSED TO PM ZAID RIFAI AT 0900 LOCAL.

2. RIFAI SAYS THAT US AND USSR MUST HAVE AGREED ON A COMMON INTERPRETATION OF 242 AND HOPES THAT CONCERNED PARTIES SUCH AS JORDAN WILL BE BRIEFED ON THIS SOONEST.
BROWN

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DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CW

SECRET 509

PAGE 01 AMMAN 05531 160953Z 2

21
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 INRE-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00

CIAE-00 USSS-00 NSAE-00 /031 W
---------- 115464

O R 160821Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9748
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

S E C R E T AMMAN 5531

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: AEMR
SUBJECT: E & E PLANNING

REF: STATE 204191

1. FOLLOWING ARE EMBASSY VIEWS AS REQUESTEDNPARA 2 REFTEL:

A. BELIEVE OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENT NOT NECESSARY. SITUATION IN JORDAN IS GENERALLY WELL KNOWN AND APPEARS TO BE SUFFICIENT IN ITSELF AT THIS TIME TO DISCOURAGE TRAVEL BY AMERICAN CITIZENS TO JORDAN. AIRPORT IS CLOSED AND DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED IN ROAD TRAVEL FROM BEIRUT OR FROM SAUDI ARABIA ARE SUCH AS TO DISCOURAGE SUCH TRAVEL.

B. FEW TOURISTS REMAINING IN JORDAN AT THIS TIME ARE ANXIOUS TO LEAVE AS SOON AS COMMERICAL TRANSPORTATION BECOMES AVAILABLE AND THERE IS NO NEED TO ENCOURAGE THEM TO DO SO. DEPARTURE OF FAMILIES OF RESIDENTS OR EVEN DISCREET ENCOURAGEMENT FOR THEM TO DO SO ON PART OF EMBASSY WOULD BE INTERPRETED AS

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 AMMAN 05531 160953Z

INDICATION THAT SITUATION IN JORDAN IS WORSENING. AS LONG AS JORDANIANTERRITORY IS NOT AFFECTED BY MILITARY OPERATIONS, AND ANTI-AMERICAN FEELING REMAINS AT RELATIVELY LOW LEVEL, THERE APPEARS TO BE NO NEED TO ENCOURAGE PRIVATE AMERICAN CITIZENS TO LEAVE.

C. EVACUATION SHOULD BE INITIATED ONLY IF AND WHEN JORDANIAN TERRITORY BECOMES DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN HOSTILITIES OR ANTI-AMERICAN FEELING REACHES DANGEROUS LEVEL. ASSUMING AMMAN AIRPORT CAN BE USED, CHARTER AIRCRAFT WOULD BE PREFERABLE. ONLY OTHER POSSIBILITY AS LAST RESORT WOULD BE BY ROAD TO TABUK IN SAUDI ARABIA.

2. RE PARA 3 REFTEL. ESTIMATED NUMBER EVACUEES REMAIN AS STATED AMMAN 5416: 136 OFFICIAL, 30 TOURISTS, 400 OTHER, 200 THIRD COUNTRY.
BROWN

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05/10/3/07

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

WH

SECRET 513

PAGE 01 AMMAN 05530 161000Z

2/3

11
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 INRE-00

CIAE-00 NSAE-00 USSS-00 /031 W
---------- 115496

O R 160820Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9747
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

S E C R E T AMMAN 5530

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: AEMR
SUBJECT: E&E PLANNING

REF: STATE 204192

1. AMMAN AIRPORT NOW CLOSED, NO COMMERCIAL FLIGHTS IN OR OUT. POST STILL IN WARNING PHASE, IF EVACUATION NECESSARY COMMERCIAL CHARTER OF U.S. AIRCRAFT WILL BE REQUIRED.

2. PAN AMERICAN HAS A TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TEAM IN AMMAN HEADED BY KENNETH FENSKE. THIS TEAM HAS HAD CONSIDERABLE EXPERIENCE ELSEWHERE IN PLANNING AND MANAGING PAN AMERICAN PARTICIPATION IN CHARTERED AIRCRAFT EVACUATION. IN THE EVENT OF NEED THEY ARE PREPARED TO ASSIST IN EMBASSY ORGANIZED AIR EVACUATION.
BROWN

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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT

DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

LUH

SECRET 217

PAGE 01 AMMAN 05472 131220Z

2/3

53
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00 DODE-00

CIAE-00 NSAE-00 USSS-00 /031 W

096474

Z 1312117 OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SEXSTATE WASHDC FLASH 9709

S E C R E T AMMAN 5472

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MOPS, JO
SUBJ: KING'S PRESENCE

KING IS BACK IN AMMAN AFTER TRIP TO FRONT WITH HIS ADVANCE TROOPS.
BROWN

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SECRET
30

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT

DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 963

PAGE 01 AMMAN 05421 111204Z 2

20
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 CIAE-00 USSS-00

/026 W
---------- 073542

R 110915Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9672
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
USMISSION USUN NY
AMEMBASSY RABAT
USINT ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
DIA
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GER

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 5421
EXDIS
USCINCEUR PASS /USNAVEUR/USAFE/USAREUR

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINS, MOPS, JO
SUBJ: JORDAN SITREP NR 1

REF: STATE 201367

1. AS REPORTED SEPTEL, JORDAN ANNOUNCED FULL MOBILIZATION WEDNESDAY EVE. CALL-UP OF "RESERVES" AND VOLUNTEERS MAY BE HAVING REAL MANPOWER EFFECT SINCE LOCAL RESIDENTS COMPLAINING OF FEWER TAXIS. DESPITE GOJ PRONOUNCEMENTS, FLOUR SHORTAGES APPEARS WORSE. SOME CONSUMERS HAVING TO WAIT THREE DAYS FOR 50 LB. SACKS. BLACK MARKET IN OPERATION.

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M DS-1652

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 AMMAN 05421 111204Z

2. ISRAELI AIR PENETRATION AT 1700 HRS. LT OCT 10 (REPORTED AMMAN 5405) ACTIVATED HEAVY ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRING FROM ZARQA, JUST EAST OF AMMAN, AS WELL AS TO WEST OF CITY. RADIO ANNOUNCED ONLY THAT BATTERIES ENGAGED AIRCRAFT "IN CENTRAL SECTOR" PROBABLY TO AVOID AGITATING AMMAN INHABITANTS.

3. UNRWA DIRECTOR TANNER VISITED SEVERAL REFUGEE CAMPS AFTERNOON OF OCT 10 AND REPORTS SITUATION COMPLETELY NORMAL, CAMP POPULATIONS CALM.

4. APPARENTLY IN CONJUNCTION WITH MOBILIZATION ORDER, HOSPITALS HAVE BEEN EMPTIED OF NON-EMERGENCY PATIENTS.

5. ALIA CONTINUING SPECIAL FLIGHT SCHEDULES. OCT 11 DEPARTURES FOR FRANKFURT-COPENHAGEN (1155HRS) AND DOHA-MUSCAT (1730): FOR OCTOBER 12, TO TEHRAN (1015) BAHRAIN DUBAI (1800) AND KUWAIT-DHAHRAN(1745).

6. AMERICAN RESIDENTS BECOMING MORE EDGY. OCT 11 INQUIRIES RE EMBASSY'S EVACUATION INTENTIONS DOUBLE THOSE OF OCT 10.

7. GOI-CONTROLLED MEDIA STILL TAKING CALM APPROACH TO WAR. OCT 11 EDITORIALS DO NOT MENTION US.

8. WE ARE NUMBERING THIS "SITREP 1" IN VIEW OF OUR ENTRY INTO STANDFAST E AND E PHASE. WE UNDERSTAND ONE OR TWO EARLIER UNNUMBERED STIREPS MAY NOT HAVE REACHED SOME ADDRESSEES DUE TO COMUNICATIONS LOG JAMS. WE WILL NOT REPEAT THESE SINCE EVENTS OVERTAKEN. BROWN

NOTE BY OCT: EXDIS CAPTION ADDED PER STANDING INSTRUCTIONS PER S/S-O MR. SARROS

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CONFIDENTIAL

59

LS/10/819

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 528

PAGE 01 AMMAN 05442 111932Z

45
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00
USSS-00 /026 W

2

73 OCT 12 AM 9:53

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

077957

O P 111705Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9687
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
USINT CAIRO PRIORITY
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY
USUN PRIORITY 2617

S E C R E T AMMAN 5442

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MOPS XF
SUBJECT: INCIDENTAL ARAB ACTIONS

1. FOLLOWING FROM KING AND ENTOURAGE:

2. IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER IS DUE IN AMMAN TONIGHT. JORDANIANS NOT SURE WHAT HE IS AFTER. COULD BE TO URGE KING TO GET INTO WAR. COULD BE IN CONNECTIONS WITH MOVEMENT IRAQI FORCES TO SYRIA, PERHAPS THROUGH JORDAN.

3. BOURGUIBA HAS SENT MESSAGE TO KING SAYING HE IS SENDING FORCES TO WAR. URGES KING TO DO SAME AND SAYS HE WILL RESTOREDIPLOMATIC RELATIONS IF KING DOES. PALACE COMMENT IS THAT BOURGUIBA FORGOT WHO BROKE.
BROWN

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SECRET

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 548

PAGE 01 AMMAN 05441 111939Z

2

62
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

NSAE-00 USSS-00 /026 W
---------- 077983

P R 111645Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9686
INFO USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USUN 2616

'73 OCT 12 AM 9:53
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

S E C R E T AMMAN 5441

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR, MOPS, FX
SUBJECT: SOVIET FOREWARNING

FOR THE HISTORICAL RECORD SADAT TOLD KHAMMASH TODAY THAT SOVIETS WERE NOTIFIED OF SYRIAN-EGYPTIAN ATTACK ONE HOUR BEFORE IT TOOK PLACE.
BROWN

SECRET
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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 595

PAGE 01 AMMAN 05416 110831Z

2

13 15
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

USSS-00 /026 W

O 110800Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9668

'73 OCT 11 PM 1:29
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
071897

S E C R E T AMMAN 5416
EXDIS
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: AEMR, XF, XI
SUBJ: EMERGENCY AND EVACUATION

REF: STATE 201367

1. AMMAN HAS INVOKED WARNING PHASE E&E PLAN AND IS NOW IN STANDFAST STATUS. SITREP WILL FOLLOW.

2. ESTIMATED NUMBER POTENTIAL EVACUEES 136 OFFICIAL AMERICANS AND DEPENDENTS, 400 OTHER AMERICANS, 30 AMERICAN TOURISTS AND 200 THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS.

3. ESTIMATED COST OF EVACUATION DOLS 100,000. THIS INCLUDES CALCULATION OF DOLLARS 150 FOR FIRST-CLASS AIRFARE ALL AMERICANS AMMAN TO ATHENS.

4. FOR PLANNING AND PREPARATION OF POSSIBLE EVACUATION, REQUEST SAFE HAVEN DESIGNATION AND FISCAL DATA PER MOVEMENT. BROWN

NOTE BY OC/T: EXDIS CAPTION ADDED PER S/S-O, MR. SARROS, 10/11/73.

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SECRET

3

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DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

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SECRET 286

PAGE 01 AMMAN 05409 102252Z

2

61
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 USSS-00

/026 W

---------- 067946

O 101720Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9661
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
USINT CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
DIA WASHDC
USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 2609

'73 OCT 11 AM 9:15
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

S E C R E T AMMAN 5409

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (PARAS 2 & 3)

E.O. 11652: XGDS1
TAGS: PFOR, MILI, IS, JO
SUBJECT: ALLON WARNING

REF: TEL AVIV 7938

1. I TOOK REFTEL TO KING AND PM TONIGHT AT 1800. I APOLOGIZED TO AMB KEATING FOR NOT TELLING HIM IN ADVANCE THAT I PLANNED TO DO SO. IN VIEW OF THE WAY THINGS WERE STARTING TO DRIFT HERE IN AMMAN, I BELIEVED IT WISE TO PUT THE ISRAELI WARNING ONCE AGAIN TO THE KING. HE APPRECIATED THE LINE THAT AMB KEATING TOOK BUT NOT THAT OF DEPM ALLON.

2. RIFAI SAID THAT HE HAD HEARD THE SAME WARNINGS GIVEN TO EGYPT AND SYRIA IN THE PAST AND SAID THAT ISRAEL DOES NOT SEEM ABLE TO CARRY OUT THOSE THREATS AS RAPIDLY AS PEOPLE HAD SUPPOSED. I

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 05409 102252Z

AGREED BECAUSE I THOUGHT IT NECESSARY TO ADD THAT THE SITUATIONS ARE DIFFERENT. SYRIA AND EGYPT HAVE AN AIR DEFENSE; JORDAN DOES NOT. SAID I WOULD NEVER FAULT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE JORDAN ARMED FORCES; THEY ARE MAGNIFICENT TROOPS. BUT THAT IS NOT WHAT WE ARE TALKING ABOUT. THE REAL PROBLEM IS WHAT WOULD HAPPEN TO JORDAN'S ECONOMY.

3. ALLON'S STATEMENT THAT IAF OVERFLIGHTS TAKE PLACE OVER ONLY A SMALL EDGE OF JORDANIAN TERRITORY WAS FROSTILY RECEIVED. JORDANIAN AA GUNS HAD BEEN FIRING AN HOUR EARLIER AT A FORMATION OF ISRAELI PLANES OVERFLYING JORDAN NEAR WADI SEER, FAR SOUTH OF GOLAN.

3. I WENT ON TO SAY THAT I HOPED JORDAN WAS NOT OVERLY IMPRESSED BY SAUDI OFFER TO SEND A BRIGADE. I ADDED THAT HUME HORAN, GOOD FRIEND OF KING AND PM FROM 1970 DAYS, HAD REMINDED ME THAT SAUDIS MADE SAME OFFER IN 1967 AND MOVED SO SLOWLY THAT WAR WAS OVER BEFORE THEY WERE ANYWHERE NEAR BATTLE.
BROWN

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SITUATION ROOM
OCT 10 PM 1:09

SECRET 953

PAGE 01 AMMAN 05390 100858Z

13
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

USSS-00 /026 W
---------- 060016

Z O 100844Z OCT 73 ZFF6
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 9649
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA FLASH
USINT CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEWYORK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T AMMAN 5390

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, SA, JO, ME
SUBJ: SAUDI PARTICIPATION

1. SAUDIS HAVE ADVISED JORDANIANS THAT THEY WILL KEEP THEIR BRIGADE ON THE JORDAN-ISRAEL LINE. THEY WILL SEND ANOTHER BRIGADE FROM SAUDI ARABIA TO SYRIA. THE SAUDIS WILL TRANSIT JORDAN.

2. A SAUDI MILITARY DELEGATION IS CURRENTLY AT AMMAN ARMY HQS TO DISCUSS LOGISTICS, INCLUDING JORDANIAN PROVISION OF FUEL, ETC.

3. ZAID RIFAI IS SOURCE OF ABOVE. HE SAYS IF USG WANTS TO STOP THIS IT WILL HAVE TO WORK DIRECTLY AND QUICKLY WITH FEISAL. JORDAN CAN ONLY CONCUR.

4. RIFAI ASKED IF WE HAD ANY RECENT NEWS. HAD TO CONFESS THAT THE DAMNED COMPUTER FOULED UP AGAIN IN WASHINGTON AND THAT WE

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Department of State TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 AMMAN 05390 100858Z

ARE JUST STARTING TO RECEIVE TRAFFIC AT 1030 A.M. AFTER BEING OFF THE AIR FOR SIX HOURS. WHAT A TIME FOR THIS TO HAPPEN.

5. COMMENT: SAUDI ENTRY INTO THE WAR COULD MARK A TURNING POINT FOR JORDAN. BROWN

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L9/10/3/07

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Department of State WH **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 871

PAGE 01 AMMAN 05343 071345Z

2/3

41
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00

USSS-00 /026 W
---------- 041740

O 071215Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9615
I KO RUESBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 7279
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
USINT CAIRO IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T AMMAN 5343

EXDIS

DEPT PASS: CINCEUR FOR POLAD INFO IMMEDIATE AND

USCINCEUR INFO IMMEDIATE

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MOPS, PINS, JO, XF
SUBJ: HUSSEIN'S ALTERNATIVES

REF: BEIRUT 11878

1. SUMMARY: AVAILABLE EVIDENCE STILL SUGGESTS HUSSEIN WILL ATTEMPT TO REMAIN ON SIDELINES. HOWEVER, PRESSURES FOR JORDANIAN COMMITMENT COULD ERUPT QUICKLY FROM NUMBER OF DIRECTIONS. LATEST (AND UNEXPECTED) FACTOR WORKING AGAINST JORDANIAN MODERATION IS REPORTED ISRAELI OVERFLIGHT OF AMMAN SUBURBS NOON OCT 7. END SUMMARY

2. WE HAVE BEEN GIVING CONSIDERABLE THOUGHT TO HUSSEIN'S

LIKELY REACTIONS UNDER VARIETY OF POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS. AS AMBASSADOR WARNED IN REFTEL, WE CANNOT TAKE FOR GRANTED THE

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SECRET

PAGE 02 AMMAN 05343 071345Z

USUAL ASSUMPTION THAT KING CAN WITHSTAND INDEFINITELY PRESSURE OF ALL EXTERNAL EVENTS.

3. MAIN FACTOR FOR CONSIDERATION IS TIME-FRAME. IF FIGHTING CAN BE HALTED WITHIN FEW DAYS, HUSSEIN WILL HAVE FAIRLY EASY TIME STAYING OUT. HE UNDOUBTEDLY IS HOPING FOR THIS EARLY REPRIEVE. HOWEVER, PRESSURES WILL INCREASE RAPIDLY IF BATTLE BECOMES PROTRACTED. TIME ALSO WILL DICTATE THE TYPE OF PRESSURES HE MUST FACE. FOR EXAMPLE, AVAILABLE EVIDENCE SUGGESTS COMMAND LEVEL OFFICERS IN JORDAN ARMY AT PRESENT MOMENT ARE NO MORE ANXIOUS THAN BEFORE TO JOIN ANY BATTLE THEY ARE UNSURE OF WINNING HOWEVER, IN UNLIKELY EVENT OF ARAB "STEAMROLLER" SUCCESS AGAINST ISRAELIS, THIS ATTITUDE LIKELY TO SHIFT TO AGITATION TO JOIN FRAY. KING, DEPENDING ON ARMY AS POWER BASE AND MINDFUL OF ROLE AS OUSTED SOVEREIGN OF WEST BANK, WOULD FIND IT DIFFICULT TO FORFEIT THIS CHANCE TO RECOVER SOME OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. MORE REALISTIC SITUATION WOULD INVOLVE TURN OF TIDE IN ISRAELI FAVOR AND RESULTANT APPEALS FOR HELP BY SYRIANS AND EGYPTIANS. WE SUSPECT KING WOULD STALL AS LONG AS POSSIBLE, PERHAPS HOPING FOR SECURITY COUNCIL CEASE-FIRE APPEAL OR SOME OTHER FACE-SAVING DEVICE. ON OTHER HAND, THERE ARE EMOTIONAL LIMITS, EG: ARAB HONOR, WHICH HE WOULD EVENTUALLY REACH ESPECIALLY IF ISRAELI COUNTER ATTACK WENT BEYOND FORMER CEASE-FIRE LINES. IF SYRIANS BECAME SUFFICIENTLY DESPERATE, THEY COULD LAUNCH SOME MOVEMENT THROUGH NORTHWEST TIP OF JORDAN THAT WOULD PROVOKE ISRAELI RESPONSE AND THUS MAKE IT VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR JORDAN TO REMAIN ON SIDELINES. WE ASSUME ISRAELIS WISH TO AVOID OPENING THIRD FRONT AND WOULD AVOID SIMILAR TRANSIT OF JORDANIAN TERRITORY, DESPITE TACTICAL ADVANTAGES OF FLANKING OPERATION IN GOLAN. RASH ISRAELI MOVE IN THIS AREA WOULD OF COURSE LEAVE JORDAN NO CHOICE. STILL ANOTHER POSSIBILITY IS THAT IRAQ WOULD DEMAND TRANSIT RIGHTS IN ORDER TO COMMIT ITS FORCES TO BATTLE ZONE. HUSSEIN PRESUMABLY WOULD DO UTMOST TO AVOID THIS UNWANTED DEVELOPMENT BUT, UNDER DETERIORATING CONDITIONS, CONCEIVABLY WOULD HAVE TO AGREE. (BAGHDAD 0527 SUGGESTS THIS GOI MOVE UNLIKELY IN VIEW OF CURRENT BAD RELATIONS WITH CAIRO).

4. PRESSURES FROM KING FAISAL ARE DIFFICULT TO PREDICT BUT WE SUSPECT THEY TOO WOULD VARY ACCORDING TO TIME-FRAME OF HOSTILITIES. FAISAL PRESUMABLY AS CAUTIOUS AS HUSSEIN AND NOT LIK-

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 03 AMMAN 05343 071345Z

ELY TO DESIRE COMMITMENT OF SAUDI EAST BANK CONTINGENT WHICH INE-
VITABLE IF JORDAN JOINS BATTLE. HOWEVER, FAISAL LIKEWISE MAY
HAVE HIS EMOTIONAL LIMITS AND COULD SHIFT PRESSURE FROM RES-
TRAINT TO COMMITMENT IF ARAB ROUTE EVIDENT. (JIDDA COMMENTS WEL-
COME).

5. SHOULD BE EMPHASIZED THAT BY ALL CURRENT LOCAL INDICATIONS,
HUSSEIN IS HOLDING TO NON-COMMITMENT RESOLVE. PRIMIN RIFA'I'S
COMMENTS TO BRIT AMBASSADOR (REPORTED SEPTEL) THAT JORDAN DE-
TERMINED TO STAY OUT WOULD ONLY MOVE TO DEFEND BORDERS IS
LATEST ENCOURAGING EVIDENCE. HOWEVER, WE REMAIN MINDFUL OF
FACT THAT ONE OR MORE OF ABOVE PRESSURES COULD BEGIN BUILDING
WITHIN DAY OR TWO IF FIGHTING CONTINUES. JORDANIANS CLAIM THAT
EIGHT ISRAELI PHANTOMS OVERFLEW SUWEILEH, NEAR AMMAN, MID-DAY
TODAY ADDS ADDITONAL NOTE OF UNCERTAINTY AS TO INRAELI INTEN-
TIONS VIS-A-VIS JORDAN. IF REPORT TRUE, THIS WOULD AMOUNT TO UNN-
ECESSARY RISK-TAKING ON GOI SIDE AND ADDITIONAL FACTOR WORKING
AGAINST JORDANIAN MODERATION.
GRAHAM

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED CINCEUR,USCINCEUR.

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 728

PAGE 01 AMMAN 05369 090912Z

13
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

USSS-00 /026 W
---------- 049821

Z O 090900Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 9633
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV FLASH
USINT CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T AMMAN 5369

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR, IS, JO, US
SUBJ: MIDDLE EAST HOSTILITIES AND JORDAN

REF: TEL AVIV 7882

1. AGREE COMPLETELY WITH AMB KEATING. I WILL BE SEEING KING ANY MOMENT NOW. I PLAN TO TELL HIM OF ZEIRA THREAT, BECAUSE THAT IS OBVIOUSLY WHAT IDF WANTS. BUT AMB KEATING IS RIGHT. FAR BETTER WOULD BE TO SAY USG IS MAKING STRENUOUS EFFORTS TO HALT OVERFLIGHTS.

2. I CONCUR WITH SUGGESTION THAT ISRAELIS BE TOLD WHAT KING HAS DONE WITH FEISEL AND OF HIS RESISTANCE TO PLEAS FROM OTHER ARAB STATES TO ENTER THE FRAY.

3. REQUEST F L A S H INSTRUCTIONS.
BROWN

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 980

PAGE 01 AMMAN 05343 072209Z

73/41
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00

USSS-00 /026 W
---------- 043085

O 071215Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9615
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
USINT CAIRO IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T AMMAN 5343

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - INTERNAL PASSING INSTRUCTIONS

DEPT PASS: CINCEUR FOR POLAD INFO IMMEDIATE
DIA INFO IMMEDIATE

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MOPS, PINS, JO, XF
SUBJ: HUSSEIN'S ALTERNATIVES

REF: BEIRUT 11878

1. SUMMARY: AVAILABLE EVIDENCE STILL SUGGESTS HUSSEIN WILL ATTEMPT TO REMAIN ON SIDELINES. HOWEVER, PRESSURES FOR JORDANIAN COMMITMENT COULD ERUPT QUICKLY FROM NUMBER OF DIRECTIONS. LATEST (AND UNEXPECTED) FACTOR WORKING AGAINST JORDANIAN MODERATION IS REPORTED ISRAELI OVERFLIGHT OF AMMAN SUBURBS NOON OCT 7. END SUMMARY

2. WE HAVE BEEN GIVING CONSIDERABLE THOUGHT TO HUSSEIN'S LIKELY REACTIONS UNDER VARIETY OF POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS. AS AMBASSADOR WARNED IN REFTEL, WE CANNOT TAKE FOR GRANTED THE

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 05343 072209Z

USUAL ASSUMPTION THAT KING CAN WITHSTAND INDEFINITELY PRESSURE OF ALL EXTERNAL EVENTS.

3. MAIN FACTOR FOR CONSIDERATION IS TIME-FRAME. IF FIGHTING CAN BE HALTED WITHIN FEW DAYS, HUSSEIN WILL HAVE FAIRLY EASY TIME STAYING OUT. HE UNDOUBTEDLY IS HOPING FOR THIS EARLY REPRIEVE. HOWEVER, PRESSURES WILL INCREASE RAPIDLY IF BATTLE BECOMES PROTRACTED. TIME ALSO WILL DICTATE THE TYPE OF PRESSURES HE MUST FACE. FOR EXAMPLE, AVAILABLE EVIDENCE SUGGESTS COMMAND LEVEL OFFICERS IN JORDAN ARMY AT PRESENT MOMENT ARE NO MORE ANXIOUS THAN BEFORE TO JOIN ANY BATTLE THEY ARE UNSURE OF WINN- HOWEVER, IN UNLIKELY EVENT OF ARAB "STEAMROLLER" SUCCESS AGAINST ISRAELIS, THIS ATTITUDE LIKELY TO SHIFT TO AGITATION TO JOIN FRAY. KING, DEPENDING ON ARMY AS POWER BASE AND MINDFUL OF ROLE AS OUSTED SOVEREIGN OF WEST BANK, WOULD FIND IT DIFFICULT TO FORFEIT THIS CHANCE TO RECOVER SOME OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. MORE REALISTIC SITUATION WOULD INVOLVE TURN OF TIDE IN ISRAELI FAVOR AND RESULTANT APPEALS FOR HELP BY SYRIANS AND EGYPTIANS. WE SUSPECT KING WOULD STALL AS LONG AS POSSIBLE, PERHAPS HOPING FOR SECURITY COUNCIL CEASE-FIRE APPEAL OR SOME OTHER FACE-SAVING DEVICE. ON OTHER HAND, THERE ARE EMOTIONAL LIMITS, EG: ARAB HONOR, WHICH HE WOULD EVENTUALLY REACH ESPECIALLY IF ISRAELI COUNTER ATTACK WENT BEYOND FORMER CEASE-FIRE LINES. IF SYRIANS BECAME SUFFICIENTLY DESPERATE, THEY COULD LAUNCH SOME MOVEMENT THROUGH NORTHWEST TIP OF JORDAN THAT WOULD PROVOKE ISRAELI RESPONSE AND THUS MAKE IT VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR JORDAN TO REMAIN ON SIDELINES. WE ASSUME ISRAELIS WISH TO AVOID OPENING THIRD FRONT AND WOULD AVOID SIMILAR TRANSIT OF JORDANIAN TERRITORY, DESPITE TACTICAL ADVANTAGES OF FLANKING OPERATION IN GOLAN. RASH ISRAELI MOVE IN THIS AREA WOULD OF COURSE LEAVE JORDAN NO CHOICE. STILL ANOTHER POSSIBILITY IS THAT IRAQ WOULD DEMAND TRANSIT RIGHTS IN ORDER TO COMMIT ITS FORCES TO BATTLE ZONE. HUSSEIN PRESUMABLY WOULD DO UTMOST TO AVOID THIS UNWANTED DEVELOPMENT BUT, UNDER DETERIORATING CONDITIONS, CONCEIVABLY WOULD HAVE TO AGREE. (BAGHDAD 0527 SUGGESTS THIS GOI MOVE UNLIKELY IN VIEW OF CURRENT BAD RELATIONS WITH CAIRO).

4. PRESSURES FROM KING FAISAL ARE DIFFICULT TO PREDICT BUT WE SUSPECT THEY TOO WOULD VARY ACCORDING TO TIME-FRAME OF HOSTILITIES. FAISAL PRESUMABLY AS CAUTIOUS AS HUSSEIN AND NOT LIK-

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 03 AMMAN 05343 072209Z

ELY TO DESIRE COMMITMENT OF SAUDI EAST BANK CONTINGENT WHICH INEVITABLE IF JORDAN JOINS BATTLE. HOWEVER, FAISAL LIKEWISE MAY HAVE HIS EMOTIONAL' LIMITS AND COULD SHIFT PRESSURE FROM RESTRAINT TO COMMITMENT IF ARAB ROUTE EVIDENT. (JIDDA COMMENTS WELCOME).

5. SHOULD BE EMPHASIZED THAT BY ALL CURRENT LOCAL INDICATIONS, HUSSEIN IS HOLDING TO NON-COMMITMENT RESOLVE. PRIMIN RIFA'I'S COMMENTS TO BRIT AMBASSADOR (REPORTED SEPTEL) THAT JORDAN DETERMINED TO STAY OUT WOULD ONLY MOVE TO DEFEND BORDERS IS LATEST ENCOURAGING EVIDENCE. HOWEVER, WE REMAIN MINDFUL OF FACT THAT ONE OR MORE OF ABOVE PRESSURES COULD BEGIN BUILDING WITHIN DAY OR TWO IF FIGHTING CONTINUES. JORDANIANS CLAIM THAT EIGHT ISRAELI PHANTOMS OVERFLEW SUWEILEH, NEAR AMMAN, MID-DAY TODAY ADDS ADDITONAL NOTE OF UNCERTAINTY AS TO ISRAELI INTENTIONS VIS-A-VIS JORDAN. IF REPORT TRUE, THIS WOULD AMOUNT TO UNNECESSARY RISK-TAKING ON GOI SIDE AND ADDITIONAL FACTOR WORKING AGAINST JORDANIAN MODERATION.
GRAHAM

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED CINCEUR FOR POLAD.

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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT

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SECRET 379

PAGE 01 AMMAN 05363 081848Z

42
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W
046725

O 0817307 OCT 73 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9627

S E C R E T AMMAN 5363

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, MOPS, JO
SUBJ: COOLING OFF THE KING

1. I WILL SEE KING AND PM IN MORNING.

2. SEND ME A FLASH CABLE TIMED FOR ABOUT 0700 ZULU SETTING FORTH OUR VIEWS. MAKE IT CANDID. GIVE ME THE LATEST INFO AND FACTS I NEED TO COOL HIM OFF IF, AS I SUSPECT, THE OTHERS ARE GETTING TO HIM WITH THEIR APPEALS FOR JORDANIAN INTERVENTION. DON'T FORGET HOW HE ACTED IN 1967 EVEN WHEN HE KNEW IN HIS HEART THAT IT WOULD BE A HOPELESS GESTURE.

3. IF WE WANT TO BE MILDLY THREATENING, I'LL DO IT.

4. LET ME HAVE AS WELL HOW WE SEE APPEAL FOR CEASEFIRE GOING. IF NEWS IS SUCH THAT HE WON'T LIKE IT, IT WOULD BE BETTER TO TELL HIM NOW THAN TO LET HIM HEAR IT FROM THIRD PARTIES WHO DO NOT HAVE SAME INTERESTS THAT WE DO.
BROWN

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 376

PAGE 01 AMMAN 05362 081846Z

42
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

USSS-00 /026 W
---------- 046714
O 081728Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9626
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
USINT CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T AMMAN 5362

EXDIS

DEPT PASS DIA INFO IMMEDIATE

EO 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR, MOPS, EG, IS
SUBJ: SADAT MESSAGE TO HUSSEIN

1. ABDUL MUNIM RIFAI WAS EXTREMELY CAGEY DURING OUR FLIGHT TOGETHER AS TO EXACTLY WHAT MESSAGE HE CARRYING FROM SADAT. HE SAID THAT SADAT STILL HOLDS TO POSITION THAT IT NOT NECESSARY FOR JORDAN TO ENTER WAR AS LONG AS IT HOLDS ITS FRONT STRONGLY, THUS PREVENTING ISRAELI STRIKE THROUGH JORDAN AT SYRIA.

2. PROBLEM WITH THIS IS THAT MESSAGE REPRESENTS SADAT'S THINKING AS OF LATE SUNDAY. IT MAY ALL BE CHANGED AND HE AND ASSAD MAY BE TRYING TO PUSH JORDAN INTO THE WAR IN ORDER TO EASE THEIR OWN PROBLEMS. BROWN

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FORM DS-1652

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SECRET 318

PAGE 01 AMMAN 05360 081646Z

45
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00

USSS-00 /026 W
---------- 046357

O 081531Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9625
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
USINT CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T AMMAN 5360

EXDIS

DEPT PASS DIA INFO IMMEDIATE

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR, MOPS, EG, IS
SUBJ: SADAT'S VIEW ON CEASE FIRE

1. HAVE JUST RETURNED, FLYING FROM TABUK WITH JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR TO CAIRO ABDUL MUNIM RIFAI. LATTER WAS DES-PATCHED BY SADAT TO TALK TO KING. ACCORDING RIFAI, SADAT HAS LEARNED THAT USG IS PLANNING TO PUSH FOR A CEASE-FIRE AND RETURN TO STATUS
QUO ANTE AND HE CONSIDERS THIS COMPLETELY UNACC-EPTABLE TO EGYPT. RIFAI PLANS TO DISCUSS THIS WITH KING.

2. RIFAI LEFT CAIRO EARLY THIS MORNING AND IS OUT OF TOUCH WITH WHAT HAPPENED TODAY. HE WILL BE REPORTING TO KING THAT SADAT AND EGYPTIAN MILITARY BELIEVE THEY HAVE WON IMPORTANT VICTORY AND THAT THEY CANNOT BE PUSHED BACK ACROSS THE CANAL. HE WILL ALSO SAY THAT SADAT HAS LARGE ADDITIONAL FORCES WHICH HE PLANS TO PUT INTO BATTLE TODAY AND TOMORROW. EGYPTIAN

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MILITARY BELIEVE THEY HAVE STRENGTH TO PUSH WELL INTO SINAI AND ARE URGING THIS ON SADAT. ALL OF THIS OPTIMISM MAY HAVE THE WRONG SORT OF EFFECT ON KING. I WILL SEE HIM AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. BROWN

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

'73 SEP 30 AM 11:34

CONFIDENTIAL 330

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
2

PAGE 01 AMMAN 05213 291539Z

53
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /026 W
---------- 102649

R 291515Z SEP 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9554
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY MANAMA
AMEMBASSY SANAA

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 5213

EXDIS

DEPT PASS CINCEUR

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, JO, YE
SUBJ: JORDAN AID FOR YEMEN

REF: AMMAN 5189

1. KHAMMASH HAS GIVEN ME A PAPER SPELLING OUT JORDANIAN GRANT AID MENTIONED IN PARA 7 OF REFTEL.

2. RADIO SETS ARE 30 IN NUMBER WITH CSP FOR THREE YEARS.

3. MINISTRY OF EDUCATION IS PROVIDING FIVE COPIES OF ALL TEXT BOOKS USED IN JORDAN PLUS COPY OF SYLLABUS AND PROGRAM FOR ALL CLASSES.

4. MINISTRY OF HEALTH IS SUPPLYING COPIES OF ALL RULES AND REGULATIONS IN EFFECT. IT IS ALSO SENDING SMALL POX AND CHOLERA VACCINE.

5. MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE IS SENDING FRUIT TREES, OLIVES, AND FOREST TREES.

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CONFIDENTIAL

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6. JAF WILL PROVIDE SPACES FOR FOLLOWING COURSES: (A) BASIC TACTICAL FOR OFFICERS, (B) AFVANCE TACTICAL FOR OFFICERS, (C) SPCETAL FORCES, (D) ARMORED COURSES--SALADIN ARMOR CAR, (E) 106MM AT GUN, (F) SMALL ARMS, AND (G) 81 MM MORTAR.

7. GENERAL SECURITY WILL OFFICER: (A) 10 SPACES IN POLICE COLLEGE AND (B) 10 SPACES FOR ON-THE-JOB TRAINING IN GENERAL SECURITY BRANCHES.

8. MINISTRY OF EDUCATION: (A) 5 SPACES IN TEACHERS TRAINING INSTITUTE AND (B) 2 SPACES IN JORDAN UNIVERSITY.

9. MINISTRY OF HEALTH: FIVE SPACFS IN NURSES COLLEGE WITH FULL ACCOMMODATION FOR FEMALES. NO ACCOMMODATION FOR MALES.
BROWN

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SEP 28 PM 3:57
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

CONFIDENTIAL 779

PAGE 01 AMMAN 05189 280748Z

20
CTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /026 W
087035

R 280633Z SEP 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9539
INFO AMEMBASSY SANAA
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY MANAMA

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 5189

EXDIS

DEPT PASS USCINCEUR FOR INFO

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, JO, YE
SUBJ: JORDAN AID FOR YEMEN

1. KHAMMASH HAS GIVEN ME GOJ PROGRAM FOR TECHNICAL HELP TO YEMEN. IT COMES TO 745,892 JDS ANNUALLY. EXPENDITURE WILL NOT REACH THIS LEVEL UNTIL SEPT 1 1974 AS TEACHERS NOT AVAILABLE UNTIL THEN. TO BE FINANCED NOW IS TOTAL OF 152,392 JDS. THIS WILL TAKE CARE OF JAF AND GS (ARMY AND SECURITY PERSONNEL) PLUS ONE DOCTOR.

2. KHAMMASH STATES GOJ DOES NOT HAVE FUNDS. HE ASKS US TO ASSURE PAYMENT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY.

3. JAF AND GS PERSONNEL ARE BROKEN DOWN AS FOLLOWS: JAF, 16 OFFICERS AND 36 NCOS; GS, 3 OFFICERS. AVERAGE MONTHLY PAY FOR EACH OFFICER IS 330 JDS. ACCOMMODATION, TRANS, AND TECHNICAL ALLOWANCES NOT INCLUDED. AVERAGE PAY FOR EACH NCO IS 150 JDS. ALLOWANCES NOT INCLUDED.

4. TOTAL ANNUAL COSTS COMES TO 140,040 JDS. ROUND TRIP COSTS ARE 5060 JDS. TOTAL COST FOR SECONDED OFFICERS AND NCOS IS

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THUS 145,100 JDS.

5. THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH WILL SUPPLY ONE DOCTOR. TOTAL ANNUAL COST OF SALARY AND TRANSPORT IS 7,292 JDS.

6. THE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION WILL SUPPLY AS OF SEP 1: 175 REGULAR TEACHERS AT 165 JD PER MONTH: 50 QUALIFIED (TTI) TEACHERS AT 215 JDS PER MONTH, AND 25 QUALIFIED (BA) TEACHERS AT 250 JDS PER MONTH. TOTAL ANNUAL COST FOR SALARIES IS 550,500 JDS. TRANSPORT AT 23,000 JDS BRINGS TOTAL TO 573,500.

7. KHAMMASH SAYS GOJ WILL UNDERTAKE CERTAIN ADDITIONAL ACTIVITIES AT ITS OWN EXPENSE. IT IS PROVIDING GRATIS EIGHT OFFICERS AND NCOS TO TRAIN AND MAINTAIN SALADINS. IT IS OFFERING SPACES IN ITS MILITARY SCHOOLS GRATIS. SPACES WILL BE FILLED IN GID, MEDICAL SERVICES, REGULAR SERVICES, AND POLICE SCHOOLS. GOJ ALSO SUPPLYING GRATIS LARGE NUMBER OBSOLESCENT RADIOS WITH SPARES IN OPERATIONAL CONDITION TO FILL IN UNTIL BETTER SETS AVAILABLE.
GOJ IS, BELIEVE IT OR NOT, SHIPPING TREES TO YEMEN FREE.

8. KHAMMASH SAID THAT HE BELIEVED THIS PROGRAM WAS WHAT SECRETARY KISSINGER HAD TOLD HIM USG WANTED JORDAN TO DO. HE SAID IT NOT POSSIBLE FOR GOJ TO FINANCE THIS AMOUNT OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE. THE G HAS TO MAKE SURE THAT JORDAN WAS COMPENSATED. REQUEST GUIDANCE.
BROWN

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98/10/819

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SEP 24 PM 7:44

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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SECRET 239

PAGE 01 AMMAN 05112 241343Z

45
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /026 W
---------- 045550

R 241108Z SEP 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9502
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
USINT CAIRO
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

S E C R E T AMMAN 5112

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PASS CINCEUR

E.O. 11652: XGDS1
TAGS: PFOR JO SA
SUBJECT: KING'S VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA

1. KING PLUS PM, CINC, CHIEF OF STAFF AND FEW OTHERS MADE LIGHTNING VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA YESTERDAY. ATTENDED MILITARY PARADE AT TOBOUK AT WHICH KING FEISAL PRESENT PLUS PRINCE SULTAN AND SAUDI MILITARY COMMANDERS.

2. TRIP WAS DISAPPOINTMENT FOR KING HUSSEIN, ACCORDING TO PM. KING HAD HOPED FOR GOOD PRIVATE TALK WITH FEISAL DURING WHICH HE COULD BRING FEISAL UP TO DATE ON RECENT POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS, INCLUDING CAIRO SUMMIT AND AMNESTY. SAUDIS HAD ALREADY BEEN BRIEFED (DEPUTY OF DEFENSE PRINCE TURKI SPENT THREE DAYS IN JORDAN, LEAVING SEPTEMBER 20), BUT HUSSEIN WANT TO MAKE SURE SAUDI PRIDE ASSUAGED BY PERSONAL TALK WITH FEISAL. ONLY TIME TWO WERE TOGETHER PRIVATELY WAS IN CAR TRIPS BETWEEN AIRPORT AND PARADE GROUND. CONVERSATION WAS COMPLETELY DESULTORY WITH FEISAL GIVING

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USUAL ZIONIST-COMMUNIST TIRADE.

3. PM SAYS FEISAL WAS OLDER AND MORE TIRED THP WHEN HE HAD SEEN HIM A FEW MONTHS AGO. THERE WERE BREAKS IN CONVERSATION WHEN FEISAL SEEMED TO DRIFT OFF. TALKS WITH SULTAN WERE MUCH BETTER AND, ACCORDING TO PM, SULTAN SEEMS TO BE FAR MORE IN COMMAND.

4. PM AND SULTAN, WITH HUSSEIN'S AGREEMENT, ARE SETTING UP PRIVATE CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION. AMBASSADOR TO SAUDI ARABIA BHANGITI WILL NOT BE CUT IN.

5. PM SAID PARADE ITSELF WAS A DISGRACE AND SHOWED THAT SAUDIS, DESPITE IMPRESSIVE AMOUNTS OF NEW EQUIPMENT, WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO FIGHT ANYONE.
BROWN

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L8/10/81

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SEP 24 PM 7:44
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

SECRET 048

PAGE 01 AMMAN 05107 241252Z

44
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
---------- 045092

P 241015Z SEP 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9500
INFO USINT CAIRO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY

S E C R E T AMMAN 5107

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS1
TAGS: PFOR, PINS, TS, JO
SUBJECT: TUNISIAN BELIEF HUSSEIN WANTS TO ASSASSINATE
BOURGUIBA

REF: STATE 189364

1. WHEN QABOOS WAS IN LONDON HE ALSO TALKED TO AMER KHAMMASH ABOUT ALLEGED JORDANIAN PLOT AGAINST BOURGUIBA. KHAMMASH PASSED STORY ON TO KING AND PM.

2. PM TELLS ME HE HAS DISCUSSED MATTER WITH AN-NAHAR CORRESPONDENT RAMADAN (WHO DID ORIGINAL INTERVIEW THAT LED TO BREAK). RAMADAN IS OUR SHORTLY WILL BE EN ROUTE TO TUNIS TO SEEK ANOTHER INTERVIEW WITH BOURGUIBA. HE TOLD PM HE WILL REPHRASE HIS QUESTIONS TO BOURGUIBA SO THAT LATTER WOULD SAY SOMETHING NICE ABOUT KING AND JORDAN. THIS MAY HEAL THE BREACH.

2. PM SAID THAT BOURGUIBA HAD SOUGHT OUT ABDUL MUNIM RIFAI AT ALGIERS MEETING TO TELL HIM THAT HE HAD HIGH RESPECT FOR HUSSEIN AND REGRETTED BREAK IN RELATIONS WHICH HE HOPED WOULD BE TEMPORARY.
BROWN

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

'73 SEP 22 PM 2:13

SECRET 490

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 AMMAN 05056 220922Z

14
ACTION SS-25

2

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W
035818

O 220910Z SEP 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9474
INFO USINT CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T AMMAN 5056

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS1
TAGS: PINS, PFOR, TS, JO
SUBJECT: TUNISIAN BELIEF HUSSEIN WANTS TO ASSASSINATE
BOURGIBA

REF: A. TUNIS 5486
B. LONDON 10840

1. I WOULD LIKE PERMISSION TO GO TO KING ASAP AND TELL HIM ABOUT THIS STORY SO HE CAN PUT A STOP TO IT.

2. IT COMES OUT JUST AT MOMENT KING IS SEEKING UNOFFICIAL INTERMEDIARY TO GO TO BOURGIBA TO SAY JORDAN WOULD LIKE TO RESUME DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.

3. COMMENT: KING REALIZES THAT BREAK WAS FOOLISH ACTION ON HIS PART. HE IS LOOKING FOR ANY SORT OF KIND WORD FROM BOURGUIBA AND HE WILL RESTORE.
BROWN

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3:22

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WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

'73 SEP 18 PM 3:22

SECRET 659

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04983 180800Z

2

20
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /026 W
---------- 120809

R 180700Z SEP 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9451
INFO USINT CAIRO

S E C R E T AMMAN 4983

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR JO SY EG
SUBJECT: TRIPARTITE SUMMIT

1. JORDANIAN OFFICIALS REMAIN EXTREMELY CLOSE-MOUTHED ON RESULTS OF CAIRO. HENRY TANNER OF NEW YORK TIMES HERE IN AMMAN FOR FEW DAYS HAS BEEN UNABLE TO GET APPOINTMENTS WITH KING, ZAID RIFAI, OR ADNAN ABU ODEH. LONDON TIMES REPORTER HAVING SAME PROBLEM.

2. GOJ DOES NOT WANT ANY AMMAN-ORIGINATED STORIES WHICH COULD BOTHER ASAD.
BROWN

SECRET
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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SEP 13 PM 3:22

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

2

SECRET 915

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04902 131030Z

12
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /026 W
---------- 081116

R 130945Z SEP 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9424
INFO USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

S E C R E T AMMAN 4902

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PASS CINCEUR

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR
SUBJECT: TRIPARTITE SUMMIT

1. CANNOT GET TO KING UNTIL WEEKEND FOR BRIEFING ON CAIRO MEETING, HAVE SEEN ABU ODEH WHO, HOWEVER, DID NOT TAKE PART IN PRIVATE MEETINGS OF THREE LEADERS. HIS IMPRESSIONS ARE THAT SADAT IS DELIBERATELY TAKING DISTANCE FROM ALGERIANS, LIBYANS, ETC IN ORDER TO OCCUPY MIDDLE GROUND IN ARAB AFFAIRS AND THUS STRENGTHEN HIS POSITION, EXTERNALLY AND INTERNALLY. HE FOUND EGYPTIAN OFFICIALS RELAXED AND FRIENDLY. FROM BEGINNING OF MEETING IT WAS OBVIOUS DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WOULD BE IMMEDIATELY RESOTRED AND THAT EGYPTIANS DID NOT CARE WHAT THE REACTION WOULD BE FROM ARAFAT OR QADDAFI. EGYPTIANS DID NOT PRESS FEDEYEEN CASE AT ALL. INSTEAD THEY EXPRESSED FULL APPRECIATION FOR JORDANIAN VIEW. SAME WAS NOT TRUE WITH ASAD WHO SAID THAT, WHILE HE UNDERSTOOD JORDANIAN POSITION, JORDANIANS HAD TO UNDERSTAND HIS. HE HAS LARGE FEDEYEEN ELEMENTS IN HIS

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 04902 131030Z

COUNTRY AND HE WOULD REALLY LIKE SOME OF THEM TO GO TO JORDAN. ODEH ATTRIBUTES SYRIAN DELAY IN REOPENING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONSHIP TO ASSAD'S NEED OR DESIRE TO CONSULT FURTHER, ALTHOUGH ODEH BELIEVES ASAD WILL PUSH IT THROUGH. HE SAID SYRIANS IN THEIR TALKS
WITH JORDANAINS FOLLOWED PATTERN SET
BY TLAS WHEN HE CAME
TO JORDAN RECENTLY. THEY WERE PRAGMATIC
AND INTERESTED IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, NOT THE SLOGANS SHOUTED IN THE DAMASCUS PRESS. HE WAS HIMSELF IMPRESSED TO HEAR THEM TALKING CONSTANTLY ABOUT TOURISM, AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT ETC.

2. ALSO TALKED TO FIELD MARSHALL MAJALI. HE HAD ATTENDED BRIEFING KING HAD GIVEN FOR TOP LEADERS. THEREAFTER HE HAD HAD PRIVATE TALK WITH THE KING. THE KING TOLD HIM THAT FEDYEEN WOULD NOT RETURN TO JORDAN AND THAT THIS POSSIBILITY HAD NOT BEEN PART OF THE DEAL. KING ALSO TOLD HIM THAT ASAD HAD PRESSED FOR THTS, SAYING HE NEEDED FAVORABLE REACTION FROM JORDAN BECAUSE OF HIS OWN PROBLEMS, JORDAN HAD NEVERTHLESS RESISTED. ACCORDING MAJALI, HE ANSWERED KING BY SAYING THAT AS ASAD HAD PROBLEMS HE AND KING WOULD HAVE PROBLEMS WITH ARMY IF A SINGLE FEDEYEEN RETURNED. TOO MUCH BLOOD HAD BEEN SHED AND THE ARMY WOULD NOT TAKE IT. MAJALI ALSO SAID HE DID NOT MIND SENDING MUNIN RIFAI TO CAIRO AS AMBASSADOR; IF HE HAD HIS WAY, HE RATHER SEND HIM TO JAFR (LOCAL SING SING).

3. THERE IS A SORT OF AIR OF RELIEF AROUND TOWN. JORDANIAN EYES, ESPECIALLY PALESTINIAN EYES, HAVE ALWAYS BEEN COCKED TOWARDS CAIRO. RESTORATION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS MAKES PEOPLE FEEL LESS ISOLATED. THERE IS ALSO AIR OF IMMENSE SATISFACTION THAT JORDANIAN FIRMNESS PAID OFF SO THAT IT WAS EGYPT WHICH CHANGED.
BROWN

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED CINCEUR.

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16/10/819

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 992

46
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /026 W

R 090955Z SEP 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9390
INFO USINT CAIRO

S E C R E T AMMAN 4820

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, JO, EG, SY
SUBJECT: TRIPARTITE SUMMIT IN CAIRO

REF: A. AMMAN 4705V
B. AMMAN 4734

WITH PROLONGATION ALGIERS NONALIGNED CONFERENCE TRIPARTITE MEETING IN CAIRO HAS BEEN PUT BACK AT LEAST A DAY. WORD OF MEETING IS LEAKING OUT IN AMMAN AND WILL PROBABLY HIT PRESS SOON.
BROWN

046237
'73 SEP 10 AM 7:48
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

'73 SEP 9 AM 10:49

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04782 0809497Z

2

14
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /026 W
---------- 042484

R 0807457Z SEP 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SCSTATE WASHDC 9379
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
USINT CAIRO
USMISSION USUN

S E C R E T AMMAN 4782

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: PFOR, PBOR, JO, IS
SUBJ: DAYAN'S THINKING ON EVOLUTION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

REF: A. TEL AVIV 6817
B. TEL AVIV 6819

1. SUMMARY: REFTELS PROVIDE EXCELLENT INSIGHT INTO EVOLVING GOI LAND POLICIES. EXTENT TO WHICH THESE WILL IMPEDE FINAL SETTLEMENT IS COMPLEX QUESTION. FROM JORDAN VANTAGE POINT WE SEE NOT-SO-CREEPING EXPANSION AROUND JERUSALEM AND FUTURE PLANS FOR JORDAN VALLEY AS CREATING TWO CONCENTRIC RINGS AROUND HOLY PLACES. THIS INCREASES DIFFICULTY OF CREATING ACCESS CORRIDOR THAT INTEGRAL TO FACE-SAVING SOLUTION NEEDED BY HUSSEIN. GOI'S GAZA POLICIES ARE BCEOMING GEORGAPHICALLY CLEARER BUT REMAIN POLITICALLY FUZZY. ISRAELIS MAY BE OVER-ESTIMATING EXTENT TO WHICH JORDANIANS INTERESTED IN WHAT'S LEFT OF GAZA. END SUMMARY.

2. TEL AVIV REFTELS ARE AMONG MOST DEFINITIVE REPORTS YET SEEN ON GOI'S EVOLVING LAND AND SETTLEMENT POLICIES. WHILE PROJECTION HIGHLY DISCOURAGING IN TERMS OF LIKELY IMPACT ON ARAB ATTITUDES WE FIND AT LEAST SMALL CONSOLATION THAT ISRAELI BLUEPRINT BECOM-

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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ING MORE READABLE.

3. FOLLOWING ARE COMMENTS ON SPECIFIC ITEMS IN TEL AVIV 6819:
PARA 2: OBSERVATION THAT GOLAN SETTLEMENT PACE REACHING POINT OF NO-RETURN IS SIGNIFICANT AND PERHAPS NOT ADEQUATELY APPRECIATED BY MOST AREA OBSERVERS. OBVIOUS THAT SYRIA STANDS LESS CHANCE THAN JORDAN OR EGYPT OF RECOVERING ANY OF LOST TERRITORIES. DESPITE NECESSITY OF MAKING MORE SYMPATHETIC NOISES, SADAT PROBABLY IS AS INDIFFERENT TO GOS PREDICIMENT AS HUSSEIN. WE WONDER WHAT INEVITABLE SYRIAN ISOLATION WILL MEAN IN TERMS OF OVERALL SETTLEMENT SCENARIO? IF NEGOTIATIONS EVER GET UNDERWAY, EXCEEDINGLY FRUSTRATED GOS MORE LIKELY TO ATTEMPT RASH WRECKING ACTION THAN PALESTINIAN ORGANIZATIONS, WHICH EDGING TOWARD COMPROMISE. WE DON'T HAVE ANY ANSWERS TO THIS PROBLEM, BUT WOULD LIKE TO CAUTION AGAINST FORGETTING POTENTIAL GOLAN TROUBLES THROUGH PREOCCUPATION WITH BRINGING EGYPTIANS AND ISRAELIS TO CONFERENCE TABLE.
PARA 3: YEACOBI'S RATIONALIZATION THAT LAND PURCHASES AROUND TUL-KARM AND JERUSALEM MAINLY MOTIVATED TO PROVIDE LABOR-INTENSIVE INDUSTRY FOR BENEFIT OF LOCAL INHABITANTS PATENTLY ABSURD. HIS STRAINED JUSTIFICATION FOR TALKARM IN FACT UNNECESSARY BECAUSE JORDANIANS NO DOUBT HAVE WRITTEN OFF THIS DISTANT APPENDAGE WHICH PRACTICALLY IN TEL AVIV'S SUBURBS.
PARA 4: WE ARE INCLINED TO DISAGREE THAT SIGNIFICANT QUESTION IS WHETHER TERRITORY ADDED TO JERUSALEM FORMALLY ANNEXED OR NOT: ON OTHER HAND, WE AGREE FULLY THAT ROOT DIFFICULTY IS ORIGINAL ANNEX-ATION OF EASTERN SECTOR IN 1967. QUESTION OF WHETHER INEVITABLE ENCROACHMENTS ON JERUSALEM CONSTITUTE MAJOR BARRIER TO MIDDLE EAST PEACE IS MORE DIFFICULT TO ANSWER. WE DETECT INCREASING DESPAIR AND FATALISM ON PART OF GOJ DECISION MAKERS WHO APPRECIATE EXTENT OF JORDAN'S IMPOTENCE. KING IS AND HAS BEEN READY TO TALK: MOST LIKELY HE IS INTERESTED IN FACE-SAVING FORMULA FOR ACCESS TO CITY AND SOVEREIGNTY OVER HOLY PLACES. ISRAELI EFFORT TO SEW UP CLAIM TO GREATER JERUSALEM BY RINGING IT WITH SETTLEMENTS IS UNDER-STANDABLE, BUT IRONICALLY THEY MAY BE COMPLICATING CHANCES FOR DEAL WITH ALREADY AMENABLE JORDAN KING BY BLOCKING OFF ACCESS CORRIDOR. ISRAELIS ARE LUCKY TO BE FACING SUCH MILD ADVERSARY AS HUSSEIN; HOWEVER, THEIR ANNEXATION POLICIES IN JERUSALEM AND ELSEWHERE IN WEST BANK MAY WELL BE DRIVING HIM TOWARDS FUTURE INTRACTABILITY. IT WOULD BE IRONIC INDEED OF GOJ POSITION HARDENED AT TIME WHEN THAT OF EGYPTIANS FINALLY SOFTENED.

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PAGE 03 AMMAN 04782 0809497

AGAINST HUSSEIN'S READINESS TO DEAL MUST BE WEIGHED FACT THAT HE UNWILLING TO GO DOWN IN HISTORY AS DESCENDENT OF PROPHET WHO SIGNED AWAY DEED TO SECOND HOLIEST SITE IN ISLAMIC WORLD. IN SUM, WE SEE ISRAELI JERUSALEM POLICY AS EXAMPLE OF "OVER-KILL" AND MISREADING OF PRECISE NATURE OF JORDAN'S WEAKNESSES. PARA 5: REFTEL OBSERVATION ABOUT IMPROVEMENT OF REFUGEES LOT IS LOGICALLY CORRECT BUT, UNFORTUNATELY, IRRELEVANT IN TERMS OF ARAB EMOTIONS. PAST 25 YEARS HAVE SHOWN THAT ARAB REGIMES CYNICALLY HAVE "USED" REFUGEES FOR OWN POLITICAL PURPOSES WITH LITTLE HUMANITARIAN CONCERN FOR THEIR PLIGHT. "LIQUIDATION OF PALESTINIAN IDENTITY" IS CATHWORD IN ARABS' PROPAGANDA VOCABULARY. GOI IS NAIVE IF IT EXPECTS ARABS TO REMAIN SILENT ON THIS ONE. WE SHARE TEL AVIV'S DOUBTS THAT AMELIORATION OF REFUGEES' LIVING CONDITIONS WILL BRING REALITY TO DAYAN DREAM OF REDUCED COMMUNAL TENSION.

4. TEL AVIV 6817 PROVIDED ADDITIONAL VALUABLE INSIGHTS INTO THINKING OF MAN LIKELY TO SHAPE FUTURE OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. WE ARE STRUCK BY FACT THAT HIS PLANS ARE INCREASINGLY CLEAR GEO-RAPHICALLY BUT RETAIN CUSTOMARY POLITICAL FUZZINESS. REF TO DAYSN'S DESIRE TO GIVE INHABITANTS GREATER POLITICAL AUTONOMY OVER NEXT FOUR YEARS (PARA 1) CONTRASTS INTERESTINGLY WITH REMARKS CONCERNING ANNEXATION AND "ISRAELI CONTROL" CONTAINED PARA 4. REFERENCES TO CREATION OF DISTINCT POLITICAL ENTITIES IN SOUTH AND NORTH GAZA ESPECIALLY INTERESTING AND SUGGEST NEW APPLICATION OF TIME-HONORED "DIVIDE AND RULE" THEORY. CONCURRENT BUILDING OF YAMIT WOULD CREATE CRAZY-QUILT POLITICAL PATTERN IN THIS COASTAL AREA THAT WOULD RENDER MEANINGLESS ANY POLITICAL "PRIVILEGES" EXTENDED TO JORDAN. ISRAELIS MAY BE OVERESTIMATING DEGREE TO WHICH HUSSEIN WOULD BE INTERESTED IN ACQUIRING GAZAN SUBJECTS. RECORD OF PAST TWELVE MONTHS SHOWS THAT GOJ RELUCTANT EVEN TO GIVE RESTRICTED PASSPORTS TO GAZANS WHO CERTIFIED "SAFE" BY RASHAD SHAWWA. DAYAN IS NOBODY'S FOOL, SO WE ASSUME THERE MAY BE A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF CYNICISM ABOUT CUTTING JORDAN IN ON GAZA GAME. DESIRE TO INCORPORATE MOST OF JORDAN VALLEY INTO ISRAEL (PARA 3) WOULD INJECT ADDITIONAL COMPLICATION INTO JORDAN-ISRAEL NEGOTIATIONS, SINCE THIS WOULD MAKE NOT ONLY EAST JERUSA-LEM BUT TRUNCATED WEST BANK TERRITORIES MERELY JORDANIAN ISLANDS IN ISRAELI SEA. IN EFFIECT JORDANIAN ACCESS TO HOLY PLACES WOULD BE CUT OFF BY TWO CONCENTRIC CIRCLES OF ISRAELI HABITATION, ONE AROUND CITY ITSELF AND OTHER ALONG RIVER. THIS WOULD STRIKE

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PAGE 04 AMMAN 04782 080949Z

ANOTHER BLOW AT CORRIDOR CONCEPT WHICH OTHERWISE COULD PROVIDE NEAT FACE-SAVING DEVICE FOR HUSSEIN.

5. WE TRUST THIS AND OTHER AMMAN COMMENTARIES ON EVOLVING ISRAELI LAND POLICIES WILL NOT BE BRANDED AS ADVOCACY OF GOJ VIEWPOINT. FACT IS THAT HASHEMITE INTERESTS (MAXIMUM RESTORATION OF LOST TERRITORIES) AND THOSE OF USG (ENDING MIDDLE EAST CRISIS) NOT NECESSARILY IDENTICAL. FROM THIS VANTAGE POINT WE ARE BEGINNING TO WONDER IF "CREEPING" IS A BIT TO CONSERVATIVE AS DESCRIPTION OF ANNEXATION PACE. WE WOULD BE SURPRISED IF ISRAELIS ADOPTED ANYTHING OTHER THAN PRESENT POLICIES WHICH LIKELY TO BRING THEM SHORT-TERM SUCCESS. OUR CONCERN IS OVER POTENTIAL IMPEDIMENTS TO REALIZATION OF US POLICY GOALS. BROWN

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Eb/10/8107

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT

DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 567

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04732 0414247Z

44
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W
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O 041350Z SEP 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9350

S E C R E T AMMAN 4732

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: EGEN, JO
SUBJECT: HEAD OF ROYAL SCIENTIFIC SOCIETY IS FIRED

1. DR. ELI BAGHDADI, AMERICAN CITIZEN WHO SINCE LATE 1971 HAS HEADED JORDAN'S ROYAL SCIENTIFIC SOCIETY, WAS RELIEVED FROM POSITION SEPTEMBER 4 PURSUANT TO DECISION TAKEN BY RSS BOARD OF DIRECTORS NIGHT BEFORE. CENTRAL BANK GOVERNOR NABULSI TOLD EMBOFF THIS AT NOON TODAY, SAYING HE HAD INFORMED BAGHDADI OF FINAL DECISION AN HOUR BEFORE AND EXPECTED BAGHDADI WOULD LEAVE JORDAN FOR US SEPTEMBER 5. NABULSI SAID HE WOULD TODAY BE SEEING JAMES ACHTERHOF OF JORDAN'S AMERICAN ADVISORY FIRM (CONNOLE AND O'CONNELL) AND ASKING HIM HAVE JACK O'CONNELL FLY IMMEDIATELY TO AMMAN TO DISCUSS POSSIBLE LEGAL ACTION IN US AGAINST BAGHDADI.

2. NABULSI STATED RSS BOARD NOT ONLY DEEPLY SUSPICIOUS BAGHDADI HAS BEEN USING RSS FUNDS FOR HIS OWN PURPOSES IN US BUT HAS CERTAIN KNOWLEDGE OF TWO OR THREE INSTANCES OF HIS MISCONDUCT WITH FUNDS OF RSS IN LOCAL JORDANIAN BANKS. SAID THAT AS REGULAR AND AGREED PRACTICE, SIZABLE RSS FUNDS HAVE BEEN DEPOSITED IN BANK ACCOUNT OF BAGHDADI'S OWN COMPANY IN BOSTON AREA. THEN BAGHDADI HAS BEEN TRANSFERRING SUMS TO TWO DIFFERENT US WEST COAST ELECTRONIC FIRMS THAT ARE ENGAGED ON RSS BUSINESS. BOARD NOW BELIEVES BAGHDADI AT VERY LEAST HAS "OVERCHARGED" RSS FOR SERVICES OF THOSE FIRMS. AS CONVERSATION PROCEEDED,

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 04732 041424Z

NABULSI MADE FLAT STATEMENTS TO EMBOFFS THAT BAGHDADI HAS BEEN ENGAGED IN "EMBEZZLEMENT" AND "HAS TAKEN JORDAN FOR AN EXPENSIVE RIDE."

3. NABULSI SAID HE WAS TELLING US THIS AS BACKGROUND FOR FOLLOWING REQUEST THAT CROWN PRINCE HAD SPECIFICALLY DIRECTED HIM TO POSE TO EMBASSY. CP AND RSS WONDER IF USG WILLING EXTEND ASSISTANCE ON CLOSELY HELD BASIS BY HAVING APPROPRIATE AGENCY "SUCH AS FBI" PROBE BANK RECORDS OF BAGHDADI AND HIS BOSTON COMPANY (WHICH NABULSI DESCRIBED AS PRETTY MUCH A FAMILY CONCERN, INVOLVING BAGHDADI HIMSELF, WIFE AND PERHAPS CHILDREN) TO SEEK EVIDENCE OF FINANCIAL MISCONDUCT. HE APPRECIATED THAT CENTRAL CHANNEL FOR PURSUING MATTER SHOULD BE PRIVATE LAW FIRM, BUT CP AND RSS BELIEVED USG COOPERATION MIGHT BE ESSENTIAL AND THAT USG MIGHT FOR REASONS OF ITS OWN WANT TO ASSIST. DEGREE OF USG ASSISTANCE, WHICH TO BE OF MAXIMUM HELPFULNESS SHOULD BE ON URGENT BASIS, WOULD HELP DETERMINE WHETHER AND HOW FAR TO PROSECUTE CASE AGAINST BAGHDADI IN COURTS. EMBOFFS RESPONDED THAT NABULSI WOULD APPRECIATE THIS WAS VERY DELICATE MATTER AND THAT, OFFHAND, LEGAL REMEDIES WOULD SEEM THE MAIN RECOURSE, BUT WE PROMISED HIM A FURTHER RESPONSE SOONEST.

4. COMMENT: FACT THAT BAGHDADI WAS IN SERIOUS TROUBLE WITH RSS DIRECTORS AND CP, WHO CHAIRS RSS BOARD AND PRIDES HIMSELF ON HAVING BUILT UP ORGANIZATION, HAS BEEN RUMORED IN AMMAN CIRCLES FOR SOME TIME. WE HAVE FELT THAT LOCAL SUSPICIONS MAY HAVE STARTED OVER BAGHDADI'S ROLE IN HIGH-POWERED TRANSMITTER PROJECT LAST YEAR.
BROWN

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S6/10/8109

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SECRET 692

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04544 231049Z

15
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
---------- 030511

R 221306Z AUG 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9279
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY SANAA

S E C R E T AMMAN 4544

EXDIS

DEPT PASS MUSCAT

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, JO, MU
SUBJ: GRENADE LAUNCHERS FOR OMAN

1. I HAVE HAD TWO GO-AROUNDS WITH PRIME MINISTER IN PAST TWO DAYS ON GRENADE LAUNCHERS. HE IS INCENSED THAT WE ARE ASKING GOJ TO TURN OVER TO US TREASURY SALES PROCEEDS FROM LAUNCHERS AND GRENADES. HE SAYS THIS MAKES NO SENSE AS RESULT IS THAT JORDAN LOSES ITS STOCKS AND THEN HAS TO PURCHASE REPLACEMENTS FROM ITS OWN BUDGET. WHY IS THIS NECESSARY, HE ASKED, WHEN ALL JORDAN IS DOING IS PROVIDING ARMS TO OMAN IN ACCORD WITH WHAT IT THOUGHT WERE US DESIRES?

2. I TOLD HIM WE HAD NEVER ASKED JORDAN TO GIVE OR SELL GRENADE LAUNCHERS TO OMAN. THIS WAS A DEAL WORKED UP LOCALLY. WE HAVE NO MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR OMAN. WHAT HE PROPOSES IS THAT JORDAN SET ON UP AND HAVE THE US FINANCE IT. I SUGGESTED THAT JORDAN GET OUT OF THE BUSINESS OF SUPPLYING ARMS TO GULF STATES IF IT EXPECTS US TO REPLACE THE ARMS GRATIS. IT JUST WON'T WORK. IT WOULD BE EASIER ALL AROUND, I CONCLUDED, FOR THOSE JORDANIANS IN THE GULF, WHO ARE ASKED FOR ARMS, TO POINT WAY TO US EMBASSY.

'73 AUG 23 AM 11:40
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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SECRET

PAGE 02 AMMAN 04544 231049Z

3. THIS HAD TO BE PUT BLUNTLY AS ZAID (PLUS KING, CP, KHAMMASH, ETC., ETC.) ARE UNDER IMPRESSION THAT US WANTS IT TO ACT QUICKLY AND EFFECTIVELY TO SHORE UP GULF STATES, INCLUDING FAST SUPPLY OF ARMS AND AMMO WHEN WHAT USG REALLY WANTS IT TO DO IS RE-READ THE MAP AGREEMENT. BROWN

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED MUSCAT.

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SECRET

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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SECRET 462

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 04536 221253Z

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
---------- 020687

R 221153Z AUG 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9275
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
USINT CAIRO
RUESRUPVAMEMBASSY JIDDA 2270
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

S E C R E T AMMAN 4536

EXDIS

DEPT PASS CINCEUR

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR, EG, JO, SY
SUBJ: JORDANIAN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH SYRIA AND
EGYPT

REF: AMMAN 4229

1. PM RIFAI SAID HE HAS NO PROGRESS TO REPORT ON RESUMPTION RELATIONS WITH EGYPT AND SYRIA. HE DOES KNOW THAT ARAFAT HAS BEEN CAMPAIGNING HARD AGAINST TRIPARTITE SUMMIT. HE SAID KAMAL ADWAN HAS BEEN ACTIVELY TALKING TO PEOPLE IN THE AREA BUT HE DOES NOT KNOW THEME OF HIS TALKS. HE WONDERS IF FIESEL IS TRYING TO GET INTO ACT AFTER EARLIER BEING NEGATIVE.

2. DOES JIDDA HAVE ANYTHING?
BROWN

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED CINCEUR.

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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SECRET 449

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04496 210915Z

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
---------- 008014

R 210815Z AUG 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9256
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY SANAA

S E C R E T AMMAN 4496

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, JO, YE
SUBJECT: ARMS FOR YAR

REF: SANAA 1533

WE MENTIONED SUBJECT OF CAPTURED MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO HAIDAR MUSTAFA. HE APPARENTLY WILL TAKE THIS UP DURING CONSULTATION. AS MINOR CORRECTION, HE SAID EQUIPMENT TAKEN FROM FEDAYEEN, NOT SYRIANS. SRF UNDERSTANDS VERY LITTLE REMAINS FROM THESE STOCKS, EXCEPT FOR SOME EXPLOSIVES.
BROWN

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 250

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04408 180954Z

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ACTION SS-25

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INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 /026 W
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P 180918Z AUG 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9223
INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY SANAA PRIORITY

S E C R E T AMMAN 4408

EXDIS

DEPT PASS MUSCAT

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, JO
SUBJ: SALADINS FOR YEMEN

REF: AMMAN 4160(NOTAL)

1. AMER KHAMMASH TELLS ME THAT SHEIK ZAYID REQUEST IS 42 SALADINS: 30 FOR YEMEN AND 12 FOR OMAN. HE HOPES DEAL WILL GO THROUGH AS BOTH COUNTRIES CAN USE SALADINS EFFECTIVELY.

2. KHAMMASH IS JUST BACK FROM ABU DHABI WHERE HE HAD SERIES OF MEETINGS WITH ZAYID. ZAYID AGREED TO PAY FOR SECOND-PHASE JORDANIAN DELIVERY OF AMMO (ABOUT $450,000). ALL HE ASKS FOR IS BILL AND LIST OF ITEMS. ZAYID SAID HE WILL FINANCE SIMILAR SHIPMENTS FROM JORDAN ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS. ALL HE WANTS IS A YEMENI REQUEST AND AN ITEMIZED BILL FROM JORDAN. KHAMMASH WARNED ZAYID THAT YEMEN COULD BE A BOTTOMLESS WELL. ZAYID AGREED AND SAID THAT IS WHY HE WANTS TO CONSIDER ITEMS ON CASE-BY-CASE BASIS RATHER THAN ESTABLISHING A CASH SUBSIDY SYSTEM.

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 AMMAN 04408 180954Z

3. ANY NEWS ON REPLACEMENTS?
BROWN

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SECRET

001/10/810

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

WH

SECRET 489

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04360 1414237Z

2/3

46
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
---------- 083213

R 1413257Z AUG 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9211
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

S E C R E T AMMAN 4360

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PASS CINCEUR

E.O. 11652: XGDS1
TAGS: PFOR, EG, JO
SUBJECT: EL-KHOLY VISIT: SECOND STAGE

REF: AMMAN 4229

1. SUMMARY. PM GIVES STATE OF PLAY WITH SYRIA AND EGYPT. ASKS US UNDERSTANDING OF JORDANIAN STRATEGY AND GOALS.

2. PM RIFAI WENT OVER EVENTS SINCE THOSE DESCRIBED REFTEL. AS MEETINGS WITH EL-KHOLY WENT ON LATTER SAID THERE WAS NO USE DISCUSSING RETURN OF FEDAYEEN TO JORDAN AS IT "NO LONGER RELEVANT." EQUALLY DISMISSED EASTERN FRONT AND UNIFIED COMMANDER, SAYING JORDAN CORRECT IN SAYING THERE NO USE FOR EASTERN FRONT AS LONG AS COUNTRIES NOT UNITED ON PLANS AND POLICIES AND WHILE COUNTRIES LIKE JORDAN NOT READY FOR CONFRONTATION. EL-KHOLY WENT ON TO EXPLAIN THAT SADAT ALONE, AGAINST ADVICE ALL ADVISERS, HAD DECIDED ON DIPLOMATIC

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 04360 141423Z

BREAK. FEDAYEEN-RETURN, EASTERN FRONT, ETC., WERE THEN LISTED AS PRE-CONDITIONS FOR RESTORATION RELATIONS BUT EVEN SADAT FINALLY RECOGNIZED JORDAN WOULD NOT CHANGE BASIC POLICIES IN ORDER TO GET RECOGNITION. EL-KHOLY THEN SAID SADAT NEEDED SOME SOFTENING UP. REQUESTED KING TO PHONE SADAT. LATTER DID SO AND THERE ENSUED INOCUOUS CONVERSATION WHICH KING THOUGHT WOULD BE TPAED AND USED AT LATER DATE. (CAIRO PRESS ANNOUNCED PHONE CALL.)

3. AFTER SOME DISCUSSION, EL-KHOLY SAID HE WOULD GO ON TO DAMASCUS. ASKED FOR TWO THINGS: FX-PM MUNIM RIFAI TO ACCOMPANY AND, SECOND, HUSSEIN WILLINGNESS VISIT SADAT IN CAIRO. EXPLAINED THAT HE HAD NO INVITATION FROM SADAT TO GIVE TO KING BUT THOUGHT HE COULD ARRANGE IT. KING SAID OKAY.

4. TRIP TO DAMASCUS WENT SMOOTHLY. EL-KHOLY RETURNED TO CAIRO. HE WILL TALK TO SADAT. HE EXPECTS TO SET UP TRIPARITE MEETING IN CAIRO SOMETIME AROUND AUGUST 25-28.

5. RIFAI SAID THIS ALL SOUNDED FINE BUT MUCH DEPENDED ON SADAT'S FINAL REACTION. ON BALANCE, HE THOUGHT THERE CHANCE IT WOULD WORK OUT. RIFAI SPECULATES THAT EGYPTIANS AND SYRIANS ARE LOOKING FOR TWO THINGS: FIRST, A WAY OUT OF IMPENDING CONFRONTATION INTO WHICH THEY ARE DRIFTING AND, SECOND, A NEW CHANNEL TO U.S. IF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ARE RESTORED, HE IMAGINES THAT SADAT WILL TELL HIS PEOPLE THAT NO ACTION CAN BE TAKEN AT PRESENT BECAUSE JORDAN'S CONTRIBUTION TO EVENTUAL CONFRONTATION HAS TO BE ASSESSED. THIS WILL RELIEVE PRESSURE AND CREATE EXTENSION OF CEASES-FIE DURING WHICH U.S. COULD RE-EXAMINE ITS POSITION.

6. RIFAI SIAD THAT HE HAD TOLD EL-KHOLY (AND KING HAD BACKED HIM STRONGLY) THAT JORDAN WAS NOT CHANGING ITS POLICIES. IT WOULD NOT GET INTO WAR AND IT WOULD NOT CHANGE ITS CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH USG. RIFAI THEN WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE AND KING HAD MADE IT PLAIN THAT, ONCE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS RESTORED, JORDAN EXPECTS EGYPT AND SYRIA TO WORK HARD ON KUWAIT.

7. RIFAI SAID HE WANTED USG TO UNDERSTAND THESE POINTS. JORDAN IS NOT SUCKING UP TO EGYPT AND SYRIA IN ANY SYMPATHY WITH THEIR PRESENT POLICIES OR ANTI-US KICK THEY ARE ON. INSTEAD IT IS LOOKING TO ITS OWN FINANCIAL FUTURE. IT ALSO BELIEVES THAT BY STANDING FIRM IT HAS HELPED TO SHOW SADAT AND ASSAD HOLLOWNESS

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 03 AMMAN 04360 141423Z

OF THEIR OWN POLICIES AND, HOPEFULLY, IT MIGHT BE ABLE TO LEAD THEM INTO MORE PRODUCTIVE WAYS. HE THOUGHT THAT ISRAELIS MIGHT MAKE A BIT OF PRESS FUSS IF RELATIONS RENEWED BUT THAT THEY WOULD UNDERSTAND VALIDITY AND CONTINUITY OF JORDAN'S POLICIES. HE HOPED USG WOULD BE SYMPATHETIC. OF COURSE, HE CONCLUDED, ALL THIS MAY FALL APART.
BROWN

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SECRET

29

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

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WH

SECRET 359

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04358 141334Z

2/3

53
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
---------- 082703

R 141320Z AUG 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9209
INFO AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY JIDDA

S E C R E T AMMAN 4358

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, JO, MU
SUBJECT: GRENADE LAUNCHERS FOR OMAN

REF: STATE 160292

DATT SENT LETTER TO JAA CHIEF-OF-STAFF BIN SHAKER ON AUGUST 7 INFORMING HIM OF USG AUTHORIZATION RE TRANSFER OF GRENADE LAUNCHERS AND AMMO TO OMAN. WE ARE EXPECTING NOTIFICATION OF RESULTANT JAA ACTION WITHIN NEXT FEW DAYS; WILL INQUIRE IF THIS NOT RECEIVED.
BROWN

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

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'73 AUG 12 PM 5:3

SECRET 114

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04287 1208137Z

2

10
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
067252

R 1207337 AUG 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9179
INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
AMEMBASSY DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
AMEMBASSY SANAA

S E C R E T AMMAN 4287

EXDIS

DEPT PASS USCINCEUR FOR INFO

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, YE, JO
SUBJ: EMERGENCY ARMS ASSISTANCE FOR YEMEN

REF: AMMAN 4259

SPOKE TO GENERAL BEN SHAKER. HE UNDERSTANDS PROBLEM AND WILL MAKE SURE SAUDIS GET BRIEFING.
BROWN

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'73 AUG 4 PM 6:3

CONFIDENTIAL

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04184 060911Z 2

12
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W
014334

O 060910Z AUG 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9125

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 4184

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP, JO
SUBJECT: PROTECTION FOR KING'S SONS

REF: STATE 154229

1. JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR SALAH HAS EVIDENTLY BEEN BRIEFED BY DEPARTMENT ON BOTH PARAS OF REFTEL.

2. AS RESULT ZAID RIFAI CALLED ME LAST NIGHT ON BEHALF OF KING TO EXPRESS LATTER'S UNHAPPINESS. ACCORDING RIFAI, SALAH WAS TOLD THAT OGDEN HANDLING EVERYTHING IN USG "NOT RESPONSIBLE" FOR SAFETY KING'S SONS. I AM SURE THIS IS MISINTERPRETATION OR A SORT OF SEMANTIC PROBLEM. WOULD APPRECIATE IT, HOWEVER, IF DEPARTMENT COULD STRAIGHTEN THIS OUT BOTH IN MESSAGE TO ME AND IN RE-BRIEFING OF SALAH.

3. AS FOR TUTOR, AFRAID I CANNOT GIVE DEFINITE ANSWER BEFORE AUGUST 6. SALAH HAS SCREWED THIS UP ENOUGH SO THAT I CANNOT GET DECISION. DEPARTMENT WILL HAVE TO SETTLE WITH HIKMET AND MUNA IN WASHINGTON.
BROWN

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13 AUG 4 PM

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

SECRET 355

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04131 041204Z

44
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
---------- 008385

R 041130Z AUG 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9100
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

S E C R E T AMMAN 4131

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, EG, JO, IS
SUBJECT: CONSULTATIONS PRIOR TO WALDHEIM'S VISIT TO M.E.

REF: CAIRO 2268

1. STRONGLY SUPPORT USINT CAIRO SUGGESTION THAT WALDHEIM VISIT OFFERS APPROPRIATE OPPORTUNITY TO BEGIN CONVEYING FORCEFULLY TO ISRAELIS BELIEF THAT THEY SHOULD RESPOND TO OUR SUPPORT (UN VETO) BY OFFERING SADAT FACE-SAVING DEVICES THAT COULD LEAD TO SETTLEMENT. TIME IS ALSO PROPITIOUS IN JORDANIAN CONTEXT. AS WE HAVE REPORTED EXTENSIVELY IN RECENT WEEKS, GOJ DEEPLY CONCERNED BY ZAYYAT/BOURGUIBA PROPOSALS AND CONCURRENT PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF ALTERNATE PALESTINIAN ENTITY THAT COULD EVOLVE AT POLITICAL OR TERRITORIAL EXPENSE OF HASHEMITES. GOJ-CONTROLLED MEDIA WORKING OVERTIME TO DISCREDIT TALK OF ANYTHING THAT MIGHT ALTER POLITICAL MAKE-UP OF EAST BANK.

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 AMMAN 04131 0412047

PRIMIN RIFAI MADE SPECIAL POINT IN WIDELY CIRCULATED JULY 26 KUWAIT NEWSPAPER INTERVIEW THAT GOJ HAS POSITIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD WEST BANK PLEBISCITE. IMPLICATION WAS THAT GOJ MAINLY INTERESTED IN FORWARD MOTION, WHETHER THIS MEANS RECOVERY OF WEST BANK, ACCEPTANCE OF KING'S UAK PLAN, OR EVEN WEST BANK INDEPENDENCE. (KING SAID APPROXIMATELY SAME THING IN LONDON TIMES ARTICLE INTENTIONALLY TIMED FOR RELEASE JUST PRIOR TO LAST WASHINGTON VISIT.) HUSSEIN'S TRUE FEELINGS TOWARD FUTURE OF WEST BANK NOT SO CAVALIER, BUT BY ALL INDICATIONS HE IS READY BUY ANY REASONABLE PROPOSAL THAT WILL ELIMINATE PERCEIVED THREAT OF "EXTERNAL" PALESTINIAN INITIATIVE.

2. WE RECOGNIZE EXISTENCE OF MANY VALID ARGUMENTS AGAINST JORDAN-ISRAEL SETTLEMENT PRECEDING ONE WITH EGYPT. HOWEVER, GOJ FLEXIBILITY AND READINESS TO SETTLE UNDER THESE NEW CIRCUMSTANCES COULD BE FAVORABLE FACTOR IN MEDIATORS' EFFORTS TO WRING AGREEMENT FROM BOTH ISRAELIS AND EGYPTIANS.

3. OLD CLICHE STILL VALID THAT HISTORY OF MIDDLE EAST IS ONE OF MISSED OPPORTUNITIES. WALDHEIM MAY NOT BE MOST DYNAMIC MEDIATOR TO COME ALONG, BUT HIS UPCOMING VISIT REPRESENTS YET ANOTHER OPPORTUNITY TO DO SOMETHING.
BROWN

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 140

2

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04048 311317Z

53
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
---------- 098986

R 3110437Z JUL 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9066
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY SANAA

S E C R E T AMMAN 4048

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: MASS, YE, JO, SA, EG
SUBJ: FILLING YEMEN'S IMMEDIATE LOGISTICAL NEEDS

REF: A. JIDDA 3081
B. SANAA 1410

1. DESPITE TEMPORARY PROBLEMS GENERATED BY HUSSEIN'S GENEROSITY AND PRINCE SULTAN'S DIFFIDENCE, JORDANIAN ARMS DELIVERIES TO YAR PROVING REASONABLY SUCCESSFUL VENTURE. THESE PRESUMABLY HAVE GIVEN YEMENIS NEEDED PSYCHOLIGICAL BOOST; MOST IMPORTANTLY, OPERATION PROVIDES EVIDENCE THAT REGIONAL COOPERATION AND THIRD-PARTY DEFENSE ASSISTANCE IS FEASIBLE. SANAA REFTEL SUGGESTS FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR GOJ-YARG COOPERATION ARE EVEN BRIGHTER. COORDINATION WITH SAUDIS WILL CONTINUE TO BE DELICATE MATTER, BUT THIS SITUATION LIKEWISE SEEMS TO BE IMPROVING.

2. TAKING BROADER LOOK AT US-SAUDI-JORDANIAN EFFORTS TO HELP YAR MEET PDRY THREAT, FACT REMAINS THAT YEMENIS WILL NEED LONG TIME TO ABSORB AND EFFECTIVELY UTILIZE WESTERN-ORIGIN WEAPONRY. EVEN IF OVERSTATED BY YARG, PDRY THREAT IS AN IMMEDIATE ONE. APPEARS TO US THAT YAR'S REALLY CRITICAL SHORT-TERM NEED IS FOR SOVIET-ORIN SPARES AND AMMO, ESPECIALLY SINCE VEHICLES AND WEAPONS ALMOST WHOLLY OF SOV AND SATELLITE MANUFACTURE. PRINCE SULTAN'S IDEAS ABOUT PROCUREMENT OF SURPLUS EGYPTIAN MATERIEL

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SECRET

PAGE 02 AMMAN 04048 311317Z

THEREFORE MERIT URGENT CONSIDERATION. WHILE DEFERRING TO JIDDA AND SANAA OPINIONS, WE PERCEIVE REAL BENEFITS IN PROMPT DELIVERIES OF SAUDI-PURCHASED EGYPTIAN ITEMS; ALLOWING EGYPTIANS TO GET INTO ACT WITH DIRECT SUPPLY LIKELY TO REVIVE MANY OLD PROBLEMS THAT HAPPILY DISAPPEARED IN LATE 1967.

3. ADDITIONAL THOUGHT OCCURS THAT EGYPT IS NEITHER SOLE NOR NECESSARILY BEST POTENTIAL SOURCE FOR MATERIEL. WITH USG HELP, SAUDIS POSSIBLY COULD FIND EAGER SELLERS AND AMPLE STOCKS IN INDONESIA, PAKISTAN, OR OTHER COUNTRIES WHERE SOVIET ROMANCE HAS COOLED BUT HARDWARE REMAINS. INDONESIA SHOULD BE ESPECIALLY LIKELY SOURCE, GIVEN SAG INTEREST IN PROMOTING CONTACTS WITH MUSLIM SOUTH-EAST ASIA. PERHAPS STOCKPILES OF CAPTURED EQUIPMENT COULD BE TAPPED IN VIETNAM OR SOUTH KOREA. SELLERS SHOULD BE HAPPY TO GET RID OF KOREAN-VINTAGE ITEMS WHICH JUST WHAT YEMENIS NEED. WITH BIT OF DISCREET BEHIND-SCENES COORDINATION ON PART OF USG, SAUDIS MIGHT FIND SOME UNEXPECTED BARGAINS ALONG THIS ALTERNATE ROUTE AS WELL AS SOLVE URGENT SHORT-TERM SUPPLY CRISIS ABOUT WHICH YARG COMPLAINING. DIVIDENT FOR USG AND GOJ (WHICH NEED NOT BE STRESSED TO SAUDIS) WOULD BE EXCLUSION OF EGYPT FROM POTENTIALLY TROUBLESOME PENINSULA ROLE.
BROWN

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 697

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04036 301319Z

42
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
---------- 089563

R 301255Z JUL 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9054

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 4036

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP, JO
SUBJ: TRAVEL BY PRINCESS TO US

1. CHIEF ROYAL PROTOCOL ADVISED EMBASSY OF FOLLOWING SCHE-DULE FOR PRINCESS MUNA AND FOUR CHILDREN:

A) 8 AUG. DEP. AMMAN FOR LONDON (ACCOMPANIED BY NURSES AND CHIEF OF PROTOCOL)

B. 9 AUG. DEP. LONDON VIA OBAC BA521 AT 1330 ARR. 1640 DULLES. FAMILY WILL STAY AT HOME IN WASHINGTON.

C) 14 AUG-21 AUG: ORLANDO, FLORIDA FOR VISIT TO DISNEY WORLD. RESERVATIONS HAVE BEEN MADE AT POLYNESIAN HOTEL.

D) 21 AUG-RETURN TO WASHINGTON. GIRLS WILL RETURN TO JORDAN ACCOMPANIED BY NURSES EARLY SEPTEMBER. PRINCESS MUNA WILL REMAIN UNTIL BOYS START SCHOOL.

2. PALACE REQUEST SECURITY FOR CHILDREN AND REQUESTS IT BE INFORMED OF ARRANGEMENTS. ASSUMES LOCAL POLICE IN ORLANDO WILL BE SUFFICIENT. PALACE NOT RPT NOT PLANNING TO ASSIGN JORDANIAN SECURITY MAN FOR THIS TRIP.

3. PALACE UNDERSTANDS ARABIC INSTRUCTOR FOR CHILDREN HAS MOVED, AND THAT NEA/ARN LOOKING FOR NEW ONE. PROTOCOL (HIKMAT) ADVISES MOST OF ROYAL FAMILY HAS READ BOOK "GREEN MARCH-BLACK

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CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 AMMAN 04036 301319Z

SEPTEMBER" AND IS CONCERNED THAT DEPT. WILL SCREEN MASSACHUSETTS PROFESSORS TO ENSURE THAT NONE OF PRO-FEDAYEEN TYPES MENTIONED IN BOOK ARE ENGAGED. BROWN

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 874

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03981 290745Z

16
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
---------- 084400

R 290634Z JUL 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9025
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY SANAA
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

'73 JUL 30 AM 9:41
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

S E C R E T AMMAN 3981

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PASS CINCEUR
KUWAIT PASS ABU DHABI

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, US, YE, UAR, JO, SA
SUBJ: JORDANIAN ARMS FOR YAR

1. AMER KHAMMASH HAS JUST RETURNED TO AMMAN. HE RECEIVED FILL-IN FROM KING AND CP ON ARMS FOR YEMEN AND THEN ASKED ME CLARIFY IT FOR HIM. TRIED TO DO SO. ALSO TOLD HIM THAT I HAD JUST WRITTEN PM RIFAI (MAKING POINTS IN STATE 147163) AND SUGGESTING HE GET COPY FROM RIFAI (WHO IN SAUDI ARABIA TODAY).

2. KHAMMASH SAYS JORDAN CANNOT AFFORD TO GIVE AMMO TO YAR. IF IT DOES, IT WILL JUST GET MORE REQUESTS AS YEMEN "BOTTOMLESS WELL" SO FAR AS ARMS AND AMMO CONCERNED. TOLD HIM I AGREED COMPLETELY AND THAT USG BILL FOR REPLACEMENT OF ITEMS JORDAN HAS OR WILL SEND WILL COME TO ABOUT HALF-MILLION DOLLARS. I SAID MAYBE ABU DHABI WILL PAY. HE REPLIED THAT ONLY THING HE KNOWS FOR SURE THAT ABU DHABI WILL PAY FOR ITS SALADINS. MAYBE YEMENIS HAVE COMMITMENT FROM ABU DHABI BUT NO ONE SHOULD RELY

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 03981 290745Z

ON THIS.

3. I SUGGESTED THAT HE GET IN AN AIRPLANE AND GO SEE SHEIK SAYID. HE SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO BUT HAS NOT THE SLIGHTEST IDEA WHERE HE IS NOW. THINKS HE IS IN LONDON. (ABU DHABI: LET ME KNOW)

4. KHAMMASH SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN ASKED BY KING TO TAKE OVER ARMS FOR YEMEN PROGRAM. I SAID THAT WAS FINE WITH ME AS I WAS NOW DEALING WITH KING, CROWN PRINCE, PRIME MINISTER, AND CHIEF OF STAFF, ALL OF WHOM SEEM TO HAVE SLIGHTLY DIFFERENT IDEAS. SAID THAT I WANTED ONCE AGAIN TO MAKE IT PLAIN THAT USG DID NOT HAVE FUNDS OR ABILITY TO OBTAIN THEM IN ORDER TO FINANCE JORDANIAN SHIPMENT OF AMMO TO YAR. SOMEONE WOULD HAVE TO FIND CASH TO RESUPPLY JORDANIAN RESERVES.
BROWN

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

3 JUL AM 9:57
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

SECRET 938

15
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
---------- 059149

R 260747Z JUL 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9011
INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY SANAA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

S E C R E T AMMAN 3953

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, US, YE, SA, JO
SUBJECT: EMERGENCY ARMS SUPPLY TO YAR

REF: STATE 146708

1. I WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF STATE WOULD GIVE A BRIEFING TO AMB SALAH, STRESSING OUR BELIEF THAT PROVISION OF ARMS TO YAR BY GOJ AND USG SHOULD BE ON CASH/REIMBURSABLE BASIS AND THAT ABU DHABI IS READY TO FOOT THE BILL.

2. SUCH BRIEFING IF REPORTED FULLY, WILL HELP THOSE HERE IN GOJ WHO ARE TRYING TO PERSUADE KING HE IS BEING TOO GENEROUS AT EXPENSE OF JAA.
BROWN

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 915 2

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03929 251026Z

53
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
---------- 050876

R 250945 Z JUL 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8995
INFO USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
47$5:/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2620
AMEMBASSY SANAA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

S E C R E T AMMAN 3929

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PASS CINCEUR

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, JO, SA
SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER TO VISIT SAUDI ARABIA

1. PRIME MINISTER ZAID RIFAI WILL GO TO SAUDI ARABIA THIS WEEK END AT INVITATION KING FEISAL. HE SAYS HE WILL BEHAVE HIMSELF.

2. TRIP BEING HELD VERY CLOSELY FOR SECURITY REASONS.
BROWN

NOTE BY OCT: NOT PASSED CINCEUR.

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 345

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03871 230642Z

2

13
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
---------- 026615

R 230605Z JUL 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8968
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY SANAA
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

'73 JUL 23 PM 3:07
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

S E C R E T AMMAN 3871

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PASS CINCEUR
KUWAIT PASS ABU DHABI

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, US, YE, SA, JO, UAE
SUBJECT: EMERGENCY ARMS SUPPLY TO YAR

REF: AMMAN 3865

1. INFO IN REFTEL CORRECTED THIS MORNING BY BEN SHAKER. DELIVERY WAS 13 TONS AFTER ADDITIONS. CONSISTED OF 35,000 ROUNDS 50 CALIBER, 300 ROUNDS 76MM, AND 65,000 ROUNDS OF 12.7 (FOR SOVIET-MADE DOSCHKA MG).

2. STILL TO BE SHIPPED AMOUNT TOTALS 117 TONS. IT CONSISTS OF 1,000 ROUNDS OF 81MM, 465,000 ROUNDS OF 50 CALIBER, 1,000,000 ROUNDS OF 30 CALIBER, AND 100,000 ROUNDS OF 9MM.
BROWN

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED CINCEUR.

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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

'73 JUL 23 AM 8:33

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

2

SECRET 152

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03854 221332Z

43
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W
---------- 024353

O 221305Z JUL 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8957
INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LOONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY SANAA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T AMMAN 3854

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PASS CINCEUR IMMEDIATE

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, US, YE, SA, JO, UAE
SUBJECT: EMERGENCY ARMS SUPPLY TO YAR

REF: STATE 143871

1. SUGGESTION GIVEN REFTEL FINE ONE. HOPE IT WORKS OUT.

2. COULD NOT GET TO KING YESTERDAY OR TODAY BUT DID TALK TO CROWN PRINCE TO MAKE IT PLAIN THAT USG IS NOT PREPARED TO REPLACE JORDANIAN TRANSFERS ON GRANT BASIS. SAID I HEARD C-130 BEING LOADED. HE SAID HE WAS NOT INFORMED AND DOUBTED IT. SAID HE HAD INSTRUCTED BEN SHAKER TO COORDINATE WITH ME.

2. OUR MAP PEOPLE CONFIRM C-130 IS BEING LOADED AFTER REPAIRS; ITS DESTINATION IS SANAA.

3. ALL JAA TOP OFFICERS AT PALACE IN DAY-LONG SEMINAR ON WHAT TO DO WITH RETIRED OFFICERS. TEAM FROM TAIWAN IS

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 AMMAN 03854 221332Z

MAKING PRESENTATION. THUS CANNOT GET TO BEN SHAKER UNTIL LATER TODAY, IF THEN.

3. COMMENT: CROWN PRINCE DISAPPROVES OF KING'S MAGNAMINITY. IF WE CAN WORK OUT SOMETHING WITH UAE HE WILL TRY TO STRAIGHTEN IT OUT.
BROWN

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SECRET

b11/10/81

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

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73 JUL 23 AM 8:33

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

SECRET 150

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03865 221318Z

43
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W
---------- 024336

O R 221200Z JUL 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8965
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY SANAA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

S E C R E T AMMAN 3865

EXDIS

KUWAIT PASS ABU DHABI
DEPARTMENT PASS CINCEUR

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, US, YE, SA, JO, UAE
SUBJECT: EMERGENCY ARMS SUPPLY TO YAR

REF: AMMAN 3854

1. BEN SHAKER REPORTS C-130 LEFT TODAY FOR SANAA WITH SIX TONS OF AMMO: M-1, 76 FOR SALADINS, AND SOME 50 CALIBER. EXACT QUANTITIES WILL BE SUPPLIED BY LATER CABLE.

2. REST OF SHIPMENT ASSEMBLED FOR YAR IS 45 TONS.

3. BEN SHAKER SAYS SIX-TON SHIPMENT IS GIFT FROM KING. HOPES SOME WAY CAN BE FOUND TO PAY FOR 45 TONS AS HE CANNOT AFFORD TO REPLACE IT AND IT IS VITAL PART OF WAR RESERVES.

3. TOLD HIM I HOPED HE WOULD MAKE THIS CLEAR TO HM. BROWN

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

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SECRET 435

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03789 180938Z

16
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W
---------- 115278

O 180935Z JUL 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8923
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY SANAA IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T AMMAN 3789

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, JO, YE, SA
SUBJECT: SAUDI AMBASSADOR'S WHEREABOUTS

REF: AMMAN 3780

1. IN TRYING TO CHECK WITH KUHEIMY WHAT HE HAD REPORTED TO FONOFF WE FIND HE HAS LEFT AMMAN FOR VACATION IN ITALY. JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR TO SAUDI ARABIA IS EITHER HERE OR ON WAY. THIS CUTS OFF COMMUNICATIONS AT UNFORTUNATE MOMENT.

2. KUHEIMY'S NIECE WAS RECENTLY MARRIED TO PRINCE SULTAN BUT AFRAID THAT WON'T HELP MUCH.
BROWN

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

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SECRET 377

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03780 1808597Z

13
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W
---------- 114971

O 1808507 JUL 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8916
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY SANAA IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T AMMAN 3780

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, JO, SA, YE
SUBJECT: SULTAN'S UNHAPPINESS WITH JORDANIAN DELIVERIES
TO YEMEN

REF: JIDDA 2988 AND 2977

1. SUBSTANCE OF 2988 PASSED ON TO KASSEM FOR TRANSMITTAL TO CROWN PRINCE WHO TIED UP, AS REPORTED MY 3632, CP BRIEFED SAUDI AMBASSADOR ON JORDAN PLANS, INCLUDING POSSIBLE C-130 SHIPMENT. QUESTION IS WHETHER KUHEIMI INFORMED HIS GOVERNMENT OR, IF SO, WHAT HAPPENED TO HIS CABLE.

2. WILL FOLLOW UP.
BROWN

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'73 JUL 18 AM 8:09
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
113537

SECRET 174

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03761 1805127

20
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00 /026 W

O 1805057 JUL 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8908
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY SANAA IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T AMMAN 3761

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, JO, SA
SUBJECT: EMERGENCY JORDANIAN ARMS DELIVERIES TO YAR

REF: JIDDA 2988

IN SUBSEQUENT CABLE I WILL FILL YOU IN ON JORDANIAN ARMS PLANS FOR YEMEN. IN MEANTIME I CAN SET YOUR MIND AT EASE. THERE WILL BE NO C-130 DELIVERY AT THIS TIME. EVERY SINGLE ONE OF JORDAN'S TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT (ONE C-130, THREE C-119S, AND A COUPLE OF C-47S) IS OUT OF COMMISSION-- MUCH TO THE FRUSTRATION OF KING HUSSEIN WHO IS BACK AND IN THE ACT.
BROWN

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SECRET

7

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

'73 JUL 16 PM 3:33

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WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

SECRET 382

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03730 160918Z

15
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W
094168

O 160902Z JUL 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8896
INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY SANAA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T AMMAN 3730

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PASS CINCEUR IMMEDIATE

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, US, YE, SA, JO, UAE
SUBJECT: EMERGENCY ARMS SUPPLY TO YAR

REF: STATE 130643

1. INSTRUCTIONS CARRIED OUT WITH CROWN PRINCE. HE WAS A BIT ASKANCE ABOUT DEMANDING CASH FOR AMMO. TOLD HIM THAT YEMENIS OFFERED TO PAY US FOR MATERIEL AND JORDAN SHOULD NOT BE RELUCTANT TO ACCEPT PAYMENT TOO.

2. HE ASKED ABOUT SITUATION. TOLD HIM IT WAS PROBABLY NOT AS DRAMATIC AS YEMENI OFFICIALS HAD MADE IT OUT TO BE. NEVERTHELESS, WE THOUGHT YEMEN DESERVED HELP AND THAT PROMPT DELIVERIES WILL HAVE IMPORTANT PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT.

3. CP HAS SENT TWO OFFICERS TO SANAA TO TALK TO YAR AND MAKE QUICK ASSESSMENT. HE WILL PASS ON INFO I GAVE HIM AND AWAIT REPORT BEFORE PACKING UP A C-130.

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SECRET

PAGE 02 AMMAN 03730 160918Z

4. COMMENT: SUGGEST THAT SANAA GIVE JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR SUBSTANCE OF PARAS 3A AND 3B OF REFTEL, TELLING HIM THAT THIS HAS BEEN PASSED ON TO CP TODAY.
BROWN

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73 JUL 15 AM 10:39

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

SECRET 073

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03693 150806Z

15
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
---------- 090386

R 150620Z JUL 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8877
INFO AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY JIDDA

S E C R E T AMMAN 3693

EXDIS

DEPT PASS SECDEF FOR ISA/SA/DSAA/TM FOR ACTION ALSO
DEPT PASS USCINCEUR/ECJG-PM AND DIA FOR INFO
DEPT PASS MUSCAT

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, JO, MU
SUBJECT: GRENADE LAUNCHERS FOR OMAN

REF: AMMAN 3000 (NOTAL)

1. HAVE JUST RECEIVED JULY 9 LETTER FROM CHIEF-OF-STAFF BIN SHAKR REQUESTING PERMISSION FOR JAF SALE OF REFERENCED GRANT-AID M-79 GRENADE LAUNCHERS TO OMAN. QUANTITY IS SIXTY, PLUS 1200 CARTRIDGES 40MM PRACTICE AMMO PLUS 4800 ROUNDS HE AMMO.

2. ACCORDING TO JAF STUDY PROVIDED GRANGER SURVEY TEAM, JAF REQUIREMENTS AND STOCKS ARE:

	REQUIREMENT	ON HAND AND DUE IN	SHORTFALL
M-79 AND M-203	1579	1200	395
HE AMMO	105,820	103,729	2,091
TRAINING AMMO	24,712	24,091	621

(NOTE: 395 FIGURE INCLUDES ATTRITION OF 16)

3. IN VIEW RELATIVELY SMALL SHORTFALL REFLECTED IN ABOVE

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SECRET

PAGE 02 AMMAN 03693 150806Z

FIGURES, ADDITIONAL TEMPORARY SHORTFALL PENDING REPLACEMENT OF OMAN ITEMS SHOULD NOT RPT NOT DETRACT SUBSTANTIALLY FROM JAF COMBAT CAPABILITY. ASSUMING OMANI NEED LEGITIMATE AND BETTER, ALTERNATIVE SUPPLY SOURCES NOT AVAILABLE, RECOMMEND FAVORABLE ACTION ON BIN SHAKR REQUEST.
BROWN

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791/10/310

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 431

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03632 110947Z

2

12
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W
---------- 049964

O 110930Z JUL 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8854
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY SANAA IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T AMMAN 3632

EXDIS

DEPT PASS USCINCEUR IMMEDIATE INFO

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, JO, YE, SA
SUBJECT: JORDANIAN ARMS FOR YEMEN

CP HAS TALKED TO SAUDI AMBASSADOR KUHEIMI WHO SAID IMMEDIATELY SAUDI GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE NO PROBLEM WITH JORDAN SHIPMENT OF AMMO. HE IS NOTIFYING HIS GOVERNMENT BY CABLE THIS MORNING.
BROWN

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 334

2

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03626 110829Z

14
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

O 110814Z JUL 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8849
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY SANAA IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T AMMAN 3626

EXDIS

DEPT PASS USCINCEUR INFO IMMEDIATE

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, US, YE, UO, SA
SUBJ: JORDANIAN ARMS FOR YEMEN

AS I WAS SENDING MY 3618, SANAA'S 1249 ARRIVED. MAYBE WE CAN CUT GORDIAN KNOT. IF ABU DHABI IS INDEED READY TO PAY, LET IT GIVE CHECK TO JORDANIANS AND HAVE JORDANIANS TURN IT OVER TO US TO PAY FOR REPLACEMENTS. JORDANIANS HAVE, AT LEAST, CAPABILITY AND WILLINGNESS TO MAKE FAST DELIVERY WHICH COULD BE JUST SORT OF PSYCHOLOGICAL BOOST THAT GOY NEEDS. I STILL THINK THAT IT WOULD BE SMART OF SAUDIS TO GET INTO ACT FAST AND MAKE QUICK AIR DELIVERY.
BROWN

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED USCINCEUR.

'73 JUL 11 PM 9:34
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
049440

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WH

'73 JUN 21 AM 9:25

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM 004836

SECRET 87a

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03263 201149Z

46
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W

R 201000Z JUN 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8706
INFO USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USMISION USUN

S E C R E T AMMAN 3263

EXDIS

DEPT PASS USCINCEUR

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR, JO, EG
SUBJ: JORDAN'S FEARS ABOUT EGYPT

REF: AMMAN 3176

1. PRIME MINISTER RIFAI AND I TALKED AGAIN ABOUT EGYPT. I TOLD HIM I HAD NO ANSWERS YET TO HIS QUESTION.

2. RIFAI IS WORRIED AS WELL BY UNSC. HE FEARS THAT BRITISH OR FRENCH OR AUSTRIANS WILL COME UP WITH NEW RESOLUTION WHICH WILL REWRITE 242 SO FAR AS IT APPLIES TO EGYPT AND ITS BORDER PROBLEMS WITH ISRAEL. THIS HE

IMAGINES IS ONE OF ZAYYAT'S OBJECTIVES. A SECOND ONE COULD BE A NEW RESOLUTION OR SORT OF CONSENSUS WHICH WOULD CALL FOR A HOMELAND FOR PALESTINIANS. SUCH A RESOLUTION OR CONSENSUS WOULD GRAVELY DISTORT 242 AND PUT JORDAN IN

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SECRET

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 AMMAN 03263 201149Z

AN IMPOSSIBLE POSITION.

3. I TOLD ZAID WE OPPOSED ANY TINKERING WITH 242 AND SAW NO POSSIBILITY OF OUR CHANGING THIS POSITION. I ALSO SAID WE THOUGHT KING'S PLAN THE BEST IDEA AND WERE AGAINST A SEPARATE PALESTINIAN STATE. HE WAS GRATIFIED. (AS DEPARTMENT KNOWS, THERE IS ALWAYS LATENT SUSPICION IN JORDAN THAT USG SUPPORTS AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINE AND HAS PUSHED IT WITH CERTAIN ARABS.)

4. ZAID SAID THAT ARAB STATES WERE CONFUSED IN THEIR THINKING. MANY, INCLUDING EGYPT, SYRIA, AND SAUDI ARABIA, THINK THAT WAR IS THE ONLY ANSWER IS US, UN OR FOUR POWERS CANNOT WORK MIRACLES. THIS WOULD BE A DISASTER. FEW SEEM TO REALIZE THERE IS ANOTHER ALTERNATIVE WHICH IS WHAT HE FAVORS; LET WHOLE THING RIDE FOR A GENERATION OR SO AND HAVE ARABS CONCENTRATE ON INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT AND REFORM. HIS IDEA OF JORDAN'S POLICY FOR FUTURE IS TO MAINTAIN CONTACTS WITH WEST BANK, KEEP BRODGES OPEN, AND DEVELOP JORDAN IN SUCH A WAY THAT PALESTINIANS IN JORDAN GET LARGER SLICES OF BIGGER PIE. ZAID DISCARDS, FOR TIME BEING AT LEAST, MORE DANGEROUS ALTERNATIVE PROPOSED BY SOME JORDANIANS (INCLUDING A LOT OF ARMY SENIOR OFFICERS); ACCEPT IDEA OF WEST BANK AS PALESTINIAN STATE, CLOSE BRIDGES AND ANNOUNCE THAT HENCEFORTH WEST BANK AND JERUSALEM ARE PROBLEMS OF (1) ARAB STATES IN GENERAL, (2) UN. JORDAN'S POLICY WOULD THEN BE DETERMINED IN LIGHT OF ITS OWN INTERESTS AS DO THOSE OF OTHER ARAB STATES WHCUH DID NOT LOSE TERRITORY. ZAID SAYS KING COMPLETELY OPPOSES THIS ALTERNATIVE, BELIEVING HE HAS A RESPONSIBILITY TO WEST BANKERS IN PARTICULAR AND PALESTINIANS IN GENERAL.
BROWN

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED USCINCEUR

SECRET

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ES1/10/819

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

WH

'73 JUN 19 PM 2:29

SECRET 339

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03237 190814Z

15
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
---------- 126157

R 190740Z JUN 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8696
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY SANAA

S E C R E T AMMAN 3237

EXDIS

KUWAIT PASS ABU DHABI

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, JO
SUBJECT: SALADINS FOR YEMEN

1. ZAID RIFAI TELLS ME ABU DHABI HAS ASKED TO PURCHASE 30 SALADINS WHICH WILL BE GIVEN TO NORTH YEMEN. GOJ HAS MADE NO DECISION YET BUT IS SERIOUSLY STUDYING THE IDEA. ONCE IT DOES RIFAI WILL GET IN TOUCH WITH ME OFFICIALLY.

2. ZAID SAID WE HAD MADE MIMEX OFFER OF M-48S. IF PRICES, ETC., ARE RIGHT, JORDAN MIGHT REPLACE THESE SALADINS WITH M-48S. IT CANNOT AFFORD MILITARILY TO SELL THEM WITHOUT SOME SORT OF REPLACEMENT.

3. COMMENT: WE DID MAKE AN OFFER OF 26 M-48A2CS. A FEW DAYS LATER WE WERE TOLD TO WITHDRAW OFFER AS TANKS WERE NO LONGER AVAILABLE. ZAID MAY NOT KNOW THIS (I DIDN'T WHEN I TALKED TO HIM). 48CS ARE NORMALLY ONLY USED FOR TRAINING. I WOULD LIKE TO KNOW, HOWEVER, WHAT OUR VIEWS ARE AND IF FAVORABLE, WHAT IS AVAILABLE. WHEN I WAS IN SANAA YEMENIS TALKED CONSTANTLY ABOUT THEIR NEED FOR FAST-MOVING ARMORED VEHICLES LIKE THE SALADIN.
BROWN

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 809

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03177 01 OF 02 151823Z

2

43
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
---------- 101789

R 151000Z JUN 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8673
INFO USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USUN 2540

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 AMMAN 3177

EXDIS

DEPT PASS CINCEUR

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR, JO, EG
SUBJECT: JORDAN'S FEARS ABOUT EGYPT

REF: AMMAN 3176

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF LETTER PM RIFAI SENT TO SADAT AND CERTAIN OTHER ARAB LEADERS.

1. THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN GREETS HIS EXCELLENCY THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

2. WIT REGARD TO THE POSITION OF DR MUHAMMAD HASSAN AZ-ZAYYAT, FOREIGN MINISTER OF T E EGYPTIAN ARAB REPUBLIC, AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL NOA MEETING TO DISCUSS THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS, (THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF JORDAN) WISHES TO CLARIFY T E JORDANIAN CIEWPOINT VIS-A-VIS DR ZAYYAT'S POSITION, SUBMIT THE BACKGROUND OF THE CASE, AND EXPLAINS THE DANGERS RESULTING FROM THIS (DR ZAYYAT'S) POSITION. THE SECURITY COUNCIL ISSUED ON 22/11/

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1967, UNANIMOUSLY, RESOLUTION NUMBER 242 TO SERVE AS A BASIS FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS. THE COUNCIL HAD REQUESTED THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO SUBMIT A REPORT ABOUT THE RESULTS OF HIS ENDEAVOURS IN THIS RESPECT.

3. THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL REQUESTED DR GUNNAR JARRING, THE SWEDISH AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW, TO BE HIS ENVOY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. DR JARRING MADE SEVERAL ROUNDS WHICH LASTED UNTIL THE 8TH OF FEBRUARY, 1971, WHEN HIS MISSION WAS FROZEN DUE TO ISRAEL'S REFUSAL TO REPLY TO THE MEMORANDUM HE HAD SUBMITTED TO IT AFTER HE RECEIVED A POSITIVE REPLY FROM EGYPT TO A SIMILAR MEMORANDUM.

4. WHILE DR JARRING WAS CARRYING OUT HIS MISSION, EGYPT ANNOUNCED THE WAR OF ATTRITION, IN FEBRUARY, 1969, A WAR WHICH ENDED WITH A CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL ON 7 AUGUST 1970 THAT WAS TO LAST FOR A PERIOD OF 90 DAYS. THIS PERIOD WAS EXTENDED AND THE CEASE-FIRE HAS PREVAILED, FROM THAT TIME UNTIL NOW.

5. THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT WAS BASED ON THE INITIATIVE OF MR WILLIAM ROGERS, T E US FOREIGN MINISTERJM THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT, AT THAT TIME, FAILED TO INFORM ITS PARTNER THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT, OF ITS DECISION, IN SPITE OF THE COORDINATION THAT HAD EXISTED BETWEEN JORDAN AND EGYPT SINCE THE SIGNING OF THE JOINT DEFENSE AGREEMENT IN MAY, 1967 THROUGH AUGUST 1970.

6. FOLLOWING THE FREEZING OF THE INTERNATIONAL ENVOY'S MISSION, AND WITH THE FLUIDITY OF T E INITIATIVE OF MR ROGERS, A STATE OF NO-WAR, NO-PEACE EMERGED IN THE MIDDLE EAST, BROUGHT OUT BY THE EGYPTIAN INFORMATION APPARATUS WHICH DEALT WITH IT IN GREAT DETAILS ASCERTAINING THAT SUCH A SITUATION CANNOT BE TOLERATED AND CANNOT BE PERMITTED TO CONTINUE.

7. DURING THE NO-WAR, NO-PEACE PERIOD, THE EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT, ANWAR AS-SADAT, CAME UP WITH HIS INITIATIVE IN FEBRUARY 1971 TO OPEN THE SUEZ CANAL TO INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING. EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI DISAGREEMENT FOLLOWED REGARDING THE DISTANCE TO WHICH THE ISRAELI FORCES SHOULD WITHDRAW IN SINAI AND THE SIZE OF THE EGYPTIAN FORCES WHICH WILL MOVE TO THE EAST OF THE CANAL. THIS CAUSED THE EGYPTIAN INITIATIVE TO FAIL AFTER, IT BECAME

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APPARENT TO EGYPT THAT ISRAEL INTENDED TO MAKE THE INTERIM AGREEMENT A PARTIAL AGREEMENT SEPARATE FROM THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS.

8. ON 28 SEPTEMBER 1972, PRESIDENT SADAT DECLARED THAT THE TIME HAD COME FOR THE PALESTINIANS TO FORM AN ENTITY AND THAT EGYPT WOULD WELCOME AND RECOGNIZE THIS ENTITY WHEN THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, AND THE RESISTANCE TOOK THE NECESSARY MEASURES TO CREATE "A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT. THIS STATEMENT WAS MET BY ADVERSE REACTION FROM THE FEDAYEEN ORGANIZATIONS AND PRESIDENT SADAT WAS FORCED WITHDRAW HIS PROPOSALS AND LEAVE THE MATTER TO THE DECISION OF THE ORGANIZATIONS THEMSELVES.

9. ON JUNE 6, 1973, THE SECURITY COUNCIL HELD ITS FIRST MEETING TO DISCUSS THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS IN ALL ITS ASPECTS. ONE OF THE FIRST SPEAKERS WAS MUHAMMAD HASSAN AZ-ZAYYAT, EGYPT'S FOREIGN MINISTER, WHO MADE THE FOLLOWING CLEAR R REFERENCE WITH REGARD TO THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION AND HE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE:

10. A) "THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE TODAY LIVE UNDER THE ISRAELI MILITARY OCCUPATION DEPRIVED OF THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION."

B) "THE COUNTRIES WHICH RECOGNIZE THE JEWISH STATE HAVE THE MORAL OBLIGATION TO ALSO RECOGNIZE HE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE WHO WERE SUPPOSED TO TAKE PART, WITH THE JEWISH STATE, IN THEIR SECTOR OF PALESTINE IN ACCORDANCE WITH UN RESOLUTION NO 181 DATED 29 NOVEMBER 1947."

C) "SIX YEARS AGO THE ISRAELI FORCES INVADED AND OCCUPIED WHAT WAS LEFT OF PALESTINE, INCLUDING JERUSALEM, AS THEY ALSO OCCUPIED PARTS OF SYRIA ND EGYPT."

D) "THE ISRAELI BORDERS, WHICH THE COUNCIL WISHED TO DEFINE AND TO RECOGNIZE WERE NO MORE THAN THE GEOGRAPHIC BORDERS OF PALESTINE, AS IT WAS UNDER THE MANDATE, AND WHICH WERE THE SUBJECT OF THE PARTITION RESOLUTION IN 1947."

E) "THE BORDERS WHICH ISRAEL IS DEMANDING MAY NEVER GO BEYOND THE INTERNATIONAL BORDERS OF PALESTINE AND INTO EGYPTIAN TERRITORY."

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11. THIS APPEAL BY DR ZAYYAT HAS REAISED AGAIN THE PROBLEM OF REPRESENTING THE PALESTINIAN PEOILE AND MOVED IT INSIDE THE SCOPE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION.

12. IN CAIRO, AL-AHRAM REPORTED IN 10 JUNE 1973 THAT WORLD RECOGNITION OF THE STATE OF PALESTINE, AS PROPOSED BY DR ZAYYAT, IS A VITAL MATTER, TO LESSEN THE INCREASING DANGER OF PALESTINIAN TERRORISM, IN PARTICULAR THEIR THREAT TO THE FLOW

OF OIL
AT A TIME OF INCREASED CONCERN REGARDING THE ENERGY CRISIS.

13. THE NEWSPAPER WENT ON
TO SAY THAT THE PALESTINIANS LIVING
IN THE OCCUPIED ARAB LANDS (WEST BANK AND GAZA) MUST NOT BE PERMITTED TO PLAY A MAJOR ROLE IN THE PROPOSED STATE BECAUSE THEIR ABILITY
TO EXPRESS THEIR FREE WILL UNDER THE OCCUPATION
IS IN DOUBT. THE NEWSPAPER ALSO SAID THAT THE FEDAYEEN ORGANIZATIONS, HEADED BY FATAH AND THE PLO, AND WHICH ARE NOT RECOGNIZED BY ALL THE ARAB STATES AND THE ARAB LEAGUE AS REPRESENTING THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE WILL LEAD THIS ROLE.

14. WE BELIEVE THAT DR ZAYYAT'S POSITION AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL, IF IT RECEIVED NECESSARY INTERNATIONAL APPROVAL, WILL REMOVF JORDAN FROM THE QUESTION AND THIS AFTER THE SECURITY COUNCIL RULED IN FAVOR OF ITS INDISPUTABLE RIGHT--WITH SYRIA AND EGYPT--TO RETRIEVE THE TERRITORIES OCCUPIED BY ISRAEL IN 1967 IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242. DR ZAYYAT'S POSITION WILL ALSO LEAD TO THE DIVISION AND FRAGMENTATION OF THE QUESTION SINCE THE BASIC PROBELM IS THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAEL
FROM THE OCCUPIED ARAB LANDS, NOT THE RAISING OF A NEW QUESTION WHICH DOES NOT EXIST IN PLACE OF A CLEAR AND JUST CAUSE REGARDING WHICH THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS RULED IN OUR FAVOR.

15. THE ISRAELI DELEGATE CRITICIZED THE JORDANIAN DELEGATE BECAUSE THE LATTER SPOKE ON BEHALF OF THE PALESTINIANS, THUS

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EXPLOITING THE PROPOSAL SUBMITTED BY DR ZAYYAT IN ORDER TO DRIVE A WEDGE BETWEEN JORDAN AND EGYPT. THIS IS ONE OF THE DANGEROUS RESULTS OF THE POSITION OF DR ZAYYAT. ISRAEL WILL UNDOUBTEDLY DRAW IROFIT SROM THIS POSITION AND THROUGH IT WILL ATTEMPT TO RENEGE ON ITS COMMITMENT TO RES 242 OF THE UNSC. THIS IS WHAT ISRAEL HAS BEEN SEEKING IN THE PAST: A PROPER EXCUSE TO AVOID ITS OBLIGATIONS. T E RAISING OF THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM IN THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION IN THIS NEW MANNER, MAY BE INTERPRETED AS ABANDONMENT BY EGYPT OF RES 242, A MATTER WHICH WILL CAUSE GREAT DAMAGE TO OUR POSITION AND WILL MAKE US LOSE A LEGAL AND A LEGITIMATE POSITION ON WHICH THE SECURITY COUNCIL RULED IN OUR FAVOR SIX YEARS AGO AND WHICH WILL GIVE ISRAEL THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISAVOW THE PROVISIONS OF THE SAID RESOLUTION AND SUBSEQUENTLY TO CREATE A FLUID SITUATION THAT WOULD PERMIT IT TO STRENGTHEN ITS OCCUPATION AND ESTABLISH ITS FIRM PRESENCE IN THE OCCUPIED ARAB LANDS.

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED CINCEUR.

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SECRET 998

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03177 02 OF 02 151125Z

16
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
---------- 098022

R 151000Z JUN 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8674
INFO USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USUN 2541

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 AMMAN 3177

EXDIS

16. DR ZAYYAT REQUESTED A SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING ON 28/5/73 AND THEN REQUESTED THAT IT BE POSTPONED TO 4/6/73, HE AGAIN ASKED FOR A POSTPONEMENT UNTIL 6/6/73 WHEN THE FIRST SESSION WAS HELD, WITHOUT ANY PRIOR COORDINATION BETWEEN JORDAN AND EGYPT, THE TWO COUNTRIES WHICH ACCEPTED RES 242 IMMEDIATELY AFTER IT WAS PASSED.

17. DR ZAYYAT'S DELIBERATE DECISION NOT TO COORDINATE WITH THE JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER WHEN HE WAS CALLED UPON TO PARTICIPATE IN THE LAST GENERAL DEBATE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL, INDICATES THAT HIS POLICIES ARE AIMED AT THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE QUESTION, IGNORING THE ENSUING DANGERS. HE IS DETERMINED TO ISOLATE THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI PROBELM FROM THE WHOLE QUESTION BY REMOVING JORDAN AND GIVING THE PALESTINIANS RESPONSIBILITY TO WORK FOR THEIR "CAUSE", AND EXPLOITS SYRIA'S POSITION WHICH SHOWS NO ADHERENCE TO OR CONCERN FOR THE SAID SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION.

18. IT APPEARS TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN THAT DR ZAYYAT'S POSITION IN THE SECURITY

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COUNCIL REPRESENTS A NEW TREND AIMED AT THE SETTLEMENT OF THE EGYPTIAN PROBLEM AND THE RENEGING ON THEIR COMMITMENTS TO THE PREVIOUS EGYPTIAN POSITION UNDER WHICH EGYPT HAD PLEDGED NOT TO ACCEPT ANY PARTIAL SETTLEMENT AND HAD COMMITTED ITSELF TO A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT FOLLOWING TOTAL WITHDRAWAL

FROM ALL OCCUPIED ARAB LANDS IN EGYPT, SYRIA, AND JORDAN. THIS POSITION BY DR ZAYYAT COINCIDES WITH THE ISRAELI POSITION WHICH AIM AT DIVIDING THE QUESTION, NEUTRALIZING THE EGYPTIAN FRONT AND REMOVING A BASIC FACTOR FROM THE ARENA OF THE ARAB POLITICAL AND MILITARY STRUGGLE.

19. THIS POSITION WILL NATURALLY LEAD TO THE DISENGAGEMENT

OF EGYPT FROM THE ISRAELI-ARAB STRUGGLE AND FROM THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION AND ALSO WILL LEAD TO THE ISOLATION OF EGYPT FROM THE COUNTRIES OF THE ARAB EAST. IT WILL DRIVE THE ARAB PEOPLE IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA TO THE ABYSS OF DESPERATION AND HOPELESSNESS,
AND DRAW THE PALESTINIAN LEADERSHIP INTO A VICIOUS CIRCLE OF STRUGGLE FOR POWER.

20. THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN, HAVING EXPRESSED TO HIS EXCELLENCY THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF (COUNTRY) HIS VIEWPOINT WITH REGARD TO DR ZAYYAT'S POSITION AND THE ENSUING SERIOUS RESULTS TAKES THIS OPPORTUNITY (COMPLIMENTARY CLOSE).
BROWN

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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SECRET 804

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03235 181111Z

43
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W

R 181003Z JUN 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8695
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

S E C R E T AMMAN 3235

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: AGDS 3/18/73
TAGS: OVIP, JO
SUBJECT: KING HUSSEIN'S TRAVEL PLANS

KING WILL GO TO IRAN JUNE 27 FOR VACATION. PLANS TO
VISIT LONDON THEREAFTER.
BROWN

JUN 18 PM 12:29
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
116121

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SECRET

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DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 840

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03000 0508247

13
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

O 050805Z JUN 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8594

S E C R E T AMMAN 3000

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PASS AS DESIRED

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, JO, MU
SUBJECT: GRENADE LAUNCHERS FOR OMAN

1. WE ARE PROBABLY GOING TO GET A REQUEST FROM THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT FOR FAST DESPATCH OF UNKNOWN QUANTITY OF M-79 GRENADE LAUNCHERS TO OMAN. QABOOS HAS MADE AN URGENT APPEAL TO WHICH HUSSEIN IS SYMPATHETIC.

2. WHILE I DOUBT I CAN HEAD OFF REQUFST, I TRUST THAT DEPARTMENT/DOD WILL TAKE LOOK AROUND AREA TO SEE IF ANY M-79S AVAILABLE ELSEWHERE OR IF WE WANT TO GET INTO ACT DIRECTLY.

3. WE CAN ALSO EXPECT GOJ TO ASK FOR PROMPT REPLACMENT. M-79 IS HIGH PRIORITY ITEM HERE. JORDANIANS HAVE 500 ON HAND. THERE ARE 700 M-203S (A NEWER GRENADE LAUNCHER) ON ORDER. ALL M-79S ARE OF MAP ORIGIN.
BROWN

'73 JUN 5 PM 1:02
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
23698

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SECRET

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

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SECRET 703

PAGE 01 AMMAN 02981 0411337

43
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
114954

R 041006Z JUN 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8586
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
USINT CAIRO
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

S E C R E T AMMAN 2981

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, JO, EG, SY, KU
SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER'S OVERVIEW OF POLITICAL SITUATION

1. SUMMARY: PRIME MINISTER ZAID RIFAI SAYS THAT DESPITE OPPOSITION FROM SOME OF MORE CONSERVATIVE ELEMENTS HE WILL PRESS AHEAD WITH ATTEMPT TO GET BETTER RELATIONS WITH EGYPT AND SYRIA. HIS AIM IS NOT DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THOSE TWO STATES BUT RESTORATION OF KUWAIT SUBSIDY OR ITS REPLACEMENT BY SOME OTHER SORT OF KUWAITI MONEY. IT IS THE DEFICIT THAT WORRIES HIM.

2. RIFAI SAID HIS TRIP TO SEE ASSAD HAD BEEN BETTER THAN HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE. RELATIONS ARE AS GOOD OR MAYBE A LITTLE BETTER THAN THEY WERE JUST BEFORE KING SENT HIS LETTER TO ASSAD. SYRIANS HAVE INVITIED ABBOUD AND A GROUP OF MILITARY OFFICERS TO COME TO DAMASCUS FOR TALKS. RIFAI SUGGESTED THEY COME HERE AND REITERATED KING'S INVITATION TO TALAS. WHEN SYRIANS BROUGHT UP POSSIBILITY OF AN INFORMATION AGREEMENT INCLUDING EXCHANGES OF TV

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 02981 041133Z

PROGRAMS, RIFAI SUGGESTED THEY SEND THEIR MINISTER OF INFORMATION TO AMMAN TO NEGOTIATE DEAL.

3. RIFAI CLAIMS HE USED KING'S LETTER AS HIS BRIEFING PAPER, MAKING ALL POINTS IT CONTAINED ORALLY. ASSAD SEEMED TO ACCEPT THEM BUT PRESSED, NEVERTHELESS, FOR JORDANIAN ACCEPTANCE OF CONCEPT OF UNIFIED COMMAND AND DESIGNATION OF AN EGYPTIAN COMMANDER. RIFAI REFUSED POINT BLANK, SAYING THIS WOULD REQUIRE FINAL ACTION AFTER ALL POLITICAL AND FINANCIAL PROBLEMS HAD BEEN FACED AND SETTLED. THEY AGREED TO DISAGREE ON THIS SUBJECT.

4. I ASKED RIFAI IF LEBANON HAD BEEN DISCUSSED. HE SAID ONLY BRIEFLY. ASSAD HAD SAID THAT BORDER WAS CLOSED AND WOULD REMAIN CLOSED. HE WAS NOT AT ALL FRIENDLY TOWARD LEBANON.

5. RIFAI ALSO TALKED ABOUT RIAD'S VISIT. IT WAS NEVER CLEAR TO JORDANIANS WHETHER HE WAS TALKING AS HEAD OF ARAB LEAGUE OR AS AN EGYPTIAN OFFICIAL BUT IT DID NOT MATTER MUCH. RIAD PRESSED HARD FOR ACCEPTANCE OF UNIFIED COMMANDER. KING FINALLY AGREED TO SEE WAR MINISTER ISMAIL IF HE CAME TO JORDAN. RIFAI THINKS RIAD WILL ATTEMPT TO SET THIS UP. RIAD ALSO SAID A SUMMIT MEETING OF HUSSEIN, ASSAD AND SADAT SHOULD BE HELD. JORDANIANS AGREED ALTHOUGH THEY ARE SKEPTICAL THAT IT WILL TAKE PLACE. JORDAN'S NEWLY NAMED PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF KING (MUNIM RIFAI) ATTENDED ALL MEETINGS AND DANCED ECSTATIC ATTENTION ALL AROUND RIAD.

6. RIFAI AS PRIME MINISTER NOW SEES FINANCIAL SITUATION OF JORDAN FAR MORE CLEARLY THAN HE DID AS POLITICAL ADVISER TO KING. HE SEES NOW WAY OUT EXCEPT THROUGH KUWAIT. HE IS PLANNING TO APPROACH KUWAITIS WITH FOLLOWING DEAL: GIVE US A LONG-TERM, LOW-INTEREST LOAN EQUAL TO AMOUNT OF FROZEN SUBSIDY. IF AND WHEN SUBSIDY UNFROZEN, USE IT TO REPAY LOAN. IN MEANTIME, UNPAID SUBSIDY IS JORDAN'S COLLATERAL. (IT IS INGENIOUS BUT WILL IT WORK?)
BROWN

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CONFIDENTIAL 942

PAGE 01 AMMAN 02774 231006Z

45
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
---------- 009493

R 230854Z MAY 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8493
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 2774

EXDIS

DEPT PASS CINCEUR

E.O. 11652: XGDS1
TAGS: PFOR, EG
SUBJECT: SCHEEL'S VIEWS ON EGYPT

1. HAD A BRIEF, OFTEN INTERRUPTED CONVERSATION WITH SCHEEL LAST NIGHT. HE SAID HE HAD STRONG IMPRESSION FROM CAIRO VISIT THAT SADAT WILL NOT GO TO WAR. HE HIMSELF HAD PRESSED HARD ON SADAT TO AVOID WAR, SAYING THAT EGYPTIANS SHOULD GO THE POLITICAL ROAD, AS RESULT OF HIS WASHINGTON TALKS, HE TRIED CONVINCE SADAT THAT USG COULD STILL PLAY A ROLE AND THAT SADAT SHOULD NOT THROW AWAY THAT OPTION. HE ALSO TOLD SADAT THAT BREZHNEV HAD MADE IT PLAIN TO GERMANS THAT SOVIETS DO NOT WANT WAR IN MIDDLE EAST.

2. SCHEEL THOUGHT THIS HAD MADE AN IMPRESSION ON SADAT.
BROWN

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 732

PAGE 01 AMMAN 02398 040611Z

15
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 /026 W
---------- 102711

R 040505Z MAY 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8328
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

S E C R E T AMMAN 2398

EXDIS

KUWAIT PASS ABU DHABI

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, US, JO, TC
SUBJECT: MILITARY SALES: TRANSFER OF 106S TO ADDF

REF: ABU DHABI 0495

KHAMMASH WITH CROWN PRINCE AND EXPECTED WASHINGTON SHORTLY. SUGGEST PROBLEM OF REFTEL BE RAISED WITH HIM.
BROWN

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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT

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CONFIDENTIAL 231 POSS DUPE

PAGE 01 AMMAN 02331 011510Z

50
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
---------- 076649

R 011500Z MAY 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8294
INFO AMEMBASSY MADRID

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 2331

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PASS TORREJON/BASE COMMANDER

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP, JO, US
SUBJECT: CROWN PRINCE HASSAN AIRCRAFT SCHEDULE

REF: AMMAN 2247

PLEASE ADD TO LIST OF PERSONS ON AIRCRAFT AMMAN- NEW YORK
THREE JORDANIAN NON-REVENUE PASSENGERS, MR./MRS. GHAZI
ABU HASSAN AND CHILD MUNA, DEBARKING NEW YORK. ALSO
ADD ONE JORDANIAN CABIN CREW ATTENDANT, ROUND TRIP.
BRUBECK

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED TORREJON

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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT

DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 110

PAGE 01 AMMAN 02247 260956Z

10
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W

R 2609007 APR 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8253
INFO AMEMBASSY MADRID

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 2247

EXDIS

DEPT PASS CSAF, SECDEF AND TORREJON/BASE COMMANDER

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP, JO, US
SUBJECT: CROWN PRINCE HASSAN AIRCRAFT ROUTING

REF: AMMAN 2226

1. FOLLOWING IS REVISED AIRCRAFT SCHEDULE TO REPLACE THAT GIVEN REFTEL.

MAY 10	DEPART	AMMAN	2130Z
MAY 11	ARRIVE	TORREJON	0230Z
	DEPART	TORREJON	0315Z
	ARRIVE	NEW YORK (JFK)	1100Z
	DEPART	NEW YORK (JFK)	1400Z
	ARRIVE	LONDON	2100Z

2. AIRCRAFT WESTBOUND WILL CARRY CAPT. SARADAN (PAKISTANI) PLUS TWO FLIGHT CREW (JORDANIAN) AND SIX SECURITY GUARDS (JORDANIAN). BOARDING AT NEW YORK, IN ADDITION TO CROWN PRINCE PARTY, WILL BE RELIEF CREW OF CAPT. HUSSEINI PLUS THREE FLIGHT CREW (JORDANIAN) AND FIVE CABIN CREW (JORDANIAN).
BRUBECK

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED ABOVE ADDRESSEES.

'73 APR 26 PM 12:42
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
03242

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 638

PAGE 01 AMMAN 01989 162302Z

40
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W

R 150855Z APR 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8143

S E C R E T AMMAN 1983

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (PARA 1 LINE 2 APRIL 23 VICE JUNE 23)

PASS SECRET SERVICE

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: UVIP, JO, US
SUBJECT: VISIT OF CROWN PRINCE HASSAN TO US

REF: AMMAN 1798

1. CROWN PRINCE HASSAN WILL ARRIVE IN HONOLULU FROM TAIPEI ON APRIL 23 AT 1050 HOURS LOCAL VIA CHINA AIRLINES FLIGHT 008. IN ADDITION PARTY ALREADY REPORTED, MR. HANNA AWDAH WILL ALSO BE INCLUDED. DEFER TO SECRET SERVICE TO MAKE RESERVATIONS FOR ONWARD TRAVEL TO LOS ANGELES ON APRIL 25.

2. PRINCESS SARVATH AND PARTY WILL ARRIVE LOS ANGELES ON PANAM FLIGHT 121 FROM LONDON ON APRIL 23. PARTY BOOKED ON AIRCRAFT IN NAME OF HENDERSON, WHICH TAKEN FROM NAME OF MISS GAIL HENDERSON, NURSEMAID WHO ACCOMPANYING PRINCESS SARVATH AND CHILDREN.
BROWN

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED SECRET SERVICE.

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
APR 17 AM 8:37
084592

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State TELEGRAM

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
APR 14 AM 9:52

SECRET 169

PAGE 01 AMMAN 01972 131355Z

43
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
---------- 062324

R 131245Z APR 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8135
INFO AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

S E C R E T AMMAN 1972

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, KU, IR, US, JO
SUBJECT: POSSIBLE IRANIAN AID FOR KUWAIT

I WENT BACK TO GENERAL KHAMMASH TO ASK HIM FOR RE-RUN OF WHAT SHAH HAD SAID. HE REPLIED CONVERSATION HAD STARTED WITH PROVERB REFERING TO EMIR OF KUWAIT QTE HE MADE HIS BREAD: NOW LET HIM EAT IT UNQTE. SHAH WENT ON TO SAY THAT AS A TEMPTING A POLICY AS THIS WAS IT COULD NOT BE CARRIED OUT. IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT KUWAIT BE HELPED IF IT CAME TO WORST. IN PRINCIPLE, IRAN WAS WILLING TO ASSIST. FOR EXAMPLE AND AGAIN IN PRINCIPLE, HE TOLD KHAMMASH THAT IRAN WOULD BE READY TO SUPPLY C-130S TO JORDAN TO TRANSPORT JORDANIAN TROOPS AND SUPPLIES. HE WOULD ALSO BE WILLING PROVIDE DIRECT ASSISTANCE, IF KUWAIT ASKED. THERE IS A BIG QIE HOWEVER UNQTE IN ALL THIS. THE SHAH WOULD INSIST ON HAVING DIRECT AND COMPLETE APPROVAL FROM USG IN ADVANCE. THIS IS JORDANIAN POLICY TOO. IN OTHER WORDS NO ACTION WITHOUT A CLEAR SIGNAL FROM THE USG. AS EARLIER REPORTED, THE SHAH SAID THIS IS ONE SUBJECT HE WANTS TO DISCUSS WITH THE PRESIDENT. IS ASKED KHAMMASH IF HE THOUGHT THAT THIS MEANT THAT THE SHAH WOULD NOT TAKE ANY ACTION OF SUPPORT FOR KUWAIT UNTIL HE HAD SEEN THE PRESIDENT. KHAMMASH SAID THAT THIS MIGHT NOT BE THE CASE. WHAT IS PLAIN, HOWEVER, IS THAT THE SHAH IS MOST RELUCTANT TO DO CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR SPECIFIC PROBLEMS UNTIL HE HAS A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT IS THE LONG-TERM POLICY OF THE USG FOR THE REGION.
BROWN

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

'73 APR 11 PM 9:07

SECRET 682

PAGE 01 AMMAN 01944 111417Z

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

2

50
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
---------- 038046

R 111101Z APR 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8126
INFO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

S E C R E T AMMAN 1944

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINT, PFOR, IS, XF
SUBJECT: ISRAELI POLICY TOWARD WEST BANK

REF: STATE 067072

NO NEED TO TELL GOJ OF SISCO'S INTERVENTION. IT HAS BEEN ON TV BOTH HERE AND ISRAEL, AS WELL AS IN PRESS, BASED ON ISRAELI SOURCES. ENTIRE GOVERNMENT HERE ASSUMES IT WAS US PRESSURE AT LAST MINUTE WHICH CHANGED POLICY. THEY ARE PATTING THEMSELVES ON BACK FOR HAVING RAISED PROBLEM WITH US AND GETTING SUCH PROMPT ACTION.
BROWN

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SECRET

31

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

WH

SECRET 823

PAGE 01 AMMAN 01943 111059Z

20
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

O 111042Z APR 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8125
INFO AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE

SITUATION ROOM
037671
'73 APR 11 PM 12:13

13

S E C R E T AMMAN 1943

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINS, SU
SUBJECT: POSSIBILITY ONE OF KHARTOUM KILLERS AT LARGE

1. ROBERT ROGERS, NBC PRODUCER WHO HAS BEEN DOING STORY ON KHARTOUM, HAS JUST HAD LENGTHY INTERVIEW WITH JORDANIAN CHARGE NASSIR HERE IN AMMAN. HE SHOWED NASSIR VARIOUS PHOTOS, WHICH KHARTOUM EMBASSY HAS, AND SAYS THAT ONE OF TERRORISTS IS NOT IN ANY OF PHOTOS. THIS ONE WAS A STUDENT AT KHARTOUM UNIVERSITY WHO HAD HIS BOOKS WITH HIM AT EMBASSY. NASSIR SURMISES HE MAY STILL BE AROUND SOMEHOW.

2. NASSIR IDENTIFIES TARIQ, SECOND MAN FROM LEFT IN PHOTO PUBLISHED IN STERN AS REAL LEADER OF TERRORIST GROUP. SAID HE HAD STRONG LEBANESE ACCENT.

3. ROGERS WILL PROBABLY LEAVE AMMAN FOR ISRAEL TOMORROW IF THERE ARE ANY QUESTIONS.
BROWN

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

WH

SECRET 838

PAGE 01 AMMAN 01942 111062

46
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

O 111029Z APR 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8124

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM 037800 '73 APR 11 PM 12:13

S E C R E T AMMAN 1942

EXDIS

FOR NOOTER, ENGLE AND SISCO

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINS, OVIP, JO
SUBJ: PUBLIC SECURITY FORCE PROGRAM

1. HASSAN WANTS TO DISCUSS THE PSF PROGRAM WITH US WHILE IN THE STATES. AS ADDRESSEES AWARE HE WILL NOT COME TO WASHINGTON BUT WILL BE IN NEW YORK FOR ABOUT A WEEK. HE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE MESSRS. NOOTER AND ENGLE MEET HIM THERE, MAKING ARRANGEMENTS THROUGH AMBASSADOR SHARAF.

2. HE HAS ALSO SUGGESTED THAT CATLING MIGHT ATTEND THE MEETING. HE WILL ARRANGE TO HAVE CATLING IN NEW YORK IF WE THINK IT USEFUL.

3. HE ALSO SUGGESTED MAURY WILLIAMS MEET HIM IN NEW YORK. I SAID MAURY IS ON SPECIAL PROJECT NOW AND I WAS NOT AT ALL SURE HE WOULD BE AVAILABLE. ALSO SAID THAT MAURY NOT INVOLVED IN PSF PROBLEM.

4. EXPRESSED SOME DOUBTS AS TO AVAILABILITY OF NOOTER.

5. WOULD APPRECIATE KNOWING (A) IS DEPARTMENT WILLING SEND ENGLE AND GROUP TO NEW YORK? (B) DO WE WANT CATLING INCLUDED?

6. HASSAN LEAVES HERE THIS WEEK END, PROBABLY FRIDAY.

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FORM DS-1652

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 AMMAN 01942 111106Z

WOULD BE BEST IF WE COULD ANSWER BEFORE DEPARTURE. IF NOT, WE CAN DO IT THROUGH EMBASSY TAIPEI.

7. ARN HAS SCHEDULE FOR NEW YORK. BROWN

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SECRET

651/10/8107

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 418 POSS DUPE

'73 APR 11 AM 8:15

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

2

PAGE 01 AMMAN 01927 101525Z

67
ACTION SS-25

INFO UCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
---------- 028196

R 101426Z APR 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8116
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

S E C R E T AMMAN 1927

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, JO, IR, KU, IZ
SUBJ: KUWAIT-IRAQ BORDER PROBLEM

1. GENERAL KHAMMASH HAS JUST RETURNED FROM A TRIP TO TEHRAN WHERE HE DISCUSSED GULF WITH SHAH. SHAH TOLD HIM THAT IRAN WOULD BE WILLING TO AID KUWAIT MILITARILY IF SO REQUESTED BY KUWAIT.

2. KHAMMASH SAID THAT JORDAN HAD NOT HEARD ANYTHING SPECIFIC FROM KUWAIT SINCE KING MADE HIS OFFERS OF ASSISTANCE. I TOLD KHAMMASH THAT KUWAITIS SEEM TO WANT TO RENT AIR COVER. HE THOUGHT THIS RIDICULOUS AS PLANES AND PILOTS CAPABLE OF TAKING ON MIG-21S ARE JUST NOT RENTABLE THESE DAYS. HE ASKED ME WHAT USG REACTION WAS TO POSSIBILITY OF JORDAN'S PROVIDING AIR COVER IF ASKED. I TOLD HIM I HAD NO NEWS ON THIS. HE THEN SAID THAT A REQUEST FOR AIR COVER MIGHT COME AS A DESPERATION DEMAND FROM KUWAIT SHOULD THE IRAQIS TRY TO PULL OFF A SUDDEN GRAB. TIME WOULD THEN BE COMPELLING AND IT WOULD BE ADVISABLE FOR USG TO HAVE THOUGHT OUT IN ADVANCE WHAT IT WOULD DO OR SAY.

3. KHAMMASH NOTED THAT SHAH HAD SAID THAT, UNFORTUNATELY, IRAQ COULD TAKE A LOOK AT WHAT ISRAEL HAD BEEN ABLE TO GET AWAY WITH IN 1967 AND MIGHT BE PREPARED TO SEIZE

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SECRET

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 AMMAN 01927 101525Z

THE ISLANDS IT WANTS, HOLD THEM, AND THUMB ITS NOSE
AT AYTHING SECURITY COUNCIL MIGHT SAY. BROWN

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SECRET

1971 10 8 10

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

'73 APR 10 PM 7:44

SECRET 207

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 AMMAN 01926 101523Z

44

2

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W

---------- 028164

R 101425Z APR 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8114
INFO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

S E C R E T AMMAN 1926

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, JO, IS
SUBJ: ISRAEL PRIVATE LAND PURCHASE ON WEST BANK

1. FONMIN ABU ZAYD RECEIVED WITH SIGH OF RELIEF NEWS THAT ISRAELI CABINET HAD TURNED DOWN PRIVATE PURCHASE OF ARAB LANDS. HE BELIEVES, HOWEVER, THAT GRADUAL ISRAELI ENCROACHMENT ONTO LANDS WILL CONTINUE.

2. SAID THAT KING HAD SUMMONED HIM AND OTHERS TO DISCUSS PAPER HE WANTS PREPARED FOR USG. SINCE THEN THERE HAS BEEN ONE MEETING ON SUBJECT BUT NO PAPER HAS YET EMERGED.

3. FONMIN SAID THAT HE WANTED PAPER TO BE FACTUAL, NONPOLEMIC, YET ATTENTION-CATCHING ENOUGH SO THAT HIGH USG OFFICIALS WILL REALIZE THAT, WHILE ONE PROBLEM OVERCOME THANKS TO ENERGETIC ACTION BY USG, BASIC FACT THAT REMAINS IS CONSTANT ISRAELI MOVEMENT INTO WEST BANK WHICH, IN THE END, WILL MAKE ANY POSSIBLE SETTLEMENT MORE DIFFICULT.

4. JERUSALEM'S 367 MAKES THIS POINT WELL. BROWN

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SECRET

M DS 1652

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

INR

CONFIDENTIAL 719

PAGE 01 AMMAN 01909 101144Z

2/3

43
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
---------- 026125

R 101030Z APR 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8104

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 1909

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS1
TAGS: PINS, JO
SUBJECT: JORDAN REQUEST FOR SECRET SERVICE TRAINING

REF: A. AMMAN 1449
B. STATE 061288

1. MG SHARIF ZAYD BIN-SHAKER, COFS JAF, WAS MOST PLEASED TO ACCEPT IN THE NAME OF HIS MAJESTY OFFER TO SEND MR. BARTON TO AMMAN FOR AN UNOFFICIAL VISIT OF FIVE WORKING DAYS. TIME CAN BE AS DECIDED BY USG AND GOJ HAS NO PREFERENCE, EXCEPT FOR A STATED "AS SOON AS POSSIBLE." WHILE IN-COUNTRY, MR. BARTON WILL BE GUEST OF HIS MAJESTY, AND GOJ WILL TAKE CARE OF HIS MEALS AND ACCOMMODATIONS.

2. MG BIN-SHAKER WAS MOST PLEASED WITH SCHOOL OFFER AND WILL DISCUSS IT FURTHER WITH MR. BARTON DURING HIS STAY IN AMMAN.

3. FYI: MG BIN-SHAKER STATED THAT MR. BARTON'S VISIT AND PROSPECTIVE TRAINING HAS NOT BEEN DISCUSSED WITH ANY OTHER JORDANIAN MILITARY, AND HE REQUESTED THAT IT REMAIN THAT WAY. HE REQUESTED THAT DATT DEAL DIRECTLY WITH HIM WITHOUT INTERMEDIARIES.
BROWN

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DS-1652

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

73 APR 9 AM 8:14
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

SECRET 890

PAGE 01 AMMAN 01851 081049Z

2

10
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W
---------- 012061

O P 081028Z APR 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8088
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY

S E C R E T AMMAN 1851

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: PINT, PFOR, JO, IS, XF
SUBJ: ISRAELI POLICIES TOWARD WEST BANK

REF: A. STATE 64462
B. TEL AVIV 2768
C. AMMAN 1793
D. AMMAN 1837

1. SISCO TALK WITH DINITZ CONSTRUCTIVE AND TIMELY. HOWEVER, TEL AVIV REFTEL INDICATES THAT GOI CABINET DECISION COMING MUCH SOONER THAN ANTICIPATED. CANNON EMPHASIZE TOO STRONGLY ADVERSE POLITICAL EFFECT THAT ANY RPT ANY ALTERATION IN GOI LAND POLICIES WILL HAVE HERE.

2. THE CUMULATIVE WEIGHT OF CURRENT ARAB SETBACKS IS SIMPLY GETTING TO BE MORE THAN TRAFFIC WILL BEAR. FIRST, MRS. MEIR'S TRIUMPHANT (ILRAELI VERSION) TRIP TO STATES, YIELDING STORIES ABOUT FURTHER AIRCRAFT SUPPLY AND SUPPORT FOR ISRAELI PLANE PRODUCTION; EXPANSIVE AND STEADILY HARDENING ISRAELI STATEMENTS ON NEGOTIATING POSITION, LINKED IN ISRAELI COMMENT TO ALLEGED AMERICAN SUPPORT; IN PROSPECT, REDUCTION OF UNRWA RATIONS CONSEQUENT ON REVALUING OF US WHEAT CONTRIBUTION; AND PROPOSED ISRAELI MILITARY PARADE IN EAST JERUSALEM. THESE ARE BAD NEWS ENOUGH, BUT CHANGE IN LAND POLICY IN WEST BANK WOULD BE THE WORST. COMING IN CONJUNCTION, THESE ARE GOING TO STRAIN LIMITS OF EVEN JORDANIAN TOLERANCE. US CREDIBILITY AS IMPARTIAL MEDIATOR

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 AMMAN 01851 081049Z

IN MIDDLE EASE IS GETTING TATTERED.

3. WE AGREE WITH TEL AVIV THAT TIME HAS COME FOR USG TO STRENGTHEN HAND OF THOSE IN GOI WHO OPPOSE CREATION OF NEW FACTS IN WEST BANK. THEREFORE HOPE THAT SISCO DEMARCHE WILL BE FOLLOWED SOONEST WITH ADDITIONAL REPRESENTATIONS AT HIGHEST LEVELS IN ISRAELI GOVERNMENT. BROWN

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SECRET

S91/10/310

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT

22

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 315

PAGE 01 AMMAN 01660 311406Z

50
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W

R 311331Z MAR 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8010

S E C R E T AMMAN 1663

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP, JO
SUBJECT: VISIT OF CROWN PRINCE HASSAN TO US

REF: AMMAN 1609

1. PLEASE ADVISE SECRET SERVICE OF FOLLOWING CHANGES IN ITINERARIES OF HRH CROWN PRINCE HASSAN AND PRINCESS SARVATH.
A. PRINCE HASSAN AND PARTY WILL ARRIVE IN HONOLULU ON APRIL 23 AND DEPART FOR LOS ANGELES ON APRIL 25.
B. PRINCESS SARVATH AND PARTY WILL DEPART LONDON ON APRIL 19 ARRIVING LOS ANGELES APRIL 19.

2. PLEASE CHANGE HOTEL RESERVATIONS ACCORDINGLY.
BROWN

WH WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM 074965

'73 APR 1 AM 10:48

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SECRET

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

'73 MAR 29 AM 8:14 911

PAGE 01 AMMAN 01629 281616Z

2

44
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
044135

R 281501Z MAR 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7998
INFO AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

S E C R E T AMMAN 1629

EXDIS

DEPT PASS ABU DHABI

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, US, JO, TC
SUBJ: 106S FOR ABU DHABI

1. KHAMMASH SAID HE LEFT DRAFT ASSURANCES WITH SWEILEH WHO SAID HE WOULD TYPE THEM UP ON OFFICIAL STATIONERY, SIGN, AND GIVE BACK TO KHAMMASH. SWEILEH WAS THEN SUDDENLY DISPATCHED TO LIBYA FOR ISLAMIC CONFERENCE (THIS WAS TO GET HIM OUT OF TOWN BEFORE ARRIVAL OF QABOOS).

2. KAMMASH LEFT MESSAGES ALL OVER TOWN FOR SWEILEH REMINDING HIM TO GET ASSURANCES TO GOJ. JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR AWARE OF ALL THIS. SUGGEST CHECK WITH HIM IF SWEILEH BACK IN TOWN BUT NO DIRECT CONTACT WITH ABU DHABI OFFICIALS.

3. KHAMMASH SAYS ALL ARE DELIGHTED WITH 106S AND JORDANIAN CREW THERE. WHEN HE ASKED DEFMIN IF THERE ANY UNHAPPINESS, HE WAS TOLD TO CONTRARY.

4. KAMMASH TOLD DEFMIN THAT JORDAN HAD TRIED 106 ON BOTH SHORT AND LONG WHEEL BASE LANDROVERS AND FOUND IT COMPLETELY UNSATISFACTORY. HE ALSO REMINDED DEFMIN THAT LANDROVER AS WELL AS JEEP IS ON BOYCOTT LIST AND

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 AMMAN 01629 281616Z

THAT ARAB ARMIES WERE EXCUSED FROM COMPLIANCE. BROWN

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED ABU DHABI.

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b91/10/8/07

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

'73 MAR 28 AM 11:21

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

WN

SECRET 299

PAGE 01 AMMAN 01614 281132Z

43
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
---------- 042737

2/3

R 281022Z MAR 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7989

S E C R E T AMMAN 1611

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP, JO
SUBJECT: VISIT OF CROWN PRINCE HASSAN TO US

REF: A. AMMAN 1609
B. AMMAN 1610

1. DEPARTMENT WILL NOTE FROM REFTELS THAT CP WILL NOT VISIT WASHINGTON. HE SAYS HE THINKS IT WOULD BE TOO SOON AFTER HM'S VISIT. HIS NEW YORK PROGRAM IS BEING WORKED OUT BY AMBASSADOR SHARAF. HE PLANS TO TALK TO BANKERS, BUSINESS INTERESTS, AND FOUNDATIONS. WILL PROBABLY ALSO MAKE SPEECH AT ARAB-AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE. HE WOULD BE OPEN TO MEETING WITH COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS OR EVEN SPEECH.

2. APPRECIATE DEPARTMENT'S VIEWS ON LATTER.
BROWN

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'73 MAR 28 AM 11:21

SECRET 074

PAGE 01 AMMAN 01610 281058Z

46
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
---------- 041203

R 281021Z MAR 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7988
INFO AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
AMEMBASSY TOKYO

S E C R E T AMMAN 1610

EXDTS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP, JO, TW, JA
SUBJECT: VISIT OF CROWN PRINCE TO FAR EAST

REF: AMMAN 1609

1. REFTEL NOTES US PORTION OF CP'S ITINERARY. HIS VISIT TO TAIPEI WILL NOT, UNFORTUNATELY, BE PARALLELED BY A TRIP TO JAPAN. ACCORDING TO CP, JAPAN ACCEPTED IDEA OF HIS VISIT AND THEN BEGGED OFF ON SECURITY GROUNDS. HE IS STILL IN TOUCH WITH JAPANESE THROUGH JAPANESE AMBASSADOR IN BEIRUT AND HAS SUGGESTED THAT JAPANESE SEND A MISSION TO TAIPEI TO TALK TO HIM DURING HIS STAY THERE. NO ANSWER YET.

2. CP WAS EXTREMELY PLEASED WITH NOTE USG GAVE TO JAPANESE IN WASHINGTON. HE HOPES IT WILL HAVE FAVORABLE RESULT BUT IS DUBIOUS GIVEN ON-AND-OFF NATURE OF HOPED-FOR VISIT. HE WILL TAKE ACTION TO GET SPECIFIC PROPOSALS TAILORED FOR JAPANESE CONSIDERATION.

3. I AM A LITTLE MYSTIFIED BY JAPANESE TURNDOWN OF VISIT. ACTION, UNFORTUNATELY, SEEMS ATTUNED TO JAPANESE POLICY OF COURTING ME RADICALS.
BROWN

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

WH

'73 MAR 28 AM SECRET 125

PAGE 01 AMMAN 01609 281125Z

2/3

46
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
---------- 041419

R 281020Z MAR 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7987
INFO AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
AMEMBASSY TOKYO

S E C R E T AMMAN 1609

EXDIS

PASS SECRET SERVICE

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP, JO, TW
SUBJECT: VISIT OF CROWN PRINCE HASSAN TO US

1. FOLLOWING IS CROWN PRINCE'S ITINERARY FOR HIS COMING VISIT TO US:

APRIL 23 - ARRIVE HONOLULU ABOARD CHINA AIRLINES FLIGHT FROM TAIPEI. (EXACT FLIGHT NUMBER AND ETA WILL BE PROVIDED LATER.) CHINESE FURNISHING SKY MARSHALLS ON FLIGHT.

APRIL 24 - DEPART HONOLULU FOR LOS ANGELES. PRINCE HASSAN DESIRES SPEND APRIL 24-MAY 6 AT NEWPORTER INN IN NEWPORT BEACH.

MAY 6 - DEPART LOS ANGELES FOR NEW YORK. PRINCE HASSAN, WIFE, TWO DAUGHTERS AND NURSEMAID WILL STAY WITH FRIENDS IN OYSTER BAY. ADDRESS AND OTHER DETAILS WILL BE PROVIDED LATER.

MAY 9 OR 10 - DEPART NEW YORK (JFK) ON SPECIAL ALIA FLIGHT.

2. PRINCE HASSAN'S PARTY AS FAR AS HONOLULU WILL CONSIST OF MARWAN KASIM, GENERAL AMER KHAMMASH, MAJOR DIB SULAYMAN, MISS SUSAN CASEY, AND SIX GUARDS. ALL BUT GENERAL KHAMMASH WILL ACCOMPANY PRINCE HASSAN TO NEWPORT BEACH. GENERAL KHAMMASH WILL PROCEED FROM HONOLULU TO WASHINGTON ALONE.

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 AMMAN 01609 281125Z

3. REQUEST SECRET SERVICE MAKE HOTEL RESERVATIONS FOR PRINCE HASSAN'S PARTY IN HONOLULU. HE HAS NO PARTICULAR PREFERENCE AND DEFERS TO SECRET SERVICE JUDGMENT AS TO WHICH HOTEL BEST IN INTERESTS OF SECURIYT.

4. IN NEWPORT BEACH PRINCE HASSAN REQUESTS IF POSSIBLE SAME APARTMENT HE HAD ON HIS LAST VISIT. STAYING WITH HIM IN APARTMENT WILL BE PRINCESS SARVATH, TWO DAUGHTERS, AND NURSEMAID.

5. PRINCESS SARVATH WILL ARRIVE IN LOS ANGELES, PROBABLY ABOARD PAN AMERICAN POLAR FLIGHT FROM LONDON ON APRIL 24. SHE WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY HER TWO DAUGHTERS, NURSEMAID, MRS. RANSOM HAIG, AND LT. ABDULLAH KRAYYAM.
BROWN

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DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

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CONFIDENTIAL 287

PAGE 01 AMMAN 01421 190835Z

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20
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
---------- 088146

P R 190754Z MAR 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7893
INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 1421

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, US, JO, TC
SUBJ: TRANSFER OF 106S TO ABU DHABI

REF: STATE 47707

1. REGRET DELAY IN ANSWERING REFTEL BUT WANTED TO DISCUSS WITH BEN SHAKER AND KHAMMASH.

2. AS REPORTED EARLIER, KAMMASH WAS SUPPOSED TO GO TO ABU DHABI AFTER JIDDA VISIT. INSTEAD HE RETURNED HERE. WILL LEAVE SOON FOR ABU DHABI BEARING WITH HIM DRAFT COMITMENT ON NON-TRANSFERABILITY OF 106S. HE UNDERSTANDS IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO THIS DOCUMENT AND EXPECTS NO TROUBLE GETTING IT SIGNED.

3. FOUR 106S WERE DELIVERED LATE LAST WEEK. FOUR MORE EXPECTED TO GO TODAY. THIS WILL MAKE DELIVERY TOTAL FOURTEEN. THIRTY-ONE IS TARGET AND LIMIT. ALL 106S WILL BE SUPPLIED WITH SPARES. THEY WILL BE COSMOLINE-PACKED. JORDANIAN EXPERTS WILL ACCOMPANY IN ORDER TO ASSEMBLE. JORDANIANS NOT SUPPLYING AMMO. THEY ASSUME UAE CAN ORDER IT.

4. DOES AMMO QUESTION POSE LOCAL PROBLEM? WE CAN PROBABLY GET JORDANIANS TO PROVIDE MINIMUM AMOUNT BUT THEY ARE NOT ANXIOUS TO DO SO.
BROWN

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 306

PAGE 01 AMMAN 01339 141545Z

46
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
---------- 051416

'73 MAR 13 PM 7:52

R 141431Z MAR 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7858
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

S E C R E T AMMAN 1339

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: PINS, LE
SUBJECT: HOW TO FIGHT FEDAYEEN TERROR

1. SUMMARY: REHETORIC AND UN RESOLUTIONS WILL NOT SOLVE TERRORIST THREAT. LEBANON NEEDS TO BE PERSUADED OR, IF THAT FAILS, FORCED TO TAKE SUCH STRONG MEASURES AGAINST FEDAYEEN HEADQUARTERS THAT THEY WILL MOVE. END SUMMARY.

2. KHARTOUM MARKS A NEW ESCALATION IN FEDAYEEN TERROR AND, AT THE SAME TIME, EMPHASIZES THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF GUARDING EVERY TARGET THE FEDAYEEN MIGHT HIT. HOWEVER ELABORATE AND COSTLY THE PROTECTIVE MEASURES, THEY CAN ALWAYS FIND A SOFT SPOT TO ATTACK SO LONG AS OUR MEASURES ARE PASSIVE AND REACTIVE.

3. KHARTOUM ALSO SHOWED, HOWEVER, THAT THE EXTREMISM OF TERRORISTS IS CREATING SEVERE STRESSES AMONG ARAB GOVERNMENTS. IN SUDAN, FOR FIRST TIME SINCE JORDAN IN 1970, AN ARAB GOVERNMENT HAS OPENLY BROKEN WITH AND TAKEN OFFENSIVE AGAINST TERRORISTS. UNHAPPINESS AND AMBIVALENCE WITH WHICH OTHER GOVERNMENTS ARE REACTING -- EG SAUDI ARABIA, LEBANON, KUWAIT, EVEN EGYPT -- HOLDS POTENTIAL FOR A SERIOUS ARAB SPLIT OVER SUPPORT FOR TERRORISTS.

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FORM DS-1652

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 01339 141545Z

4. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, IT MAY BE POSSIBLE TO GO BEYOND PASSIVE PROTECTION AND OPEN A COUNTEROFFENSIVE AGAINST TERRORISM. SPECIFICALLY, WE SHOULD LOOK FOR MEANS NOW OF ISOLATING TERRORISTS, DEPRIVING THEM OF BASES FROM WHICH TO OPERATE, AND WEAKENING THEIR SUPPORT AMONG ARABS. IF WE CAN MAKE THEIR OPERATIONS MORE DIFFICULT AND THEIR PROSPECTS MORE DISCOURAGING, WE REDUCE OUR RELIANCE ON PASSIVE DEFENSE.

5. THE MOST OBVIOUS BLOW TO FEDAYEEN TERROR WOULD BE TO ELIMINATE IT FROM LEBANON AS THOROUGHLY AS IT WAS ELIMINATED FROM JORDAN IN 1970-71. TO ELIMINATE TERRORISM, HOWEVER, LEBANESE WOULD HAVE TO ELIMINATE ALL FEDAYEEN ACTIVITIES, AS JORDANIANS DID.

6. LEBANON STILL OFFERS FEDAYEEN A PRIVILEGED SANCTUARY FOR A HEADQUARTERS AND COMMAND POST, RECRUITMENT, TRAINING, MOUNTING TERRORIST OPERATIONS WORLDWIDE, AND PROPAGANDA: LEBANON IS TERRORIST CENTER. IF THIS BASE WERE DENIED THEM, FEDAYEEN WOULD, OF COURSE, FIND OTHER PLACES FROM WHICH TO OPERATE. BUT NO OTHER BASE COMBINES UNIQUE ADVANTAGES OF LEBANON IN PROVIDING A MEDIA AND COMMUNICATIONS CENTER: A CROSSROADS OF ARAB WORLD: A NOMINAL BASE FOR OPERATIONS AGAINST ISRAEL: AND A BREEDING AND RECRUITING GROUND IN REFUGEE CAMPS WHERE FEDAYEEN ARE SOVEREIGN. NEITHER EGYPT NOR SYRIA IS LIKELY TO WELCOME THEM: AND NO ARAB COUNTRY REALLY WANTS TO EMBRACE INTERNAL POLITICAL AND SECURITY PROBELMS FEDAYEEN BRING WITH THEM. LOSS OF LEBANON WOULD NOT ONLY BE A SEVERE BLOW TO TERRORIST OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY: IT WOULD BE DEMORALIZING PSYCHOLOGICALLY AND DAMAGING TO FEDAYEEN POLITICAL CREDIBILITY.

7. WHAT ARE CHANCES THAT LEBANON COULD BE PERSUADED TO SO DRASTIC A STEP AS ELIMINATING FEDAYEEN? LEBANON HAS ALREADY SHOWN, UNDER PRESSURE OF ISRAELI RAIDS, THAT IT CAN DO A LOT MORE THAN IT WOULD LIKE TO DO. IN NORTH LEBANON RAID OF FEBRUARY, ISRAELIS THEMSELVES BEGAN MOUNTING EFFORTS TO FORCE LEBANESE TO ACT AGAINST BREEDING GROUNDS OF TERRORISM. FOR ISRAELIS THIS IS NEXT LOGICAL STEP AFTER SEALING BORDER. WHILE ISRAELI PRESSURES WILL CONTINUE, THEY ALONE PROBABLY WILL NOT DO THE TRICK. AMERICAN PRESSURES, BOTH CARROT AND STICK, MIGHT BE CATALYST TO PRODUCE LEBANESE ACTION AGAINST FEDAYEEN ACROSS-THE-BOARD.

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PAGE 03 AMMAN 01339 141545Z

8. SOME STICKS: WE COULD USE DIPLOMATIC PRESSURE, GRADUATED FROM PERSUASION TO TACIT THREAT OF SERIOUS CHANGE IN OUR PRESENT CLOSE RELATIONS -- VISIBLE AMERICAN DISENCHANTMENT WITH LEBANON, NO SUPPORT VIS-A-VIS ISRAELIS, REDUCTION OF USG ACTIVITIES ON SECURITY GROUNDS. THERE MAY EVEN BE WAYS BY WHICH WE CAN SHARPEN CONFRONTATION BETWEEN LEBANON AND FEDAYEEN.

9. THE REALLY VITAL LEBANESE NERVE IS ECONOMIC. US ACTION FOR SECURITY REASONS PUBLICLY TO DISCOURAGE TOURISM AND US INVESTMENT, TO PRESSURE PRIVATE AMERICAN TO TRANSFER THEMSELVES AND EVEN THEIR BUSINESSES ELSEWHERE, WOULD BE A SERIOUS THREAT. THE THREAT, FOR EXAMPLE, OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION TO IMPOSE COMMERCIAL AND ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ON COUNTRIES HARBORING TERRORIST BASES, WOULD BE A SOBERING ONE FOR LEBANESE BUSINESSMEN. WE MIGHT EVEN PERSUADE SOME OTHER GOVERNMENTS TO JOIN IN THESE PRESSURES.

10. ON OTHER SIDE, WE HAVE SOME CARROTS. IF LEBANESE INDICATED A SERIOUS WILLINGNESS TO MOVE AGAINST FEDAYEEN, WE COULD OFFER TO HELP THEM SUBSTANTIALLY BOTH IN STRENGTHENING THEIR INTELLIGENCE/SECURITY CAPABILITIES AND WITH INCREASED MILITARY AID.

11. ALL OF THESE POSSIBLE PRESSURES ARE MORE EFFECTIVE AS THREATS THAN AS ACTIONS. IF US IS VISIBLY SEEN TO BE PRESSURING LEBANESE TO A SHOWDOWN, IT WILL BE MUCH HARDER FOR LEBANESE TO ACT. WHILE ALTERNATIVE OF UNWELCOME US PRESSURES SHOULD BE VISIBLE TO LEBANESE GOVERNMENT LEADERS, THEREFORE, OUR OVERT ACTION INITIALLY SHOULD BE ENCOURAGING NOT THREATENING. WE SHOULD, IF POSSIBLE, INCREASE OUR EFFORTS TO DITINGUISH BETWEEN PALESTINIANS AND FEDAYEEN AND TO SHOW OURSELVES SYMPATHETIC TO PALESTINIANS -- AS WE DO PERIODICALLY IN ACKNOWLEDGING THEIR STAKE IN MIDDLE EAST ISSUE. WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT FATEH AND PLO ARE INDISTINGUISHABLE FROM BLACK SEPTEMBER AND OTHER TERRORIST GROUPS. THIS MEANS MAKING SURE THAT GOL UNDERSTANDS THAT WE CAN NO LONGER ACCEPT CHUMMY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ARAFAT AND LEBANESE POLITICAL LEADERS. WE SHOULD, SOMEHOW, LOOK FOR WAYS TO HELP LEBANESE DEFEND THEIR ARAB CREDENTIALS EVEN WHILE ATTACKING FEDAYEEN. WE SHOULD, ABOVE ALL, MAKE IT CLEAR THAT WE ARE DEAD SERIOUS -- THAT THE PRICE OF INACTION WILL BE COSTLY AND SPECIFIC AMERICAN COUNTER-MEASURES.

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 04 AMMAN 01339 141545Z

12. THIS MAY NOT BE BEST, AND CERTAINLY IT'S NOT A COMPLETE SCENARIO. THERE MAY BE OTHER AND BETTER RESOURCES (EG GETTING SAUDIS TO EXERCISE THEIR FINANCIAL MUSCLE IN BEIRUT) WE COULD USE TO IMPEL LEBANESE COOPERATION AND ACTIONS DISCUSSED ARE ONLY SUGGESTIVE. COUPLED WITH ISRAELI PUNITIVE ACTIONS THAT WILL PRESUMABLE CONTINUE, HOWEVER, OUR PRESSURES COULD BE PERSUASIVE. LEBANON UNDOUBTEDLY CAN, AT A PRICE, MOVE AGAINST FEDAYEEN. THERE IS A FAIR CHANCE THAT GIVEN RIGHT INCENTIVES, IT WILL DO SO. THE BLOW TO TERRORISM, PRACTICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL, WOULD BE GREAT ENOUGH TO WARRANT A SERIOUS EFFORT. ADMITTEDLY, ACTIONS REQUIRE ARE DRASTIC: BUT PROBLEM IS A GRAVE ONE.
BROWN

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 219

PAGE 01 AMMAN 01300 140715Z

20
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 CCU-00 NSCE-00 /026 W
---------- 047441

O 140651Z MAR 73 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7843
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

S E C R E T AMMAN 1300

EXDIS
DEPT PASS CINCEUR

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, US, JO, TC
SUBJECT: TRANSFER OF 106S FROM JORDAN TO ABU DHABI

1. ASKED MAJOR GENERAL BEN SHAKER WHAT WAS UP WITH 106 DELIVERIES. HE SAID THAT JORDANIANS HAVE BEEN WAITING FOR AMER KHAMMASH TO VISIT ABU DHABI TO DISCUSS SPARES, TRAINING, AND DELIVERY REMAINDER OF GUNS. KHAMMASH LEAVES THIS MORNING FOR JIDDA WITH PRIME MINISTER LAWZI. WILL GO FROM SAUDI ARABIA TO ABU DHABI.

2. TOLD BEN SHAKER THAT ABU DHABI SEEMS TO BE UNHAPPY ABOUT TRANSACTION. HE SAID IT IS GOJ'S INTENT TO GIVE ABU DHABI GUNS WITH FULL SET OF SPARES, AMMO, ETC., AT SAME LEVELS EQUIPMENT ORIGINALLY BOUGHT FROM U.S.

3. BEN SHAKER IS THINKING OF LOADING THE C-130 WITH SOME MORE GUNS AND SENDING AN OFFICER ALONG TO EXPLAIN SITUATION AND NOTE UPCOMING KHAMMASH VISIT. HE WILL HAVE TO CHECK IT OUT WITH KING.

4. DON'T BE SURPRISED TO FIND AN UNSCHEDULED C-130 AT THE AIRPORT.
BROWN
NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED CINCEUR.

'73 MAR 13 AM 8:27

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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SECRET 108

PAGE 01 AMMAN 01123 051137Z

2

46
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00

/026 W
---------- 098525

R 051106Z MAR 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7759
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
AMEMBASSY TUNIS

S E C R E T AMMAN 1123

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINS, SU, JO
SUBJECT: KHARTOUM ASSASSINATIONS

REF: STATE 039861

1. GREATLY APPRECIATE INFO CONTAINED REFTEL CONCERNING JORDANIAN CHARGE NASR. I IMMEDIATELY PASSED IT ON TO SECGEN OF FOREIGN OFFICE. LATER INFORMED KING, FOREIGN MINISTER, AND VARIOUS ROYAL COURT OFFICIALS. THEY ARE APPRECIATIVE OF OUR CONCERN AND PROMPT REPORT ON NASR'S CONDITION.

2. AS SIDELIGHT, I WAS TOLD THAT NASR'S SISTER-IN-LAW, WHO LIVES IN BEIRUT, IS WIDOW OF FEDAYEEN BIG SHOT KILLED ABOUT TWO YEARS AGO. SHE HAS ALLEGEDLY BEEN CLOSE TO ARAFAT SINCE. JORDANIANS ASSUME SHE INTERVENED WITH ARAFAT AND THAT THIS SAVED NASR'S LIFE. IF TRUE, IT IS ONE MORE BIT OF EVIDENCE LINKING ARAFAT TO KHARTOUM TRAGEDY.
BROWN

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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SECRET 716

PAGE 01 AMMAN 00614 021049Z

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14
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 ECO-00 /026 W
---------- 106150

O 021040Z FEB 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7558
INFO DIA
CSAF WASHDC
SECDEF/ISA
USCINCEUR/ECJG-PM

S E C R E T AMMAN 0614

EXDIS

SUBJ: 106S FOR ABU DHABI

REF: AMMAN 611

WE ARE INFORMED THAT IN ADDITION TO C130 FLIGHT, RJAF
C119 MISSION TO ABU DHABI FEB 1 ALSO DELIVERED TWO 106 RR.
SEEMS CLEAR JORDANIANS WILL PROBABLY COMPLETE DELIVERY OF
81 106S PLANNED FOR ABU DHABI IN NEXT FEW DAYS.

GDS.
BRUBECK

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DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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SECRET 081

PAGE 01 AMMAN 00590 311506Z

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46
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W
---------- 087070

'73 JAN 31 PM 4:12

O R 311500Z JAN 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7537
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USUN NEW YORK 2489

S E C R E T AMMAN 0590

EXDIS

SUBJ: CAIRO CONFERENCE

1. HM HAS NOW MET WITH RETURNED CAIRO CONFEREES AND ZAID RIFAI CONFIRMS EARLIER JUDGMENT THAT CONFERENCE SOUND AND FURY PRODUCED NOTHING. REPORT TABLED BY GEN ISMAIL FOR REACTIVATION OF JOINT COMMAND CALLED FOR NINETY MILLION POUND FUND FOR MILITAR AID TO CONFRONTATION STATES. WHEN CONFERENCE PRODUCED NO MONEY COMMITMENTS HE REFUSED TO ACCEPT COMMAND UNTIL FUNDS FORTHCOMING. (JORDAN'S SHARE IN THEORY ABOUT 40 MILLION POUNDS.) THUS, EVEN ON PAPER, COMMAND NOT ACTIVATED.

2. JORDANIANS, PER HM INSTRUCTION, REFUSED TO AGREE TO REACTIVATION OF COMMAND PENDING A POLITICAL SUMMIT OF THREE CONFRONTATION CHIEFS OF STATE (HUSSEIN, ASSAD, SADAT) AND NO AGREEMENT ON SUMMIT REACHED. JORDAN ALSO MAINTAINED POSITION THAT NAY TROOPS IN JORDAN TO BE UNDER JORDANIAN COMMAND (AND IN FACT NOT PREPARED TO ACCEPT ANY FOREIGN TROOPS) AND FLATLY REFUSED TO CONSIDER RETURN OF FEDAYEEN EVEN UNDER JAA CONTROL. THUS NO PROGRESS ON ANY OF LONGSTANDING ISSUES BETWEEN JORDAN AND OTHER ARABS. RIFAI CONCEDES THIS IS UNPROMISING OMEN FOR RESUMPTION OF KUWAIT SUBSIDIES BUT INSISTS PROSPECT OF KUWAITI

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RESUMPTION GOOD IF PRESENT DIALOGUE LEADS TO RESUMPTION FULL JORDAN RELATIONS WITH EGYPT AND SYRIA.

3. IN SUMMARY, JOINT COMMAND REMAINS STRICTLY PAPER COMMAND, NO PROGRESS ON ANY IMPORTANT ISSUES, NO JORDANIAN CONCESSIONS, CONFERENCE A COMPLETE BUST. ZAID, AT LEAST, SEEMS UNDISTURBED AND CONTENT TO STICK WITH JORDAN HARD LINE. CONFERENCE SERVED ONLY TO EMPHASIZE ARAB DISARRAY AND ZAID LEAVES IMPRESSION JORDAN MORE CONCERNED TO CONTINUE PURSUE ITS BILATERAL DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES WITH SADAT AND ASSAD.

XGDS-1.
BRUBECK

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L81/10/8109

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

WX

SECRET 505

PAGE 01 AMMAN 00568 310851Z

13
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /026 W
---------- 084506

O 310820Z JAN 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7529
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE
DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
CSAF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHDC/ISA IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T AMMAN 0568

EXDIS

DEPT PASS USCINCEUR/ECJG-PM IMMEDIATE INFO

SUBJECT: 106S FOR ABU DHABI

REF: STATE 230442 (22 DEC 1972)

1. NEW RJAF C-130 ARRIVED YESTERDAY WITH USAF (TEXAS USAF RESERVE) FERRY CREW COMMANDED COL. DAVID G. KNIGHT. THIS MORNING RJAF DIRECTOR OPS COL. QANDA CONVEYED TO DATT KING'S PERSONAL REQUEST THAT CREW BE RETAINED HERE ONE WEEK.

2. ACCORDING QANDA, PRIMARY PURPOSE OF HOLDOVER IS TO USE USAF CREW AND C-130 TO FERRY TO ABU DHABI "JEEPS FOR 106 RECOILLESS RIFLES." RJAF HAD FIRST TWO JEEPS ABOARD C-119 FOR SHIPMENT TODAY BUT CANCELLED DUE TO WEATHER. HM NOW WANTS TO SHIP BY C-130 INSTEAD OF C-119. USAF CREW TO BE USED FOR FIRST TWO MISSIONS TO ABU DHABI FOR RJAF FLIGHT CREW ROUTE CHECKOUT.

3. WE HAVE INFORMED QANDA WE WILL SEEK IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON DECISION ON CREW RETENTION, WHICH SHOULD HOLD SITUATION FOR 24-48 HOURS. WE DID NOT REPEAT NOT OPEN 106 QUESTION.

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4. IF JORDAN IS SHIPPING 106 JEEPS (WHICH ARE M151A1C SPECIAL PURPOSE), THEY PRESUMABLY PLAN FOLLOW UP WITH 106S THEMSELVES. LATEST WE HAVE ON ISSUE HERE IS REFTEL WHICH RAISED NUMBER OF QUESTIONS AND DID NOT AUTHORIZE TRANSFER. UNLESS THERE HAS BEEN FURTHER DISCUSSION/DECISION BETWEEN AMBASSADOR AND WASHINGTON OF WHICH I AM UNAWARE, HM APPARENTLY ACTING WITHOUT USG AGREEMENT.

5. BEFORE REOPENING THIS SUBJECT WITH GOJ NEED URGENTLY GUIDANCE ON 106 ISSUE (EVEN IF WE DO NOT PROVIDE CREW, RJAF CAN RESORT TO SHIPMENT BY C-119 OR USE JORDANIAN C-130 CREW). ALSO NEED DECISION ON WHETHER HOLD USAF CREW HERE FOR POSSIBLE MISSIONS PER HM'S REQUEST. XGDS-1.
BRUBECK

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED USCINCEUR.

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W

SECRET 578

PAGE 01 AMMAN 00562 301521Z

47
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 /026 W
---------- 076333

O P 301435Z JAN 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7525
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY
USINT CAIRO PRIORITY

S E C R E T AMMAN 0562

EXDIS

SUBJ: CAIRO CONFERENCE TRIES TO REVIVE EASTERN FRONT

REF: DAO 0028 JAN 73 (NOTAL)

1. AS ADDRESSEES ALREADY AWARE FROM MEDIA, ARAB DEFENSE COUNCIL IN CLOSED SEESION EVENING JANUARY 28 AGREED TO APPOINT EGYPTIAN WARMINISTER AHMAD ISMAIL AS COMMANDING GENERAL OF THREE ARAB FRONTS: NORTHERN (SYRIA), SOUTHERN (EGYPT), AND EASTERN (JORDAN). ON PRECEDING DAY MEDIA REPORTED EXPANSIVE REMARKS BY FONMIN ABU ZAYD RE GOJ WILLINGNESS TO PLACE ARMED FORCES UNDER ISMAIL'S COMMAND. ISRAEL RADIO SUBSEQUENTLY CARRIED WARNING FROM DEPUTY PRIMIN ALLON THAT HUSSEIN SHOULD RECALL EVENTS OF 1967 BEFORE PURSUING THIS COURSE.

2. PALACE COUNSELOR ZAYID RIFA'I TOLD CHARGE' THAT AGREEMENT CONTAINED NOTHING OF IMPORTANCE AND WAS STRICTLY COSMETIC. HE SAID PALACE UPSET WITH REPORTED ABU ZAYD STATEMENT AND QUERIED HIM BY TELEPHONE. ABU ZAYD DENIED MAKING REMARKS AS

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QUOTED BY PRESS. FONMIN DIRECTOR GENERAL ANTON NABER (WHO JUST RETURNED FROM NIGERIA) GAVE APPROXIMATELY SAME ASSESSMENT TO EMBOFF. NABER SAID EASTERN FRONT ESSENTIALLY A PAPER PLY. IT SUFFICIENTLY OPEN-ENDED THAT JORDAN CAN STALL ON ANY UNPALATABLE JOINT DECISIONS WITH EXCUSE THAT COORDINATED ARAB PLANS STILL INCOMPLETE. EMBOFF ASKED ABOUT POSSIBILITY THAT PAPER AGREEMENT WOULD PRY LOOSE SUSPENDED KUWAIT SUBSIDIES. NABER REPLIED THAT IN HIS OPINION, KUWAITI LEADERSHIP STILL AFRAID OF PARLIAMENT AND PALESTINIAN RESIDENTS AND WOULD NOT ACT PRECIPITIOUSLY ON BASIS THIS SINGLE GESTURE. HE FELT THAT FURTHER EGYPTIAN MOVES, FOR EXAMPLE, RESUMPTION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH JORDAN, MIGHT SERVE AS A CATALYST.

3. WE UNDERSTAND THAT JAA'S CHIEF CAIRO DELEGATE MAJ GEN QANDA HAS ASSURED PALACE THAT NO REAL COMMITMENTS MADE AND THAT MEETING IN FACT ACCOMPLISHED NOTHING.

4. WILL PROVIDE FULLER REPORT TOMORROW AFTER DELEGATION'S RETURN. GDS
.
BRUBECK

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681/10/8107

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

'73 JAN 23 AM 8:22

WH

SECRET 632

PAGE 01 AMMAN 00409 232223Z

67
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
---------- 025134 2

R 231058Z JAN 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7458

S E C R E T AMMAN 0409

EXDIS

SUBJECT: POLITICAL ASPECTS OF HUSSEIN'S WASHINGTON AGENDA

1. WHILE KING WILL WANT TO DISCUSS ARAB-ISRAELI PROBLEM AS PRINCIPAL ITEM ON POLITICAL AGENDA, WE EXPECT HE WILL ALSO WANT TO BRING UP GULF AGAIN. AS PALACE OFFICIALS KEEP TELLING US, KING PERCEIVES INCREASED COMMITMENTS OF ADVISERS TO OMAN AND UAE AS RESPONSE TO "REQUEST" FOR MORE ACTIVE JORDAN WHICH PRESIDENT ALLEGEDLY MADE DURING LAST YEAR'S VISIT. THIS INTERPRETATION SHAPED BY DESIRE TO SHOW THAT JORDAN PROVIDING NEW TYPE OF RETURN ON US INVESTMENT, POSSIBLY TO JUSTIFY INCREASED FINANCIAL AND MILITARY AID, AND TO ELICIT MORE LIBERAL USG POLICY RE GOJ REQUESTS FOR TRANSFER OF FMS SURPLUSES. WHETHER OR NOT KING SPECIFICALLY LINKS INCREASED PENINSULA ACTIVITIES WITH BUDGET REQUESTS, HE IS LIKELY TO REVIEW GOJ'S PERFORMANCE AND TO EXPECT WORD OF APPRECIATION.

2. KING HAS BEEN COMMISSIONED BY OMAN'S SULTAN QABOOS TO CONVEY REQUESTS FOR A) USG BACKSTOPPING OF SAUDI WEAPONS/AMMO SUPPLY OPERATIONS AND B) PREPARATION OF CONTINGENCY PLAN IN EVENT OF ACTIVE PDRY INTERVENTION IN DHOFAR (SEE ALSO AMMAN 154).

3. AS DEPARTMENT WILL RECALL, GOJ WAS SUPPOSED TO SUPPLY US WITH A PAPER ON HOW IT VIEWS PROBLEMS OF GULF AND LISTING RESOURCES REQUIRED. WE HAVE NEVER RECEIVED THAT PAPER DESPITE REPEATED PRODDINGS. IT IS MOST LIKELY THAT GOJ PREFERS TO AD HOC IT AND NOT ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS WITH USG ON DETAILS OF GULF POLICY.

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4. I HOPE WE WILL BE VERY CAREFUL AND NOT LET GOJ THINK THAT WE HAVE SELECTED IT AS OUR CHOSEN INSTRUMENT. GOJ CAN PLAY A USEFUL ROLE IN GULF IF GIVEN NECESSARY FINANCIAL AND MATERIAL ASSISTANCE BY IRAN AND SAUDI ARABIA. THAT IS THE DIRECTION IT SHOULD TURN RATHER THAN TO US. GDS.
BROWN

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SECRET

161/10/8109

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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'73 JAN 1? PM 6.30

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CONFIDENTIAL 992

PAGE 01 AMMAN 00157 101142Z

52
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
---------- 055064

R 100857Z JAN 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7355
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
AMEMBASSY MANAMA

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 0157H

EXDIS

DEPT PASS MUSCAT; ABU DHABI
DEPT PASS CINCEUR FOR POLAD

SUBJECT: AMER KHAMMASH VISIT TO OMANI SULTAN

1. AMER KHAMMASH BRIEFED ME YESTERDAY ON JUST-COMPLETED TRIP TO PENINSULA. ITINERARY INCLUDED RIYADH, MUSCAT, DOHA, AND BAHRAIN, WITH BRIEF ABU DHABI STOPOVER.

2. FIRST STOP FOR PURPOSE QUERYING SAUDI PRINCE SULTAN ON OMAN AID INTENTIONS FOR RELAY TO SULTAN QABOOS. REFERRING TO 6 MILLION (STERLING) EARMARKED FOR DEVELOPMENT AID OVER COMING THREE YEARS, PRINCE SAID SAG WOULD CONSIDER REQUESTS FOR INCREASES IN EVENT OMAN COMPLETED PROJECTS AT FASTER RATE. THUS GRANT NOT TIED TO 2 MILLION YEARLY. ON MILITARY SIDE, SAG WOULD PROVIDE ADEQUATE NUMBER 105 HOWITZERS, 81MM MORTARS, AND BROWNING 50'S PLUS AMMO. ARMS BEING LOADED AT DAMMAM AT TIME OF KHAMMASH'S STOPOVER. SAUDIS PREPARED TO SEND INSTRUCTORS BUT KHAMMASH SUGGESTED JORDANIANS ON SPOT COULD DO JOB. UPON LEARNING FORE-GOING, QABOOS ESPECIALLY HAPPY THAT DEVELOPMENT GRANT MORE FLEXIBLE THAN PREVIOUSLY UNDERSTOOD.

2. QABOOS, WHO RECEIVED KHAMMASH IN SALALAH, REPORTED DHOFAR SITUATION SOMEWHAT IMPROVED. (KHAMMASH NOTED THAT OMANIS HAD

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 AMMAN 00157 101142Z

KEPT REGIMENT ON MOUNTAIN TOP THRU MONSOONS PER HIS SUGGESTION; THIS PAID OFF.) CONDITIONS ALSO BETTERED BY REPLACEMENT TOP TWO BRITISH ADVISERS WITH YOUNGER, MORE CAPABLE OFFICERS.

3. QABOOS DESCRIBED RECENT CAIRO AND TRIPOLI VISITS. SAID EGYPTIANS HOSPITABLE, SURPRISINGLY UNDERSTANDING ABOUT OMAN'S CONTINUING TIES WITH UK AND IRAN. EGYPTIANS IN FACT SPOKE WARMLY ABOUT BRITS, URGING HIM TO KEEP BRITISH OFFICERS UNTIL OMANIS FULLY TRAINED. QADHAFI SIMILARLY SOLICITOUS BUT URGED QABOOS TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT UNIFYING BICKERING GULF SHAIKHDOMS. SULTAN REPLIED HE HAD HANDS FULL WITH OWN TROUBLES. LIBYANS OFFERED DEVELOPMENT AID, SUBSEQUENTLY DESPATCHED TEAM TO SURVEY OMANI NEEDS. ONE PROJECT MAY BE TEACHERS COLLEGE.

4. QABOOS ASKED FOR KHAMMASH'S OPINION ON RETURN VISIT TO SHAIKH ZAYYID. KHAMMASH URGED QABOOS TO GO, ASSURED HIM THAT SAUDIS WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTIONS.

5. KHAMMASH CONFIRMED RECENT REPORT OF OMANI SECURITY ARRESTS. ROUNDUP WAS EXTENSIVE: IT NETTED ONE MEMBER OF BU SA'ID FAMILY WHO MIN EDUCATION OFFICIAL, AND NUMEROUS SUSPECTS IN SUR. ARRESTEES AFFILIATED WITH PFLOAG. SECURITY FORCES DISCOVERED ARMS CACHE PRESUMABLY SMUGGLED BY PFLOAG THRU RAS AL KHAIMAH. OBJECTIVE WAS TO CREATE DIVERSIONARY TROUBLES IN JABAL AL AKHDARJT ARRESTS FOILED PFLOAG PLOT TO ASSASSINATE BRIT OFFICERS EVENING DECEMBER 24. GDS. BROWN

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED ABOVE ADDRESSEES.

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'73 JAN 17 PM 6:30

CONFIDENTIAL 059

PAGE 01 AMMAN 00155 101223Z

53
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
---------- 055337

R 100855Z JAN 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7353
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 0155

EXDIS

DEPT PASS CINCEUR FOR POLAD
DEPT PASS MUSCAT

SUBJ: KHAMMASH ON GULF VISIT

1. AMER KHAMMASH BRIEFED ME YESTERDAY ON JUST-COMPLETED VISITS TO BAHRAIN AND QATAR FOLLOWING MEETING WITH OMAN SULTAN QABOOS. QATAR RULER KHALIFA IBN HAMAD PRESENTLY CONCERNED OVER WEAKNESSES OF UAE, SAID SHAIKH ZAYYID BASICALLY GOOD LEADER BUT HE SURROUNDED BY WRONG ADVISERS. BAHRAIN TALKS UNEVENTFUL.

2. KHAMMASH ASKED JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR TO MEET HIM AT ABU DHABI AIRPORT DURING BRIEF STOPOVER EN ROUTE BAHRAIN. QUERIED AMB ON ZAYYID'S WHEREABOUTS AND LIKELY INTENTIONS RE MEETING WITH SAUDIS. AMB REPLIED THAT ZAYYID STILL ON EXGENDED HUNTING TRIP IN PAKISTAN AND NOT EXPECTED RETURN ABU DHABI UNTIL NEXT FRIDAY (JAN 12) FOR 'IID. AFTER HOLIDAY HE INTENDS RESUME PAKISTAN VISIT. HIS ABSENCE DURING CURRENT TROUBLED TIMES HAS PROMPTED WIDESPREAD CRITICAL COMMENT. SHAIKH RASHID OF DUBAI ALSO ABSENT ON HUNTING TRIP UNTIL FEW DAYS AGO, COMPOUNDING UAE LEADERSHIP SHORTAGE. KHAMMASH NOTED THAT ZAYYID COULD FLY TO MECCA IN TIME FOR LAST-MINUTE HAJ, BUT NO ONE (INCLUDING SAUDIS) HAD ANY FIRM INFORMATION RE SUCH INTENTIONS.

3. SAUDI PRINCE SULTAN DISCUSSED UAR/SAG DISPUTE WITH KHAMMASH AT BEGINNING OF PENINSULA TRIP. KHAMMASH SUMMARY OF

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PRINCE'S COMMENTS RE NEED FOR ZAYYID TO "COME TO TERMS" AND GENEROSITY OF PRESENT SAG OFFER VIRTUALLY DUPLICATED EMBASSY JIDDA REPORTING ON SUBJECT.

4. KHAMMASH MADE PASSING MENTION OF RUMORED 16 MILLION DOLLAR UAE LOAN TO SYRIA, WHICH GRANTED FOLLOWING VISIT BY PRESIDENT ASSAD; HALF-JOKINGLY SAID JORDAN WOULD HAVE TO MAKE SIMILAR APPROACH IN VIEW OF SYRIAN SUCCESS. KHAMMASH APPEARED UNCERTAIN ABOUT TERMS OF LOAN; THIS PLACES IN DOUBT A REPORT HEARD HERE THAT ZAYYID HAD GRANTED ASSAD LOAN ON CONDITION THAT SYRIA WOULD RE-OPEN JORDAN BORDER, SINCE KHAMMASH PRESUMABLY WOULD HAVE BEEN WELL INFORMED RE DETAILS.

GDS.
BROWN

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

WH

'73 JAN 1 PM 6:30

SECRET 024

PAGE 01 AMMAN 00154 101210Z

53
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 W
---------- 055234

R 100854Z JAN 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7352
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

S E C R E T AMMAN 0154

EXDIS

DEPT PASS CINCEUR FOR POLAD
DEPT PASS MUSCAT

SUBJ: MESSAGES FROM SULTAN OF OMAN

OMANI SULTAN QABOOS REQUESTED AMER KHAMMASH CONVEY FOLLOWING MESSAGES TO KING HUSSEIN FOR RELAY TO USG DURING FORTHCOMING WASHINGTON VISIT.

A) QABOOS IS PLEASED WITH RECENT SAUDI EFFORTS TO SUPPLY 105MM HOWITZERS, 81MM MORTARS, AND BROWNING 50'S. 105'S ESPECIALLY WELCOME IN VIEW INCREASING OBSOLESCENCE OF 25-POUNDERS IN OMANI INVENTORY. SAG WILL PROVIDE AMMO, BUT OMANIS EXPENDING THIS AT RAPID RATE IN DHOFAR ACTIONS. HE HOPES THAT USG WILL BACKSTOP AMMO SUPPLY IF AND WHEN THIS NEEDED.

B) OMANI FORCES ARE HOLDING OWN AGAINST DHOFAR LIBERATION FRONT (DLF) REBELS. HOWEVER, SULTAN IS WORRIED THAT PDRY MIGHT DECIDE TO COMMIT REGULAR FORCES WHICH OMANIS WOULD BE UNABLE TO HANDLE. HE THEREFORE HOPES USG WILL PREPARE CONTINGENCY SUPPORT PLAN. (QABOOS AGREED WITH KHAMMASH THAT PDRY UNLIKELY TO COMMIT REGULAR FORCES IN VIEW LONG SUPPLY LINES AND CURRENT PROBLEMS WITH YAR, BUT NEVERTHELESS HE IS ANXIOUS TO HAVE USG ASSURANCE OF INTENDED SUPPORT.)

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

SECRET 561

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ORIGIN SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00 CIAE-00

NSAE-00 USSS-00 DODE-00 /031 R

DRAFTED BY NEA TASK FORCE - MWILEY
APPROVED BY NEA - ALATHERTON
S/S- MR. GAMMON

126603

O 311741Z OCT 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 214427

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MOPS, PINS, SY
SUBJ: SOVIET FORCES IN SYRIA AND OTHER INTELLIGENCE
REF: AMMAN 5787

1. CONSIDERABLE INTEREST HERE IN REFTEL. APPRECIATE ANY FURTHER EVALUATION OF REPORT AND OF SOURCE. IF POSSIBLE, PLEASE IDENTIFY SOURCE. KISSINGER

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

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SECRET 726

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ORIGIN SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 R

DRAFTED BY NEA:RPDAVIES:KM
APPROVED BY NEA:RPDAVIES
NEA:JJSISCO
NEA/TUR - MR. DILLON (INFO)
S/S:SRGAMMON

2 '73 OCT 26 AM 10:16
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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P 271936Z OCT 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
USMISSION NATO PRIORITY
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 212596

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, TU
SUBJ: SOVIET OVERFLIGHTS OF TURKISH TERRITORY

REF: ANKARA 8346

1. DEPT ASST SECTY DAVIES RAISED QUESTION OF INCREASED NUMBER OF SOVIET FLIGHTS THROUGH TURKISH AIRSPACE WITH AMBASSADOR ESENBEL EVENING OCTOBER 25 NOTING HE DOING SO INFORMALLY BUT REFLECTING SERIOUS CONCERN AND SURPRISE FELT AT TURKEY'S YIELDING TO SOVIET PRESSURE FOR MILITARY AIRLIFT DESIGNED TO ENHANCE SOVIET INFLUENCE AND PRESENCE IN NEAR EAST.

2. DAVIES SAID USG HAD GONE TO GREAT LENGTHS TO AVOID ACTIVITIES AT JOINT FACILITIES IN TURKEY THAT MIGHT CONFLICT WITH TURKISH POLICY OF NEUTRALITY AND FELT TURKISH ACQUIESCENCE IN INCREASED SOVIET FLIGHTS DISCRIMINATORY AND CONTRARY TO THAT POLICY. FURTHERMORE,

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SOVIET RESUPPLY OPERATION INITIATED AT TIME USG SEEKING MUTUAL RESTRAINT RAISED ISSUE FROM THAT OF NEAR EAST CONFLICT TO THAT OF SOVIET INTENTIONS AND POWER POSITION IN AREA OF MAJOR IMPORTANCE TO ALLIANCE. AMBASSADOR MACOMBER HAD EXPRESSED CONCERN WHEN APPRISED OF GOI DECISION BY FOREIGN MINISTER BAYULKEN AND WE WISHED TO UNDERLINE THIS IN STRONGEST TERMS.

3. AMBASSADOR ESENBEL SAID HE UNAWARE OF FACTS AND THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO STUDY MONTREUX CONVENTION BEFORE DISCUSSING ISSUE FURTHER. KISSINGER

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PAGE 01 STATE 208919

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ORIGIN SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSCE-00

/031 R

66602
DRAFTED BY: NEA/EGY:MSTERNER
APPROVED BY: NEA:JJSISCO
S/S-O:KKURZE
S/S:MR. PICKERING
WHITE HOUSE: GENM SCOWCROFT

---------- 055153

Z 231540Z OCT 73 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN FLASH

S E C R E T STATE 208919

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: OGEN, PFOR, XF
SUBJECT: JORDANIAN FORCES IN SYRIA

REF: AMMAN 5653

1. YOU SHOULD TELL KING THAT WE ARE IN TOUCH WITH SOVIETS ON THIS MATTER. KISSINGER

'73 OCT 23 PM 8:28
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

2

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ORIGIN SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /031 R

66602
DRAFTED BY: TEXT RECEIVED FROM WHITE HOUSE
APPROVED BY: S/S-TRPICKERING
NEA:MR. SISCO

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
'73 OCT 23 PM 8:28
055155

O 231540Z OCT 73 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN NIACT IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 208918

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINT JO
SUBJECT: PALESTINE

REF: AMMAN 5652

PLEASE INFORM THE KING THAT THERE WAS NO DISCUSSION OF ANY KIND IN MOSCOW REGARDING PALESTINE. KISSINGER

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
OCT 23 PM 3:12

2/3

SECRET 746

PAGE 01 STATE 208875

15
ORIGIN SS-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 (SS-20,) R

DRAFTED BY TEXT AS RECEIVED FROM SAM 86970
APPROVED BY S/S-O: REGINA ELTZ
========== 054522

Z 230615Z OCT 73 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN FLASH

S E C R E T STATE 208875

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)
SUBJECT: CEASEFIRE

FOLLOWING MESSAGE RECEIVED FROM AIRCRAFT SAM 86970 FOR FLASH RELAY TO YOU

QUOTE

FOR AMBASSADOR BROWN FROM SECRETARY

1. PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO KING FROM SECRETARY

2. QUOTE YOUR MAJESTY

AMBASSADOR BROWN HAS JUST ADVISED ME OF THE PRESSURES YOU ARE UNDER FOR YOUR UNITS TO CONTINUE FIGHTING ON THE SYRIAN FRONT.

I AM AT THIS MOMENT IN THE AIR ENROUTE TO WASHINGTON TO REPORT PERSONALLY TO PRESIDENT NIXON ON MY TALKS IN MOSCOW, WHICH ACHIEVED THE RESOLUTION PASSED LAST NIGHT BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL. EGYPT AND ISRAEL HAVE ACCEPTED THE CEASEFIRE. I VERY MUCH HOPE I CAN REPORT TO HIM

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 208875

THAT JORDAN HAS DONE THE SAME, WITH REGARD TO ITS FORCES EVERYWHERE. THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION IS

UNAMBIGUOUS IN THIS REGARD.

IT WOULD BE TRAGIC, YOUR MAJESTY, AFTER THE FORTITUDE YOU HAVE SHOWN DURING THESE DIFFICULT WEEKS IN RESISTING A WIDENING OF THE WAR, IF JORDAN SHOULD BE IN VIOLATION OF THE CEASEFIRE FOR WHICH WE HAVE ALL STRIVEN SO HARD.

SINCERELY

HENRY A. KISSINGER

UNQUOTE

RUSH

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SECRET

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State

TELEGRAM

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OCT 22 PM 2 43

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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CONFIDENTIAL 250

PAGE 01 STATE 208678

13
ORIGIN SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

INRE-00 /031 R

DRAFTED BY EUR/EE/JABAKER,JR./MWJ
APPROVED BY S/S - MR. MILLER
EUR - JAARMITAGE
NEA - AATHERTON
S - MR. EAGLEBURGER
S - MR. GOMPERT

========== 040720

R 202140Z OCT 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 208678

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS:PFOR, RO
SUBJECT: MACOVESCU'S CALL ON SECRETARY: MIDDLE EAST

1. THE FIRST SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE (OTHER ISSUES REPORTED SEPARATELY) RAISED BY FOREIGN MINISTER MACOVESCU DURING HIS CALL ON SECRETARY OCTOBER 13 WAS THE FIGHTING IN THE MIDDLE EAST. SECRETARY REMARKED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT ALL POWERS EXERCISE RESTRAINT IN THE PRESENT

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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SITUATION. HE STATED THAT WE ARE AWARE THAT SOVIETS HAVE FLOWN IN 105 CARGO FLIGHTS IN RECENT DAYS WHICH IS NOT HELPFUL. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE US WILL BE FORCED TO TAKE COUNTER MEASURES AND WILL DO SO. HE ADDED THAT THE US WILL NOT PERMIT DETENTE TO BE USED FOR UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE.

2.FOREIGN MINISTER MACOVESCU OBSERVED THAT HE HAD RECENTLY TALKED WITH ISRAELI AND UAR FOREIGN MINISTERS IN NEW YORK. BOTH HAD TAKEN A VERY TOUGH LINE. HE OBSERVED THAT EVERYONE IN NEW YORK APPEARED TO BE WAITING FOR RESULTS ON BATTLEFIELD. IT WAS NECESSARY TO SHOW RESTRAINT AND TO BRING THE PARTIES TOGETHER FOR A SETTLEMENT.

3. THE SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT THIS WAS EXACTLY THE US POSITION BUT THAT HE COULD NOT PREDICT WHEN THE PARTIES COULD BE BROUGHT TOGETHER.

4. MACOVESCU OBSERVED THAT PERHAPS THE PRESENT "BALANCE" IN WHICH THE ISRAELIS WERE ADVANCING IN THE GOLAN HEIGHTS AREA AND THE ARABS IN THE SINAI COULD PRODUCE THE BEGINNINGS OF AN EFFORT AT SETTLEMENT. THE SECRETARY STATED THAT PRESENT INDICATIONS WERE THAT THE ARABS WERE NOT ADVANCING AT ALL. HE ADDED THAT AS SOON AS EITHER OR BOTH PARTIES WANT TO SETTLE, THE US WILL BE READY TO HELP.

5. THE FOREIGN MINISTER ASKED WHETHER, IN THE SECRETARY'S VIEW, THE ARABS WOULD STOP IF THEY REACHED THE 1967 BOUNDARIES. THE SECRETARY SAID THEY WOULD NOT NECESSARILY STOP THERE IF THEY DID GET THAT FAR, BUT THAT THE US WOULD NOT UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES PERMIT ISRAEL TO BE ESTROYED.

6. THE FOREIGN MINISTER DEPLORED THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S PRESENT INACTION AND NOTED THAT THE ARABS WERE NOT READY TO BRING THE MATTER TO THE ASSEMBLY. THE SECRETARY REMARKED THAT THIS ILLUSTRATED THAT BOTH SIDES WERE CLEARLY SEEKING MILITARY VICTORY. IN ANSER TO MACOVESCU'S QUERY ABOUT THE ISRAELIS, HE NOTED THAT THE ISRAELIS

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 208678

WOULD NOT SEEK ASSEMBLY ACTION BECAUSE THEY HAD FEW SUPPORTERS.

7. MACOVESCU OBSERVED THAT SOMETHING NEEDED TO BE DONE AT THE UN. THE BIG POWERS SHOULD NOT GET INVOLVED. THE SECRETARY SAID THE US HAD NO DESIRE TO GET INVOLVED BUT THIS DEPENDED ON THE USSR, WHICH SEEMED TO BE HEADING IN THE OTHER DIRECTION. HE CONCLUDED THAT IT IS NOT VERY HELPFUL TO INTRODUCE MASSIVE ARMS SUPPLIES WHEN A WAR IS GOING ON. RUSH

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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

'73 OCT 16 A

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

SECRET 278

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62
ORIGIN SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 INRE-00 DODE-00

CIAE-00 NSAE-00 USSS-00 /031 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/EX:TWDAVIS:SKG
APPROVED BY NEA:ALATHERTONJR
OPR/WLG:JMCDONNELL
AF:JMONTVILLE
NEA/IAI:HHSTACKHOUSE
S/S:TPICKERING
S/S-O:PPSARROS
SCA:WPCHASE
S:LEAGLEBURGER

---------- 110815

O 152151Z OCT 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
USINT CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MANAMA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY SANAA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE
USINT ALGIERS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL CASABLANCA IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL TANGIER IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE
USINT BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE

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FORM DS-1652

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 204192

AMCONSUL NAPLES IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL ISTANBUL IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL KARACHI IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL BOMBAY IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL STUTTGART IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL ASMARA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAKAR IMMEDIATE
CINCUSNAVEUR IMMEDIATE
CINCEUR IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 204192

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: AEMR
SUBJECT: E AND E PLANNING

1. FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS PROVIDED TO FACILITATE YOUR ADVANCED E AND E PLANNING, AND DOES NOT REPEAT NOT CONSTITUTE AUTHORITY TO ORDER EVACUATION.

2. SHOULD, HOWEVER, EVACUATION BECOME NECESSARY FROM YOUR POST THE FOLLOWING SAFE HAVEN AND FISCAL INFORMATION WILL APPLY.

A) SAFE HAVEN:

BEIRUT - ATHENS
BAGHDAD - TEHRAN
AMMAN - TEHRAN
DHAHRAN - TEHRAN
KUWAIT - TEHRAN
CAIRO - ROME
KHARTOUM - ASMARA

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

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JIDDA - ASMARA
SANAA - ASMARA
TRIPOLI - MADRID
TUNIS - MADRID
ALGIERS - MADRID
RABAT - MADRID
CASABLANCA - MADRID
TANGIER - MADRID
NOUAKCHOTT - DAKAR
MUSCAT - KARACHI OR BOMBAY
ABU DHABI - KARACHI OR BOMBAY
DOHA - KARACHI OR BOMBAY
MANAMA - KARACHI OR BOMBAY

B) FISCAL DATA:

STATE - APPROPRIATION 1940522, ALLOTMENT 4K-2036-20;

USIA - APPROPRIATION 6740100, ALLOTMENT 1102, FUNCTION 1-2000, T.O. NO. 40283;

AID - MANUAL ORDER 709.1;

DOD - ACCORDING TO J.T.R.

USE STATE DATA FOR ANY OTHER U.S.G. EMPLOYEES AND DEPENDENTS.

3. IF REGULAR TRANSPORTATION IS INADEQUATE TO EFFECT EVACUATION YOU SHOULD ADVISE DEPARTMENT OF YOUR REQUIREMENTS. REQUESTS FOR COMMERCIAL CHARTER OF U.S. AIR CARRIERS SHOULD BE SUBMITTED TO DEPARTMENT FOR ACTION. KISSINGER

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SECRET

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

'73 OCT 16 AM 8:34

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

SECRET

PAGE 01 STATE 204191

61
ORIGIN SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 INRE-00 CIAE-00 NSAE-00 CCO-00

USSS-00 /031 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/EX:TWDAVIS/ARN:EDJEREJIAN:EMP
APPROVED BY NEA:JJSISCO
NEA:ALATHERTON
NEA/IAI:HHSTACKHOUSE
SCS:WCHASE
AF/N:JBLAKE
OPR/WLG:JMCDONNELL
S/S-O:RELTZ
S/S:TRPICKERING
SCA/SCS:WPCHASE S:LEAGLEBURGER
---------- 110996

O 152147Z OCT 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
USINT CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MANAMA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY SANAA IMMEDIATE
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AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 204191

AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL NAPLES IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL ISTANBUL IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE
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AMCONSUL KARACHI IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL BOMBAY IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL STUTTGART IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL ASMARA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAKAR IMMEDIATE
CINCUSNAVEUR IMMEDIATE
CINCEUR IMMEDIATE
JCS PRIORITY
NSC PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 204191

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: AEMR
SUBJ: E AND E PLANNING

FOR CHIEFS OF MISSION AND PRINCIPAL OFFICERS

1. GIVEN CONTINUATION OF ARAB-ISRAELI WAR, WE WANT AGAIN TO ASSESS POSSIBILITY OF THREATS TO AMERICAN CITIZENS AND INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA. IN MAKING ASSESSMENT YOU SHOULD BE AWARE WE ANTICIPATE INCREASING REPORTS OF U.S. MILITARY RESUPLLY FOR ISRAEL, WHICH COULD EXACERBATE ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENT IN THE ARAB COUNTRIES. ALSO, THERE ARE INCREASING REPORTS ALLEGING DIRECT U.S. PARTICIPATION IN ISRAELI MILITARY OPERATIONS.

2. ACCORDINGLY, WE SEEK, URGENTLY, YOUR VIEWS ON FOLLOWING:

A. SHOULD USG NOW MAKE OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENT

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

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WARNING AMERICAN CITIZENS AGAINST TRAVEL TO YOUR COUNTRY?

B. DO YOU BELIEVE IT WOULD BE PRUDENT TO DISCREETLY ENCOURAGE PRIVATE AMCITS, PARTICULARLY TOURISTS AND FAMILIES OF RESIDENTS, TO BEGIN LEAVING VIA PRESENTLY AVAILABLE SCHEDULED COMMERCIAL TRANSPORTATION?

C. DO YOU BELIEVE IT WOULD BE PRUDENT TO INITIATE EVACUATION, LIMITED OR OTHERWISE, AND IF SO, TO WHAT EXTENT AND BY WHAT PREFERRED MEANS, E.G. CHARTER AIRCRAFT, ETC.?

3. APPRECIATE YOUR LATEST ESTIMATE OF (A) PRIVATE AMERICANS WHO WOULD REQUEST EVACUATION AND (B) NUMBER OF TOURISTS IN CONSULAR DISTRICT.

4. DEPARTMENT DEFERRING DESIGNATION SAFEHAVENS SINCE DECISION MUST BE BASED ON SEVERAL FACTORS INCLUDING SCOPE OF EMERGENCY, AVAILABILITY OF TRANSPORTATION AND ANTICIPATED DURATION OF EVACUATION.

5. FOR BEIRUT: YOUR ASSESSMENT OF SITUATION AFFECTING AMERICAN CITIZENS IN SYRIA WOULD BE APPRECIATED.

6. FOR KUWAIT: WE NEED THIS INFO FOR DOHA AND MUSCAT ASAP INCLUDING POSSIBLE TRIP BY EMBASSY OFFICER.

7. PLEASE DO THIS ASSESSMENT ON A VERY CLOSE IN-HOUSE BASIS. DO NOT DISCUSS OUTSIDE MISSION. KISSINGER

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 744

PAGE 01 STATE 200709

45
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 USSS-00

/026 R

DRAFTED BY NEA:JJSISCO:HLK
APPROVED BY THE SECRETARY
S - MR. EAGLEBURGER
S/S - MR. PICKERING

---------- 064887

O 101729Z OCT 73 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN NIACT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NIACT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY SANAA IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NY IMMEDIATE
USINT CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
'73 OCT 11 AM 9:16

S E C R E T STATE 200709

EXDIS

E.O. 11652 - GDS
TAGS: PFOR, XF, SA
SUBJECT: RECOMMENDATIONS RE CEASEFIRE IN MIDDLE EAST

REF: JIDDA 4375; AMMAN 5386; BEIRUT 11972

FOR AMBASSADORS AND CHARGE FROM SECRETARY

1. APPRECIATE RECEIVING YOUR VIEWS.

2. YOU MUST BEAR IN MIND, HOWEVER, THAT: (A) IN VIEW FLUID SITUATION, THERE IS NO DISCERNIBLE DESIRE OR

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FORM DS-1652

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 200709

CONSENSUS FOR EARLY ACTION; AND (B) IF THERE WERE MOVE TODAY FOR SIMPLE CEASEFIRE, KIND OF RESOLUTION WHICH COULD GET NINE VOTES AND WHICH WE WOULD HAVE TO VETO WOULD BE CEASEFIRE COUPLED WITH TOTAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL TO 1967 LINES. HOW WOULD SUCH A VETO HELP OUR INTERESTS IN ARAB WORLD?

3. YOUR VIEWS AND RECOMMENDATIONS HAVE BEEN NOTED, AND I RECOGNIZE PRESSURES YOU FEEL FROM YOUR VANTAGE POINTS. THIS IS PERIOD WHEN CALM JUDGMENT AND ABILITY TO WITHSTAND PRESSURES AND INEVITABLE MOUNTING CRITICISM OF U.S. ARE ESSENTIAL. WE NEED YOUR COOPERATION IN HOLDING THE LINE AND HELPING US CALM CRISIS ATMOSPHERE AND KEEP MATTERS UNDER FIRM CONTROL. I TRUST I WILL HAVE YOUR FULL SUPPORT IN THIS ENDEAVOR. KISSINGER

SECRET

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DOE/10/8/07

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 674

PAGE 01 STATE 200524

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62
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 USSS-00

/026 R

DRAFTED BY TASK FORCE:DKORN:EMP
APPROVED BY TASK FORCE:DKORN
S/S-O:WNEWLIN
INR/RNA;CMOREHOUSE
---------- 057877
O 100157Z OCT 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 200524

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR, JO
SUBJ: IRAQI MOVEMENTS
REF : AMMAN 5384

INFORMATION ON IRAQI ACTIVITIES REQUESTED REFTEL IS BEING SENT YOU THROUGH SEPARATE CHANNEL. YOU MAY PASS SUBSTANCE TO KING BUT SHOULD CAUTION THAT INFO IS SENSITIVE. KISSINGER

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SECRET

EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 784

PAGE 01 STATE 199804 2

11
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 USSS-00

CCO-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY NEA:MR ANDERSON:CHG
APPROVED BY NEA: MR STERNER
S/S-O - MS ELLTZ
S/S - MR BARNES

---------- 050293

Z 0 091022Z OCT 73 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN FLASH
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
USINT CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 199804

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, IS, JO, US
SUBJECT: YOUR MEETING WITH KING

REF: AMMAN 5369

YOU WILL BY NOW HAVE RECEIVED SECRETARY'S MESSAGE TO KING (STATE 199800). IN ADDITION TO CONVEYING THIS MATERIAL TO KING, YOU MAY MENTION ZEIRA'S THREAT. YOU SHOULD NOT, HOWEVER, RAISE QUESTION OF ANY U.S.G. EFFORTS RE ISRAELI OVERFLIGHTS AT THIS TIME. WE WILL GIVE EARLY CONSIDERATION TO YOUR AND AMBASSADOR KEATING'S SUGGESTION ON THIS.

KISSINGER

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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT

DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 571

PAGE 01 STATE 199800

21 15
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 /026 R

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APPROVED BY THE SECRETARY
S/S-O:RELTZ
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION
S, O, P, NEA, WH, CIA ONLY
---------- 048816

Z 090529Z OCT 73 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN FLASH

S E C R E T STATE 199800

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MUPS, SA, JO, UN
SUBJ: MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY TO KING HUSSEIN

REF: AMMAN 5363, 5367, 5368

FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY

1. AT YOUR MEETING WITH KING HUSSEIN TUESDAY MORNING, YOU SHOULD DELIVER FOLLOWING PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY TO THE KING.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

YOUR MAJESTY:

YOU WILL HAVE RECEIVED MY PERSONAL MESSAGE OF A FEW HOURS AGO, BUT SINCE THEN I HAVE RECEIVED AMBASSADOR BROWN'S REPORT OF HIS LATEST TALK WITH YOU, AND AS A FRIEND AND A GREAT ADMIRER, I WANT TO LOSE NO TIME IN SENDING YOU THESE FURTHER THOUGHTS.

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 199800

I AM ACUTELY AWARE OF THE PRESSURES ON YOUR MAJESTY RESULTING FROM THE CURRENT DIFFICULT SITUATION. YOUR DECISION TO AVOID INVOLVEMENT IN THE CURRENT HOSTILITIES IS AN ACT OF RESPONSIBLE STATESMANSHIP. I BELIEVE HISTORY WILL RECOGNIZE THE SERVICE YOU HAVE PERFORMED

BOTH TO YOUR PEOPLE AND COUNTRY BY RESISTING THE PRESSURES OF THE MOMENT. I AGREE FULLY WITH AND APPRECIATE YOUR PROMPT DECISION TO TURN ASIDE KING FAISAL'S REQUEST TO MOVE SAUDI FORCES FROM JORDAN TO SYRIA. I URGE YOU TO MAINTAIN THE STEADFAST POSITION THAT YOU HAVE TAKEN ON ALL THESE MATTERS.

I BELIEVE IT OUGHT TO BE POSSIBLE FOR THE FIGHTING TO END SOON. OUR RECOGNITION OF THE PROBLEM THAT THE HOSTILITIES ARE CAUSING FOR YOUR MAJESTY WAS A MAJOR FACTOR IN OUR DECISION TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN CONVENING THE SECURITY COUNCIL, WITH A VIEW TO SEEKING AN EARLY END OF THE FIGHTING. CANDIDLY, YOUR MAJESTY, IT IS INEXPLICABLE TO US WHY YOUR ARAB COLLEAGUES AND MANY OF THE NON-ALIGNED HAVE BEEN DELAYING CONSIDERATION OF THIS MATTER IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL. AMBASSADOR SCALI HAS EXPRESSED OUR IDEAS IN THE COUNCIL THIS EVENING, AND I WANT TO ASSURE YOU THAT WE ARE READY TO MOVE IN THE COUNCIL ALONG THE LINES HE HAS INDICATED. WITH RESPECT TO A SIMPLE CALL FOR A CEASEFIRE, IT SHOULD BE POINTED OUT THAT EGYPT HAS CONSISTENTLY STATED THAT IT WAS NOT INTERESTED IN SUCH A PROPOSITION. OUR REFERENCE TO AN EVENTUAL RETURN TO POSITIONS HELD PRIOR TO THE OUTBREAK OF CURRENT HOSTILITIES WOULD APPLY ALSO IN THE EVENT ISRAELI FORCES SHOULD PENETRATE BEYOND THE 1967 CEASEFIRE LINES.

I AGREE WITH YOU THAT WE SHOULD, IF AT ALL POSSIBLE, USE THE PRESENT COUNCIL MEETING TO LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR GETTING MEANINGFUL NEGOTIATIONS GOING ON A FUNDAMENTAL SETTLEMENT. WE ARE PREPARED TO WORK TO THIS END. IN FACT, AS YOUR FOREIGN MINISTER HAS UNDOUBTEDLY REPORTED TO YOU, I HAD ALREADY BEGUN EXPLORATIONS IN NEW YORK LAST WEEK, AND IT IS MY UTMOST DESIRE THAT FROM THIS CONFLAGRATION SOME NEW IMPETUS TOWARD PEACE WILL

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RESULT.

YOUR FRIENDSHIP FOR THE UNITED STATES IS RECIPROCATED IN THE FULLEST MEASURE. PLEASE COMMUNICATE WITH ME AT ANY TIME, FOR YOUR CONCERNS ARE OUR CONCERNS.

SINCERELY,

HENRY A. KISSINGER

END TEXT, KISSINGER

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'73 SEP 23 AM 9:23

SECRET 349

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 R

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DRAFTED BY NEA/ARN:DKORN:CF
APPROVED BY NEA:ALATHERTON
AF/N - MR. BLAKE
S/S-TRPICKERING

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O 221927Z SEP 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE
USINT CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 189364

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PINS, PFOR, TS, JO
SUBJECT: TUNISIAN BELIEF HUSSEIN WANTS TO ASSASSINATE BOURGUIBA

REF: AMMAN 5056

1. NO OBJECTION TO YOUR PASSING STORY TUNIS 5486 TO HUSSEIN SUBJECT TO CAVEAT RE SOURCE PER TUNIS 5565. WE ASSUME TUNIS WISHES PROTECT BOURGUIBA, JR., NOT ARAFAT. WE WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION TO YOUR TELLING HUSSEIN THAT ARAFAT IS SPREADING STORY, IF IN EMBASSY TUNIS' VIEW THIS WOULD NOT COMPROMISE GOT.

2. YOU MAY ASSURE KING WE CONSIDERED STORY A MALICIOUS FABRICATION AND THAT AMBASSADOR SEELYE HAS TOLD TUNISIANS NO CREDENCE SHOULD BE PUT IN IT. KISSINGER

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12
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/ARN:DMRANSOM:JMP
9/7/73 EXT 21018
APPROVED BY NEA/RPDAVIES
L/NEA:ATBROWN
S/S - MR. GAMMON
NEA/ARN:DAKORN

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R 072218Z SEP 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

S E C R E T STATE 178577

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: EGEN, JO
SUBJ: RSS INQUIRY

1. BEFORE DEPARTURE TO AMMAN YESTERDAY OF QUINN O'CONNELL, JACK O'CONNELL ASKED DEPTOFF IF IRS MIGHT INVESTIGATE ANY "PROBABLE SUSPICION" THAT BAGHDADI FAILED TO REPORT HIS INCOME COMPLETELY. DEPTOFF SAID HE KNEW OF NO EVIDENCE OF UNREPORTED INCOME, AND QUESTION WOULD HAVE TO BE EXAMINED ON ITS OWN MERITS BY COMPETENT USG AUTHORITIES. SAID THAT IN CASE WHERE FRIENDLY GOVERNMENT LIKE JORDAN ALLEGED EMBEZZLEMENT ON PART OF U.S. CITIZEN, WE WOULD DO WHATEVER WE COULD TO BE HELPFUL BUT WOULD HAVE TO OBSERVE SCRUPULOUSLY LEGAL RIGHTS AND PROCESSES ASSURED IN U.S. CRIMINAL LAW.

2. O'CONNELL SAID HE NOT SURE WHAT EVIDENCE HE MIGHT BE ABLE DISCOVER IN U.S. IF BAGHDADI LEFT AMMAN AND THEN REFUSED TO HONOR ANY AGREEMENT HE MAY HAVE MADE TO OPEN HIS BOOKS IN U.S. IN THAT CASE, O'CONNELL SAID HE UNCERTAIN THAT ANY GROUNDS FOR LEGAL ACTION IN U.S. WOULD EXIST. GOJ

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APPARENTLY HAS LITTLE OR NO DOCUMENTATION ON TRANSFER OF FUNDS TO BAGHDADI. SAID, HOWEVER, BAGHDADI MAY BE DETAINED IN JORDAN ON SEPARATE MATTER INVOLVING UNAUTHORIZED WITHDRAWAL FROM JORDANIAN BANK ACCOUNTS.

3. AGREE IT IN U.S. INTEREST TO SETTLE MATTER PROMPTLY. HOWEVER, BELIEVE WE SHOULD AWAIT RETURN OF O'CONNELL WITH INFORMATION AS THEN DEVELOPED, BEFORE WE ATTEMPT DEFINE PROPER SCOPE USG INVOLVEMENT. RUSH

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'73 SEP 6 AM 8:29

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WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN: D.M. RANSOM
L/NEA: T. BROWN
APPROVED BY: NEA: R.P. DAVIES
SY: MR. GENTILE S/S: MR. GAMMON
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P 052116Z SEP 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 176430

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: EGEN, JO
SUBJ: INQUIRY RE HEAD OF ROYAL SCIENTIFIC SOCIETY

REF: AMMAN 4732

1. QUINN O'CONNELL, BROTHER OF JACK AND PARTNER IN LAW FIRM WHICH REGISTERED FOREIGN AGENT FOR JORDAN, IS FLYING TO AMMAN TO CONSULT ON BAGHDADI CASE. JACK O'CONNELL SAYS THAT BAGHDADI HAS AGREED GIVE ACCESS BOOKS HIS FIRM TO ACCOUNTING FIRM WHICH JACK O'CONNELL HAS ALREADY ENGAGED (HASKIN AND SELLS). INFORMATION PROBLEM MAY ALSO BE EASED BY FACT THAT BAGHDADI FIRM EMPLOYED AS ITS OWN ACCOUNTANT HIGHLY REPUTABLE COMPANY (TOUCHE, ROSS) WHICH HASKIN FIRM CAN AND WILL WORK WITH.

2. IT THUS APPEARING INVESTIGATION OF THIS PROBLEM NOW WELL IN HAND. WE BELIEVE USG EFFORTS ALONG SAME LINES NOT PRESENTLY NECESSARY. IF O'CONNELL'S WORK TURNS UP POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF US LAW, APPROPRIATE USG AGENCIES COULD BE ASKED TO CONTINUE INVESTIGATION. RUSH

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DRAFTED BY NEA/ARN:DAKORN:JMP
8/6/73 EXT 22670
APPROVED BY NEA: JOSEPH J. SISCO
NEA/ARN - F.M.DICKMAN
S/S -MR. GAMMON
NEA- MR. ATHERTON
========== 028254

R 071927Z AUG 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
INFO AMEMBASSY SANAA
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
CHUSMTM
USCINCEUR

S E C R E T STATE 155456

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, YE, JO
SUBJ: EMERGENCY ARMS ASSISTANCE FOR YEMEN

REF: AMMAN 4138

1. DEPARTMENT CONCURS IN YOUR WORDS OF CAUTION TO KING REPORTED PARA FOUR REFTEL.

2. IN ADDITION, WE BELIEVE JORDANIANS SHOULD CONSULT CLOSELY WITH SAUDIS. SAUDIS ARE CERTAIN TO BE SENSITIVE ABOUT ANY THIRD COUNTRY INVOLVE-

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MENT IN YEMEN, EVEN JORDANIAN, WHICH HAS NOT PREVIOUSLY BEEN COORDINATED WITH THEM. BELIEVE YOU SHOULD MAKE THIS POINT TO APPROPRIATE GOJ OFFICIALS AND SUGGEST THAT SENIOR JORDANIAN OFFICER WHO GENERAL BEN SHAKER INTENDS TO SEND TO YEMEN BE INSTRUCTED TO STOP OFF IN SAUDI ARABIA ON THE WAY (AND POSSIBLY ON RETURN ALSO) FOR CONSULTATIONS WITH SAUDIS. ROGERS

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INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 R

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8/2/73 EXT. 21018
APPROVED BY NEA:ALATHERTON, JR.
DOD/ISA/METG - GEN SUMNER
NEA/ARN - MR. KORN
NEA/ARN - MR. RANSOM
NEA/ARP - MR. BUCK
PM/MAS - COL FARNHAM
S/S-O: W. NEWLIN

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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R 022330Z AUG 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

S E C R E T STATE 152687

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, JO
SUBJ: SALADINS FOR YEMEN
REF: STATE 146705; AMMAN 3979

1. YOU MAY INFORM JORDANIANS WE CAN MAKE 40 M48A1 TANKS AVAILABLE FOR SHIPMENT AT A UNIT COST OF DOLLARS 21,870.80 WITHIN 60 DAYS AFTER RECEIPT OF SIGNED LETTER OF OFFER. OVERSEAS TRANSPORTATION WOULD REQUIRE AN ADDITIONAL 60 TO 90 DAYS. THE TOTAL COST OF THE TANKS WOULD BE CONSIDERABLY LESS THAN THE PROCEEDS OF SALADIN SALE, AND THE MARGIN OF PROFIT COULD FINANCE INSTALLATION OF NIGHT VISION AND NIGHT SIGHTING EQUIPMENT. THE TANKS ARE PRESENTLY LOCATED IN DEPOTS AND WOULD BE SOLD IN AS-IS CONDITION BUT WE UNDERSTAND THAT THEY ARE OPERABLE. JORDANIANS MAY WANT TO SEND ONE OR MORE QUALIFIED ARMOR OFFICERS TO EXAMINE THE TANKS AVAILABLE AND CHOOSE THOSE IN BEST CONDITION.

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2. WE RECOGNIZE JORDAN'S PREFERENCE FOR THE M48A3, BUT ARE UNABLE TO SHORTEN 2-YEAR LEAD-TIME WITHOUT SERIOUS DISRUPTION TO U.S. ARMY ASSETS- FYI: AS YOU KNOW, JORDAN ALREADY HAS THE TECHNICAL EXPERTISE TO RETROFIT EARLY MODEL TANKS AND HAS DIESELIZED AN M48A1. SINCE ONE OPTION UNDER CONSIDERATION IN THE GRANGER REPORT IS THE PROVISION OF A TANK REBUILD FACILITY, THE JORDANIANS MAY IN FACT BE ABLE TO PURCHASE THE M48A1'S AND INCORPORATE THE DIESEL ENGINE AND POSSIBLY OTHER DESIRED FEATURES. END FYI. ROGERS

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DRAFTED BY NEA/ARP DMRANSOM:CF
8/4/73 EXT 20695
APPROVED BY NEA:ALATHERTON
NEA/ARP - MR KORN
S/S-O: K. KURZE

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P 041907Z AUG 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 154229

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP, JO
SUBJ: PROTECTION FOR KING'S SONS

REF: AMMAN 4036

1. OGDEN DETECTIVE FIRM WILL DETAIL TWO MEN TO BE WITH CHILDREN BOTH IN WASHINGTON AND ORLANDO. THESE MEN WILL BE PART OF DETAIL WHICH WILL LATER SERVE AT DEERFIELD. ARRIVING IN WASHINGTON ON AUGUST 6, THEY WILL CONTACT PREVIOUS HEAD OF DEERFIELD DETAIL, WHO IS HERE IN WASHINGTON, AND WILL FAMILIARIZE THEMSELVES WITH WASHINGTON HOME OF PRINCESS MUNA. THEY WILL BE ON HAND WHEN PRINCESS AND PARTY ARRIVE ON AUGUST 9.

2. SUGGESTED ARABIC TUTOR HAS CLEARED OUR BOULDER INQUIRIES. SYRIAN-BORN BUT NOW SETTLED IN US, HE IS OF ARMENIAN EXTRACTION, TEACHER OF CLASSICAL ARABIC AT UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS. NAME: VARTAN H. ARTINIAN. HAS BEEN RECOMMENDED AS DISCREET, HIGHLY INTELLIGENT, GOOD TEACHER, AND RESPONSIBLE MAN. AFTER DISCUSSION WITH AMBASSADOR SALAH HERE, DEPTOFF AGREED ASK SCHOOL

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PROCEED WITH INITIAL CONTACTS, AND CONTRACT DISCUSSIONS, SUBJECT TO FINAL APPROVAL AFTER MEETING WITH SALAH. SALAH, HOWEVER, WHO RETURNING TO JORDAN IN WEEK'S TIME, WILL PUSH FOR TUTOR FROM JORDAN WHO WILL TEACH RELIGION AS WELL AS ARABIC. DEPTOFF SAID THIS FAMILY AFFAIR, BUT IN ORDER TO HAVE SOMEONE AVAILABLE WHEN SCHOOL OPENED IN SIX WEEKS, NEEDED TO START TALKS WITH ARTINIAN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. WILL WAIT TO DO SO, HOWEVER, UNTIL MONDAY COB AUGUST 6 TO ALLOW REPLY FROM AMMAN IF HM OR PRINCESS HAVE OBJECTION ABOVE PROCEDURE. ROGERS

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DRAFTED BY NEA:ALATHERTON,JR./NEA/ARN:DRANSOM:HLK
APPROVED BY NEA - JOSEPH J. SISCO
S/S-0 - MR. WRIGHT

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
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P R 272050Z OCT 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY ROME

S E C R E T STATE 212609

EXDIS

E.O. 11652 - GDS
TAGS: PBOR, XF
SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST BRIEFING FOR JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR

1. SUMMARY: JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR SALAH CALLED AT DEPARTMENT OCTOBER 23 TO EXPRESS UNHAPPINESS THAT JORDAN BEING KEPT IN DARK ABOUT U.S.-SOVIET TALKS WHILE SOVIETS WERE KEEPING EGYPT AND SYRIA IN PICTURE AND USG DOING SAME WITH ISRAEL. HE FEARED JORDAN BEING TAKEN FOR GRANTED. DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY ATHERTON BRIEFED SALAH ALONG LINES STATE 209022, AND STRESSED THAT USG HAS JORDANIAN

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INTERESTS VERY MUCH IN MIND AND HAS NO DESIRE TO KEEP JORDAN IN DARK. SALAH SAID THAT U.S.-SOVIET SPONSORED OCTOBER 22 SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION APPEARED TO COMPOUND AMBIGUITIES OF RESOLUTION 242. UNLESS U.S. AND SOVIETS TOOK POSITION ON SUBSTANCE OF SETTLEMENT, WHAT GUARANTEE WAS THERE THAT NEGOTIATIONS TO BREAK DEADLOCK WOULD BE ANY MORE LIKELY TO SUCCEED NOW THAN BEFORE OCTOBER 6? ATHERTON SAID U.S.-SOVIET TALKS IN MOSCOW HAD FOCUSED ON CEASEFIRE AND PROCEDURES FOR GETTING NEGOTIATIONS STARTED SO THAT PARTIES, UNDER APPROPRIATE AUSPICES, COULD BEGIN TO DEAL WITH SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES. AS FOR CHANCES FOR GETTING SETTLEMENT PROCESS MOVING, ATHERTON SAID IT IMPORTANT TO RECOGNIZE NEW SITUATION HAD BEEN CREATED BY LATEST WAR,

BOTH IN ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT ON PARTIES, IN CHANGES IN MILITARY SITUATION, AND IN FACT THAT USG AND USSR WERE ENGAGED IN JOINT EFFORTS TO STOP FIGHTING AND GET NEGOTIATIONS STARTED. FOR ALL THESE REASONS, WE FELT SITUATION TODAY VERY DIFFERENT FROM THAT EXISTING BEFORE OCTOBER 6 AND THERE WAS BETTER OPPORTUNITY NOW FOR REAL PROGRESS TOWARD SETTLEMENT TO BE MADE. END SUMMARY.

2. AMBASSADOR SALAH OF JORDAN CALLED AT OWN REQUEST ON DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY ATHERTON ON AFTERNOON OCTOBER 23 TO SEEK BACKGROUND OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 338 OF OCTOBER 22, 1973.

3. SALAH OPENED BY NOTING THAT SYRIANS AND EGYPTIANS APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN CONSULTED BY SOVIETS, AND ISRAELIS WERE VISITED ON OCTOBER 22 BY SECRETARY KISSINGER. JORDAN, HOWEVER, REMAINED LARGELY "IN THE DARK" ABOUT DISCUSSIONS IN MOSCOW WHICH LED TO OCTOBER 22 RESOLUTION IN SECURITY COUNCIL. SALAH SAID HE HAD HOPED AT MINIMUM THAT SOMEONE FROM SECRETARY'S PARTY COULD HAVE VISITED AMMAN AFTER TEL AVIV STOP SINCE JORDAN WAS NOT ONLY PARTY TO THE CONFLICT BUT ALSO HEART OF THE PROBLEM OF PALESTINE AND LINKED TO

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SETTLEMENT IN JERUSALEM AND ON FINAL BORDERS.

4. ATHERTON REPLIED HE APPRECIATED JORDANIAN CONCERN AND WANTED TO GIVE AMBASSADOR SALAH AS FULL A BRIEFING AS POSSIBLE ON BACKGROUND OF RESOLUTION. TIMETABLE OF SECRETARY'S TRIP SIMPLY ALLOWED NO TIME FOR VISIT TO AMMAN. ATHERTON SAID HE WANTED TO CALL ATTENTION OF SALAH NOT ONLY TO TEXT OF RESOLUTION BUT ALSO TO ACCOMPANYING STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SCALI. ATHERTON SAID SCALI STATEMENT, WHICH SALAH DID NOT HAVE, WAS CAREFULLY DRAFTED AND MERITED PRECISE READING.

5. ATHERTON SAID THAT SINCE FIGHTING BROKE OUT U.S. HAD PURSUED TWO OBJECTIVES: (A) STOP THE FIGHTING, AND (B) LAY BASIS FOR FUTURE PEACE EFFORTS IN MIDDLE EAST. RESOLUTION 338 IS EFFORT ACCOMPLISH BOTH PURPOSES. IT CONTAINS PARAGRAPHS CALLING FOR END OF FIGHTING, IMPLEMENTATION OF 242, AND PROCEDURE TO CARRY OUT IMPLEMENTATION OF 242. ATHERTON SAID EVERYONE AWARE THAT IT NO REPEAT NO USE JUST TO TRY TO STOP THE FIGHTING; IT IS NECESSARY TO END CONDITIONS WHICH LED TO THE FIGHTING. IN ABSENCE OF DIPLOMATIC ALTERNATIVE, IT WAS CLEAR THAT THERE WOULD BE MORE WARS IN THE FUTURE.

6. IT ALSO CLEAR, ATHERTON CONTINUED, THAT MIDDLE EAST WAS AREA IN WHICH BOTH US AND USSR HAVE IMPORTANT INTERESTS. MANNER IN WHICH US AND USSR DEALT WITH PRESENT MIDDLE EAST CRISIS WAS THEREFORE TEST OF NEW US/SOVIET RELATIONSHIP AND OF ERA OF DETENTE. FACT THAT WE AND SOVIETS AGREED ON FORWARD-LOOKING AND CONSTRUCTIVE RESOLUTION IS VICTORY FOR POLICY OF DETENTE.

7. ATHERTON SAID THAT IMMEDIATE PROBLEM WAS TO STABILIZE CEASEFIRE WHICH HAD BEEN ACCEPTED BY EGYPT, ISRAEL AND JORDAN. SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING LATER IN DAY OCTOBER 23 WOULD DEAL WITH THIS PROBLEM, IN-

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CLUDING QUESTION OF HOW TO USE UNTSO TO SUPERVISE CEASEFIRE. ATHERTON NOTED THAT RESOLUTION WAS NOT SPECIFIC ABOUT MECHANICS OF CEASEFIRE. THESE MUST BE WORKED OUT BY THE PARTIES, USING UNTSO FACILITIES IF DESIRED. RELATED ISSUE WAS POW EXCHANGE. WE HAD BEEN IMPRESSED WHILE IN ISRAEL WITH IMPORTANCE ISRAEL ATTACHES TO EARLY RELEASE OF POWS BY BOTH SIDES. ALTHOUGH THIS NOT IN TEXT OF NEW RESOLUTION, SOVIETS AND USG HAD BOTH AGREED TO URGE EARLY POW RELEASE LEST PRISONER ISSUE BECOME SERIOUS OBSTACLE TO PROGRESS ON OTHER MATTERS.

8. TURNING TO SECOND AND THIRD PARAGRAPHS, AS "POLITICAL PARTS" OF RESOLUTION 338, ATHERTON SAID THEY CLOSELY LINKED. THESE PARAGRAPHS MEAN THAT IMPLEMENTATION OF SC RESOLUTION 242 WOULD PROCEED THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN PARTIES CONCERNED "UNDER APPROPRIATE AUSPICES." ATHERTON NOTED THAT THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME SC HAD ENDORSED NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES AS PRACTICAL MEANS OF PROCEEDING TO SOLUTION OF PALESTINE AND ARAB/ISRAEL PROBLEM.

9. "APPROPRIATE AUSPICES," SAID ATHERTON, REMAIN TO BE WORKED OUT IN SPECIFIC TERMS. US AND SOVIETS HAD AGREED TO MAKE AVAILABLE JOINT GOOD OFFICES TO PARTIES CONCERNED, IF THEY SO DESIRED.

10. SALAH SAID THAT HE FEARED AMBIGUITY OF SC RESOLUTION 242 HAD BEEN COMPOUNDED BY AMBIGUITY OF RESOLUTION 338. HE NOTED THAT THERE SEEMED TO BE NO CLOSE TIE BETWEEN THE CEASEFIRE AND THE PROCESS OF SETTLEMENT. THE GOVERNMENT OF JORDAN WOULD NEED SOMETHING MORE SPECIFIC

ON US/SOVIET DISCUSSIONS OR AGREEMENT ON HOW RESOLUTION 242 WOULD BE IMPLEMENTED. HOW ELSE, HE ASKED, COULD JORDAN ENTER NEGOTIATIONS AS IT WOULD HAVE TO AS A PARTY TO THE CONFLICT? SALAH SAID THAT ON ITS FACE RESOLUTION 338 APPEARED TO MEAN THAT SC HAD ENDORSED IDEA OF NEGOTIATIONS WHILE OMITTING ANY REFERENCE TO UN OR SECRETARY GENERAL. SALAH SAID THAT

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NEGOTIATIONS AND AVOIDANCE OF UN INVOLVEMENT HAD LONG REPRESENTED TWO AIMS OF ISRAELI DIPLOMACY, AND THEY HAD NOW BEEN ADOPTED IN A TIME OF MILITARY ADVANTAGE OF ISRAEL.

11. ATHERTON REPLIED THAT USG HAD LONG SEEN NEGOTIATIONS AS ONLY MEANS OF RESOLVING DIFFERENCES OF INTERPRETATIONS OF RESOLUTION 242. NOW, HOWEVER, NEGOTIATIONS WOULD TAKE PLACE AGAINST A NEW BACKGROUND. HE URGED SALAH TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT FACT THAT FIGHTING, WHICH VERY COSTLY TO BOTH SIDES, HAD CREATED PSYCHOLOGICAL BACKGROUND VERY DIFFERENT THAN THAT PRIOR TO WAR. ATHERTON NOTED THIS PSYCHOLOGICAL DIFFERENCE APPLIED TO BOTH SIDES. SECOND, SAID ATHERTON, US AND USSR WERE NOW JOINTLY ENGAGED IN EFFORT TO GET PROCESS GOING. THIS IS THE SECOND NEW ELEMENT IN THE SITUATION WHICH GIVES CAUSE FOR HOPE. FINALLY, SAID ATHERTON, FOCUS OF TALKS IN MOSCOW WAS NOT ON SUBSTANTIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF RESOLUTION 242 BUT ON A RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD BE A FRAMEWORK FOR ENDING HOSTILITIES AND GETTING TALKS GOING. SALAH COULD NOT EXPECT US AND USSR TO RESOLVE ALL LONG-STANDING DIFFERENCES ON INTERPRETATION OF 242.

12. SALAH ASKED WHAT WOULD MOVE THE ISRAELIS IF THEY DECIDED AFTER THIS LATEST WAR THAT THEIR BEST COURSE OF ACTION WAS TO BECOME MORE OBSTINATE? WITH NEW LOSSES, SAID SALAH, ISRAELIS MAY DECIDE TERRITORY IS BETTER GUARANTEE OF SECURITY THAN SETTLEMENT. ATHERTON SAID THAT IN HIS JUDGMENT IT WAS TOO SOON TO JUDGE WHAT FINAL IMPACT OF WAR WOULD BE ON ATTITUDES IN ISRAEL. HE NOTED THAT WAR NOT ONLY HAD BEEN VERY COSTLY BUT CEASEFIRE HAD LEFT FOUR EGYPTIAN DIVISIONS ON EAST BANK OF SUEZ CANAL AS WELL AS ISRAELI ADVANCES IN SYRIA AND WEST OF CANAL. SITUATION TODAY WAS DIFFERENT PSYCHOLOGICALLY, STRATEGICALLY AND IN ITS MAJOR POWER ASPECTS FROM WHAT IT HAD BEEN BEFORE OCTOBER 6.

13. SALAH ASKED WHO WAS GOING TO INITIATE TALKS?

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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ATHERTON SAID THIS REMAINED TO BE WORKED OUT, BUT NOTED THAT RESOLUTION 338 MADE PROVISION FOR "APPROPRIATE AUSPICES." PROCESS OF DIPLOMACY, INCLUDING BETWEEN US AND USSR, WOULD CONTINUE. WE ARE DETERMINED TO MAINTAIN MOMENTUM.

14. SALAH ASKED IF IN USG OPINION INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE FORUM FOR INITIATION OF DISCUSSIONS. ATHERTON REITERATED THAT QUESTION OF WHAT CONSTITUTED "APPROPRIATE AUSPICES" REMAINED TO BE WORKED OUT.

15. SALAH SAID THE GOVERNMENT OF JORDAN HOPED THAT THE US INTERPRETATION OF 242, AS SET FORTH IN 1969, STILL STANDS. ATHERTON SAID HE COULD NOT GIVE AN ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION. THE ORIGIN OF USG VIEWS ON FRAMEWORK FOR NEGOTIATIONS AS SET FORTH IN 1969 WAS IN US/SOVIET AND FOUR POWER TALKS AT THAT TIME, BUT THEY HAD NOT BEEN ACCEPTED BY ANYONE. WHAT HE WANTED TO EMPHASIZE, ATHERTON SAID, WAS THAT OUR FOCUS IS NOT REPEAT NOT ON PUTTING FORTH U.S. PLANS FOR A SETTLEMENT BUT ON GETTING NEGOTIATING PROCESS STARTED SO THAT PARTIES COULD PUT OWN VIEWS ON TABLE, WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS. SO RESOLUTION 338 PROVIDED OPPORTUNITY TO DO THIS. SALAH SAID HE FEARED THAT PARAGRAPH 3 OF RESOLUTION 338 WEAKENED PARAGRAPH 2. LATTER CALLED FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 242, BUT FORMER CALLED FOR NEGOTIATIONS. ATHERTON REPLIED THAT SECOND AND THIRD PARAGRAPHS ARE CLOSELY LINKED AND COMPLEMENTARY. FORMER CALLS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 242; LATTER CALLS FOR NEGOTIATIONS TO ACHIEVE THAT END. THIS WAS ENVISAGED IN RESOLUTION 242, WHICH RECOGNIZES NEED FOR AGREEMENT BETWEEN PARTIES -- AGREEMENT THAT IS ONLY POSSIBLE THROUGH PROCESS OF NEGOTIATIONS.

16. SALAH RETURNED TO IDEA THAT CONTACTS WITH EVERYONE BUT JORDAN MADE HIM VERY UNEASY. HE SAID HE HAD PERSONAL FEAR THAT BIG POWERS WERE CONDUCTING BUSINESS WHILE TAKING JORDAN FOR GRANTED. ATHERTON STRONGLY DENIED THIS, SAYING THAT THE USG HAD THE

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INTERESTS OF JORDAN VERY MUCH IN MIND. AS FOR JORDAN'S BEING LEFT OUT, ATHERTON SAID, HE HAD CONVEYED TO AMBASSADOR SALAH A FULL APPRECIATION OF MOSCOW TALKS, AS WE HAD DONE FOR ISRAEL DURING SECRETARY'S STOPOVER IN TEL AVIV.

17. SALAH COMPLAINED HE STILL FELT "IN THE DARK" AND

TURNED TO ALLEGED QUOTATION OF PRIME MINISTER MEIR IN KNESSET WHERE SHE REPORTEDLY SAID SHE HAD BEEN ASSURED BY SECRETARY THAT NO PRESSURES WHATSOEVER WOULD BE APPLIED DURING NEGOTIATING PROCESS, WHICH WOULD BE FREE OF OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE. ATHERTON SAID SALAH SHOULD LOOK TO STATEMENTS OF U.S., NOT ISRAELI SPOKES-MEN AS REPRESENTING POSITION AND VIEWS OF USG. KISSINGER

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 594

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ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/ARP:SWBUCK:MB
7/31/73 X22686
APPROVED BY NEA:ALATHERTON
NEA/ARN:DMRANSOM
NEA/ARN:DKORN
NEA/ARP:FMDICKMAN
PM/MAS:RGRAY (SUBS)
DOD/ISA:
SCHAFER DOD/ISA:APR
S/S - S RGAMMON
DOD/ISA:APRADOS
---------- 101693
O P 311843Z JUL 73 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN NIACT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY SANAA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY DHAHRAN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

S E C R E T STATE 150182

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, YE, US, SA, JO, TC
SUBJ: ABU DHABI FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR YEMEN ARMS PURCHASES

REFS: (A) SANAA 1430; (B) SANAA 1429; (C) ABU DHABI 1059; (D) STATE 147163

1. FOR AMMAN: SUGGEST YOU PASS ON INFO REF A TO JORDANIANS POINTING OUT THAT IN OUR VIEW THIS IS A FAR

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 150182

CRY FROM A FIRM COMMITMENT BY ABU DHABI TO FINANCE JORDANIAN AMMO SHIPMENT TO YAR. WE HAVE SOUGHT TO ENCOURAGE JORDANIAN AMMO ASSISTANCE TO YAR BY OFFERING TO SELL REPLACEMENT MATERIEL FOR AMMO TRANSFERRED. HOWEVER, BELIEVE GOJ IS PRUDENT IN DELAYING FURTHER SHIPMENT UNTIL ABU DHABI GOVERNMENT CONFIRMS ITS WILLINGNESS TO FUND 465,000 DOLS AMMO TRANSFER TO YAR. IN STATING THIS TO GOJ, YOU MAY WISH TO RE-EMPHASIZE PARA 2 REF D, I.E. THAT WE WILL NOT RESUPPLY ON A GRANT BASIS ANY OF THE TRANSFERS MADE TO YEMEN.

2. SUPPORT POSTS' SUGGESTIONS THAT JORDAN SEND EMISSARY TO ABU DHABI AND UAE SEND ONE TO YAR. EVEN IF IT MEANS SHORT DELAY, FINANCING QUESTIONS SHOULD BE SETTLED BEFORE SHIPMENT. ROGERS

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'73 JUL 28 PM 4 5

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

SECRET 485

PAGE 01 STATE 148978

61
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/ARP:SWBUCK:MB
7/27/73 X22686
APPROVED BY NEA:ALATHERTON
NEA/ARP:FMDICKMAN
NEA/ARN:DMRANSOM
PM/MAS:DFARNHAM
DOD/ISA:ESCHAEFER
DOD/DSAA: MR. GRANDPRE
S/S-O: K. KURZE

---------- 078036

P R 280109Z JUL 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY SANAA
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
CINCEUR

S E C R E T STATE 148978

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, US, YE, SA, JO, UAE
SUBJ: JORDANIAN ARMS FOR YAR

REF: (A) STATE 147163; (B) STATE 146708; (C) AMMAN 3871

1. PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE TOTAL COST OF REPLACING QUANTITIES OF U.S. ORIGIN AMMUNITION MENTIONED IN REF C WOULD BE 485,000 DOLS, INCLUDING ACCESSORIAL COSTS AND TRANSPORT TO AMMAN. WITHOUT 35,000 ROUNDS OF 50 CALIBER AMMUNITION, WHICH PART OF ORIGINAL 13 TON GIFT FROM KING

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MENTIONED PARA 1 REF C, ESTIMATED TOTAL INCLUDING ACCESSORIAL COSTS AND TRANSPORT TO AMMAN WOULD BE 461,000 DOLS.

2. SUGGEST GOJ AND EMBASSY ABU DHABI PASS ABOVE INFO TO ABU DHABI GOVERNMENT.

3. FOR ABU DHABI: ALTHOUGH POTENTIAL RECIPIENTS HAVE SAID ABU DHABI WILL PAY, WE HAVE NO CONFIRMATION OF THIS FROM ADG. ANY INFORMATION YOU COULD SUPPLY ON THIS KEY POINT WOULD BE APPRECIATED. ROGERS

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ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/ARP:SWBUCK/NEA/ARN:DMRANSOM
7/25/73 X22686
APPROVED BY NEA:ALATHERTON
DOD/ISA:ESCHAEFER
DOD/DSAA:DGRANDPRE
PM/MAS:DFARNHAM
NEA/ARP:FMDICKMAN
L/PM:LFIELDS
S/S - MR. GAMMON

73 JUL 27 AM 10:44
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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P R 262053Z JUL 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY SANAA
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

S E C R E T STATE 147163

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, US, YE, SA, JO, UAE
SUBJ: EMERGENCY ARMS SUPPLY TO YAR

REF: (A) AMMAN 3895; (B) AMMAN 3871; (C) AMMAN 3865;
(D) AMMAN 3854; (E) STATE 143868 (F) STATE 146708

1. AS OUR CHARGE ABU DHABI WILL SHORTLY APPROACH ADG WITH REF E INFO, SUGGEST EMBASSY AMMAN URGE JORDANIANS TO CONTACT ABU DHABI SOONEST RE ANY FINANCING GOJ SHOULD REQUIRE FOR INITIAL 13 TON GIFT AS WELL AS FINANCING FOR 117 TONS OF AMMO STILL TO BE SHIPPED.

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2. WE WELCOME AND SUPPORT JORDANIAN TRANSFER OF NEEDED AMMO TO YAR BUT YOU ARE CORRECT TO EMPHASIZE TO JORDANIANS THAT WE WILL NOT RESUPPLY ON A GRANT BASIS ANY OF THE TRANSFERS MADE TO YEMEN. IF GOJ IS ANXIOUS NOT TO PRESENT BILL TO YARG FOR AMMO DELIVERIES, THEN, AS AMBASSADOR POINTED OUT, IT SHOULD LOOK TO SOME THIRD PARTY TO FOOT THE BILL.

3. WE NOTE INITIAL 13 TON JORDANIAN SHIPMENT INCLUDES PRESUMABLY U.S. ORIGIN 50 CALIBER AMMO, WHICH MAY HAVE BEEN SUPPLIED UNDER FMS OR MAP. EMBASSY AMMAN SHOULD REMIND GOJ THAT FOR ANY FMS OR MAP SUPPLIED AMMO TRANSFERRED TO YARG, GOJ UNDER FMS LEGISLATION MUST FIRST OBTAIN YARG ASSURANCES IN WRITING RE NON-TRANSFER OF

AMMO WITHOUT PRIOR USG PERMISSION. THIS SHOULD BE DONE PRIOR TO TRANSFER.

4. IN PARTICULAR, WISH CALL ATTENTION OF GOJ TO LAST SENTENCE PARA 2 STATE 143781, WHICH SETS OUT REQUIREMENT THAT IF ANY AMMO SUPPLIED BY JORDAN TO YARG COMES FROM MAP OR UNDER FMS, AMMO OR EQUIPMENT WITH A SIMILAR VALUE WILL HAVE TO BE PURCHASED FROM U.S. BY GOJ. THIS APPLIES ESPECIALLY SINCE AMMO BEING TRANSFERRED IS FROM EMERGENCY WAR RESERVES AND IS NOT SURPLUS TO JORDAN'S NEEDS. IT IS ALSO IMPORTANT STIPULATION TO AVERT POSSIBLE CRITICISM THAT GOJ MIGHT RECEIVE IN CONGRESS IF GOJ APPEARS TO BE PROFITING FROM TRANSFER OF MAP GOODS.
ROGERS

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 STATE 143868

72
ORIGIN SS-25

2

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY DOD/DSAA:FTHIEBERGER/DOD/ISA:EWSCHAEFER
7/20/73 X22686
APPROVED BY NEA:ALATHERTON
NEA/ARP:FMDICKMAN
PM/MAS:MR. GRAY
S/S:O S.E. FRY

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O R 210148Z JUL 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY SANAA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
USCINCEUR
SECDEF

S E C R E T STATE 143868

EXDIS
SECDEF FOR ISA
E.O. 11652: GDS

REF: (A) SANAA 1249; (B) STATE 138643; (C) SANAA 1296;
1. P A ESTIMATESFOR PLANNING PURPOSES ONLY FOR ITEMS LISTED IN REF A ARE AS FOLLOWS:
A. AMMUNITION (FMS CASE IDENIFIER PAB)
(1) 7.62 LINK (FOR USE IN M-60 MACHINE GUN ONLY) 4 BALL/1 SPACE TRACER .11 DOL PER ROUND FEDERAL STOCK NUMBER (FSN) 1305-A-131
(2) CAL .30 M2 CLIPPED (FOR M-1 RIFLE) .09 DOL PER ROUND FSN 1305A216
(3) CAL. 30 4 BALL/1 TRACER BELTED .09 DOL PER ROUND FSN 1305A218

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(4) (CAL. 50 4 BALL/1 TRACER FOR M2MG .58 DOL PER ROUND FSN 1305A577
(5) ROCKET HEAT 3.5" M28A1 22.27 DOLS EA FSN 1340H600
(6) SHELL 81MM MORTAR HE M374A1 18.42 DOLS EA FSN 1315C256
(7) GRENADE FRAGMENTATION M67 W/FUZE 213 1.68 DOLS EA FSN 13306881

B. WEAPONS (FMS CASE IDENTIFIER PAA)
(1) MG CAL .50 M2 W/MOUNT M3 1095.00 DOLS EA

FSN 1005-322-9715 AND 1005-322-9716.
(2) MG CAL .30 M191A6 W/MOUNT 431 DOLS EA FSN 1005-611-6005 AND 1005-322-9718
(3) LAUNCHER ROCKET 3.5" (BAZOOKA) M20A1B1 80.80 DOLS EACH FSN 1055-840-1 1842.
(4) MORTAR 81MM M29A1 4,400 DOLS EA FSN 1015-999-7794
(5) MORTAR 75MM - NOT A U.S. ARMY ITEM

C. ALL ITEMS SHOWN ABOVE EXCEPT B (5) CAN BE MADE IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE FOR AIR SHIPMENT UPON ACCEPTANCE OF LETTERS OF OFFER (L/O'S) SHOULD PRIORITYWARRANT. ALL WEAPONS WOULD BE REBUILT. ESTIMATED COSTS DO NOT INCLUDE TRANSPORTATION OR OTHER ACCESSORIAL CHARGES FOR SUCH ITEMS AS PACKING, CRATING, HANDLING, AND ADMINISTRATIVE CHARGES.

2. TRANSPORTATION DATA CANNOT BE ESTIMATED UNTIL YARG DEFINES SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS, QUANTITIES AND LOCATIONS FOR DELIVERY.

3. RE AMBASSADOR SUWEIDI'S QUERY ABOUT TRANSPORT HELICOPTERS (SANAA 1296), WE AGREE ENTIRELY WITH USMTM ASSESSMENT THAT INDEPENDENT HELICOPTER PROGRAM FOR YAR NOT FEASIBLE. WE WONDER WHETHER DIFFICULTIES IN OPERATING AND SERVICING HELICOPTERS IN YEMEN, PARTICULARLY ON SUCH SHORT NOTICE, MIGHT NOT BE JUST AS GREAT AS THOSE INVOLVED IN OVERLAND TRANSPORT OF EQUIPMENT AND AMMO. URGE THAT YOU DISCOURAGE SUWEIDI'S INTEREST IN PURCHASE HELICOPTERS. FYI. ESTIMATED PRICES FOR NEW EQUIPMENT

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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COULD RUN FROM ABOUT 3 MILLION DOLS EACH FOR A CH-47 TO 350,000 DOLS EACH FOR A UH-1 SERIES HELICOPTER, EPEENT ON CONFIGURATION AND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT. LEAD TIMES RANGE FROM ABOUT 18 - 24 MONTHS. END FYI. IN ANY CASE HELICOPTERS FROM NEW PROCUREMENT CLEARLY NOT A PRACTICAL MEANS MEET IMMEDIATE PROBLEM OF TRANSPORTATION OF EMERGENCY SUPPLIES. IN SHORT WE BELIEVE HELICOPTER SUPPLY, FROM ANY SOURCE, IS NOT FEASIBLE AT PRESENT FOR YEMEN.

4. FOR SANAA: SALE TO YARG WOULD BE EFFECTED BY LETTER OF OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE (DD FORM 1513). NORMAL PROCEDURE IS TO FORWARD LETTER OF OFFER (L/O) TO COUNTRY BY CLASSIFIED POUCH. THIS WOULD REQUIRE WEEK OR MORE TRANSIT TIME. IT COULD BE QUICKER TO HAVE YAR AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON SIGN, BUT THIS WOULD REQUIRE AUTHORIZATION FROM HIS GOVERNMENT. SINCE YARG HAS HAD NO EXPERIENCE ON FMS MATTERS, IT MAY BE DESIRABLE TO SEND LETTER OF OFFER TO SANAA FOR REVIEW PRIOR TO SIGNATURE. ONCE LETTER OF OFFER IS SIGNED AND WASHINGTON INFORMED BY EMBASSY, SUPPLY ACTION COULD BE INITIATED IMMEDIATELY. REQUEST YOUR COMMENTS.

5. DEFINITIVE L/O CANNOT BE PREPARED UNTIL SPECIFIC DATA REQUESTED HAS BEEN OBTAINED, I.E. AMOUNTS AND TYPES OF AMMO TO BE SUPPLIED BY JORDAN, AND AMOUNTS AND TYPES OF REMAINING AMMO TO BE SUPPLIED BY U.S. THROUGH SAUDI ARABIA. RUSH

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'73 JUL 21 AM 9:46

SECRET 676

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 STATE 143871

70
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/ARP:SWBUCK:HLK
7/20/73 EXT 22686
APPROVED BY NEA - ALFRED L. ATHERTON, JR.
NEA/ARN:DMRANSOM
PM/MAS:DFARNHAM
DOD/DSAA:FTHIEGBERGER
DOD/ISA:ESCHAEFER
L/PM:JMICHEL
DOD/GC:MR. FORMAN
NEA/ARP:FMDICKMAN
DOD/SA:COL. BRIGGS
S/S-O: SE FRY

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O 210152Z JUL 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY SANAA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
CINCEUR

S E C R E T STATE 143871

EXDIS

E.O. 11652 - GDS
TAGS: MASS, US, YE, SA, JO, UAE
SUBJECT: EMERGENCY ARMS SUPPLY TO YAR

REF: (A) AMMAN 3776; (B) STATE 140323; (C) STATE 138643

1. YOU TOOK CORRECT LINE WITH KING (REF A). AS STATED REF C, ANY REPLACEMENT WOULD BE ON AN FMS BASIS AND ABU

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DHABI PREPARED TO PAY, MAKING TRANSFER AT NO COST TO GOJ. KING SHOULD BE INFORMED THAT WE ARE NOT REPEAT NOT IN A POSITION TO REPLACE JORDANIAN TRANSFERS ON A GRANT BASIS.

2. BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT THERE IS A WAY OUT OF PROBLEM RAISED REF A. REQUEST EMBASSY AMMAN AND ABU DHABI REACTION TO FOLLOWING PROPOSAL: AFTER DETERMINATION OF AMMO TO BE SUPPLIED FROM JORDANIAN INVENTORY, PRICE AND AVAILABILITY AND TRANSPORT AND OTHER ACCESSORIAL COSTS, GOVERNMENT OF ABU DHABI WOULD PAY DIRECTLY TO JORDAN FOR COST OF AMMO, WHICH GOJ WOULD THEN TRANSFER (NOT SELL) TO YARG. THIS WOULD NOT AFFECT ARRANGEMENT FOR REMAINING AMMO AND EQUIPMENT, WHICH WOULD BE BOUGHT BY YARG FROM

US ON FMS BASIS, DELIVERED TO SAUDI ARABIA FOR RESHIPMENT, AND FUNDED BY ABU DHABI PAYMENT TO YARG. ADVANTAGE OF ABU DHABI PAYMENT TO GOJ WOULD OF COURSE BE THAT GOJ WOULD NOT BE PLACED IN POSITION OF HAVING TO ASK YARG FOR PAYMENT. YARG WOULD BE GRATEFUL TO BOTH JORDAN AND ABU DHABI, SINCE FORMER WOULD BE ACTUALLY PROVIDING AMMO AND LATTER UNDERTAKING FINANCING. IF ANY OF AMMO SUPPLIED BY JORDAN TO YARG CAME FROM MAP OR UNDER FMS, AMMO OR EQUIPMENT WITH A SIMILAR VALUE WOULD HAVE TO BE PURCHASED FROM U.S. BY GOJ, PRESUMABLY FINANCED BY ABU DHABI PAYMENT.

3. IF REACTION FROM BOTH ACTION ADRESSEES FAVORABLE, AMMAN SHOULD RAISE PROPOSAL WITH GOJ, AND EMBASSY ABU DHABI WITH ADG AFTER RECEIVING PRICE AND AVAILABILITY DATA, WHICH SUBJECT OF SEPTEL. RUSH

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PAGE 01 STATE 119694

72
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/ARP:SWBUCK:MB
6/15/73 X22686
APPROVED BY NEA:ALATHERTON
NEA/ARP:FMDICKMAN
OGC: MR FOREMAN
JOINT STAFF J-5: CAPT CONNELLEY
PM/MAS:DFARNHAM
S/S-V: SEFRY
NEA/ARN:TJSCOTES/EDJEREJIAN
NEA/RA:AMUNDY
DOD/ISA:JTIMBERLAKE
DOD: I AND L: COL. CRAGUN
ISA/NESA:MR. TIMBERLAKE/LTC PRADOS
ISA/SA: COL. BRIGGS
DSAA: MR. GUILD/MR. THIEBERGER
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P R 192323Z JUN 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
USCINCEUR

S E C R E T STATE 119694

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, JO, MU
SUBJECT: GRENADE LAUNCHERS FOR OMAN
KUWAIT PASS MUSCAT
1. SINCE QABOOS HAS APPROACHED HUSSEIN WE WOULD PREFER TO LEAVE REQUEST IN THIS CHANNEL. HOWEVER IF DIRECT SUPPLY FROM U.S. NECESSARY TO PROVIDE LAUNCHER CAPABILITY QUICKLY TO OMAN WE HAVE NO OBJECTION FMS ROUTE.

2. IF GOJ WILLING TO PROVIDE OMAN WITH M-79 GRENADE

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LAUNCHER WITHOUT REPLACEMENT, TRANSFER COULD OCCUR, PROVIDED: (1) GOJ REQUESTS USG APPROVAL OF TRANSFER, (2) GOJ SELLS M-79S TO OMAN, (3) GOJ RETURNS PROCEEDS OF SALE TO USG AS MAP REIMBURSEMENT, AND (4) OMAN PROVIDES GOJ WITH NECESSARY ASSURANCES FOR TRANSMITTAL TO USG RE NON-TRANSFER OF THIS EQUIPMENT TO THIRD COUNTRY WITHOUT USG APPROVAL. SALES PROCEDURES AND PAYMENT TO USG REQUIRED BECAUSE JORDAN'S M-79S ARE MAP PROPERTY, AND OMAN ELIGIBLE FOR FMS BUT NOT FOR MAP. PRICE GOJ CHARGES OMAN SHOULD CORRESPOND TO WHAT DOD WOULD CHARGE UNDER ITS REGULATIONS. THIS DEPENDS ON COITION OF EQUIPMENT, WHICH CAN RANGE FROM FIVE TO FIFTY PERCENT OF ACQUISITION COST, BUT IN THIS CASE WOULD PROBABLY BE ABOUT 20 OF $222 COST OF NEW M-79S. SALE OF 40MM GRENADES FOR THE LAUNCHERS WOULD BE APPROXIMATELY 50 OF ACQUISITION COST.

3. M-79S ARE NO LONGER U.S. ARMY ITEM OF ISSUE AND

NONE BEING MANUFACTURED. USG COULD SELL NEWER GRENADE LAUNCHER M-203 TO OMAN, BUT LEAD TIME THIS ITEM ABOUT TWO YEARS. FYI URGENT REQUEST FOR M-203S BY LEBANON IN EARLY JANUARY HAD TO BE MET BY DIVERSION FROM OTHER RECIPIENTS. END FYI. SINCE M-203 CAN BE USED ONLY AS ATTACHMENT TO M-16 RIFLE, OMAN WOULD ALSO HAVE TO BUY M-16 RIFLES. COST OF RIFLES AND GRENADE LAUNCHER ROUGHLY COMPARABLE TO COST OF NEW M-79. ROGERS

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'73 JUN 19 PM 10:50
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

SECRET 932

PAGE 01 STATE 119011

47
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/EGY:GNANDERSON:CFF
6/18/73 EXT 22660
APPROVED BY NEA:JJSISCO
NEA:ALATHERTON, JR.
S/S:DMILLER
NEA/ARN:DAKORN

---------- 128081

R 191543Z JUN 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
INFO USINT CAIRO
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

S E C R E T STATE 119011

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR, JO, EG
SUBJECT: JORDAN'S FEARS ABOUT EGYPT
REF: AMMAN 3176 AND 3177

1. WE HAVE NOTHING BEYOND ZAYYAT'S PUBLIC STATEMENTS CITED BY PM ON WHICH TO ASSESS LATEST EGYPTIAN ATTITUDE ON "HOMELAND FOR PALESTINIANS." WE HAVE NO RPT NO INDICATIONS OF OUR OWN TO SUPPLEMENT PM'S INFORMATION THAT EGYPT ACTIVELY WORKING TOWARD ESTABLISHMENT OF PALESTINIAN GOVT IN EXILE, NOR DO WE SEE ZAYYAT'S REMARKS AS BEING TARGETED PARTICULARLY AGAINST JORDAN. THERE IS OBVIOUSLY NO LOVE LOST THESE DAYS BETWEEN AMMAN AND CAIRO, BUT WE WOULD THINK GOE HAD ENOUGH PROBLEMS WITHOUT STIR-

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FORM DS-1652

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RING UP FURTHER INTRA-ARAB CONTROVERSY OF THIS NATURE.

2. WE ALSO RECALL, AS DOES PM IN LETTER TO SADAT, THAT WHEN SADAT, IN SPEECH OF SEPT 28, 1972, ANNOUNCED EGYPT WOULD WELCOME AND RECOGNIZE PROVISIONAL PALESTINIAN GOVT IF ONE WERE FORMED, RESULT WAS THAT PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE REJECTED SADAT'S PROPOSAL AND PALESTINIAN REACTIONWAS UNIVERSALLY NEGATIVE. IDEA HAD APPARENTLY NOT BEEN DISCUSSED WITH PALESTINIAN GROUPS IN ADVANCE, AND SADAT SUBSEQUENTLY BACKED OFF. WE WOULD HAVE EXPECTED EGYPTIANS TO BE DETERRED BY THIS PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE.

3. WE HAVE NOTED THAT PERSISTENT THEME IN ZAYYAT'S PUBLIC

STATEMENTS HAS BEEN THAT WARS OF 1967 AND 1948 CREATED TWO DISTINCT PROBLEMS. AS A RESULT OF 1967, ACCORDING TO ZAYYAT, EARLIER PALESTINE PROBLEM WAS "INTERNATIONALIZED" BECAUSE OF ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF TERRITORIES OF SOVEREIGN STATES OUTSIDE PALESTINE MANDATE BORDERS. WE WOULD TEND TO SEE ZAYYAT'S STATEMENTS AS LARGELY IN SUPPORT OF EGYPTIAN POSITION FAVORING JARRING MEMORANDUM OF FEBRUARY 8, 1971 AND AS FURTHER EVIDENCE OF WHAT WE HAVE ALWAYS SUPPOSED--THAT EGYPTIANS FIRST AND FOREMOST INTERESTED IN RECOVERY OF THEIR OWN TERRITORY. EGYPTIANS MAY FEEL THAT, BY MAKING DISTINCTION BETWEEN PROBLEM LEFT BY 1967 WAR AND EVEN MORE DIFFICULT ISSUES STEMMING FROM 1948 CONFLICT, THEY IMPROVE PROSPECTS OF OBTAINING INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR EGYPTIAN OBJECTIVES ON FORMER.

4. AS FOR US POSITION ON PALESTINIAN GOVT-IN-EXILE, WE WOULD OBVIOUSLY NOT RECOGNIZE SUCH A GOVERNMENT OR HAVE ANY DEALINGS WITH IT.

5. YOU MAY SHARE ABOVE WITH PM AND EXPRESS INTEREST IN ANY FURTHER INFORMATION HE MAY ACQUIRE ON THIS ISSUE. ROGERS

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73 APR 33 AM 9:59

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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CONFIDENTIAL 813

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64
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/ARN:DCCOCHRAN:JMP/
5/2/73 X20791
APPROVED BY NEA/ALATHERTON
AF/XOXXEN - COL. SCHEIDT
NEA/ARN - MR. KORN
S/S - O: R.WRIGHT
OSD/ISA - MR. KUBAL
********** 091548

R 030024Z MAY 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
INFO AMEMBASSY MADRID

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 083485

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP, JO, US
SUBJ: CROWN PRINCE HASSAN AIRCRAFT SCHEDULE

REF: AMMAN 2226, AMMAN 2247, AMMAN 2331

1. USAF HAS AGREED TO PROVIDE ALL NECESSARY SUPPORT FOR HASSAN AIRCRAFT. NAVIGATOR WILL ARRIVE IN AMMAN MAY 9.
ROGERS

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'73 APR 13 AM 8:45

CONFIDENTIAL 691

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PAGE 01 STATE 069053

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ORIGIN SS-25

02

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/TUR:RSDILLON:CF
4/12/73 EXT 20714
APPROVED BY NEA:RPDAVIES
S/S:O S.FRY
SY - MR GENTILE
S/CPR - MR DAVIS

---------- 057528

P R 130145Z APR 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY
INFO AMCONSUL ADANA
AMCONSUL ISTANBUL
AMCONSUL IZMIR

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 069053

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINS, TU
SUBJ: INCIDENTS AT TURK CONGENS IN LOS ANGELES AND CHICAGO
REF: ANKARA 2819

1. TURK EMB COUNSELOR YEGEN REPORTED INCIDENT AT CHICAGO CONGEN TO DEP ASST SEC DAVIES ON APRIL 6 AND MADE GENERAL PITCH FOR PROTECTION OF TURK OFFICIALS AND STUDENTS DURING TIME PERIOD SURROUNDING APRIL 24. (SEE SEPTEL CONTAINING DAVIES-YEGEN MEMCON). ON APRIL 10 YEGEN LEFT AIDE-MEMOIRE WITH NEA/TUR DIRECTOR DILLON REPORTING POSSIBLE BREAK-IN ATTEMPT IN LOS ANGELES. WE HAVE ALSO BEEN INFORMED OF LOS ANGELES INCIDENT BY FBI.

2. THROUGH SY WE HAVE REQUESTED SPECIAL ATTENTION FOR ALL TURK INSTALLATIONS FOR APRIL 24 AND SEVERAL DAYS ON EACH SIDE, PARTICULARLY INCLUDING APRIL 28 WHICH IS SATURDAY. WE HAVE ALSO TELEPHONED FOREIGN STUDENT ADVISORS AT SCHOOLS WHERE THERE ARE TURKISH STUDENTS AND

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FORM DS-1652

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ASKED THAT THEY GIVE SPECIAL ATTENTION DU G THIS PERIOD. WE BELIEVE ALL LOCAL AUTHORITIES HAVE BEEN APPROPRIATELY ALERTED AT THIS POINT.

3. AS REGARDS THE INCIDENTS AT CHICAGO AND LOS ANGELES, THERE IS AT LEAST SOME DOUBT WHETHER BREAK-INS EITHER OCCURRED OR WERE ATTEMPTED. AT CHICAGO A SEAL WAS TAKEN FROM THE WALL OUTSIDE THE CONGEN OFFICES; THERE WAS NO

EVIDENCE OF AN ATTEMPTED BREAK-IN. AT LOS ANGELES ACTING CONSUL GENERAL GUVENDIREN REPORTED THAT HE FOUND A WASTE BASKET OVERTURNED AND TWO COFFEE CUPS UPSET WHEN HE OPENED THE OFFICE IN THE MORNING. LAPD OFFICERS HAVE INVESTIGATED AND FOUND NO EVIDENCE OF AN ATTEMPTED BREAK-IN.

4. DESPITE AMBIGUITY OF INFO CONTAINED IN PARA 3, WE ARE ACTING ON BASIS THAT TURK CONCERNS ARE REAL. YOU MAY ASSURE FONMIN THAT WE UNDERSTAND FULLY TURKISH CONCERNS AND ARE TAKING EVERY PRECAUTION TO SEE THAT TURK OFFICIALS, INSTALLATIONS AND CITIZENS ARE FREE FROM HARASSMENT IN THE UNITED STATES. ROGERS

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73 APR 13 AM 8:45

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WHITE HOUSE
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CONFIDENTIAL 682

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40
ORIGIN SS-25

2

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/TUR:MRHIRSHORN:CF
4/12/73 EXT 29393
APPROVED BY NEA:RPDAVIES
NEA/TUR - MR DILLON
S/S-O: S. FRY

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P 130144Z APR 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 069052

EXDIS

E.O. 16652: GDS
TAGS: PINS, TU
SUBJ: PROTECTION OF TURKISH OFFICIALS AND STUDENTS:
YEGEN-DAVIES MEMCON
REF: ANKARA 2819

1. TURKISH DCM YEGEN CALLED ON DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY DAVIES APRIL 6 FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION OF PROTECTION OF TURKISH OFFICIALS.

2. YEGEN SAID THAT THE TURKISH EMBASSY EXPECTED ARMENIAN TERRORIST ACTIVITIES ON APRIL 24. HE CAME TO REQUEST THE DEPARTMENT'S ASSISTANCE IN COOPERATION WITH OTHER AGENCIES OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND STATE GOVERNMENTS IN PROVIDING ADEQUATE PROTECTION OF TURKISH OFFICIALS AND PREMISES. IN ADDITION, HE REQUESTED THAT PROTECTION BE EXTENDED TO TURKISH STUDENTS STUDYING IN THE U.S. THESE ARE MOSTLY LOCATED IN BOSTON AND LOS ANGELES. YEGEN SAID THAT IN THE PAST THE DEPARTMENT HAS REQUESTED THE UNIVERSITIES CONCERNED TO PAY SPECIAL ATTENTION TO THE SECURITY OF TURKISH STUDENTS. HE WISHED TO MAKE THE SAME REQUEST THIS YEAR.

3. YEGEN GAVE MR. DAVIES A LIST OF TURKISH OFFICIALS AND

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OFFICIAL PREMISES IN THE U.S. HE SAID THAT IN FEBRUARY THE TURKISH EMBASSY HAD PROVIDED TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT THE NAMES OF UNIVERSITIES IN WHICH THERE ARE TURKISH STUDENTS.

4. MR. DAVIES SAID THAT U.S. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS HAVE INFORMED LOCAL OFFICIALS OF THE NEED TO MINIMIZE HOSTILE MANIFESTATIONS. HE BELIEVED THAT THIS HAS HEIGHTENED THEIR AWARENESS OF THE PROBLEM. HE SAID THAT THE DEPARTMENT WILL CONTACT THE UNIVERSITIES AND WILL DO THE UTMOST TO ENSURE THAT IF THERE ARE DEMONSTRATIONS THEY WILL BE PEACEFUL AND WILL STAY AWAY FROM TURKISH OFFICIALS. MR. DAVIES SAID THE DEPARTMENT WOULD ALERT LOCAL SECURITY AUTHORITIES. FURTHERMORE, HE HOPED THAT RECENT TALKS WITH THE MORE REASONABLE ARMENIAN-AMERICAN ORGANIZATIONS WILL BEAR FRUIT, AND THAT THE SANTA BARBARA TRAGEDY WILL COOL THE HOTHEADS. MR. DAVIES ASKED MR. YEGEN TO ASSURE HIS AMBASSADOR THAT WE HAVE DONE WHAT WE CAN TO ASSURE THAT THE SITUATION IS IN HAND AND WE WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO. ROGERS

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WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 STATE 066151

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ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/ARP:FMDICKMAN/GQLUMSDEN:HLK
4/7/73 EXT 22647
APPROVED BY D - MR. RUSH
DOD/ISA/NESA - MR. NOYES
NEA - MR. SISCO S/S-MR ØARNES
NEA/IRN - MR. MIKLOS
NEA/ARN - MR. KORN
NEA - MR. ATHERTON
PM - MR. NORLAND
EUR/SOV - MR. KADILIS
T - DR. TARR

---------- 029107

O 101656Z APR 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USCINCEUR

S E C R E T STATE 066151

EXDIS

E.O. 11652 - XGDS
TAGS: MASS, KU, JO
SUBJECT: JORDAN'S ANTICIPATED RESPONSE KUWAIT REQUEST FOR AIR COVER

REF: A. AMMAN 1781; B. AMMAN 1792

1. IN SEPTEL, WE CONVEYING OUR RESPONSE TO KUWAITI REQUEST FOR USG ADVICE ON FASTEST POSSIBLE WAYS TO ACHIEVE AIR COVER. WE BELIEVE KUWAITIS ARE LOOKING AT VARIOUS OPTIONS TO STRENGTHEN THEIR NEGOTIATING POSTURE VIS-A-VIS IRAQ. IN RESPONSE PARA 6 REF (B), FOLLOWING IS OUR CURRENT ASSESS-

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

MENT OF PRESENT KUWAITI/IRAQ DISPUTE AND SOVIET INTENTIONS WHICH YOU MAY CONVEY TO GOJ:

A. IRAQI FORCES MAY HAVE WITHDRAWN SOMEWHAT FROM KUWAITI TERRITORY THEY HAD OCCUPIED BUT REMAIN IN GOOD POSITION TO RETURN QUICKLY. THIS TOKEN WITHDRAWAL, IF CONFIRMED AND MAINTAINED, MAY FACILITATE GOK WILLINGNESS TO DEAL WITH IRAQI TEAM WHICH VISITING KUWAIT FOR NEGOTIATIONS. KUWAITIS HAVE PREVIOUSLY STATED LATTER COULD NOT TAKE PLACE WHILE IRAQI TROOPS STILL ON THEIR SOIL.

B. IRAQ WANTS EXPANDED CONTROL OVER DEEP WATER ACCESS TO UMM QASR FOR ECONOMIC (OIL EXPORT) AS WELL AS MILITARY

REASONS. UMM QASR IS GRADUALLY REPLACING BASRA AS IRAQ'S CHIEF GATEWAY TO GULF AND IS ITS PRINCIPAL NAVAL BASE. IRAQ IS LIKELY TO CLAIM BOTH WARBA AND BUBIYAN ISLANDS AT OUTSET OF NEGOTIATIONS.

C. KUWAIT HOPES MEDIATION EFFORTS BY RIAD, ZAYYAT, KHADDAM AND ARAFAT WILL ASSIST THEM IN FACE-TO-FACE NEGOTIATIONS WITH IRAQIS EVEN THOUGH POSITIONS OF TWO GOVERNMENTS REMAIN FAR APART. IF TALKS WITH IRAQIS UNPRODUCTIVE, KUWAITIS WILL PROBABLY TAKE DISPUTE TO ARAB LEAGUE FORUM IN CAIRO IN EFFORT REESTABLISH LEAGUE'S 1961 GUARANTEE OF KUWAITI SOVEREIGNTY. THIS 1961 COMMITMENT IS ONE OF FEW INSTANCES WHEN ARAB LEAGUE ABLE RESOLVE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN DISPUTING ARAB STATES.

D. IF ALL THESE MEANS FAIL, KUWAITIS MAY SEEK TO RESIST. THEY ARE THEN LIKELY TO ASK FOR OUTSIDE HELP AND MAKE USE OF THEIR FINANCIAL POWER. WE DOUBT THEY WILL WANT FOREIGN AIR AND GROUND FORCES TO COME TO THEIR SUPPORT NOW REPEAT NOW, BUT SUCH A SITUATION COULD POSSIBLYARISEIF OTHER CHANNELS TOWARD A SETTLEMENT CLOSE.

E. RE SOVIET INTENTIONS, RUSSIANS HAVE LONG-RANGE GOAL OF IMPROVING THEIR POSITION IN ARABIAN PENINSULA AND GULF BUT WE DOUBT THEY MASTERMINDING IRAQI AND

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PDRY ACTIONS. WE BELIEVE SOVIETS WELL AWARE THAT AN ATTACK BY STATES CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH THEM RUNS THE RISK OF SETTING BACK THE PROGRESS THEY HAVE MADE WITH IRAN AS WELL AS PLACE STRAINS ON U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS, WHICH FOR MANY REASONS THEY HAVE AN INTEREST IN AVOIDING AT PRESENT TIME.

2. YOU SHOULD TELL KING HUSSEIN THAT WE SEE OPPORTUNITY, NOW THAT GOK HAS TURNED TO US FOR ADVICE, TO SEEK TO STEER KUWAIT TO MORE REALISTIC COURSE OF SUPPORTING POSITION OF ARAB MODERATES INSTEAD OF CONTINUING ITS PAST FENCE-STRADDLING POLICIES. WE INTEND TO BE RESPONSIVE TO RECENT REQUESTS FOR MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND ADVICE AND THEREBY INDICATE OUR INTEREST IN KUWAIT'S CONTINUED INDEPENDENCE, WHILE AT SAME TIME ENCOURAGING SUCH REORIENTATION OF KUWAITI POLICY. WE WILL, OF COURSE, WELCOME ANY FEASIBLE STEPS WHICH JORDAN AND KUWAIT CAN WORK OUT IF GOK SHOULD AT SOME FUTURE TIME SEEK JORDANIAN MILITARY PRESENCE ON KUWAITI SOIL. GOJ, HOWEVER, WOULD NEED LOOK TO GOK TO COVER COSTS ANY SUCH OPERATION, INCLUDING REPLACEMENTS FOR U.S.-PROVIDED AIRCRAFT AND EQUIPMENT WHICH MIGHT BE LOST OR EXPENDED IN OPERATIONS IN KUWAIT.

3. WE RECOGNIZE STRONG DESIRABILITY OF ANY JORDANIAN ACTION IN SUPPORT OF KUWAIT BEING PARALLELED BY SIMILAR ACTIONS BY OTHER ARABS, ESPECIALLY SAUDI ARABIA. SAUDI AIR CAPABILITIES ARE PRESENTLY LIMITED AND STRAINED BY SAUDIS' NEED TO PROVIDE INCREASED AIR SUPPORT FOR ITS OWN AND POSSIBLY YEMENI FORCES IN THE SOUTH WHERE PDRY HAS ALSO BEEN CREATING TROUBLES. HOWEVER, SOME SAUDI GROUND PRESENCE MAY BE AVAILABLE FOR DEPLOYMENT EITHER TO KUWAIT OR ALONG SAUDI-IRAQI BORDER. ROGERS

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SECRET 578

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14
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 R

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4/10/73 EXT 21018
APPROVED BY NEA:JJSISCO
NEA/ARN:DAKORN
NEA/IAI:HHSTACKHOUSE
NEA:ALATHERTON
S/S:O:K.KURZE

'73 APR 11 AM 8:14
SITUATION ROOM

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R 110246Z APR 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

S E C R E T STATE 067072

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINT, PFOR, IS, XF
SUBJ: ISRAELI POLICY TOWARD WEST BANK
REF: AMMAN 1851, 1891, STATE 64462

IN VIEW OF ISRAELI CABINET DECISION APRIL 9 NOT TO ALTER POLICY ON LAND PURCHASES IN WEST BANK, BELIEVE NO FURTHER USG DEMARCHES ARE NECESSARY AT THIS TIME. IF YOU BELIEVE IT WOULD BE HELPFUL, YOU MAY TELL GOJ IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE OF ASST. SEC. SISCO'S INTERVENTION WITH AMB. DINITZ PRIOR TO APRIL CABINET MEETING. ROGERS

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'73 MAR 2 AM 8:35

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72
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/ARN:DMRANSOM:BDF
3/21/73 EXT 21018
APPROVED BY NEA:RPDAVIES
NEA/ARN:DAKORN
TREASURY/ETTO - MR. CLAWSON
S/CPR - MR. WHITEHEAD (INFO)
S/S:MR. BARNES
---------- 125531

R 221803Z MAR 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 052833

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PINS, JO
SUBJ: JORDANIAN REQUEST FOR SECRET SERVICE SURVEY TEAM
REF: AMMAN MAP 338, AMMAN 1449

DEPARTMENT AND TREASURY STUDYING JORDANIAN REQUEST SYMPATHETICALLY. EXPECT BE ABLE ANSWER IN ABOUT TEN DAYS.
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'73 FEB 15 AM 7:41

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64
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/ARN:DAKORN/DMRANSOM:JFC /BDF
22670 2-12-73
APPROVED BY NEA - MR. SISCO
NEA - MR. ATHERTON
L/PM - MR. MICHEL
NEA/ARP - MR. DICKMAN
PM/MAS - MR.NORLAND
DOD/ISA - MR. TIMBERLAKE
S/S-O: W. NEWLIN

---------- 078147

P R 150020Z FEB 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
USCINCEUR

S E C R E T STATE 028728

EXDIS

SUBJECT: JORDANIAN TRANSFER OF 106S TO ABU DHABI

1. IN MEETINGS WITH COURT MINISTER KHAMMASH AND KING'S POLITICAL ADVISER, ZAID RIFAI, ON 9 FEBRUARY, ASST. SECY. SISCO RAISED PROBLEM OF JORDANIAN TRANSFER OF 106 RECOILLESS RIFLES TO ABU DHABI. SISCO SAID WE IN BASIC AGREEMENT WITH JORDANIANS ON DESIRABILITY REINFORCING GULF STATES' SECURITY, BUT JORDANIAN ACTION IN FLYING 106S TO ABU DHABI ON FEBRUARY 1 WAS UNDERTAKEN WITHOUT COMPLETE COMPLIANCE WITH CONDITIONS ATTACHED TO USG APPROVAL OF TRANSFER. SISCO URGED GOJ IMMEDIATELY TAKE STEPS FULFILL THREE CONDITIONS ASSOCIATED WITH USG AUTHORIZATION OF TRANS.

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FERS OF 106S TO ABU DHABI: A) CONFIRMATION THAT JORDAN DOES NOT RPT NOT PLAN TO PURCHASE REPLACEMENTS FOR TRANSFERRED 106S AT THIS TIME OR IN FUTURE BARRING, OF COURSE, UNFORESEEN CIRCUMSTANCES; B) ASSURANCE FROM GOJ THAT 106S TO BE TRANSFERRED ARE FROM FMS-SUPPLIED STOCKS; AND C) UAE MUST GIVE WRITTEN COMMITMENT THAT IT WILL NOT TRANSFER 106S RECEIVED FROM JORDAN TO A THIRD COUNTRY WITHOUT PRIOR USG CONSENT. AS TO FORM, WRITTEN COMMITMENT CAN BE PROVIDED BY UAE EITHER TO GOJ OR TO USG BUT IN EITHER EVENT, SHOULD REFLECT UNDERTAKING NOT RPT NOT TO TRAMSFER H6S SHOULD CONSENT OF USG RPT USG. KHAMMASH ASSURED SISCO TRANSFER HAD BEEN MADE ONLY AFTER JORDANIANS HAD OBTAINED SAUDI APPROVAL, WHICH HE SAID HAD COME RECENTLY.

2. ON FEBRUARY 10, AMB. BROWN RECEIVED LETTER FROM JORDANIAN CHIEF OF STAFF, MAJOR GENERAL ZAID BEN SHAKER, DATED FEBRUARY 9, GIVING ASSURANCES IN SUB-PARAGRAPHS (A) AND (B).

3. ON FEBRUARY 13 ASST. SECY. SISCO TELEPHONED KING'S POLITICAL ADVISOR ZAID RIFAI (WHO IS WITH KING IN FLORIDA) TO REQUEST THAT JORDAN RAISE WITH ABU DHABI, AND SEEK TO OBTAIN, WRITTEN ASSURANCE FROM UAE TO USG NOT TO TRANSFER 106S WITHOUT PRIOR USG CONSENT. IN RESPONSE TO RIFAI'S EXPRESSION OF INTEREST, SISCO SAID WE WILL PROVIDE JORDANIANS, FOR THEIR USE WITH ABU DHABI, DRAFT TEXT OF ASSURANCE WE WILL NEED FROM UAE.

4. DRAFT TEXT BEING FURNISHED RIFAI AND WILL BE SENT YOU BY SEPTEL.

5. XGDS - 1 ROGERS

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 9859
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S E C R E T AMMAN 5735

CONTROL: 8 2 2 3 Q
OCTOBER 27, 1973
1:12 PM

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
73 OCT 26 AM 10 09

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, JO
SUBJ: REQUEST FOR ARMS

1. SUMMARY: KING HAS SENT MESSAGE TO ME THROUGH RIFAI ASKING FOR AIR DELIVERY OF M-60S AND TOW MISSILES. I TOLD RIFAI THIS IS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT REQUEST FOR USG AT THIS PRECISE MOMENT BUT THAT I HAD RECOMMENDED IMPACT PACKAGE OF BOTH ITEMS.

2. KING, IN BED, ASKED RIFAI TO SAY HE BELIEVES CEASE-FIRE WILL WORK DESPITE PRESENT DIFFICULTIES AND THAT THERE WILL BE SERIOUS EFFORTS TOWARD PEACE. WHAT HE HOPES TO HEAR SOON FROM USG ARE ITS VIEWS, UNDER WHAT AUSPICES NEGOTIATIONS WILL TAKE PLACE, AND HOW DO WE SEE FINAL SETTLEMENT. THIS IS FOR THE FUTURE. RIGHT NOW HE HAS SERIOUS MILITARY MORALE PROBLEM. ARMY HAS SEEN WHAT SOVIETS HAVE DONE FOR SYRIANS. IT HAS ALSO SEEN WHAT USG HAS DONE FOR ISRAELIS. WHEN THE ARMY COMES BACK FROM SYRIA, IT WILL TALK.

3. WHAT IS NEEDED IS AN IMPACT PACKAGE TO PROVE THAT USG CARES FOR JORDAN. IT IS NOT QUESTION OF SIZE BUT RATHER OF TIME.

4. HM WANTS REMAINDER OF M-60S PLUS TOWS. AND AIR-DELIVERED.

5. RIFAI ADDED THAT WAR HAD DESTROYED MANY MYTHS: ISRAELI SUPERIORITY IN INTELLIGENCE AND FIGHTING ABILITY AND ARAB SENSE OF INFERIORITY. ALSO DESTROYED WAS MYTH THAT USG DELIVERED ARMS ONLY SUBJECT TO CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATIONS. AVAILABILITY FROM FUTURE PRODUCTION, ETC.

5. I TOLD RIFAI HE KNEW THAT WHAT USG HAD SAID ABOUT ARMS FOR JORDAN WAS ALL TRUE. DELIVERIES TO ISRAEL WERE ENTIRELY DIFFERENT AND CAUSED BY SOVIET AIRCRAFT AIRLIFT WHICH THREAT-

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ENED CHANGE BALANCE.

6. RIFAI REPLIED THIS ALSO APPLIED TO JORDAN. SITUATION HAS CHANGED. SYRIANS HAVE OFFERED T-62S AND SAMS TO JORDAN FROM SUPPLIES THEY ARE GETTING FROM SOVIETS. SOVIETS HAVE ALSO OFFERED ARMS.

7. I PRESSED RIFAI ON LATTER POINT. HE RETRACTED A BIT TO SAY SOVIET AMB HERE HAS SAID QTE LET US KNOW WHAT YOU NEED UNQTE. ALLEGEDLY, SOVIETS ARE LETTING THIS OFFER SLIP OUT AROUND TOWN.

8. I TOLD RIFAI THIS IS REDICULOUS. A FEW SOVIET ITEMS WITHOUT BACK-UP WILL DO JORDAN NO GOOD. HE ADMITTED THIS, SAYING THAT JORDAN IS WITH US AND ANY CHANGE WOULD BE AS BAD FOR REGIME AS FOR US. IT IS JUST A SORT OF POLITE BLACKMAIL, HE SAID WITH A SMILE, TO LET US KNOW KING WANTS AND NEEDS SPEEDY US HELP. IT IS NOT ANTI-AMERICANISM THAT IS LONG-TERM THREAT BUT ANTI-REGIME FEELING.

9. IN EARLIER CABLES I HAVE SUGGESTED A PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT PACKAGE. I DO NOT KNOW HOW WE WILL FIND THE ITEMS OR THE MONEY OR THE TRANSPORT. THAT IS NOT ANY PROBLEM. BUT I FIND MYSELF RESPONSIBLE IN PART FOR THE CONTINUANCE OF A US-ORIENTED JORDAN PLAYING A SENSIBLE, SOMEWHAT US-GUIDED, ROLE IN THE ME. AND IT LOOKS LIKE A FEW MORE GUNS WILL HELP.

BROW

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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT

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NODIS NODIS NODIS

SECRET HAK SCOWCROFT RODMAN HOWE MCFARLANE

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

0 260850Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9841
BT
S E C R E T AMMAN 5700

CONTROL: 7545Q
RECVD: 26 OCT 73
79:33AM

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
OCT 26 AM 11:04

NODIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PINS, JO
SUBJECT: WITHDRAWAL JORDANIAN TROPS FROM SYRIA

PROFESSOR KISSINGER'S PRIZE PUPIL AT HARVARD HAS EXCEEDED HIMSELF IN MACHAVELLIANISM. ZAID RIFAI SENT AMER KHAMMASH TO DAMASCUS THIS MORNING. AMER IS TO TELL ASSAD THAT JORDAN KNOWS THAT ISRAEL VIOLATED CEASE-FIRE IN SYRIA AND EGYPT. JORDAN HAS INTELLIGENCE THAT IT MAY DO SO AS WELL ON EAST BANK. JORDAN, THEREFORE, MUST WITHDRAW ITS TROOPS IN ORDER TO PROTECT ITS OWN TERRITORY.

BROWN

BT
#5700

SECRET

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L V- To
White House 8
Gen Scowcroft.

Department of State TELEGRAM

SECRET

Z 241625Z OCT 73 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 9836
BT
S E C R E T AMMAN 5683

6 9 0 2 Q
24 OCT 73 Z16 55

SCOWCROFT
HOWE
McFARLANE

NODIS/CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR, JO
SUBJECT: KING'S MESSAGE TO SECRETARY

REF: AMMAN 5682

1. REPLACEMENT OF THE MILITARY LOSSES IS A DIFFICULT ONE FOR US TO UNDERTAKE, ESPECIALLY IF IT APPEARED PUBLICLY AS IF WE WERE AWARDING HIM FOR COMBAT AGAINST THE ISRAELIS. THERE IS A WAY OUT.

2. UNDER THE MAP PROGRAM WE HAVE PROMISED HIM ADDITIONAL M-60 TANKS TO COMPLETE UNITS NOW EQUIPPED WITH THOSE TANKS. WE HAVE TOLD HIM THAT THESE TANKS ARE NOT AVAILABLE UNTIL THE DISTANT FUTURE AS WE CANNOT DIVERT FROM OUR INVENTORY. WE HAVE, OF COURSE, DONE JUST THAT IN RESUPPLYING ISRAEL. HE KNOW THAT, AS HE MADE CLEAR IN AN EARLIER LETTER. SINCE WE HAVE ALREADY MADE A MAJOR RAID ON THAT INVENTORY FOR ISRAEL, A MINOR RAID FOR JORDAN WOULD SEEM IN ORDER. IT HAS THE ADVANTAGE OF NOT BEING A NEW, POST CEASE-FIRE PROGRAM. IF WE COULD ADD TO THIS SOME OF THE M-48A3S JORDANIANS HAVE REQUESTED, WE WOULD DO MUCH TO MEET HUSSEIN'S REQUEST FOR REPLACEMENTS, ALL WITHOUT CREATING NEW AID PROGRAMS. WE SHOULD NOT BE SANGUINE THAT JORDANIAN MILITARY REQUESTS WILL STOP THERE. MISSILES ARE ON EVERYONE'S MIND: ANTI-AIRCRAFT AND EVEN MORE ANTI-TANK, SPECIFICALLY THE TOW WHICH WE HAVE ALREADY PROGRAMMED BUT FOR WHICH WE WILL PROBABLY HAVE NO MONEY.

3. IRAQI PROBLEM IS MORE DIFFICULT. IT SEEMS TO ME TO BE IN OUR ADVANTAGE TO HAVE JORDANIANS STAY IN SYRIA UNTIL THINGS SETTLE DOWN. THE SAME APPLIES TO SAUDIS. BUT HUSSEIN IS ASKING FOR A STILL UNDEFINED QTE COMMITMENT UNQTE AND THAT IS HARD TO GIVE. PERHAPS WE CAN DUCK THIS ONE AND TELL THE KING WHAT WE ARE DONG.

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SECRET

-2- AMMAN 5683, OCT 24, NODIS/CHEROKEE

4. ONE REASON IRAQIS ARE SO FREE TO ACT IN SYRIA IS GO-AHEAD SIGNAL THE SHAH GAVE THEM. WE COULD CALL SHAH ON THIS AND ASK HIM TO TELL IRAQIS THAT HE DID NOT ENVISAGE AN IRAQI TAKEOVER OF SYRIA.

5. WE COULD URGE FEISEL TO GET THOSE WEEK-LONG MARCHING SOLDIERS INTO SYRIA AND HAVE HIM BOLSTER ASAD WITH A CUSSAGE OR MISSION.

6. WE COULD TAK AGAIN TO SOVIETS ABOUT DANGER OF LETTING IRAQIS INVILVE SYRIA IN BREAKING THE CEASE-FIRE.

7. WE COULD ALARM SOME OF THE WESTERN EUROPEANS WHO HAVE RELATIONS WITH SYRIA AND IRAQ.

8. COMMENT: KING IS JUMPY AND HIS PULSE RATE UP. SO FAR HE HAS COME THROUGH THIS MIRACULOUSLY BUT AT A SURE EXPENSE TO HIS NERVES. OUR SOOTHING NOISES HAVE AND WILL HELP.

BROWN

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NODIS NODIS NODIS

(3)

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

CONTROL: 6168Q
RECD: OCT 21, 1973
2027Z

Scowcroft
McFarlane
Haig

Z 212004Z OCT 73 ZFF-6
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW FLASH 0436
INFO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 9804
BT
S E C R E T AMMAN 5623

NODIS CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: OGEN
SUBJ: MIDDLE EAST

REF: MOSCOW 13137

SECRETARY'S MESSAGE DELIVERED KING AT 1930ZULU. HE COULD NOT HAVE BEEN HAPPIER. NEITHER COULD I. HE SENDS HIS HEARTFELT THANKS AND CONGRATULATIONS TO THE SECRETARY.

BROWN

BT
#5623

SECRET

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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT

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COPY 7 OF 8 COPIES

HOWE
SCOWCROFT
MCFARLANE

Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

CONTROL: 5801Q
RECD: 20 OCT 73 12:30AM

SITUATION ROOM WHITE HOUSE
OCT 20 PM 1:50

Z 200330Z OCT 73 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 9777
BT
S E C R E T AMMAN 5579

NODIS/CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: XGDS1
TAGS: PFOR, JO
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S MESSAGE FOR KING HUSSEIN

REF: STATE 208155

1. DELIVERED SECRETARY'S MESSAGE TO ZAID RIFAI AT 0500. HE WILL GET IT TO KING WHEN LATTER AWAKES. RIFAI FOUND IT ENCOURAGING AND SENDS HIS BEST WISHES TO SECRETARY FOR THIS VITAL TRIP.

2. RIFAI SAYS KING WILL STILL WANT TO KNOW OUR REACTION TO SENDING OF SECOND BRIGADE. I TOLD HIM TO LOOK AT LAST PARAGRAPH CAREFULLY. HE THEN ASKED IF HE SHOULD READ IT AS OKAYING THE SECOND BRIGADE. HERE I HESITATED AS I AM NOT SURE THAT IS EXACTLY WHAT WE WANT TO CONVEY.

3. I REALIZE THAT WE MAY NOT WANT TO BE PUT INTO POSITION OF GIVING EXPLICIT APPROVAL. IF YOU WANT ME TO TAKE THIS ON MYSELF, I'LL DO SO. PLEASE ADVISE.

BROWN

SECRET

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

'73 OCT 16 AM 8:13

CONTROL: 41480
RECD: 16 OCT 73 1:45AM
SITUATION ROOM

HAIG
SCOWCROFT
LL

Z 160105Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 9746
BT
S E C R E T AMMAN 5527

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, XF
SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST SITUATION

REF: SATE 203885

1. DISCUSSED REFTEL WITH CP HASSAN FROM 0100 TO 0230. HE UNDERSTANDS PROBLEM COMPLETELY. KING'S UNCLE, SHERIF NASR, WAS PRESENT FOR PART OF CONVERSATION AS WAS COMMANDING GENERAL OF FOURTH DIVISION, IN WHOSE HEADQUARTERS I FOUND HASSAN.

2. AFTER DISCUSSION HASSAN SAID HE WANTED TO WAKE AND TALK TO KING ALONE. I AM STANDING BY, SHOULD KING CALL. IN ANY CASE WILL SEE HIM IN A.M. TO RE-ITERATE POINTS I MADE TO HASSAN.

3. HASSAN AND NASR AGREED IT WOULD BE MADNESS FOR JORDAN TO COMMIT MORE FORCES TO SYRIA. I TOLD THEM THAT BOTH HAD TOLD ME EARLIER THAT IT WOULD BE MADNESS TO COMMIT ANY FORCES TO SYRIA. WHAT HAS TO BE AVOIDED IS THE INSATIABLE APPETITE OF BATTLE AND HONOR. WHAT IS AT STAKE IS WHAT JORDAN WILL BE IN THE FUTURE. IT CAN REMAIN, WITH LUCK, THE MODERATE JORDANIAN STATT WITH AN ARAB WINDOW TO THE WEST; OR, WITH BAD LUCK, IT CAN BE A MINOR ARAB STATE, VASSAL TO THE RICH OIL-PRODUCERS.

4. HASSAN SAID JORDAN FORCES HAD TAKEN FIRST CASUALTIES IN SYRIA. ONE KILLED AND TWO WOUNDED BY STRAY ARTILLERY SHELL, PRESUMABLY 175MM.

5. COMMENT: REFTEL ASKS ABOUT OUTFIT. IT IS 40TH ARMORED BRIGADE, A PART OF THE THIRD ARMORED DIVISION. THERE IS A FOURTH DIVISION AS WELL; IT IS PAPER OUTFIT CONSISTING LARGELY OF GARRISON TROOPS AROUND AMMAN.

BROWN

SECRET

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SECRET

Department of State

WH

TELEGRAM

'73 OCT 16 AM 8:45

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
CONTROL: 4 1 0 3Q
RECD: 15 OCT'73 7:26PM

Z 152235Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 9745
BT
S E C R E T AMMAN 5526

NODIS

E.O. 116525 XGDS1
TAGS: PFV,NPF
SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST SITUATION

REF: STATE 203885

1. ABOVE REF RECEIVED 152220Z WHICH IS 4 HOURS AFTER MESSAGE WAS RECEIVED IN STATE COMMUNICATIONS CENTER IN WASHINGTON.

2. AM TRYING TO GET TO THE PALACE IMMEDIATELY BUT DELAY IN REPLYING IS ONE OF THE PROBLEMS WE ARE HAVING WITH OUR COMMUNICATIONS AT THIS TIME.

BROWN

NODIS NODIS NODIS

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

Z 150405Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 9733
RUESAD/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV FLASH 5522
BT
S E C R E T AMMAN 5510

CONTROL: 3 8 8 4 Q
RECD: 15 OCTOBER 73 - 10 56 AM

73 OCT 15 AM 10:39
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

HAIG
Scowcroft
LL

E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: MOPS, JO, IS
SUBJECT: JORDANIAN INTERVENTION

REF: STATE 203686

1. REFTEL PASSED TO CP HASSAN AT 0500 LOCAL. HE IS PHONING GHQ IMMEDIATELY WITH INSTRUCTIONS PASS ON SUBSTANCE TO BRIGADE COMMANDER IN SYRIA.

2. HASSAN HAD JUST RETURNED FROM INSPECTING JORDANIAN TROOPS IN SYRIA. FOUND TOTAL CONFUSION WITH SYRIANS PRESSING HARD ON BRIGADE COMMANDER TO THROW HIS TROOPS INTO BATTLE BUT WITH NO PRECISE PLANS FOR DEPLOYMENT. BRIGADE COMMANDER STILL ACTING UNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO STALL, TO MAINTAIN COHESIVENESS OF HIS UNIT, AND NOT TO TAKE DIRECT ORDERS FROM SYRIANS. SAUDIS HAVE ENTERED SYRIA AND ARE DIRECTED TOWARDS KISSWA, ON OUTSKIRTS DAMASCUS.

BROWN

BT

NOTE: HANDLED AS NODIS PER S/S-O - MR. WRIGHT

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NODIS

WH (5)

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

Z 131210Z OCT 73 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 9708
BT
S E C R E T AMMAN 5471

CONTROL: 3 5 7 6 Q
RECD: 13 OCT 73Z 12 15

NODIS

DEPT PASS ACTION ALSO TO TEL AVIV FLASH

E.O. 11652: XGD-3
TAGS: PFOR, MOPS, JO
SUBJECT: JORDANIAN INTERVENTION

1. FOR MY OWN INFORMATION AND NOT TO PASS ON TO JORDANIANS, HAVE WE HAD ANY TALKS WITH ISRAELIS AT ALL AS TO THEIR REACTIONS TO A POSSIBLE JORDANIAN MOVE INTO SYRIA?

2. WHAT I AM THINKING ABOUT IS AMERICAN COMMUNITY HERE.

BROWN

BT
#5471

NOTE: NOT PASSED TEL AVIV BY OC/T.

SECRET

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NODIS NODIS NODIS

WH 6

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

'73 OCT 11 PM 3:07

SECRET

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

2873Q

Z 111515Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 9681
BT
S E C R E T AMMAN 5436

11 OCTOBER 2 11 39 AM

Scowcroft
Howe
McFarlane

NODIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR, MOPS, JO
SUBJECT: JORDANIAN INTERVENTION - PART III

REF: AMMAN 5434

1. SYRIANS ASKED FOR A FULL DIVISION. SADAT WAS LESS PRECISE BUT CALLED FOR STRONG FORCES. JORDANIANS HAVE ALREADY REPLIED THEY CANNOT AFFORD A DIVISION. THEY ARE TALKING ABOUT A BRIGADE.

2. JORDANIANS WANT TO STATION BRIGADE ON LEFT FLANK OF GOLAN, USING SUPPLY ROUTES THROUGH DE AA AND OPEN COUNTRY JUST TO WEST. TERRAIN IS DIFFICULT IN THIS AREA AND AFFORDS NATURAL PROTECTION TO FORCES THERE. ALSO IN BACK OF JORDANIAN MIND IS THAT THIS IS EASIEST PLACE FOR THEM TO GET OUT AND BACK TO JORDAN. IF NECESSARY. IT ALSO WOULD KEEP THEM OUT OF DIRECT CONTACT WITC ISRAELIS BECAUSE OF DEEP GORGES ON 1967 LINE.

3. STATE OF PLAY IS THAT JORDANIAN TEAM WILL GO TO DAMASCUS TO DISCUSS PLANNING, ALL OF COURSE AD REFERENDUM. THEREAFTER, JORDANIAN OFFICERS WILL MAKE A SITE RECONNAISSANCE. THIS IS THE STALLING TACTIC. IT REALLY DOES NOT GIVE MUCH TIME.

BROWN

SECRET

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NODIS NODIS NODIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

CONTROL: 28730
RECD: 11 OCT 73 1139A

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
73 OCT 12 AM 10 24

CORRECTED COPY

Z 111515Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 9681
BT
S E C R E T AMMAN 5436

NODIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR, MOPS, JO
SUBJECT: JORDANIAN INTERVENTION - PART III .

REF AMMAN 5434

1. SYRIANS ASKED FOR A FULL DIVISION. SADAT WAS LESS PRECISE BUT CALLED FOR STRONG FORCES. JORDANIANS HAVE ALREADY REPLIED THEY CANNOT AFFORD A DIVISION. THEY ARE TALKING ABOUT A BRIGADE.

2. JORDANIANS WANT TO STATION BRIGADE ON LEFT FLANK OF GOLAN, USING SUPPLY ROUTES THROUGH DERAZSAND OPEN COUNTRY JUST TO WEST. TERRAIN IS DIFFICULT IN THIS AREA AND AFFORDS NATURAL PROTECTION TO FORCES THERE. ALSO IN BACK OF JORDANIAN MIND IS THAT THIS IS EASIEST PLACE FOR THEM TO GET OUT AND BACK TO JORDAN, IF NECESSARY. IT ALSO WOULD KEEP THEM OUT OF DIRECT CONTACT WITH ISRAELIS BECAUSE OF DEEP GORGES ON 1967 LINE.

3. STATE OF PLAY IS THAT JORDANIAN TEAM WILL GO TO DAMASCUS TO DISCUSS PLANNING, ALL OF COURSE AD REFERENDUM. THEREAFTER, JORDANIAN OFFICERS WILL MAKE A SITE RECONNAISSANCE. THIS IS THE STALLING TACTIC. IT REALLY DOES NOT GIVE MUCH TIME.

BROWN

BT
#5436

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NODIS NODIS NODIS

WH

6

Department of State

TELEGRAM

'73 OCT 11 PM 3:07

SECRET

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

R 111030Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9677
BT
S E C R E T AMMAN 5428

2816Q
OCT. 11, 1973
8:26 AM

NODIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS1
TAGS: PFOR, JO
SUBJECT: JORDANIAN INTERVENTION

STATE 201118 TREATED COMPLETELY NODIS IN THIS EMBASSY. OUR REPLY (AMMAN 5419) SHOULD BE UPGRADED TO NODIS.

BROWN

SECRET

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NODIS NODIS NODIS

COPY 6 OF 15 COPIES

~~SECRET~~

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

O 110831Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9671
BT
~~S E C R E T~~ AMMAN 5420

CONTROL: 2765Q
RECVD: 11 OCT 73
4:58AM

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
OCT 11 AM 9:29

Secretary
House
McFarlane

NODIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR, MOPS, JO
SUBJ: DIA REPORTING

1. I HAVE KEPT MY CABLES ON POSSIBLE JORDANIAN INTERVENTION AS HIGHLY CLASSIFIED AS POSSIBLE. SO HAS SRF.

2. NOW I READ IN DIA MESSAGE 6554 (SITREP 22A) WHICH GOES TO PLACES LIKE HELSINKI THAT THE "JORDANIAN 40TH ARMORED BRIGADE MAY BE DISPATCHED TO SYRIA, ETC., ETC.)"

3. I HOPE THIS WILL BE STOPPED IMMEDIATELY.

BROWN

BT
#5420

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6
DIA Review
By [illegible] NARA, Date 7-19-00

~~SECRET~~

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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT

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SECRET

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Department of State

'73 SEP 17 PM 1:24

TELEGRAM

WH

WHITE HOU
SITUATION R

HAK
SCOWCROFT
L.L. -- SADAT REPORTEDLY TOLD KING HUSAYN OF QADHAFI'S SCHEMES TO USE EGYPTIAN MILITARY HARDWARE AGAINST ISRAELIS, I.E. SA-7'S IN TROME AND EGYPTIAN SUB TO TORPEDO QE-2.

R 150925Z SEP 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9427
BT
S E C R E T AMMAN 4909

NODIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS1
TAGS: PFOR, JO, EG, LY
SUBJECT: SADAT'S REACTIONS TO QADDAFI

1. SADAT TOLD KING THAT QADDAFI HAD ASKED HIM FOR SIX STRELA MISSILES FROM THE LOT SOVIETS HAD GIVEN EGYPT. SAID THEY WOULD BE FOR TRAINING. QADDAFI THEN GAVE THEM TO FEDAYEEN TO BE USED TO SHOOT DOWN AN EL AL PLANE IN REVENGE FOR LIBYAN PLANE.

2. SADAT WAS FURIOUS. HE HAD HAD GREAT PROBLEMS WITH SOVIETS.

3. SADAT ALSO SAID THAT HE HAD LENT SUBMARINE AND CREW TO LIBYA. QADDAFI ORDERED COMMANDER TO TORPEDO QE-2 THEN ON WAY TO HAIFA. AFTER GIVING ORDER HE RETIRED TO THE DESERT SAYING HE WAS NOT TO BE DISTURBED ON ANY ACCOUNT. SADAT SPENT AN ANXIOUS NIGHT UNTIL SUBMARINE COMMANDER COULD BE CONTACTED AGAIN AND ORDERED TO RETURN IMMEDIATELY TO EGYPT.

3. ABOVE IS FROM ZAID RIFAI WHO WAS PRESENT DURING TALK. SADAT USED THESE TWO EXAMPLES OF QADDAFI'S ACTIONS TO SHOW WHY EGYPT HAD TO BE WARY OF HIM.

BROWN

BT
#4909

SECRET

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SECRET

Department of State TELEGRAM

'73 SEP 15 PM 1:35

NODIS NODIS NODIS

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
CONTROL: 3530Q
RECVD: 15 SEP 73
6:16AM

HAK
LL

R 150925Z SEP 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9427
BT
S E C R E T AMMAN 4909

NODIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS1
TAGS: PFOR, JO, EG, LY
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BROWN

BT
#4909

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

R 160642Z SEP 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9433
BT
S E C R E T AMMAN 4927

CONTROL: 3631Q
RECVD: 16 SEP 73
3:36AM

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, JO, EG, LY
SUBJECT: SADAT'S REACTIONS TO QADDAFI

REF: AMMAN 4909

BRITISH AMBASSADOR HAS ALSO BEEN BRIEFED ON STRELA AND SUBMARINE. HE SURMISES THAT KING IS TELLING QUITE A FEW PEOPLE ABOUT THIS PART OF TALK WITH SADAT AND THAT, SOONER RATHER THAN LATER, IT WILL LEAK INTO PRESS.

BROWN

BT
#4927

'73 SEP 16 AM 11:37
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

SECRET

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NODIS NODIS NODIS

13

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

'73 SEP 15 PM

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
CONTROL: 3 5 5 4 Q
SEPTEMBER 15, 1973
9:20 AM

O 151240Z SEP 73 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9430
BT
S E C R E T AMMAN 4922

NODIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR, JO, SY, EG
SUBJECT: CAIRO TRIPARTITE SUMMIT

1. SUMMARY: PM SAYS HUSSEIN CAME OUT WINNER AT CAIRO. RELATIONS WITH EGYPT NORMAL. ASAD WILL TRY DO SAME FOR SYRIA. NO DEALS MADE ON FEDAYEEN. FURTHER SUMMITS UPCOMING. PHASE TWO WILL BE KUWAITI SUBSIDY.

2. THREE MAIN SUBJECTS WERE DISCUSSED AT LENGTHY PRIVATE MEETINGS: POLITICAL COORDINATION, MILITARY COORDINATION, AND THE FEDAYEEN.

3. ON THE FIRST IT WAS AGREED THAT TRIPARTITE MEETINGS WOULD CONTINUE (NEXT IN DAMASCUS, THEN AMMAN). IT WAS EXPECTED THAT THE THREE WOULD NOT UNDERTAKE ANY MOVES TO A ME SOLUTION WITHOUT CONSULTATION WITH OTHERS. ALL INTERIM SETTLEMENTS AND PROPOSALS WERE RULED OUT.

4. ON THE MILITARY SIDE IT WAS AGREED THAT THERE WOULD BE TALKS ON MILITARY LEVEL. THAT IS ALL. NO UNIFIED COMMAND, NO STATIONING OF SYRIAN OR EGYPTIAN FORCES IN JORDAN OR ANYTHING LIKE THAT. JORDANIAN POINT WAS THAT NONE OF THAT SORT OF THING COULD BE CONSIDERED UNTIL THERE WAS A JOINTLY AGREED STRATEGY, INCLUDING FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS.

5. ON FEDAYEEN SIDE NOTHING HAPPENED. THIS WAS THE MOST CONTENTIOUS ISSUE. ASAD INSISTED THAT JORDAN HAD TO TAKE PRESSURE OFF HIM BY PERMITTING RETURN OF AT LEAST TOKEN FATAH UNITS. KING REFUSED AND SAID INSISTENCE ON THIS POINT IMPERILED POLITICAL AND MILITARY ACCOMPLISHMENTS. ASAD ASKED WHAT THESE HAD BEE, SAYING ALL THAT HAD BEEN AGREED ON WAS TO TALK. MEETING BROKE UP RATHER ACRIMONIOUSLY. KING AND RIFAI SPENT NIGHT TALKING ABOUT IT. RIFAI SAID HE WOULD HAVE TO RESIGN IF SINGLE FEDAY'I ALLOWED TO RETURN. ALSO TOLD KING ARMY WOULD REPEL AND FIRST

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SECRET

FEDAYEEN REPS IN AMMAN WOULD BE SHOT DOWN IN STREETS. NEXT MORNING KING TOLD SADAT AND ASAD THAT MEETING WAS OVER, HE WOULD RETURN TO AMMAN AND JORDAN WOULD STRUGGLE ON ALONE, WITHOUT ARAB SUBSIDY IF IT CAME TO THAT. THIS BRUTALLY FRANK STATEMENT SHOOK SADAT AND ASAD AND REVERSED APPARENT FAILURE. SADAT SAID KING WAS RIGHT IN REFUSING FEDAYEEN AS THEY WERE NO GOOD TO ANYONE. ADDED DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WOULD BE RESTORED IMMEDIATELY AND THAL ALL IS "NORMAL" BETWEEN EGYPT AND JORDAN. ASAD SAID HE WOULD GO BAK TO DAMASCUS AND SEE WHAT HE COULD DO. KING SAID HE WOULD BE JUST AS HAPPY WITH A CHARGE INSTEAD OF AMBASSADOR IF THAT WOULD HELP.

6. RIFAI WAYS BOTH ASAD AND SADAT CRITICAL OF US, SAYING IT HAS NO WISH SEE PEACE IN ME IF THAT MEANS ANY TROUBLE WITH ISRAEL OR PRO-ISRAEL AMERICANS. HUSSEIN REPLIED THAT HOSTILITY TO US WAS NOT WAY TO GET US TO REASSESS ITS POSITION. IT WOULD BE BETTER TO BE FRIENDLY WITH US AND TALK TO INFLUENTIAL AMERICANS IN NONEMOTIONAL TONES. HE ALSO SAID THAT IT WAS COUNTERPRODUCTIVE TO TALK OF OIL AS AN ARAB WEAPON. IT WOULD NOT WORK AGAINST US. IT WAS BETTER TO THINK OF ARAB MONEY AS A WEAPON AND THIS MEANT USING THAT MONEY TO BUILD UP ECONOMIES OF THREE COUNTRIES. RIFAI THOUGHT THIS ARGUMENT HAD AFFECTED SADAT WHO, AFTER ALL THE BLUFF, REALLY WANTS ECONOMIC AND NOT MILITARY DEVELOPMENT. HUSSEIN ASKED ASAD TO COME OUT FOR 242. ASAD REPLIED THAT HE HAD NOT DONE SO IN PAST AND NO ONE COULD SAY THAT IF SYRIA HAD FAVORED 242 THE SITUATION IN ME WOULD BE THE SLIGHTEST BIT DIFFERENT THAN IT IS NOW. SYRIA WANTS PEACE AND WHEN REAL PEACE EFFORTS GET UNDER WAY SYRIA WILL BE THERE.

7. I TOLD RIFAI PRESS IS SPECULATING THAT JORDAN MUST HAVE CAVEN IN A BIT ON FEDAYEEN TO GET RESULTS IT DID. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THIS IS CASE BUT SAID HE WOULD NOT GO TO GREAT EFFORTS TO CONTRADICT THESE STORIES AT THIS TIME AS HE DOES NOT WANT TO PUT ROADBLOCKS IN ASAD'S WAY. IT WILL GRADUALLY COME OUT, PROBABLY THROUGH INFURIATED PLO CHANNELS, THAT KING GAVE AWAY NOTHING AND THAT IT WAS SADAT AND ASAD WHO 'DUMPED THE FEDAYEEN.

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8. RIFAI ATTRIBUTES NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS TO FACT SADAT IS IN MUCH STRONGER INTERNAL POSITION THAT HE WAS A YEAR AGO. NOW HE CAN APPEAR MAGNANIMOUS AND GENERATE NO INTERNAL CRITICISM. RIFAI BELIEVES SADAT TOOK STEPS ON HIS OWN INITIATIVE AND NOT AS RESULT OF ANY PUSH FROM FEISAL. ON CONTRARY, HE SAYS, FEISAL PREFERS AN ISOLATED JORDAN AS A SORT OF VASSAL STATE, SIMILAR TO WHAT IT WANTS TO CREATE IN YEMEN. SADAT CAN USE NEW RELATIONSHIP WITH JORDAN AS ONE MORE MEANS BY WHICH TO AVOID WAR. NOW HE CAN SAY THAT NEW DISCUSSIONS MUST PRECEDE ACTIONS. SADAT HAS ALSO TAKEN HIS DISTANCE FROM QADDAFI AND OTHER EXTREMISTS SHOUTING "FIGHT" FROM THEIR SAFE CORNERS. HE HAS ALSO REASSUMED LEADERSHIP ROLE IN ARAB WORLD AS HE CAN SAY IT IS UP TO "CONFRONTATION STATES" TO MAKE DECISIONS, NOT MONEY-LENDERS.

9. SADAT AND ASAD WERE BITTERLY CRITICAL OF SOVIETS, FAR MORE THAN OF US. THEY SAY THEY HAVE BEEN SOLD OUT BY KREMLIN. SADAT SAID SOVIETS NO LONGER A MAJOR FACTOR IN ME BECAUSE "KISSINGER HAS THEN IN HS BAKC POCKET."

10. RIFAI SAYS IT HAS OPINION THAT SADAT IS READY FOR ANY KIND OF SOLUTION, AS LONG AS IT DOES NOT INVOLVE A SQUARE INCH OF TERRITORY: LEASES, UN TROOPS, ANY OTHER SORT OF FOREIGN MILITARY PRESENCE, DEMILITARIZATION, ALL ARE POSSIBLE BUT NOT FORMAL SURRENDER OF LAND. HE THINKS SADAT CAN MAKE HIS POINTS TO US DIRECTLY BUT THAT HE EXPECTS TO USE JORDAN TO GET ACROSS SOME OF HIS HOPES AND FEARS. RIFAI NATURALLY WANT ON FROM HERE TO SAY THAT IT VITAL FOR USG TO COME UP WITH SOMETHING IN NEXT SIX MONTHS; NO ONE ELSE CAN DO THE JOB.

11. DEPARTMENT MAY WISH PASS THIS ON OTHER POSTS CONCERNED.

BROWN

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

CONTROL: 0602Q
RECD: 5 SEP 73 3AM

'73 SEP 5 AM 11:15
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

R 050611Z SEP 73 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9352
BT
S E C R E T AMMAN 4734

NODIS

DEPARTMENT PASS CAIRO

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, JO, EG, SY
SUBJECT: TRIPARTITE SUMMIT

REF: AMMAN 4705

1. KING CONFIRMED HIS ATTENDANCE SEPTEMBER 10 CAIRO MEETING WITH SADAT AND ASAD. HE IS CONCERNED (QUITE NATURALLY) ABOUT SECURITY AND IS SENDING AN ADVANCE TEAM IMMEDIATELY TO CAIRO.

2. SAYS ALL HE WILL DO IS REITERATE WELL-KNOWN JORDANIAN POSITIONS. HE HAS NO GIVE ON SUBJECT OF FEDAYEEN RETURN.
BROWN

NOTE: NOT PASSED BY OC/T.

SECRET

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NODIS NODIS NODIS

WN 8

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

R 040800Z SEP 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9343
BT
S E C R E T AMMAN 4705

0 3 0 3 Q
4 SEP 73 Z10 13

NODIS

DEPARTMENT PASS CAIRO

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS:PFOR, JO, EG, SY
SUBJ: TRIPARTITE SUMMIT

1. PM RIFAI RECEIVED PHONE CALL FROM PRESIDENT ASAD LAST NIGHT CONCERNING TRIPARTITE (JORDAN, SYRIA, EGYPT) SUMMIT. ASAD SUGGESTED SEPTEMBER 10 IN CAIRO. THIS IS DAY AFTER NONALIGNED ADJOURNMENT. RIFAI ACCEPTED. ASAD HAD PREVIOUSLY CLEARED DATE AND LOCALE WITH SADAT.

2. RIFAI SAID HE PREPARING VERY EXPLICIT POSITION PAPER SO THAT FULL JORDANIAN DELEGATION WILL SPEAK WITH ONE VOICE.

3. RIFAI EXPECTS FULL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WILL AUOMATICALLY FOLLOW CAIRO MEETING. THEREAFTER, HE WILL CONCENTRATE ON KUWAIT MONEY.

BROWN

NOTE: NOT PASSED CAIRO BY OC/T.

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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT

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WH 10

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET '73 JUN 19 AM 11:13

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

P 190905Z JUN 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8699
BT
S E C R E T AMMAN 3244

CN: 5152Q
REC'D: JUNE 19, 1973
7:06 A.M.

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, JO
SUBJECT: JORDANIAN AIRCRAFT TRANSFER

REF: AMMAN 2883

1. KING HAS NOT BROUGHT UP SUBJECT WITH ME AGAIN. AND WISELY SO. CHIEF OF STAFF INFORMED DATT TODAY THAT "OFFER HAS BEEN WITHDRAWN."

2. OSTENSIBLE PURCHASER IS SOUTH AFRICAN FIRM BUT PROBABLY RECIPIENT IS RHODESIA. JORDANIANS WANT NO PART OF SUCH A DEAL AND ARE EMBARRASSED ABOUT WHOLE THING.

3. I HAVE LET IT BE KNOWN THAT WE CANNOT PLAY THIS GAME AND THAT JORDAN SHOULD CUT OFF INTERMEDIARY.

4. THIS CABLE CLASSIFIED NODIS IN HOPES THAT INFO HEREIN WILL BE CLOSELY HELD AND NOT GET TO PRESS.

BROWN

BT
#3244

SECRET

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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT

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10

NODIS NODIS NODIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

R 130810Z MAY 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8406
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 2566

CONTROL: 3471Q
RECVD: 13 MAY 73
5:44AM

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: BTRA, JO
SUBJECT: AMERICAN BANK IN JORDAN

REF: AMMAN 2565

1. ALTHOUGH GOVERNOR SALEM HAD PROPOSED BANK OF JORDAN DEAL TO UNDP'S ELLIS SOME WEEKS AGO (REFTEL) AND PAVED WAY FOR ELLIS DISCUSSIONS WITH BOFJ, NEW ANGLE EMERGED ON SALEM'S INTEREST 10 DAYS AGO. AT THAT TIME, MAMDOUR ABU HASSAN (MEMBER OF PROMINENT BUSINESS FAMILY, CONFIDANT OF SALEM, AND MEMBER OF CENTRAL BANK BOARD) APPROACHED ELLIS IN CONFIDENCE WITH FOLLOWING. ACCORDING TO ABU HASSAN, SALEM WOULD BE INTERESTED IN BECOMING CHAIRMAN OF BOFJ IN EVENT OF AMERICAN TAKEOVER (AND THEREFORE PRESUMABLY IS CONSIDERING LEAVING CENTRAL BANK). ELLIS EXPRESSED FAVORABLE INTEREST AND, A DAY LATER, ABU HASSAN AGAIN CONTACTED ELLIS TO SAY HE HAD TALKED AGAIN WITH SALEM AND SALEM DEFINITELY AVAILABLE.

2. ELLIS HAS HAD NO DIRECT APPROACH FROM SALEM ON SUBJECT SALEM PARTICIPATION (ALTHOUGH HE HAS, SINCE ABOVE CONVERSATIONS, TALKED WITH SALEM ON BASIC SUBJECT OF TAKEOVER). BOTH HE AND WE FEEL, HOWEVER, THAT ABU HASSAN SO CLOSE TO SALEM THAT HIS ASSERTIONS MUST HAVE SOME GROUNDS. ABU HASSAN HAS NOT INDICATED ANY SALEM INTEREST IN STOCK BUT SAYS SALEM WOULD UNDERTAKE TOGET JIDDA AND ABU DHABI BRANCHES FOR BOFJ. SALEM CONTACTS IN SAUDI ARABIA AND BULF OBVIOUSLY WOULD BE OF CONSIDERABLE VALUE.

3. IT IS PRETTY HARD TO PREDICT AS OF NOW WHAT SALEM MAY BE PLANNING. IF ABU HASSAN CORRECT, HOWEVER, SALEM MAY BE SEEING PARLOUS DAYS AHEAD IN TRYING TO MAINTAIN SOLVENCY FOR GOJ AND INTEGRITY OF CB'S F/X RESERVES--HIS TWO KEY

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CONFIDENTIAL

NODIS NODIS NODIS

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

GOALS AS CB GOVERNOR. HE IS MOST IMPORTANT ECONOMIC-FINANCIAL FIGURE IN GOJ, ALMOST ONLY ONE WITH REAL INFLUENCE ON PALACE. HIS INFLUENCE HAS RESTED, HOWEVER, ON HIS ABILITY TO JUGGLE ACCOUNTS AND FUNDS TO UNDERWRITE HM'S AND GOJ'S EVER-RISING SPENDING APPETITE AND HIS SUCCESS IN MANAGING THE DINAR. IF HE CAN NO LONGER DO SO, HIS INFLUENCE WILL DROP AND HE MAY FEEL NOW IS TIME TO GET OUT.

BROWN

BT
#2566

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NODIS NODIS NODIS

12

Department of State

'73 APR 21 PM 3:19

TELEGRAM

SECRET

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

R 211250Z APR 73 6807Q
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8210 21 APRIL 10 11 AM
BT
S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 AMMAN 2140

NODIS

DEPT PASS JIDDA, KUWAIT, TEHRAN, LONDON, MOSCOW

E.O. 11652: XGDS3
TAGS: PFOR, JO, US, XF
SUBJ: RATIONALIZING JORDAN'S ROLE IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA

1. SUMMARY: JORDAN IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY INVOLVED IN GULF AND PENINSULA. IN VIEW OF UPCOMING WASHINGTON VISITS BY SHAH AND KHAMMASH AS WELL AS LESS-THAN-ENCOURAGING AREA DEVELOPMENTS, WE BELIEVE IT IS TIME TO GIVE MORE THAN A GENERALIZED BLESSING TO JORDAN'S EFFORTS. END SUMMARY

2. SPECTACLE OF KUWAIT SEARCHING AT ELEVENTH HOUR FOR INSTANT AIR FORCE, DUBIOUS SAUDI EFFECTIVENESS IN DEALING WITH PROBLEMS ON SEVERAL BORDERS, TROUBLESOME DHOFAR SITUATION AND OTHER LESS-THAN-ENCOURAGING AREA DEVELOPMENTS POINT TO NEED FOR CONTINUING UPDATE OF US REGIONAL STRATEGY. RECOGNIZING JORDAN'S PERIPHERAL ROLE IN PENINSULA AND GULF, WE NEVERTHELESS BELIEVE THIS IS ELEMENT IN EQUATION THAT CANNOT BE OVERLOOKED. QUESTION OF JORDAN INVOLVEMENT HAS CROPPED UP IN KUWAIT CRISIS, DHOFAR WAR, MEDIATION OF REGIONAL DISPUTES, MODERNIZATION OF YEMEN ARMY, AND OTHER NEIGHBORHOOD ISSUES. HUSSEIN OBVIOUSLY EAGER TO EXPAND JORDANIAN PRESENCE AND IS LOOKING FOR DEFINITIVE FAVORABLE SIGNALS FROM USG.

3. WHAT ARE THE PRESENT REALITIES?
A) HUSSEIN CLEARLY DESIRES A MORE ACTIVE ROLE IN GULF AND PENINSULA AND BELIEVES THE USG SUPPORTS THIS ROLE.
B) GOJ HAS SECONDED CIVILIAN AND MILITARY ADVISORS TO GULF STATES. POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT THERE IS SENSITIVE BECAUSE SOME ADVISORS PERFORM "SPECIAL BRANCH" FUNCTIONS WHICH CAN LEAD TO PROBLEMS WITH BRITISH.
C) SECONDED JORDANIAN OFFICERS PERFORM IMPORTANT TRAINING ROLE IN OMAN. HUSSEIN HAS SERIOUSLY CONSIDERED HIGHER-PROFILE COMBAT COMMITMENT SEVERAL TIMES DURING PAST YEAR.
D) HUSSEIN, THROUGH PERSON OF KHAYYASH, HAS CONDUCTED ACTIVE

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MEDIATION IN AREA. KHAMMASH HAS SHUTTLED BETWEEN FAYSAL/SHAH, SHAH/ZAYYID, FAYSAL/ZAYYID, ZAYYID/QABOOS, AND FAYSAL/QABOOS. SAUDI-ABU DHABI MEDIATION HAS FALTERED BY UAE-OMAN RELATIONS MAY HAVE IMPROVED AS RESULT.

E) YAR PRESIDENT IRYANI HAS MENTIONED JORDAN AS POSSIBLE SOURCE OF EXPERTISE FOR ARMY MODERNIZATION.

F) GOJ OPENING EMBASSY IN SANAA, PRESUMABLY WITH MORE IN MIND THAN RITUALISTIC DIPLOMACY. ALIA AIRLINE STARTING YEMEN SERVICE.

H) SAUDIS UNDERWRITING SUBSTANTIAL PORTION OF JORDAN BUDGET; THEY WANT OUR APPROVAL OF WHAT THEY DO IN GULF AND KEEP US FULLY INFORMED.

G) EFFICIENT UTILIZATION OF JORDANIANS COULD SERVE TO SIGNAL SOVIETS AND CHINESE THAT US AND AREA ALLIES ARE DETERMINED TO RESIST SUBVERSION.

H) DESPITE DISADVANTAGES OF ADDING A NEW ELEMENT IN ALREADY COMPLEX POLITICAL EQUATION, SHORTAGE OF CIVILIAN AND MILITARY EXPERTS IN PENINSULA REPRESENTS MANPOWER VACUUM WHICH BOUND TO BE FILLED BY SOMEONE, E.G., PAKISTANIS, IRANIANS, LEBANESE, PALESTINIANS, ETC. JORDANIANS AT LEAST CAN BE MORE CAREFULLY SCREENED BY "IMPORTING" REGIMES. SHAH, WHO GETS ALONG WELL WITH HUSSEIN, PROBABLY WOULD PREFER TO SEE JORDANIANS FILLING JOB VACANCIES; CONCEIVALBE RESULT IS THAT GREATER JORDAN INVOLVEMENT WOULD ACT AS CATALYST IN EXPANDING FAVORABLE INTERACTION BETWEEN IRAN AND PENINSULA REGIMES.

I) SAUDI PERFORMANCE IN DEALING WITHNEIGHBORING STATES LESS THAN IDEAL. FOR EXAMPLE, CONFRONTATION WITH IMPOVERISHED AND BASICALLY WEAK PDRY BADLY HANDLED; OMAN AID POLICY EQUIVOCAL INF FACE OF REAL DLF THREAT; RELATIONS WITH ABU DHABI/UAE HAMSTRUNG BY FAYSAL-ZAYYID DIFFERENCES; YEMEN RELATIONS TAINTED BY HEAVY-HANDEDNESS OF SAG AMBASSADOR AND BLATANT TRIBAL SUBSIDIES; SAG UNABLE OR UNWILLING TO CALL IRAQ'S BORDER BLUFF. UTILIZATION OF MORE SAUDI-PAID JORDANIAN CIVILIAN AND MILITARY EXPERTS IN FRIENDLY NEIGHBORING STATES COULD GIVE SAG BETTER GRIP ON REGIONAL AFFAIRS. ALTERNATIVELY, BANKROLLING BY HOWEVER, SAG ATTITUDE TOWARD RECIPROCAL JORDANIAN SERVICES IN PENINSULA APPEARS CAUTIOUS IF NOT DIFFIDENT.

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4. FROM THE FOREGOING IT IS APPARENT THAT JORDAN ALREADY "INVOLVED," WE THINK US INTERESTS ARE SERVED BY JORDAN'S INVOLVEMENT BUT THE FOLLOWING ARE POTENTIAL PROBLEMS:
A) HUSSEIN MAY SEEK MORE US FUNDS AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO SUPPORT ACTIVITIES.
B) JAA INVOLVEMENT IN ARMS BUSINESS COULD COMPLICATE OUR MAP AND FMS PROGRAMS. RECENT FLAP INVOLVING JAF 106'S FOR ABU DHABI IS CASE IN POINT.
C) EXCESSIVE JORDANIAN ZEAL (OR SUCCESS) COULD TRIGGER SAUDI JEALOUSY. SAUDIS COULD BECOME ESPECIALLY IRKED BY JORDANIAN OPERATIONS IF FUNDED BY SUCH RIVALS AS KUWAIT, IRAN, OR UAE.
D) INCREASINGLY ACTIVE JORDAN ORLE WOULD UNDERSCORE REGIME'S "AGENT" STATUS IN RADICAL ARAB EYES.
E. BOLSTERING JORDANIAN ROLE COULD PROMPT IRAQ (WITH OR WITHOUT SOVIET BACKING) TO SHIFT FROM CLANDESTINE TO MORE FREQUENT OVERT INTERVENTION IN GULF.
F) US LEVERAGE WITH GOJ HAS LIMITS. INDEPENDENT, IMPULSIVE JORDANIAN MOVES COULD INTERFERE WITH US POLICY OBJECTIVES.

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8211
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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 AMMAN 2140

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5. OFFSETTING FOREGOING NEGATIVE FACTORS ARE A NUMBER OF POSITIVE ONES:
A) JORDAN REPRESENTS ONE OF FEW SOURCES FOR POLITICALLY RELIABLE, TECHNICALLY-QUALIFIED ADVISORS HAVING NATIVE COMPETENCE IN ARABIC AND TOLERATION FOR ADVERSE WORKING CONDITIONS IN AREA. JORDAN HAS SURPLUS OF EXPERTS; "BRAIN DRAIN" THEREFORE NOT INVOLVED.
B) LINKED IWTH (A) IS FACT THAT SAUDIS AND OIL-RICH GULF SHAIKHDOMS LACK NECESSARY NUMBERS OF ADEQUATELY TRAINED (AND MOTIVATED) EXPERTS TO FILL TECHNICAL POSITIONS BOTH RPT BOTH IN THEIR OWN BUREAUCRACIES AND THOSE OF THEIR CLIENTS, E.G., YEMEN AND POORER SHAIKHDOMS WITHIN UAE. SWAPPING EXPERTS FOR HARD CURRENCY SALARIES INVOLVES BEST POSSIBLE UTILIZATION OF RESPECTIVE RESOURCES.
C) MORE EFFICIENT USE OF JORDAN'S SURPLUS "BRAINPOWER" ON PAYROLL OF OIL-RICH NEIGHBORS WOULD INCREASE FLOW OF REMITTANCES TO JORDAN. THIS WOULD STIMULATE ECONOMY (CF. GOALS OF THREE-YEAR PLAN) AND, EVEN MORE IMPORTANT, HELP BRIDGE WIDENING BUDGETARY DEFICIT.
D) JAA COULD SERVE USEFUL INTERMEDIARY FOR SUPPLY OF US WEAPONS AND AMMO IN CERTAIN "DELICATE" SITUATIONS. DESPITE LOFTY PRINCIPLES BEHIND OUR GULF WEAPONS POLICY, BALD TRUTH IS THAT SHAIKHS WITH MONEY WILL BUY ARMS WHERE THEY CAN GET THEM. BRITISH SALES EFFORTS COULD BE VERY DETRIMENTAL TO US INTERESTS IN AREA, NOTWITHSTANDING POLITE LANGUAGE WHICH HAS BEEN APPLIED TO PARTIALLY INCOMPATIBLE US AND UK ROLES.
E) INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF JORDANIAN CIVILIAN AND MILITARY ROLES IN PENINSULA UNDER SAUDI OR OTHER FRIENDLY PATRONAGE COULD HELP TO STENGTHEN COOPERATION THAT WE CLAIM TO BE SEEKING AMONG MODERATES.
F) (SEE 4F ABOVE) KING AND GOJ FIRMLY FOLLOW PRO-US LINE. OTHERS, E.G., UAE (OR KUWAIT UNDER IMPROVED BI-LATERAL CIRCUM-STANCES) WOULD RAISE SAG HACKLES BUT COMPETITIVE CHALLENGE MIGHT PROVE BENEFICIAL.

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-2- AMMAN 2140 SECTION TWO OF TWO

J) HUSSEIN BUILDING WHAT MAY BECOME TOP-HEAVY MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT. INCREASING SECONDMENTS IN PENINSULA WOULD SERVE MULTIPLE PURPOSE OF BENEFITTING RECIPIENT ARMED FORCES, KEEPING JAF CONSTRUCTIVELY BUSY, PROVIDING GREATER RATIONALE FOR SIZE, AND RECOUPING SOME OF COSTS.
K) RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, E.G., SAG REQUEST FOR USMTM EXPERTS FOR YEMEN SURVEY AND QABOOS' REQUEST FOR US INTERVENTION IN DHOFAR IF PDRY ESCALATES, SUGGEST THAT PRESSURES FOR HIGHER US PROFILE WILL INCREASE. IF WE HAVE TO MAKE CHOICE BETWEEN BIGGER AMERICAN OR JORDANIAN ROLES, LATTER WOULD BE MORE PALATALBE.

6. ON BALANCE, WE FAVOR INCREASED ROLE IN GULF FOR JORDAN BUT ONE WHICH IS WELL COORDINATED WITH US AS WELL AS BRITISH, SAUDIS AND IRANIANS. BELIEVE NOW IS TIME TO GIVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO FOREGOING IN VIEW OF UPCOMING VISITS OF SHAH AND KHAMMASH.

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Department of State

'73 MAR 2 PM 12:16

TELEGRAM

O 021315Z MAR 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7731
BT
S E C R E T AMMAN 1063

CONTROL: 4 8 7 Q
MARCH 2, 1973
8:26 AM

'73 MAR 2 PM 12:16

NODIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS1
TAGS: PINS, SU
SUBJECT: TERRORIST ATTACK AT SAUDI ARABIAN EMBASSY KHARTOUM INVOLVING US AMBASSADOR

REF: STATE 38557

1. KING HAS MADE NO STATEMENT THAT I KNOW OF. HE IS IN FEZ AT THIS MOMENT ABOUT TO LEAVE FOR TORREJON, REFUEL, AND RETURN HERE, PROBABLY BY LONG ROUTE.

2. CP TRIED TO REACH HIM ALL MORNING BY PHONE IN FEZ BUT HAD PROBLEMS.

3. IN ABSENCE OF KING ALL MY CONTACTS ARE IN CP. WE CAN BE SURE, HOWEVER, THAT KING WILL BACK UP HIS BROTHER'S ACTIONS.

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

WH /0

CONTROL: 6900Q
RECD: 22 FEB 11 48Z

R 221056Z FEB 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7687
BT
S E C R E T AMMAN 0917

NODIS

SUBJ: JORDAN DINAR VALUATION

1. FOLLOWING IS FROM CENTRAL BANK GOVERNOR SALEM ON PRIVILEGED AND SENSITIVE BASIS RE PRESENT AND FUTURE POLICY ON DINAR VALUATION. SALEM DID NOT RESIST CABINET DECISION TO MAINTAIN VALUE OF DINAR BECAUSE OF STRONG PRESSURES IN CABINET ON POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ARGUMENTS (MOSTLY RELUCTANCE OF IMINISTERS TO FACE CRITICISM FOR HIGHER PRICES AND INFLATION). HOWEVER HE HAS MAINTAINED PRACTICAL CONTROL OVER DINAR FOR PRESENT. NO PAR VALUE HAS BEEN SET FOR DINAR. INSTEAD, SALEM HAS ESTABLISHED INFORMAL UNDERSTANDING WITH LOCAL BANKERS UNDER WHICH ONLY MOST LIMITED FOREIGN EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS PERMITTED UNTIL MONEY MARKETS STABILIZE. HE IS ALSO MANAGING F/X SALES TO PRECLUDE ARBITRAGE. HE IS MANAGING F/X SALES ON DAY-TO-DAY BASIS, USING DAILY MARKET QUOTATIONS AND TRYING TO RELEASE CURRENCIES SELECTIVELY TO CHARGE HIGHEST DINAR PRICE FOR THEM AS MARKET FLUCTUATES. THROUGH THESE MEASURES HE IS, IN EFFECT, FLOATING THE DINAR AND MINIMIZING F/X IMPACT.

2. WHILE RELUCTANT TO DISCUSS, HE INDICATED FOLLOWING AS COURSE HE TENTATIVELY HOPES TO FOLLOW AT PROPITIOUS MOMENT AFTER MONEY MARKET SETTLES DOWN. HE WILL SET DINAR CENTRAL RATE IN TERMS OF SDR UNITS SO THAT DINAR EQUALS 3 US DOLLARS BUT, BY TAKING ADVANTAGE OF 2 1/4 PERCENT PERMISSIBLE FLUCTUATION (PLUS AN "IMF FLUCTUATION" TO WHICH HE REFERS BUT OF WHICH WE UNAWARE), KEEP DINAR ON THE BOTTOM LIMIT, THUS ACHIEVING (SALEM CLAIMS) EFFECTIVE DEVALUATION OF AS MUCH AS 8 PERCENT AGAINST DOLLAR. HE BELIEVES HE CAN GET CABINET APPROVAL AND, BY A LITTLE BLACK MAGIC, MINIMIZE PUBLIC AWARENESS AND REACTION TO THE PRACTICAL EFFECT OF THIS STEP.

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3. COMMENT: SALEM OBVIOUSLY WANTED TO DEVALUE AND IS DETERMINED TO GET PRACTICAL EFFECT OF DOING SO IN NEAR FUTURE BUT FINESSING THE RELATED POLITICAL PROBLEMS. HE CLEARLY WANTS BENEFITS OF DEVALUATION, ESPECIALLY INHIBITION OF IMPORTS, AND DOES NOT BELIEVE DINAR CAN BE MAINTAINED AT RATE SUBSTANTIALLY ABOVE DOLLAR. XGDS-1.

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O 021015Z FEB 73 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7556
BT
S E C R E T AMMAN 0612

CONTROL: 0 5 4 4 Q
RECD: 2 FEBRUARY 73 - 5 58 AM

NODIS

SUBJ: 106S FOR ABU DHABI

REF: AMMAN 0611

DPEARTMENT REPEAT AS DESIRED

1. I AM PUZZLED BY JORDANIAN HANDLING OF 106 CASE RECENT DAYS. THEY HAVE MADE NO APPARENT EFFORT TO CONCEAL FACT THAT THEY ARE TRANSFERRING EQUIPMENT TO ABU DHABI. THEY ALREADY HAD FIRST C119 FOIGHT LOADED AND IN ORIGINAL REQUEST FOR USAF CREW ON C130 MISSION MADE NO ATTEMPT CONCEAL PURPOSE OF FLIGHT. INCLINED TO BELIEVE THAT EVEN USE OF USAF CREW CONTRARY TO OUR INSTRUCTION WAS MISUNDERSTANDING, SINCE THEY WERE QUITE OPEN IN TELLING US (AFTER THE FACT) AND COULD HAVE HAD NO INCENTIVE TO FURTHER EXACERBATE SITUATION (IF THEY REALIZED 106 PROJECT ITSELF CONTROVERSIAL.)

2. ENTIRE AFFAIR HAS BEEN HANDLED BY COL QANDA (RJAF DIRECTOR/OPS) AND BETWEEN HIM DATT/MAP, WITH NO DIRECT EMBASSY CONTACT. COL KNIGHT'S CONTACT ON ACTUAL MISSION WAS QANDA'S DEPUTY, MAJOR HUSSEIN (HM'S MILITARY PILOT) WHO WENT ALONG.

3. I UNDERSTAND PRINCE SULTAN GAVE ORAL SAUDI CLEARANCE ON 106 DEAL DURING HIS RECENT VISIT HERE (REPORTED OTHER CHANNELS) AND JORDANIANS KNOW ABU DHABI HAS BEEN APPROVED FOR FMS. AMER KHAMMASH REPORTEDLY IN ABU DHABI YESTERDAY. AL THIS SUGGEST PLANNED AND SCHEDULED OPERATION JORDANIANS CONCEIVABLY BELIEVE THAT PRIOR ISSUES RAISED BY USG HAVE BEEN RESOLVED AND HAVE NOTHING TO HADE. ON THE OTHER HAND, QANDA (WHO HANDLED ALL DEALINGS WITH US) MAY NOT HAVE REALIZED HE WAS BLOWING A SENSITIVE OPERATION WHEN HE REQUESTED USAF CREW AND REVEALED NATURE OF OPERATION. I WILL WELCOME WASHINGTON LIGHT ON THIS MURKY AFFAIR.

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

73 JAN 31 PM 1:03

SECRET

O 311501Z JAN 73 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7538
BT
S E C R E T AMMAN 0591

CONTROL: 8 7 9 4 Q
RECD: 31 JAN 73Z 15 18

NODIS

DEPT PASS TO USINT CAIRO

SUBJECT: SADAT-ABU ZAID MEETING

1. ZAID RIFAI EXPRESSES SATISFACTION WITH MEETING BETWEEN SADAT AND JORDAN FOREIGN MINISTER ABU ZAID DURING CAIRO CONFERENCE THOUGH NOTHING TANGIBLE APPARENTLY EMERGED. ATMOSPHERE WAS CORDIAL BUT SADAT HAD ESSENTIALLY NOTHING NEW TO SAY. HM CONSIDERS MEETING A USEFUL STEP IN DEVELOPING JORDAN-ISRAEL DIALOGUE BUT NOTHING SPECIFIC ON RESUMPTION OF RELATIONS ACCOMPLISHED. NO PRESENT LIKELINOOD OF A HUSSEIN VISIT TO CAIRO, CERTAINLY NOT BEFORE WASHINGTON TRIP.

2. SADAT SHOWED CONSIDERABLE INTEREST IN HM'S PROPSECTIVE MEETINGS IN WASHINGTON, EXPOUNDED HIS POSITION AT COSIDERABLE BUT TOTALLY FAMILIAR LENGTH. ACCORDING TO ZAID, HE SHOWED NO INCLINATION TO USE HM TO PASS A MESSAGE OR COMMISSION HM TO SPEAK FOR EGYPT. SADAT'S PRIMARY EMPHASIS WAS ON HIS WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER A PARTIAL SETTLEMENT ONLY IN CONTEXT OF WHAT HE INSISTS WAS HIS ORIGINAL PROPOSAL, IE TIED TO A FIRM ISRAELI COMMITMENT TO TOTAL WITHDRAWAL.

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TELEGRAM

R 301045Z JAN 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7518
BT
S E C R E T AMMAN 0550

8302Q
Jan. 30, 1973
8:11 AM

NODIS

SUBJ: JORDAN-ISRAEL PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

1. VISITING NEWSWEEK TEAM SEVERAL DAYS AGO ASKED ZAID RIFAI ABOUT TERENCE SMITH NY TIMES STORY (BASED ON HAARETZ STORY) OF LEAKED ISRAELI CABINET MEMO ALLEGING FEELERS FROM KING HUSSEIN ON COMPROMISE JERUSALEM FORMULA. RIFAI ASSERTED HE HAD CHECKED SMITH'S CONTACT IN AMMAN (DURING SMITH VISIT HERE JUST BEFORE STORY PUBLISHED) AND THAT SMITH HAD NO HIGH LEVEL TALKS AND NO ONE HAD GIVEN HIM ANY INFORMATION AS BASIS FOR STORY. RIFAI DECLARED (AND NEWSWEEK GROUP AGREES) THAT SMITH ALREADY HAD HIS STORY WHEN HE CAME AMMAN AND GOT NO CORROBORATION HERE.

2. RIFAI BY IMPLICATION DENIED STORY HAD ANY BASIS IN FACT. HOWEVER ANOTHER PALACE OFFICIAL, AFTER READING NY TIMES STORY, COMMENTED THAT HE SAW "NO IMPORTANT INACCURACY" IN IT.

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TELEGRAM

O 091050Z JAN 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7335
BT
S E C R E T AMMAN 0131

CN: 1827Q
REC'D: JANUARY 9, 1973
6:10 A.M.

73 JAN 1 PM 3 43

NODIS

SUBJ: KING'S LETTER TO PRESIDENT ON MILITARY ASSISTANCE

REF: AMMAN 101 AND 111 (MAP 0029)

1. RIFAI SAYS GOJ IN STATE OF SHOCK AS RESULT OF DATT'S PRESENTATION YESTERDAY TO JAA OF FY-73 PROGRAM. GOJ UNABLE TO CONSIDER EITHER OF OPTIONS PROPOSED IN AMMAN 111 UNTIL KING RECEIVES REPLY FROM PRESIDENT. HE BELIEVES THAT PRESIDENT CAN REVERSE DECISION WHICH LED TO A CUT IN FUNDS AVAILABLE FOR JORDAN PROGRAM AND NOT ONLY RESTORE ALL ITEMS TO FY-73 PROGRAM BUT EXPEDITE DELIVERIES. HE ALSO SAYS KING IS SO UPSET THAT HE IS CONSIDERING ANOTHER MORE PERSONAL LETTER TO PRESIDENT.

2. BRIEFING WE GAVE JAA YESTERDAY WAS A REAL DASH OF COLD WATER. COUPLED IN TIME WITH JORDANIAN DISSATISFACTION WITH VISIT SCHEDULE IT MAKES SITUATION RATHER EXPLOSIVE. I THINK IT WOULD BE WISE TO DEFUSE IT A BIT. I WOULD LIKE TO BE AUTHORIZED TO INFORM JORDANIANS THAT WE HAVE A LARGE ($40 MILLION) GRANT-AID MILITARY PROGRAM IN MIND WHICH WILL BE PART OF FY-74 REQUEST TO CONGRESS. I WOULD LIKE, IN OTHER WORDS, TO GIVE THEM FIGURES THAT GO WITH ITEMS LISTED IN PART II OF PARA 2 OF AMMAN 111. THIS ACTION WILL REASSURE JORDANIANS THAT WE HAVE COME UP WITH ITEMS AGREED TO IN THREE-YEAR PROGRAM AS WELL AS A LARGE COMPONENT OF O AND M IN VITAL AREAS.

3. IT WOULD BE MOST USEFUL IF I COULD SAY THAT, SUBJECT TO CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORIZATION, WE PLAN TO CONTINUE SUBSTANTIAL MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO JORDAN IN FY-75 AND SUBSEQUENT YEARS, INCLUDING A LARGE MEASURE OF O AND M SUPPORT WHICH WILL BE OF DIRECT BENEFIT TO CONTINUING BUDGET PROBLEM JORDAN FACES. THIS IS SOMETHING

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JORDANIANS DO NOT KNOW BUT ABOUT WHICH THEY NATURALLY HAVE HOPES. I REALIZE THAT THIS IS DIFFICULT FOR DEPARTMENT TO AUTHORIZE BUT I HOPE WISDOM OF SUGGESTION IS UNDERSTOOD.

4. I BELIEVE I SHOULD GET AUTHORIZATION FOR PARA 2 (AND HOPEFULLY PARA 3) QUITE QUICKLY. WHAT WE DO NOT WANT RIFAI AND OTHERS TO THINK IS THAT BY THEIR COMPLAINTS THEY HAVE PANICKED USG INTO TOTAL RECONSIDERATION OF ITS PLANS. THAT IS WHAT THEY WILL BELIEVE IF TIME GOES BY AND THEN WE TELL THEM WHAT WE PLAN TO DO. I AM NOT AN ALARMIST BUT BELIEVE THAT WE HAVE TO COOL THINGS A BIT. KING'S FEELINGS THESE DAYS ARE VERY TENDER. HE HAS GONE THROUGH RATHER TRAUMATIC SITUATION WITH HIS HASTY MARRIAGE. WE DO NOT WANT HIM TO GET NOTION US IS LETTING HIM DOWN. HE IS AN IMPULSIVE MAN WHO HAS LET HIS EMOTIONS GET BETTER OF HIS JUDGMENT IN PAST. UNFORTUNATELY, HE TURNS TO RIFAI FOR ADVICE ON HOW TO DEAL WITH USG AND RIFAI BELIEVES THIS BLUDGEON IS THE BEST WEAPON. XGDS-1.

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BT
#0131

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

CONTROL: 1 7 9 7 Q

RECD: 9 JANUARY 73
5 00 AM

P 090838Z JAN 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7332
BT
S E C R E T AMMAN 0119

NODIS

SUBJECT: KING HUSSEIN'S VISIT

REF: AMMAN 77 AND 101

1. RIFAI INFROMS ME THAT AMBASSSADOR MUFTI WAS INSTRUCTED TO TELL STATE DEPARTMENT THAT PROPOSED SCHEDULE WAS UNSATISFACTORY. ACCORDING TO RIFAI, MUFTI WAS TOLD BY NEA/ARN THAT SECRETARY ROGERS PLANNED DINNER FOR KING.

2. RIFAI SAID THIS IS NOT ENOUGH. KING MUST RECEIVE SAME TREATMENT AS IN PAST. FURTHERMORE, HE COULD NOT BE EMBARRASSED BY COMPARISONS WITH WHAT WILL BE DONE FOR MRS. MEIR.

3. FINALLY, SAID RIFAI IN HIS MOST ARROGANT WAY, KING MAY HAVE TO RECONSIDER WHETHER HE WILL GO TO WASHINGTON AT ALL.

4. ABOVE WAS COMBINED WITH A DENUNCIATION OF OUR MILITARY ASSISTANCE OFFER FOR FY73. THIS IS REPORTED SEPTEL. XGDS-1.

BROWN

BT

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Department of State TELEGRAM

SECRET

0 090650Z JAN 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7324
BT
S E C R E T AMMAN 0101

CN: 17880
REC'D: JANUARY 9, 1973
3:00 A.M.

AM 8:19

NODIS

SUBJ: KING'S LETTER TO PRESIDENT ON MILITARY ASSISTANCE

REF: AMMAN 76

1. NOT SURE WHY KING DECIDED JUST PRIOR TO HIS WASHINGTON TRIP TO SO EMPHASIZE HIS UNHAPPINESS WITH MILITARY ASSISTANCE, GIVEN OTHER GRAVE PROBLEMS FACING JORDAN. THE DROUGHT, THE FINANCIAL PINCH, AND NEED TO GET ON WITH VITAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM ARE FAR MORE IMPORTANT. BUT THE KING'S MAIN POLITICAL CONCERN THESE DAYS IS THE ARMY AND NATIONAL SECURITY, ALMOST TO THE EXCLUSION OF ANYTHING ELSE.

2. WHERE HE GOT HIS FACTS AND FIGURES IN HIS MESSAGE IS UNKNOWN, PROBABLY FROM SOME NEWSPAPER ARTICLE. TEXT READS AS IF IT WERE DRAFTED BY RIFAI WITH SOME HELP FROM BIN SHAKER.

3. THERE ARE PROBLEMS ON BOTH SIDES. TRUE, WE HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO MEET SOME DELIVERY DATES (LAST C-119 CAME IN SIX MONTHS AFTER PROMISED). WE HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO ORDER SOME ITEMS JORDANIANS WANT TOMORROW BECAUSE WE SIMPLY DO NOT HAVE THE MONEY. JORDANIANS HAVE BEEN TOLD HERE AND IN WASHINGTON MEETINGS, AND SHOULD UNDERSTAND PERFECTLY WELL, THAT PLANS AND DELIVERIES ARE ALWAYS CONTINGENT ON CONGRESSIONAL DECISIONS ON FUNDS; AND THAT THEY HAVE A FIRM COMMITMENT TO SPECIFIC PROGRAM AGREED ON, NOT TO A SPECIFIC FUNDING LEVEL OR TIMETABLE. WHAT WE ARE TELLING THEM NOW IS PERFECTLY CONSISTENT WITH THAT UNDERSTANDING. IT SIMPLY ADDS THE UNPLEASANT INFORMATION THAT, AS THEY HAVE BEEN REPEATEDLY WARNED MIGHT HAPPEN, CONGRESSIONAL CUTS IN FUNDS HAVE REQUIRED SOME (RELATIVELY MODEST) DEFERRAL OF DELIVERIES. NOYES' LETTERS HAVE MADE THESE POINTS PERFECTLY CLEAR. THUS THERE IS NO BASIS FOR CLAIMS IN HM'S LETTER THAT FULFILLMENT OF PROGRAM IS ITSELF IN DANGER OR THAT THEY

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WERE JUSTIFIED IN "METICULOUS PLANNING" ON SCHEDULES WE REPEATEDLY WARNED WERE SUBJECT TO DELAY. ON OTHER SIDE, JORDANIAN TOP BRASS HAVE OFTEN MISINFORMED MILITARY COMMANDERS OF AVAILABILITY DATES, SAYING THAT MATERIEL IS COMING MUCH SOONER THAN IT IS. PERHAPS MOST IMPORTANT ON JORDANIAN SIDE IS CONVICTION THAT UNWELCOME DECISIONS BY USG ARE JUST A BUREAUCRATIC PRODUCT, THAT THERE IS LITTLE USE TALKING AT LOWER LEVELS, AND, INSTEAD, QUICK AND FAVORABLE RECONSIDERATION CAN BE GAINED BY DIRECT HIGH-LEVEL APPEAL.

4. I TOLD RIFAI YESTERDAY THAT UNDER CRA CY73 MAP FOR JORDAN HAS BEEN CUT BACK CONSIDERABLY. I ALSO SAID THAT WE WOULD BE DISCUSSING ACTUAL PROGRAM AND OPTIONS OPEN TO JORDANIAN FORCES IN GREATER DETAIL WITH JAA IN NEXT FEW DAYS. THIS IS IN LINE WITH SECDEF INSTRUCTIONS. WHAT WILL DISTURB JORDANIANS WILL BE NEED TO SLIP DELIVERY DATES FOR SOME TANKS OR HELICOPTERS OR BOTH IN ORDER TO FIND MONEY TO FINANCE LONG-LEAD ITEMS OF F5E PROGRAM. THEIR UNHAPPINESS WILL PROBABLY BE MADE KNOWN IN WASHINGTON.

5. WE HAVE OPEN TO US TWO WAYS OF HANDLING KING'S LETTER. I COULD BE INSTRUCTED TO SAY--PREFERABLY BY LETTER DRAFTED IN WASHINGTON TO PREVENT FUTURE MISUNDERSTANDINGS--THAT WE UNDERSTAND KING'S CONCERNS AND DOING BEST TO MEET THEM. LETTER SHOULD THEN RECALL TO HIM FACT THAT WE HAVE ALWAYS WARNED THAT TIMING OF PROGRAM IS SUBJECT TO CONGRESSIONAL FUND LEVELS AND REASSURE HIM THAT COMMITMENT TO PROGRAM (NOT FUND LEVEL) IS STILL FIRM. ALTERNATIVELY, WE COULD SIMPLY SAY ALL THIS CAN BE DISCUSSED IN WASHINGTON.

XGDS-1.

BROWN

BT
#0101

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WH 13

Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

JAN

1869Q

9 JANUARY 9:10 AM

PM 6:20

LL Saunders

O R 091315Z JAN 73
FM USINT CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2413
INFO RUESKG/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 2322
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 2942
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1281
RUESAD/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 2912
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 1157
BT
S E C R E T CAIRO 0096

NODIS

STADIS

1. WHILE SADAT REGIME HAS SO FAR STOOD FIRM AGAINST ATTEMPTS BY SYRIANS AND LIBYANS TO INVOLVE EGYPT MILITARILY WITH ISRAEL, WE CANNOT BE CERTAIN THAT SADAT WILL NOT EVENTUALLY GIVE IN TO THIS PRESSURE. IN ADDITION TO THE URGINGS OF THEIR CAR COLLEAGUES, SADAT AND HIS REGIME COULD RATIONALIZE THE INITIATION OF HOSTILITIES WITH ISRAEL ON THE FOLLOWING GROUNDS:

(A) THE PRESENT POLITICAL-MILITARY SITUATION IS UNBEARABLE FOR EGYPT AND THEONLY WAY TO BREAK THE EXISTING DEADLOCK IS TO INITIATE HOSTILITIES THAT WILL PUT THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM BACK INTO THE FOREFRONT OF CONCERNS IN THE CHANCELLERIES OF THE BIG POWERS; AND

(B) POPULAR CONCEPTIONS OF "ARAB HONOR" WITHIN EGYPT AND IN THE ARAB WORLD MUST BE ASSUAGED BY ANOTHER ROUND OF HOSTILITIES EVEN IF VICTORY IS UNLIKELY.

2. WHILE THE EGYPTIAN REGIME NOW SEEMS MORE REALISTIC IN ITS ASSESSMENT OF THE RELATIVE MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF EGYPT AND ISRAEL, IT IS STILL POSSIBLE THAT EGYPT WILL ATTEMPT SOME FORM OF LOW-LEVEL HOSTILITIES IF THE REGIME PERCEIVES THE EXISTING STATUS QUO SITUATION AS BECOMING INCREASINGLY UNFAVORABLE FOR ITS SURVIVAL IN POWER. ON BALANCE, WE ARE INCLINED TO BELIEVE THAT SADAT WILL NOT UNDERTAKE HOSTILITIES UNLESS THE INTERNAL SITUATION DETERIORATES SHARPLY OR UNLESS HE IS PLACED UNDER NEW AND UNBEARABLE PRESSURE BY QADHAFI OR OTHER ARABS. THE MOST OBVIOUS FORM OF SUCH PRESSURE WOULD BE A WITHHOLDING OF

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NODIS NODIS NODIS

THE FINANCIAL SUBSIDIES UPON WHICH EGYPT IS NOW UTTERLY DEPENDENT. THE POSSIBILITY OF RENEWED HOSTILITIES BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL IS SUFFICIENTLY GREAT, HOWEVER, TO WARRANT SOME CONTINGENCY PLANNING ON THE PART OF THE USG.

3. IN MY VIEW, OUR POLICY AT THAT STAGE SHOULD BE GUIDED BY THE FOLLOWING CONSIDERATIONS:

(A) AN ISRAELI REPLY TO EGYPTIAN MILITARY PROVOCATION WOULD BE IN THE FORM OF AIR ATTACKS ON EGYPTIAN MILITARY TARGETS OR COMMANDO RAIDS ON EGYPTIAN-HELD TERRITORY. WE DOUBT THAT ISRAEL WOULD BE INTERESTED IN SEIZING AND HOLDING ANY SUBSTANTIAL LAND AREAS NOW UNDER EGYPTIAN CONTROL. THE ACTION WOULD THUS RESEMBLE THE RECENT FIGHTING ON THE SYPIAN BORDER AND WOULD NOT BE A REPEAT OF THE 1967 WAR.

(B) AS LONG AS THE MILITARY ACTION IS SO LIMITED, IT APPEARS FROM CAIRO THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT ALLOW ITSELF TO BE DRAWN INTO THE CONFLICT BY REBUILDING ITS MILITARY PRESENCE IN EGYPT. AT MOST, THE USSR MIGHT STEP UP THE PACE OF DELIVERIES OF SPARE PARTS AND REPLACEMENTS FOR WEAPONS NOW IN THE EGYPTIAN INVENTORIES.

(C) IN CASE OF ANOTHER ROUND OF EGYPTIAN/ISRAELI HOSTILITIES, OUR OBJECT SHOULD BE TO CONVINCE THE EGYPTIANS THAT THEY NO LONGER HAVE A FEASIBLE MILITARY OPTION.

(D) THIS LESSON COULD BEST BE DRIVEN HOME TO THE EGYPTIANS BY A REFUSAL ON OUR PART TO SHOW PUBLIC OR PRIVATE CONCERN OVER AN OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES. AS LONG AS THE RUSSIANS SHOW RESTRAINT, WE SHOULD ADOPT A HANDS-OFF ATTITUDE. THIS POSTURE WOULD HELP CONVINCE THE EGYPTIANS THAT MILITARY ACTIVITY IS NO LONGER A VIABLE MEANS OF ENGAGING THE BIG POWERS IN THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM.

(E) FAILURE TO INVOLVE THE BIG POWERS THROUGH RENEWED HOSTILITIES WOULD PROBABLY STIMULATE AN ANGRY REACTION BY EGYPT AGAINST BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION. WE COULD THEN EXPECT SOME ADDITIONAL ANTI-

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AMERICAN MOVES IN EGYPT, BUT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SUCH MOVES WOULD BE LIMITED BY THE LACK OF A SUBSTANTIAL US PRESENCE. ADDITIONAL RESTRICTIONS MIGHT BE PLACED ON THE SIZE AND ACTIVITIES OF THE USINT STAFF, AND US CULTURAL ACTIVITIES IN EGYPT MIGHT AGAIN BE PLACED UNDER OFFICIAL GOE PRESSURE. THE ONLY MAJOR AMERICAN ECONOMIC INTEREST IN EGYPT, PETROLEUM, IS OF MAJOR IMPORTANCE TO THE EGYPTIAN ECONOMY, AND WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT EGYPT WOULD DISRUPT OIL OPERATION EXCEPT IN AN EXTREME SITUATION.

4. ONCE WE HAVE PASSED THROUGH ANOTHER ROUND OF FIGHTING WITH NO INVOLVEMENT OF THE MAJOR POWERS, THE THEN EXISTING EGYPTIAN REGIME WOULD BE FACED WITH THE REALIZATION THAT ONLY TWO OPTIONS EXIST, SOME FORM OF NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT WITH ISRAEL OR A CONTINUATION OF THE STATUS QUO. PROVIDED THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL THEN SIGNALED SOME INCREASED DIPLOMATIC FLEXIBILITY ON ITS PART, THE CHANCES FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT COULD SIGNIFICANTLY IMPROVE.

5. WE WOULD APPRECIATE COMMENTS FROM EMBASSIES MOSCOW AND TEL AVIV ON OUR ASSUMPTIONS CONCERNING RUSSIAN AND ISRAELI REACTIONS TO AN OUTBREAK OF ISRAELI/EGYPTIAN HOSTILITIES.
XGDS-3
WILEY

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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

Z 280043Z OCT 73 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN FLASH 5018
BT
S E C R E T STATE 212621

CONTROL 8 2 8 2 Q
RECD 27 OCT 73
8:52 PM

NODIS

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
73 OCT 26 AM 10:16

E.O. 11652 - XGDS
TAGS: PFOR, JO
SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO THE KING FROM THE SECRETARY

1. PLEASE TRANSMIT FOLLOWING ORAL MESSAGE TO KING HUSSEIN FROM THE SECRETARY.

2. QUOTE: WE WOULD LIKE HIS MAJESTY TO KNOW THAT WE HAVE HAD A FURTHER SERIES OF INTENSIVE EXCHANGES DURING THE NIGHT AND THIS MORNING WITH THE EGYPTIANS, ISRAELIS AND SOVIETS REGARDING THE PROBLEM OF THE EGYPTIAN THIRD ARMY EAST OF THE CANAL.

3. AS A RESULT OF OUR EFFORTS, THE ISRAELIS OFFERED TO SEND A SENIOR MILITARY REPRESENTATIVE TO MEET WITH AN EGYPTIAN COUNTERPART WITH A VIEW TO WORKING OUT THE DETAILS ON HOW THE MILITARY PARTS OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 338 AND 339 CAN BE CARRIED OUT.

4. AS PART OF THE ABOVE, THE ISRAELIS HAVE INDICATED WILLINGNESS TO ALLOW ONE CONVOY THROUGH TO EGYPTIAN THIRD ARMY WITH NON-MILITARY SUPPLIES UNDER THE AUSPICES OF UNITED NATIONS AND THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS.

5. EGYPT HAS AGREED TO THE ABOVE PROPOSAL.

6. WE HAVE ALSO SOUGHT AND RECEIVED THE AGREEMENT OF BOTH ISRAEL AND EGYPT THAT THE ABOVE MEETING WILL TAKE PLACE IN THE PRESENCE OF UN REPRESENTATIVE AT MIDNIGHT CAIRO TIME TODAY, OCTOBER 27. UNQUOTE. KISSINGER
BT
DRAFTED BY NEA JJSISCO
APPROVED BY THE SECRETARY
CLEARANCES S/S MR GAMMON S/S-O MR WRIGHT

SECRET

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

Z 272241Z OCT 73 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN FLASH 5017
BT
S E C R E T STATE 212617

CONTROL: 8 2 6 2 Q
RECD: 4:49 PM

73 OCT 26 AM 10:16
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

NODIS

E.O. 11652 - GDS
TAGS: PFOR, JO
SUBJECT: MESSAGE FOR THE KING

REF: AMMAN 5726

YOU MAY TELL THE KING THAT THE ISRAELIS ACCEPT HIS WORD IN GOOD FAITH REGARDING THE MOVEMENT OF JORDANIAN ARMORED UNITS TO THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST OF JORDAN. KISSINGER
BT
#2617

DRAFTED BY: JCRAIG:HLK
10/27/73 EXT 29380
AAPROVED BY: NEA ALFRED L. ATHERTON,JR.
CLEARANCES: S MR. EAGLEBURGER(DRAFT) S/S MR GAMMON

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

8332Q

Z 281908Z OCT 73 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN FLASH 5020
BT
S E C R E T STATE 212637

28 OCTOBER 2 16 PM 73

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

OCT 26 AM 8:21

NODIS

E.O. 11652 - XGDS
TAGS: PFOR, JO
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR ARMS

REF: AMMAN 5735

1. YOU SHOULD PASS WORD BACK TO KING THAT, AS SECRETARY HAS SAID, HE IS SYMPATHETIC TO HIS MAJESTY'S NEED FOR EARLY REPLACEMENT OF BATTLE LOSSES. THIS IS BEING LOOKED AT URGENTLY BY ALL CONCERNED TO SEE WHAT CAN BE DONE AND HOW QUICKLY. WE WILL BE IN FURTHER TOUCH WITH HIS MAJESTY ON THIS JUST AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

2. FYI: WE HOPE THAT SECRETARY WILL BE IN POSITION TO GIVE KING SOME SPECIFIC ANSWERS ON HIS FORTHCOMING VISIT TO AMMAN. MEANWHILE, SECRETARY'S MESSAGE TO KING ABOUT HIS PROPOSED MIDDLE EAST VISIT, WHICH YOU WILL HAVE RECEIVED BY NOW, SHOULD HELP TIDE US OVER ON ARMS RESUPPLY QUESTION. END FYI. KISSINGER

DRAFTED BY: NEA:ALATHERTON

APPROVED BY: THE SECRETARY

CLEARANCES: S: MR. EAGLEBURGER S/S:O: MR TWOHIE

SECRET

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

Z 271918Z OCT 73 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN FLASH 5012
BT
S E C R E T STATE 212589

CONTROL 82380
RECD 27 OCT 73
5:56 PM

'73 OCT 26 AM 10:16
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

NODIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: MOPS, JO, SY
SUBJ: MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY TO KING HUSSEIN

REF: (A) AMMAN 5708. (B) AMMAN 5726

1. YOU ARE REQUESTED TO CONVEY ORALLY FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY TO KING HUSSEIN IN RESPONSE TO KING'S MESSAGES CONTAINED REFTELS:

2. QTE YOUR MAJESTY:

I APPRECIATE VERY MUCH RECEIVING YOUR LAST TWO MESSAGES CONCERNING THE STATUS OF THE JORDAN ARMY UNITS PRESENTLY IN SYRIA AND THE POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS OF THE IRAQI MILITARY PRESENCE IN SYRIA. THE SITUATION IN SYRIA IS, INDEED, DELICATE AND PRESIDENT ASAD'S ABILITY TO MAINTAIN CONTROL OF BOTH MILITARY AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IS OF THE UTMOST IMPORTANCE. ACCORDINGLY, I AGREE FULLY WITH YOUR WISE SUGGESTED COURSE OF ACTION TO RESPOND AFFIRMATIVELY TO PRESIDENT ASAD'S REQUEST THAT THE WITHDRAWAL OF YOUR FORCES IN SYRIA SHOULD BE GRADUAL AND PHASED TO HIS ABILITY TO REPLACE IN THE NEAR FUTURE JORDANIAN UNITS WITH THOSE OF SYRIA.

I ALSO AM GRATEFUL FOR YOUR CONFIDENCE IN INFORMING ME OF THE PRECAUTIONARY MOVE YOU HAVE TAKEN

AGAINST ANY POSSIBLE AND UNUSUAL IRAQI MILITARY ACTIONS. IN AN EFFORT TO AVOID ANY POSSIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING, WE HAVE INFORMED THE ISRAELIS, AT YOUR REQUEST, OF YOUR MOTIVES FOR MOVING YOUR ARMORED UNITS TO THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST OF JORDAN.

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SECRET

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

I WISH TO EXPRESS MY ADMIRATION FOR THE ESSENTIAL ROLE YOU ARE PLAYING IN INFLUENCING PRESIDENT ASAD TO ADOPT POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE POLICIES WHICH CAN ONLY ENHANCE ALL OF OUR EFFORTS TO STABILIZE THE CEASEFIRE SO THAT WE CAN PROCEED WITH THE MAJOR TASK OF SECURING A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. SINCERELY, HENRY A. KISSINGER. UNQTE. KISSINGER
BT
#2589

DRAFTED BY NEA/TF EPDJEREJIAN/HHSTACKHOUSE:CF
10/27/73 EXT 22670
APPROVED BY THE SECRETARY
CLEARANCES:
NEA MR ATHERTON S/S MR PICKERING
NEA MR SISCO S MR EAGLEBURGER

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Department of State

SECRET

TELEGRAM

'73 OCT 25 AM 11:03

CONTROL: 7086Q
RECD: 25 OCT 73 12:05AM
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

O 250203Z OCT 73 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 4997
BT
S E C R E T STATE 210442

NODIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PFOR, ME, JO
SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO KING HUSSEIN FROM SECRETARY

REF: AMMAN 5682
1. PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING TO KING FROM SECRETARY.

2. QUOTE. YOUR MAJESTY:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE CONVEYED TO ME TODAY BY AMBASSADOR BROWN. I TRULY APPRECIATE ALL THAT YOU HAVE DONE TO BRING SYRIA TO ACCEPT THE CEASEFIRE. THIS IS QUITE IMPORTANT IF WE ARE TO BE ABLE TO MAKE PROGRESS TOWARD OUR GOAL OF A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT.

I SHARE YOUR CONCERN OVER THE DELICATE SITUATION CREATED BY THE PRESENCE OF A LARGE IRAQI FORCE IN SYRIA AND THE POTENTIAL DANGER THAT THIS FORCE POSES FOR THE CEASEFIRE. I HOPE YOU WILL CONTINUE TO URGE THE SYRIANS, IN THEIR OWN INTEREST, TO HOLD STEADFASTLY TO THE CEASEFIRE AND NOT TO ALLOW THEMSELVES TO BE SWAYED BY IRAQI DEMAGOGUERY.

THE CHOICE YOU FACE IN REGARD TO LEAVING YOUR FORCES IN SYRIA, OR WITHDRAWING THEM NOW THAT THE CEASEFIRE HAS BEEN AGREED UPON, IS INDEED DIFFICULT. THIS IS OF COURSE A DECISION ONLY YOUR MAJESTY CAN MAKE. MY OWN ADVICE TO YOU, HOWEVER, IS THAT YOU SHOULD WITHDRAW YOUR UNITS FROM

SYRIA. THIS WOULD BE SUPPORTIVE OF THE CEASEFIRE CALLED FOR IN SC RESOLUTION 338 AND WOULD AVOID THE DANGER OF THEIR BEING DRAWN INTO VIOLATIONS OF THE CEASEFIRE BY THE IRAQIS OR THE SYRIANS.

SECRET

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I AM FULLY SYMPATHETIC WITH YOUR REQUEST FOR REPLACEMENT OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT YOU HAVE LOST. I HAVE ASKED OUR EXPERTS TO LOOK AT THIS ON AN URGENT BASIS AND WILL BE IN FURTHER TOUCH WITH YOU AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. SINCERELY, HENRY A. KISSINGER. UNQUOTE. KISSINGER

DRAFTED BY: NEA;DAKORN/ALATHERTON

APPROVED BY: THE SECRETARY

CLEARANCES: NEA:JJSISCO S/S:TRPICKERING

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NODIS NODIS NODIS

1H 8

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

Z 221823Z OCT 73 ZFF6 6326Q
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUESKG/AMEMBASSY AMMAN FLASH 4989
INFO RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON FLASH FLASH 8554
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 4028
RUESAD/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV NIACT IMMEDIATE 8126
BT
S E C R E T STATE 208864

NODIS
TOSEC 85

E.O. 11652 XGDS
TAGS: ME, JO, SY
SUBJ: JORDANIAN FORCE IN SYRIA

1. WE WERE ON POINT OF SENDING YOU INSTRUCTIONS TO APPROACH KING WHEN REFTEL ARRIVED, YOU MADE PRECISELY POINTS WE HAD IN MIND.

2. WE THINK IT WILL BE GOOD IDEA TO KEEP PRESSURE ON KING. IF HE FEELS IT ESSENTIAL LEAVES HIS FORCES IN PLACE, WE THINK IT WOULD BE GOOD IDEA TO SUGGEST, IF YOU CONCUR, THAT KING COULD PASS HIS ASSURANCES TO ISRAELIS THAT HIS FORCES WILL ADOPT STRICTLY DEFENSIVE POSTURE IF SYRIANS DECIDE CONTINUE FLIGHT. RUSH

DRAFTED BY:
NEA:EGY:MSTERNER:MTB

APPROVED BY:
NEA:RPDAVIES

CLEARANCES:
S/S-O:PPSARROS

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Scowcroft
Howe
McFarlane

Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

CONTROL: 58140
RECD: 20 OCT 73 1:45AM

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
OCT 20 PM 1:50

Z 200531Z OCT 73 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN FLASH 4976
BT
S E C R E T STATE 208589

NODIS/CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR, JO
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S MESSAGE FOR KING HUSSEIN
REF; AMMAN 5579, STATE 208155

YOU SHOULD DISCOURAGE.
KISSINGER

DRAFTED BY: S/S:MR.PICKERING

APPROVED BY: S/S-O:MR.PICKERING

SECRET

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Scowcroft
Howe
McFadzean

Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

CONTROL: 5747Q
RECD: 19 OCT 73 11 PM

SITUATION ROOM
20 PM 1:50

Z 192326Z OCT 73 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN FLASH 4972
BT
S E C R E T STATE 208155

NODIS/CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652 - XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR, JO
SUBJECT: MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY TO KING HUSSEIN

1. PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO KING HUSSEIN FROM THE SECRETARY.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

YOUR MAJESTY,

I WANT YOU TO KNOW VERY PRIVATELY THAT I SHALL BE LEAVING TONIGHT FOR TALKS IN MOSCOW ON THE CURRENT SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. I HAVE MADE THIS DECISION IN RESPONSE TO SOVIET URGING DURING THE COURSE OF DISCUSSIONS WITH THEM THIS AFTERNOON AND IN LIGHT OF THE PROGRESS WE HAVE MADE SO FAR. THEY AND WE AGREE IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE NOW INTENSIFY OUR DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS THROUGH DIRECT TALKS BETWEEN MYSELF AND THE SOVIET LEADERS.

MY OBJECTIVES DURING THESE TALKS WILL REMAIN AS I HAVE DESCRIBED THEM TO YOUR MAJESTY IN OUR RECENT CORRESPONDENCE. WE SEEK AN IMMEDIATE END TO THE FIGHTING ON A BASIS THAT WILL MAKE POSSIBLE EARLY PROGRESS TOWARD A FINAL, JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN YOUR AREA. IT IS NOT EXPECTED THAT AGREEMENT CAN BE ACHIEVED ON A FINAL AGREEMENT, AND I CAN ASSURE YOU AS I SAID IN MY MESSAGE TO YOU LAST NIGHT, THAT YOUR INTERESTS WILL BE FULLY PROTECTED.

SECRET

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NODIS

MY TRIP TO MOSCOW WILL BE ANNOUNCED AFTER I HAVE LEFT WASHINGTON. I AM SENDING YOU THIS MESSAGE BECAUSE I FELT, GIVEN THE CLOSE AND SPECIAL TIES BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES AND YOUR COURAGEOUS AND STATESMANLIKE EFFORTS TO PREVENT THE CURRENT HOSTILITIES FROM WIDENING, THAT YOU SHOULD BE AMONG THE FEW TO KNOW OF IT IN ADVANCE. SINCERELY, HENRY A. KISSINGER.

END TEXT. KISSINGER

DRAFTED BY: NEA:ALATHERTON,JR.

APPROVED BY: THE SECRETARY

CLEARANCES: S:MR.EAGLEBURGER
S/S:MR.PICKERING
NEA:MR.SISCO

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONTROL: 5 3 7 2Q

Scowcroft
Howe
McFarlane
Rodman

Z 190211Z OCT 73 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN FLASH 4966
BT
S E C R E T STATE 207370

NODIS/CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR, JO
SUBJECT: MESSAGE FROM KING

REF: AMMAN'S 5568

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY

1. PLEASE CONVEY FOLLOWING PERSONAL MESSAGE TO KING HUSSEIN FROM SECRETARY KISSINGER:

QTE. I AM RESPONDING TO YOUR LETTER OF 18 OCTOBER PROMPTLY ATNA MOST DELICATE AND CRUCIAL MOMENT IN OUR EFFORTS TO END HOSTILITIES AND LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR A JUST AND DURABLE SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST. AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE BEEN ENGAGED IN INTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIETS AND THE EGYPTIANS WITH A VIEW TO BRINGING ABOUT A PROMPT CEASEFIRE IN CONDITIONS CONDUCIVE TO A FUNDAMENTAL SETTLEMENT.

YOUR MAJESTY, I KNOW THE DILEMMAS YOU FACE ARE SURELY GREATER THAN THOSE OF ANY OTHER ARAB LEADER. THE PRESIDENT AND I BOTH KNOW THIS, AND WE HAVE DRAWN GREAT REASSURANCE FROM THE STRENGTH OF YOUR LEADERSHIP AND THE CLARITY OF YOUR VISION OF OUR COMMON INTERESTS. WAR CAN CLOUD MEN'S REASON AND WEAKEN THEIR GRASP. YOU HAVE PROVED EQUAL TO THE TASK. YOU HAVE OUR ADMIRATION, AND I AM CONVINCED THAT HISTORY WILL CONFIRM A CRUCIAL ROLE IN ANY FAIR SETTLEMENT TO JORDAN'S PRUDENCE AND RESTRAINT IN THESE DIFFICULT TIMES. AS DIFFICULT AS IT IS, I AM CONFIDENT THAT HIS MAJESTY WILL MAINTAIN HIS POSITION OF STATESMANSHIP.

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DIS NODIS N

2. SECOND, OUR DESIRES AND HOPES FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT ARE STRONGER TODAY THAN EVER BEFORE. IN ALL THE MANY CONSULTATIONS I HAVE HAD IN RECENT DAY'S THE INTERESTS OF THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN HAVE BEEN VERY MUCH IN THE FORE. I REALIZE, AS YOUR MESSAGE INDICATES, YOUR SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES TO THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE. WE SEEK FOR JORDAN AND FOR YOU PERMANENT AND HONORABLE EXPRESSION OF THESE RESPONSIBILITIES.

3. I KNOW YOUR MAJESTY WITH ALL OF YOUR EXPERIENCE AND WISDOM THAT YOU WILL APPRECIATE THAT I AM ENGAGED IN DELICATE AND COMPLEX DISCUSSIONS. I WANT YOU TO KNOW SPECIFICALLY WHAT I AM DOING. WE ARE TALKING TO THE SOVIETS WITH A VIEW TO AGREEING TO A SC RESOLUTION WHICH CALLS FOR A CEASEFIRE IN PLACE TO BE FOLLOWED PROMPTLY BY NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES ON A FUNDAMENTAL SETTLEMENT. IN SUCH A SETTLEMENT, YOUR MAJESTY, IT IS INCONCEIVABLE THAT THE INTERESTS OF JORDAN, WHICH YOU SO ELOQUENTLY EXPLAINED TO ME, WOULD NOT BE FULLY PROTECTED. I GIVE YOU A FORMAL ASSURANCE TO THIS EFFECT.

4. YOUR MAJESTY, WE BELIEVE THAT A NEW STRATEGIC SITUATION HAS BEEN CREATED - A SITUATION IN WHICH THE NECESSITY OF A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IS BECOMING CLEARER TO ALL PARTIES AND IN WHICH IT WILL BE LESS DIFFICULT FOR THE US TO EXERCISE EFFECTIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE INFLUENCE.

5. YOUR MAJESTY, THE US KNOWS WHO ITS FRIENDS ARE. THERE CAN AND WILL BE NO SETTLEMENT WITHOUT THE FULLEST CONSULTATION BETWEEN US. YOUR VIEWS WILL, I CAN ASSURE YOU, BE GIVEN THE FULL WEIGHT THEY DESERVE.

6. DURING THIS DIFFICULT PERIOD IN WHICH OUR INTENSIVE DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS ARE CONTINUING, I URGE YOU TO MAINTAIN THE CONFIDENCE IN WHAT WE ARE SEEKING TO ACCOMPLISH. I NEED THAT CONFIDENCE AND YOUR MAJESTY'S STEADY SUPPORT MORE THAN EVER IN THE DAYS AHEAD. WITH WARMEST REGARDS.

HAK UNQTE. KISSINGER

NEA:JJSISCO:MTB:GMD
10/18/73
THE SECRETARY

S/S - MR. PICKERING

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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

'73 OCT 16 AM

CONTROL: 3 9 8 4Q

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

Z 151815Z OCT 73 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN FLASH 4948
BT
S E C R E T STATE 203885

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, XF
SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST SITUATION

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY

1. WE HAVE BEEN INFORMED BY ISRAELI AMB. DINITZ THAT KING HUSSEIN HAS INFORMED PM MEIR THAT AFTER EXAMINING LOCATION OF VARIOUS FORCES, ISRAEL SHOULD CONSIDER THE JORDANIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE OF THE 40TH ARMORED BRIGADE AS HOSTILE AS OF YESTERDAY MORNING.

2. ISRAELIS HAVE ALSO BEEN INFORMED THAT THE KING AND HIS HEADQUARTERS HAVE BEEN UNDER PRESSURE DIRECTLY FROM ASSAD TO EITHER WITHDRAW THE BRIGADE OR HAVE IT CARRY OUT ITS MILITARY DUTIES AT WHAT WAS THEN THE 8TH DAY OF THE WAR. THE BRIGADE ON THE 8TH DAY IS WITHIN THE DANGER ZONE BUT HAD NOT YET TAKEN ANY ACTION. KING HAS INFORMED PM THAT BRIGADE WILL INEVITABLY BE IN ACTION. MOREOVER, KING HAS ALSO INFORMED PM THAT AS TO THE PROBABLE FUTURE LOCATION OF THE BRIGADE, IT HAS BEEN GIVEN SO MANY CONTRADICTORY ORDERS THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO PREDICT WHERE IT WILL BE AT ANY GIVEN MOMENT.

3. DINITZ SAYS THAT THE ISRAELI UNDERSTANDING IS THAT THE JORDANIAN BRIGADE WILL BE WORKING IN COORDINATION WITH THE IRAQI FORCES; IN EFFECT, IT IS BECOMING PART OF THE IRAQI MOVEMENT IN THE AREA.

4. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, ACCORDING TO ISRAELI AMB., "THE LEAST HARM WOULD BE DONE IF IN ADDITION TO THIS FORCE, NO ADDITIONAL FORCE WAS SENT INTO ACTION IN THIS REGION OR ANY OTHER REGION OF THE FRONT WITH JORDAN, AND THAT THE EXISTING JORDANIAN FORCE THERE WOULD RECEIVE INSTRUCTIONS NOT TO ENGAGE HEAVILY IN BATTLE. THIS IS SAID WITH THE HOPE THAT THE ENGAGEMENT SHOULD IT OCCUR WILL BE LIMITED."

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

5. ISRAELI AMBASSADOR WENT ON TO SAY THAT NATURALLY ISRAEL WILL BE FORCED TO FIGHT WHEN THEY ARE ATTACKED. AMBASSADOR THEN ASKED US WHETHER WE WOULD DO EVERYTHING WITHIN OUR POWER TO IMPRESS UPON THE JORDANIANS THE OBJECTIVES STATED ABOVE.

6. AMBASSADOR SHOULD SEE KING IMMEDIATELY AND WEIGH IN IN THE ABOVE SENSE.

7. FYI: DINITZ SAYS HE KNOWS WE CARRY UNIT AS 40TH ARMORED BRIGADE, ALTHOUGH HIS OWN PEOPLE INSIST ON CALLING IT THE 4TH BRIGADE. HE AND WE BOTH CURIOUS ABOUT THE DIFFERENCE, BUT ASSUME THAT REFERENCE IS UNMISTAKABLY TO THE SINGLE JORDAN BRIGADE THUS FAR DEPLOYED TO SYRIA. KISSINGER

NEA:JJSISCO:LAB
10/15/73 EXT. 29588
THE SECRETARY

S/S - MR. PICKERING

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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Z 150149Z OCT 73 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUESKG/AMEMBASSY AMMAN FLASH 4944
INFO RUESAD/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV FLASH 8050
BT
S E C R E T STATE 203686

CONTROL: 3 8 0 5 Q

RECD: 15 OCTOBER 73 - 12 56 AM

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
73 OCT 15 PM 4:23

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: MOPS, JO, IS
SUBJ: JORDANIAN INTERVENTION

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY

1. ISRAELI EMBASSY HAS INFORMED THE DEPARTMENT THAT ISRAELIS HAVE INFORMATION THAT THE JORDANIAN BRIGADE IS LESS THAN 10 REPEAT 10 MILES FROM ISRAELI FORCES.

2. PLEASE PASS TO GOJ FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM GOI: QUOTE. BRIGADE IS NOT TO MOVE WEST OR NORTH REPEAT WEST OR NORTH OF AN ARCH FROM SOUTH TO NORTH FORMED BY THE FOLLOWING CITIES AND COORDINATES: BEGINNING AT THE SOUTHERN END AT TELSHIHAB (241233 REPEAT 241233) AND MOVING NORTH TO NAWA (247255 REPEAT 247255) AND CONTINUING NORTH TO JASSEM (249266 REPEAT 249266) THEN NORTHEAST TO ENKHEL (256270 REPEAT 256270) AND CONTINUING NORTHEAST TO SANAMIEN (260275 REPEAT 260275) AND FINALLY SHARPLY TO THE EAST TO KRIM-JANUBI (274275 REPEAT 274275). UNQUOTE.
KISSINGER
BT

TEXT RECEIVED FROM GENERAL SCOWCROFT
10/14/73 EXT:21512:PD
S/S-O:PPSARROS

THE SECRETARY

NOTE: HANDLED AS NODIS PER MR. LITTREL S/S-O.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
73 OCT 15 AM 8:39

Z 150149Z OCT 73 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUESKG/AMEMBASSY AMMAN FLASH 4944
INFO RUESAD/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV FLASH 8050
BT
S E C R E T STATE 203686

CONTROL: 3 8 5 Q
RECD: 15 OCTOBER 73 - 12 56 AM

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: MOPS, JO, IS
SUBJ: JORDANIAN INTERVENTION

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY

1. ISRAELI EMBASSY HAS INFORMED THE DEPARTMENT THAT ISRAELIS HAVE INFORMATION THAT THE JORDANIAN BRIGADE IS LESS THAN 10 REPEAT 10 MILES FROM ISRAELI FORCES.

2. PLEASE PASS TO GOJ FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM GOI: QUOTE. BRIGADE IS NOT TO MOVE WEST OR NORTH REPEAT WEST OR NORTH OF AN ARCH FROM SOUTH TO NORTH FORMED BY THE FOLLOWING CITIES AND COORDINATES: BEGINNING AT THE SOUTHERN END AT TELSHIHAB (241233 REPEAT 241233) AND MOVING NORTH TO NAWA (247255 REPEAT 247255) AND CONTINUING NORTH TO JASSEM (249266 REPEAT 249266) THEN NORTHEAST TO ENKHEL (256270 REPEAT 256270) AND CONTINUING NORTHEAST TO SANAMIEN (260275 REPEAT 260275) AND FINALLY SHARPLY TO THE EAST TO KRIM-JANUBI (274275 REPEAT 274275). UNQUOTE.
KISSINGER
BT

NOTE: HANDLED AS NODIS PER MR. LITTREL S/S-O.

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N. H. 6
E.O. Scowcroft

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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'73 OCT 14 AM 10:51

3 6 3 5 Q

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

Z 131726Z OCT 73 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN FLASH 4935
BT
S E C R E T STATE 203591

NODIS

FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR, JO
SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO KING HUSSEIN FROM THE SECRETARY

1. YOU SHOULD IMMEDIATELY INFORM THE KING WE HAVE JUST RECEIVED ASSURANCES FROM ISRAELIS THAT, IF HE DOES NOT REPEAT NOT MOVE JORDANIAN MILITARY FORCES INTO SYRIA, ISRAEL WILL TAKE NO REPEAT NO MILITARY ACTION AGAINST JORDAN. KISSINGER

DRAFTED BY:
NEA:ALATHERTON,JR.:HLK

APPROVED BY:
THE SECRETARY

CLEARANCES:
NEA - MR. SISCO
S/S - MR. PICKERING
S - MR. EAGLEBURGER

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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CONTROL: 3317Q
RECD: 12 OCT '73 2:08P

Z 121802Z OCT 73 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN FLASH 4924
BT
S E C R E T STATE 202678

NODIS

'73 OCT 12 PM 5.33
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR, US
SUBJ: KING'S LATEST LETTER TO SECRETARY

REF: AMMAN 5453

1. YOU SHOULD PASS FOLLOWING ORAL MESSAGE TO KING FROM SECRETARY:

QUOTE: YOUR MAJESTY:

I HAVE YOUR MESSAGE WHICH AMBASSADOR BROWN HAS JUST TRANSMITTED. I WANT TO ASSURE YOU THAT WE ARE CONTINUING TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO BRING ABOUT AN EARLY CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES IN A WAY WHICH WILL CONTRIBUTE TO A JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN YOUR AREA. IN THE MEANTIME, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT YOU CONTINUE YOUR EFFORTS TO CIRCUMSCRIBE THE AREA AND SCALE OF THE CONFLICT. WE ALL FACE A VERY DIFFICULT SITUATION, BUT I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT WITH STEADY NERVES, WISDOM, AND COURAGE WE CAN YET BRING SOME GOOD OUT OF THE DISASTER WHICH HAS AGAIN STRUCK THE MIDDLE EAST. I HAVE BEEN URGING RESTRAINT ON THE ISRAELIS, AND IT IS THEREFORE EQUALLY IMPORTANT FOR YOUR FORCES TO ACT WITH CIRCUMSPECTION.

SINCERELY, HENRY A. KISSINGER

UNQUOTE. KISSINGER
BT
#2678

DRAFTED BY: NEA: DAKORN: ALATHERTON APPROVED BY: THE SECRETARY
CLEARANCES: NEA: JJSISCO S/S- GAMMON

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Z 102205Z OCT 73 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN FLASH 4901
BT
S E C R E T STATE 201118

CONTROL: 2 7 1 1 Q

RECD: 11 OCTOBER 73 - 12 01 AM

73 OCT 11 AM 9 12

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

EXDIS

E.O. 11652 - XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR, JO
SUBJECT: JORDANIAN INTERVENTION

REF: AMMAN 5414

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY

1. PLEASE CONVEY IMMEDIATELY THE FOLLOWING PERSONAL MESSAGE TO KING HUSSEIN FROM ME.

2. BEGIN TEXT: I HAVE JUST LEARNED FROM AMBASSADOR BROWN'S LATEST MESSAGE THAT YOU HAVE BEEN ASKED BY PRESIDENT SADAT TO INTERVENE MILITARILY. I URGE YOU TO DELAY SUCH A DECISION AS LONG AS POSSIBLE, AND AT LEAST FOR ANOTHER 36-48 HOURS. I AM MAKING A MAJOR EFFORT THROUGH QUIET DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS TO BRING ABOUT AN END TO THE FIGHTING. I DO NOT SAY THIS LIGHTLY -- I NEED TIME AND YOUR HELP. IT IS IMPERATIVE YOU KEEP THIS IN STRICT CONFIDENCE. END TEXT. KISSINGER
BT

DRAFTED BY: NEA:JJSISCO:HLK
APPROVED BY: THE SECRETARY
S-MR. EAGLEBURGER
S/S-MR. PICKERING
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION
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Department of State

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8.

Z 101644Z OCT 73 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN FLASH 4898
BT
S E C R E T STATE 200671

24890
OCT. 10, 1973
12:50 PM

NODIS

E.O. 11652 - XGDS
TAGS: PFOR, JO
SUBJECT: JORDANIAN INTERVENTION

REF: AMMAN 5398

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY

APPRECIATE WHAT YOU ARE DOING TO GET KING TO HOLD OFF SENDING JORDANIAN TROOPS TO SYRIA. YOU SHOULD, OF COURSE, CONTINUE TO MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO CALM HIM DOWN. WE ARE LOOKING URGENTLY AT WHAT IMMEDIATE STEPS WE MIGHT TAKE TO RELIEVE PRESSURES KING FEELS. KISSINGER

DRAFTED BY:NEA:ALATHERTON, JR.
APPROVED BY: THE SECRETARY
CLEARANCE: NEA:MR. SISCO
S:MR. EAGLEBURGER
S/S:MR. PICKERING

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUESKG/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 3826
INFO RUESRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 1978
RUESKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 7641
RUESHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 6255
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 3154
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0804
BT
S E C R E T STATE 089659

CONTROL: 2 8 3 4Q

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
MAY 11 AM 9:56

NODIS

E.O.: 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PFOR, JO, XF, US
SUBJ: RATIONALIZING JORDAN'S ROLE IN ARABIAN PENINSULA
REF : AMMAN 2140

1. APPRECIATE RECEIVING AMMAN'S THOUGHTFUL TELEGRAM WEIGHING PROS AND CONS OF INCREASED JORDANIAN ROLE IN GULF. IN FACT WE THINK JORDAN ROLE IS DEVELOPING SATISFACTORILY WITHOUT US PRODDING. WE BELIEVE KING HUSSEIN WOULD FIND IT TO HIS AND GOJ'S DISADVANTAGE IF HIS ACTIVITIES WERE SUBJECT TO BACKGROUND US SUPERVISION AND CONTROL AS THIS WOULD IDENTIFY JORDANIANS AS US TOOLS RATHER THAN AS ARABS CAPABLE PLAYING USEFUL NATURAL ROLE IN REGIONAL AFFAIRS.

2. IN OUR TALKS WITH IRANIANS, WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD INDICATE THAT WE FEEL THAT JORDAN HAS A USEFUL ROLE TO PLAY IN PROVIDING PERSONNEL WITH BADLY NEEDED SKILLS TO COUNTRIES IN LOWER GULF TO HELP THEM IMPROVE THEIR INTERNAL SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT AND THAT WE ASSUME SHAH SHARES THIS VIEW. WE MAY ASK HOW JORDANIAN AND IRANIAN ACTIVITIES ARE FITTING TOGETHER AND HOW IRANIAN SUPPORT MIGHT MAKE JORDANIAN ROLE MORE EFFECTIVE. WE WILL SAY ESSENTIALLY SAME THING TO KHAMMASH NOTING OUR PLEASURE THAT JORDAN TAKING INITIATIVE IN PROVIDING BADLY NEEDED SKILLS. AT SAME TIME, WE PLAN TELL KHAMMASH THAT:

A) WE BELIEVE JORDAN'S ROLE IN LOWER GULF SHOULD

CONTINUE TO BE BASED ON ARRANGEMENTS IT CAN WORK OUT DIRECTLY WITH COUNTRIES IN AREA USING SKILLS JORDAN HAS AVAILABLE AND WITHIN ITS CAPABILITY TO ASSIGN SKILLED PERSONNEL. JORDANIAN PRESENCE IS COMPLEMENTARY TO OUR

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EFFORTS TO GET ARABIAN PENINSULAR COUNTRIES TO WORK MORE CLOSELY TOGETHER AND TO DEVELOP THEIR OWN INDIGENOUS RPT INDIGENOUS SECURITY AND MILITARY FORCES. WE DO NOT BELIEVE GOAL SHOULD BE TO SUBSTITUTE JORDANIANS FOR BRITISH IN GULF SECURITY OR DEFENSE FORCES OR TO "JORDANIZE" THESE FORCES. IN OTHER WORDS, JORDAN'S BEST CONTRIBUTION IS IN PROVIDING SMALL NUMBER OF SKILLED TECHNICIANS WHO CAN TRAIN NATIVE CADRES IN THE LOWER GULF, BE THEY TEACHERS, POLICE OFFICERS OR MILITARY PERSONNEL. LIKE-WISE TRAINING OF GULF STATE CADRES IN JORDAN IS IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION.

B) US ABILITY TO HELP JORDAN IS STRAINED TO THE UTMOST AND FINANCING FOR JORDANIAN ACTIVITIES IN GULF BEYOND JORDAN'S OWN RESOURCES SHOULD COME FROM WEALTHY COUNTRIES IN AREA (SAUDI ARABIA, ABU DHABI, KUWAIT) OR FROM RECIPIENT COUNTRIES. WE WILL WELCOME CONTINUED GOJ CONSULTATIONS ON GULF SECURITY CONCERNS AND WILL ENCOURAGE RECEPTIVITY TO JORDANIAN ROLE WITHOUT, HOWEVER, SEEKING TO COORDINATE JORDANIAN ACTIVITIES WITH OTHER PENINSULAR COUNTRIES.

C) REGARDING TRANSFERS OF US MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO COUNTRIES IN GULF, WE BELIEVE THIS CAN BEST BE HANDLED ON CASE-BY-CASE BASIS IN CLOSE CONSULTATION BETWEEN US. AS GOJ KNOWS, US IS NOT IN A POSITION TO REPLACE THROUGH GRANT AID MATERIEL JORDAN MAY TRANSFER TO OTHER COUNTRIES. AS PRACTICAL MATTER, WE WOULD EXPECT THAT SAUDI ARABIA AND TO A LESSER EXTENT IRAN WOULD BE PRIMARY SOURCE OF EQUIPMENT THAT IS TRANSFERRED.

3. WE HAVE NOT COORDINATED SPECIFIC JORDANIAN INITIATIVES IN GULF. WERE WE TO PRESS FOR INCREASED GOJ ACTIVITIES IN GULF, WE WOULD NEED EXERCISE GREATER COORDINATION BETWEEN US. WE DO NOT WANT TO ENCOURAGE JORDANIANS TO EXPECT THAT US WILL HELP MEET COSTS OF ADDITIONAL GULF RESPONSIBILITIES GOJ MAY TAKE ON.

4. WE RECOGNIZE THAT SAUDI ATTITUDES AND PERFORMANCE STILL LEAVE SOMETHING TO BE DESIRED. HOWEVER, WE DO NOT SEE JORDANIAN INVOLVEMENT AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR GENEROUS SAUDI POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND MILITARY SUPPORT FOR ITS NEIGHBORS. WE REMAIN CONCERNED, MOREOVER, THAT JORDANIANS ATTEMPT TO CARVE OUT AN INDEPENDENT ROLE IN PENINSULA

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WITHOUT COORDINATING THESE ACTIVITIES WITH SAG (OR AT LEAST KEEPING SAUDIS CAREFULLY INFORMED) COULD RISK GENERATING SAUDI SUSPICIONS OF AMMAN AND HAVE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE EFFECT. SAUDIS MAY OFTEN BE DIFFICULT BUT THEIR AT LEAST TACIT COOPERATION AND CONSENT IS ESSENTIAL IF JORDANIAN INVOLVEMENT IS TO BE A POSITIVE AND NOT A DIVISIVE CONTRIBUTION TO PENINSULAR STABILITY.
ROGERS

NEA/ARP:FMDICKMAN
4/30/73 X22647
THE DEPUTY SECRETARY

NEA/ARN - MR. KORN
PM - MR. CHAPMAN
S/S - MR. BARNES
NEA - MR. SISCO
NEA/IRN - MR. MIKLOS
NEA - MR. ATHERTON
WHITE HOUSE - MR. SAUNDERS

NODIS NODIS

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NODIS NODIS NODIS

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W 18

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

'73 MAR 2 AM 10:19

4 7 5 Q
Mar 2, 1973
7:42 a.m.

O 021206Z MAR 73 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN NIACT IMMEDIATE 3248
BT
S E C R E T STATE 038557

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINS, SU
SUBJECT: TERRORIST ATTACK AT SAUDI ARABIAN EMBASSY
INVOLVING U.S. AMBASSADOR

WE NOTE THAT ROBUST STATEMENTS ISSUED BY GOJ ON THIS SUBJECT HAVE BEEN BY CP AND FON MIN. TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE, HAS KING MADE ANY PERSONAL INPUT? RUSH
BT

AF/N:HODELL:CHG
3/2/73
S/CCT: AMB MEYER

S/S - VIETS

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NODIS NODIS NODIS

(7)

W 18

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

CONTROL: 2 0 5 0Q
RECD: 9 JAN'73, 5:14PM

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 2904
BT
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NODIS

FOR AMBASSADOR BROWN FROM SISCO

SUBJECT: KING HUSSEIN'S VISIT

REF: AMMAN 0119

1. PLANNING FOR HUSSEIN VISIT STILL CONTINUING AND INFORMATION CONVEYED TO YOU ONLY PRELIMINARY. FOR EXAMPLE, AMONG OTHER THINGS, WE ARE REVIEWING WHAT ACTIVITIES MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE TO UNDERTAKE FOR THE QUEEN. WE ARE SURE THAT AN ENTIRELY SATISFACTORY SCHEDULE CAN BE WORKED OUT.

2. IN THE MEANTIME, IN WHATEVER MANNER YOU DEEM APPROPRIATE, YOU SHOULD CONVEY TO ZAID RIFAI ON MY BEHALF THAT HE SHOULD KEEP HIS SHIRT ON, AND THAT WE ARE AS ANXIOUS TO MAKE THE KING'S VISIT HERE A SUCCESS AS HE IS. I LEAVE IT TO YOU HOW TO GET HIM OFF HIS HIGH DUDGEON APPROACH, WHICH IS NOT GOING TO INTIMIDATE ANYONE, AND PUT HIM IN A STATE OF MIND TO WORK OUT CALMLY A MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY PROGRAM.

GDS. ROGERS
BT
#4511

DRAFTED BY: NEA:JJSisco

APPROVED BY: NEA-JJSisco
S/S-Mr.Barnes

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

CODEWORD